Smith v. Beasley et al
Filing
104
ORDER denying 84 Motion to strike; denying 85 Motion to strike; denying 86 Motion to strike. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joel B. Toomey on 9/8/2011. (ADM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
OMEGA SMITH, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of L.T.,
a deceased minor,
Plaintiff,
v.
CASE NO. 3:10-cv-317-J-32JBT
VICKI BEASLEY et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant
Partnership for Strong Families, Inc.’s (“PFSF”) Affirmative Defenses (Doc. 84);
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant Community Partnership for Children, Inc.’s
(“CPC”) Affirmative Defenses (Doc. 85); and Plaintiff’s Consolidated Motion to Strike
Defendants Vicki Beasley (“Beasley”), Latoya Anderson (“Anderson”), Andrea
Senteio (“Senteio”), and Marianna Cotter’s (“Cotter”) (the “individual Defendants”)
Affirmative Defenses (Doc. 86) (collectively, “Motions”). Defendants have filed
responses in opposition to the Motions. (See Docs. 94, 92, 93, respectively.) For
the reasons stated herein, the Motions are due to be DENIED.
In short, based on the applicable standard of review, the Court declines to
employ the drastic remedy of striking Defendants’ affirmative defenses that are the
subject of the Motions because Plaintiff has not shown that these defenses have no
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possible relation to the controversy, may confuse the issues, or may otherwise
prejudice Plaintiff.
Moreover, the Court finds none of the subject defenses
insufficient as a matter of law. At the very least, these defenses present disputed
and substantial questions of law and/or fact that cannot be decided on a motion to
strike. Further, the subject affirmative defenses give Plaintiff a fair notice “of what
Defendants will argue, which is all the Eleventh Circuit requires.” Jackson v. City of
Centreville, 269 F.R.D. 661, 662-63 (N.D. Ala. 2010). Last but not least, instead of
targeting specific defenses on valid grounds, Plaintiff here appears to launch a broad
attack on almost every affirmative defense alleged by Defendants. Therefore, it is
unreasonable to assume that the Court would pierce through all affirmative defenses
that are the subject of the Motions and make findings on substantial questions of law
at this stage of the proceedings.
I.
Background
Plaintiff Omega Smith, as Personal Representative of the Estate of L.T., a
deceased minor,1 brought this action against PFSF, CPC, and the individuals
Defendants, arising out of the death of L.T. on or about April 18, 2008, as a result
of an automobile accident. (Doc. 60, ¶¶ 1, 52.)
The Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges, inter alia, that at the time
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At the time of her death, the minor was seventeen years old. (Doc. 60, ¶¶ 1, 232.)
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of the accident, the child had run away from the custody of PFSF and/or CPCI.2
(See, e.g., id. at ¶ 52.) The SAC also alleges that Defendants had not only allowed
L.T. to run away, but encouraged and assisted her in doing so, and had failed to
provide her with proper supportive services prior to the time she ran away on April
4, 2008. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 37, 49, 51, 73-77, 83, 104, 125, 128, 149, 152, 173, 176, 197,
200, 221, 224.)
The SAC raises claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants
Beasley (Count I), Anderson (Count II), Senteio (Count III), Cotter (Count IV), PFSF
(Count V), and CPC (Count VI); wrongful death claims against PFSF (Count VII) and
CPC (Count VIII); and a negligence claim against all Defendants for damages
unrelated to the child’s death (Count IX). (Doc. 60.)
II.
Standard
“The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
However, “motions [to strike] under Rule 12(f) are viewed with disfavor and are
infrequently granted” even when they are “technically appropriate and well-founded”
because striking is “a drastic remedy.” Harvey v. Lake Buena Vista Resort, LLC,
568 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2008). See also Augustus v. Board of Pub.
The Florida Department of Children and Families (the “Department”) allegedly
contracted with either PFSF and/or CPC to provide placement and services for the child.
(Doc. 60, ¶ 2.) The SAC alleges that PFSF and CPC were non-profit, Florida corporations,
and that Beasley, Anderson, Senteio, and Cotter were employed by PFSF and/or CPC.
