Lyncker v. Corey
Filing
38
ORDER denying 30 Motion for summary judgment; directing parties to advise Court of selection of mediator by 11/1/2012; parties to mediate by 1/15/2013; case to be set on April, 2013 trial term by separate Order. Signed by Judge Timothy J. Corrigan on 10/10/2012.(SRW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
JULIE LYNCKER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 3:11-cv-414-J-32MCR
ANGELA COREY, in her official capacity as
STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
Defendant.
ORDER
Plaintiff, Julie Lyncker, filed suit against defendant, Angela Corey, in her official
capacity as State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, for alleged
violations of Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act in retaliating against Lyncker for making
a complaint against her supervisor for sexually discriminatory conduct. Lyncker also alleges
a retaliation claim under the Family Medical Leave Act. This case is before the Court on
Corey’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 30.) The Court has received briefing (Docs.
30, 31), has reviewed the record, and heard extensive oral argument on October 5, 2012,
the record of which is incorporated by reference.
A grant of summary judgment is only proper “when the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” Webb-Edwards v. Orange Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 525 F.3d
1013, 1026 (11th Cir. 2008); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). It must be determined “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is
so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The Court “view[s] all facts and reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Shuford v. Fidelity Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 508 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2007).
Corey concedes Lyncker has made a prima facie case under all three claims of
retaliation – Title VII, FCRA,1 and FMLA. (Doc. 30 at 19, 25.) Additionally, Lyncker
concedes that Corey set forth a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for Lyncker’s termination.
Thus, using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework,2 the motion turns on whether
the reason for termination was mere pretext. While making no prediction as to whether
Lyncker will ultimately prevail, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Lyncker,
1
Retaliation claims under FCRA are analyzed using the same framework as retaliation
claims brought under Title VII. See Wilbur v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 393 F.3d 1192, 1195 n.1
(11th Cir. 2004) (“Florida courts have construed the [FCRA] in accordance with decisions
of federal courts interpreting Title VII.”); Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385,
1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The Florida courts have held that decisions construing Title VII are
applicable when considering claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act, because the Florida
act was patterned after Title VII.”). Therefore, Lyncker’s Title VII and FCRA retaliation
claims are examined jointly.
2
Retaliation claims using circumstantial evidence are analyzed under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Giles v. Masterbrand Cabinets, No. 3:06-cv-528WKW, 2007 WL 2274412, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 3, 2007) (“An employee’s FMLA retaliation
claim, when challenged by a motion for summary judgment, is examined under the
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis if the employee does not have direct evidence
of retaliation.”); Swanson v. Civil Air Patrol, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to a Title VII retaliation claim).
Lyncker argues that the October 30, 2009 Termination Letter is direct evidence of retaliation.
The Court need not determine whether the Termination Letter is indeed direct evidence or
only circumstantial evidence because the outcome of the Motion for Summary Judgment is
not affected.
2
there is a genuine issue of material fact on the pretext issue.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.
Corey’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 30) is DENIED.
2.
As discussed at the hearing, the Court directs the parties to participate in
mediation and to jointly file the name of the mediator selected by November 1, 2012. The
Court orders mediation to occur no later than January 15, 2013.
3.
The Court will separately issue an order setting pretrial and trial deadlines.
Trial will be set for the April 2013 docket.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida this 10th day of October, 2012.
ktm
Copies:
counsel of record
3
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