(Id. at ¶¶ 2, 8, 14, 21, 28.)
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Instruction of Escambia County, 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962). “[W]hen
evaluating a motion to strike defenses, a court must take as true those facts
supporting the questioned defenses and stated in the answer.” Nankivil v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 216 F.R.D. 689, 691 (M.D. Fla. 2003), aff’d, 87 Fed. App’x 713 (11th
Cir. 2003).
To prevail on a motion to strike, the movant must show that “the allegations
being challenged are so unrelated to plaintiff’s claims as to be unworthy of any
consideration as a defense and that their presence in the pleading throughout the
proceeding will be prejudicial to the moving party.” Harvey, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1359.
See also Augustus, 306 F.2d at 868 (“The motion to strike should be granted only
when the pleading to be stricken has no possible relation to the controversy.”);
Nankivil, 216 F.R.D. at 691 (“A ‘court will not exercise its discretion under the rule
to strike a pleading unless the matter sought to be omitted has no possible
relationship to the controversy, may confuse the issues, or otherwise prejudice a
party.’”).
“A disputed question of fact cannot be decided on [a] motion to strike.”
Augustus, 306 F.2d at 868. Further, “when there is no showing of prejudicial harm
to the moving party, the courts generally are not willing to determine disputed and
substantial questions of law upon a motion to strike.” Id. “[T]hese questions quite
properly are viewed as determinable only after discovery and a hearing on the merits
. . . .” Harvey, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1360.
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However, the court may strike a defense that is insufficient as a matter of law.
Anchor Hocking Corp. v. JEA, 419 F. Supp. 992, 1000 (M.D. Fla. 1976). “A defense
is insufficient as a matter of law if, on the face of the pleadings, it is patently
frivolous, or if it is clearly invalid as a matter of law.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Also, “[a]n affirmative defense will be held insufficient as a matter of law only if it
appears that the Defendant cannot succeed under any set of facts which it could
prove.” Rosada v. John Wieland Homes and Neighborhoods, Inc., 2010 WL
1249841, *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2010).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is not required “to
support its affirmative defenses with elaborate factual detail.” Harvey, 568 F. Supp.
2d at 1360. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1) & (c)(1) (“In responding to a pleading,
a party must . . . state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted
against it” and “must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense . . . .”).
“An affirmative defense may be pleaded in general terms and will be held to be
sufficient, and therefore invulnerable to a motion to strike, as long as it gives plaintiff
fair notice of the nature of the defense.” Harvey, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1360. See also
Myers v. Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc., 592 F.3d 1201, 1225 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that the
answer gave plaintiff “ample notice that defendants believed that that she had failed
to timely file a complaint with the EEOC”); Hansen v. ABC Liquors, Inc., 2009 WL
3790447, *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2009) (“Although Rule 8 does not obligate a
defendant to set forth detailed factual allegations, a defendant must give the plaintiff
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‘fair notice’ of the nature of the defense and the grounds upon which it rests.”).
III.
Analysis
As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues that PFSF’s First through Twelfth and
CPC’s First through Fourteenth Affirmative Defenses, invoking state law statutory
immunities, if applicable, can only be valid defenses to the negligence counts and
not the § 1983 count. (Docs. 84 at 3-5; 85 at 3-4.) Defendant CPC responds that
“Plaintiff is essentially seeking an advisory opinion from this Court to undertake the
task of deciding to which claim each defense applies,” which “is not the purpose of
a motion to strike under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f).” (Doc. 92 at 2.) The Court agrees with
Defendant.
Even where “the defenses do not specify to which counts they may pertain,”
the Court will not strike them unless they have “no possible relationship to the
controversy, may confuse the issues, or otherwise prejudice a party.” Rosada, 2010
WL 1249841, at *2 (citing Nankivil, 216 F.R.D. at 691). Here, there is no claim that
the subject affirmative defenses have no relation to the controversy, would confuse
the issues, or would prejudice Plaintiff. “If a defense may be relevant, then there are
other contexts in which the sufficiency of the defense can be more thoroughly tested
with the benefit of a fuller record—such as on a motion for summary judgment.”
Rosada, 2010 WL 1249841, at *2. See also Harvey, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1360
(stating that the legal sufficiency of the affirmative defenses is “best determined on
the merits in the context of the Summary Judgment Motion”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s
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Motions as to PFSF’s First through Twelfth and CPC’s First through Fourteenth
Affirmative Defenses are due to be denied on this basis.
Furthermore, the Motions are also due to be denied as to each and every
affirmative defense under attack because none of them is patently frivolous or clearly
invalid as a matter of law. They each at least raise substantial questions of law
better decided after factual development. Further, Plaintiff has not argued prejudice.
The Motions are broad-based attacks on the majority of the affirmative defenses
alleged. No particular defense is alleged to be prejudicial. No argument is made
that the presence of any particular affirmative defense in the Answers will result in
the expenditure of “unnecessary time and money in litigating invalid, spurious
issues.” Anchor Hocking, 419 F. Supp. at 1000. Moreover, each defense provides
fair notice of the nature of that defense. Thus, the Court sees no valid reason to
strike any of the defenses. Further, to the extent Plaintiff argues that some of the
subject defenses (see Docs. 84 at 8; 85 at 8; 86 at 3) are incorrectly labeled as
“affirmative” defenses, the Court will not strike these defenses, but rather will treat
them as specific denials. See, e.g., Rosada, 2010 WL 1249841, at *2.
Although in light of the applicable standard the Court need not specifically
discuss each affirmative defense at issue, the Court will nevertheless address a few
of the subject defenses. The first of these defenses is Plaintiff’s negligence alleged
as PFSF’s First Affirmative Defense. Plaintiff asserts that this defense should be
stricken pursuant to Gilson v. Foltz, 431 So.2d 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), and
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because it attempts to impute Plaintiff’s negligence to the child. (Doc. 84 at 5.)
Defendant responds that its affirmative defense does not allege that it imputes any
negligence or that it holds Plaintiff liable in her capacity as Personal Representative.
(Doc. 94 at 6.)
The Court agrees with Defendant. First, there is nothing to indicate that
Defendant attempts to impute Plaintiff’s negligence to the child. Further, the case
on which Plaintiff relies held that even though the personal representative’s alleged
negligence could not be charged against him in his representative capacity because
it occurred prior to the decedent’s death, it may be charged against him individually.
Gilson, 431 So.2d at 647. Here, PFSF’s First Affirmative Defense does not allege
that Plaintiff was negligent in her representative capacity. Therefore, the Court does
not find the defense to be legally insufficient.
In addition, Plaintiff seeks to strike PFSF’s Fourth, CPC’s Fourteenth, and the
individual Defendants’ Thirteenth Affirmative Defenses, arguing that they are not
affirmative defenses and that “the rules of procedure already provide a remedy to
amend a pleading.” (Docs. 84 at 7; 85 at 24-25.) The subject Affirmative Defenses
provide:
The Plaintiff has named one or more Co-Defendants in this action and
has alleged that their actions or inactions were negligent and were the
proximate cause of the damages alleged in the Complaint. Although
this Defendant is not making such a contention at this time, this
Defendant reserves the right to adopt and incorporate these allegations
as an Affirmative Defense should the Plaintiff settle with the CoDefendants or otherwise dismiss them prior to trial.
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(Docs. 64 at 27; 75 at 37-38; 76 at 33; 77 at 31; 78 at 30; 79 at 31.)
The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments and notes that Defendants
are giving notice that they may rely on Plaintiff’s own allegations against coDefendants. This would appear to be a better alternative than not providing such
notice. Without ruling on whether Defendants have such a right, at this point the
Court will allow the subject affirmative defenses to stand as they provide notice to
Plaintiff of what Defendants may argue and Plaintiff does not claim that these
defenses have no relation to the controversy, would confuse the issues, or would
prejudice Plaintiff.
Therefore, the Motions are due to be denied as to all affirmative defenses at
issue.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
The Motions (Docs. 84, 85, 86) are DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, on September 8, 2011.
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
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