Lewis v. Bowden et al
Filing
327
ORDER denying 294 Defendant McFarland's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 12/8/2017. (BL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
JONATHAN KYLE LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:11-cv-818-J-34MCR
CHRISTOPHER MCFARLAND,
Defendant.
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Jonathan Kyle Lewis, a former inmate of the Florida
penal system, initiated this action on August 15, 2011, by filing
a Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He
filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 26) on September 26, 2011; a
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 35) on December 15, 2011; a Third
Amended Complaint (Doc. 41) on February 17, 2012; a Fourth Amended
Complaint (Doc. 47) on May 16, 2012; a Fifth Amended Complaint
(Doc. 54) on July 12, 2012; a Sixth Amended Complaint (Doc. 197) on
October 11, 2013; and a Seventh Amended Complaint (Doc. 244) on
September 29, 2014. The Court appointed counsel for Lewis on
February 25, 2016. See Order Appointing Counsel for Plaintiff (Doc.
260). With the benefit of counsel, Lewis filed an Eighth Amended
Complaint (Complaint; Doc. 273) on July 29, 2016. In the Complaint,
Lewis names Christopher McFarland, a corrections officer employed
at Union Correctional Institution (UCI), as the sole Defendant.
Lewis asserts that McFarland violated his federal constitutional
rights when he assaulted Lewis on February 24, 2011. As relief,
Lewis requests compensatory and punitive damages.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant McFarland's
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion; Doc. 294). In the
Motion, Defendant McFarland asserts that Lewis is barred from
recovering compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(e), and therefore the Court should grant summary judgment
in his favor as to Lewis's request for emotional, compensatory, and
punitive damages. In support of the Motion, McFarland filed his
February 24, 2011 Incident Report (Def. Ex. A), excerpts of
Antuquoin Byrd's deposition (Def. Ex. B), and a Declaration of
Albert Carl Maier, M.D. (Def. Ex. C) with Lewis's medical records
from February 2011 through August 2011.
Lewis responded to the Motion on May 30, 2017. See Plaintiff's
Response in Opposition to Defendant's Partial Motion for Summary
Judgment (Response; Doc. 305). In the Response, he asserts that §
1997e(e) does not bar his recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages, especially given that he asserts he was sexually battered,
and therefore, Defendant's Motion should be denied. In support of
the Response, Lewis filed Anthony Batie's deposition (Batie Dep.;
P. Ex. A), Byrd's deposition (Byrd Dep.; P. Ex. B), and his own
deposition (Lewis Dep.; P. Ex. C). Defendant's Motion is ripe for
judicial review.
2
II. Plaintiff's Allegations
Lewis asserts that Defendant McFarland violated his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights when he "engaged in a deliberate and
outrageous invasion of Lewis's bodily integrity that shocks the
conscience." Complaint at 4, ¶18 (count one). He states that
McFarland's "intentional physical contact with Lewis was malicious
and designed to injure Lewis." Id. at 5, ¶24 (count two). He also
asserts that McFarland "engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct
that was intended to, and did, result in severe emotional distress
suffered by Lewis." Id. at 5, ¶27 (count three). According to
Lewis, while incarcerated at UCI, he often complained about how
corrections officers mistreated him, and on several occasions, he
filed grievances against those officers, see id. at 2, ¶6, and on
at
least
one
occasion,
McFarland
"took
issue
with
Lewis's
complaints" and described him as a "writ writer," id. at ¶7.
On February 24, 2011, McFarland escorted Lewis, who was in
full restraints, back from the Test of Adult Basic Education (TABE)
testing area to S dormitory. Id. at 2-3, ¶8. During the escort,
McFarland sexually harassed Lewis when he "repeatedly hiked Lewis's
pants well above his waist line to an uncomfortable level" and
stated "you have a fat a-–." Id. at 3, ¶9. Although Lewis asked
McFarland to leave him alone, see id. at ¶10, McFarland called
Lewis a "snitch" and told him to "shut up," id. at ¶11. According
to Lewis, McFarland escalated the confrontation when he groped
3
Lewis's posterior and threatened to "beat the sh-–" out of Lewis,
"f--- [him] up," and "stick a finger in [his] a-–." Id. During the
incident, McFarland pulled Lewis to the ground, slammed his head on
the concrete multiple times, and smeared Lewis's head against the
concrete. See id. at ¶12. McFarland also called another corrections
officer to "hold [the] n-----'s legs" down to make it appear as if
Lewis
was
resisting
McFarland.
Id.
at
¶13.
While
another
corrections officer "pinned" down Lewis's legs, McFarland started
strangling Lewis and then stopped when Lewis "was on the brink of
unconsciousness." Id. at ¶14. Lewis alleges that as he attempted to
recover while still on the ground, he "felt a finger penetrate his
anus." Id. McFarland then took Lewis to the infirmary, where Dr.
Nazareno evaluated him and documented injuries to Lewis's face,
neck, legs and arm. Id. at ¶15. Lewis suffered bruised ribs, chest
and neck pains, and severe headaches for nearly one month. Id. at
3-4, ¶16. He also suffered emotional distress and anxiety and
remained fearful of further assaults throughout the remainder of
his UCI stay. See id. at 4, ¶16.
III.
Summary Judgment Standard
The Eleventh Circuit set forth the summary judgment standard.
Summary judgment is proper when "there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The substantive
law controls which facts are material and
which are irrelevant. Raney v. Vinson Guard
Service, Inc., 120 F.3d 1192, 1196 (11th Cir.
1997). Typically, the nonmoving party may not
4
rest upon only the allegations of his
pleadings, but must set forth specific facts
showing there is a genuine issue for trial.
Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th
Cir. 1990). A pro se plaintiff's complaint,
however, if verified under 28 U.S.C. § 1746,
is equivalent to an affidavit, and thus may be
viewed as evidence. See Murrell v. Bennett,
615 F.2d 306, 310 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980).
Nevertheless, "[a]n affidavit or declaration
used to support or oppose a motion must be
made on personal knowledge." Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)(4). "[A]ffidavits based, in part, upon
information and belief, rather than personal
knowledge, are insufficient to withstand a
motion for summary judgment." Ellis v.
England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005).
As we've emphasized, "[w]hen the moving
party has carried its burden under Rule 56[],
its opponent must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts ... Where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party, there
is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d
538 (1986). "[T]he mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties
will
not
defeat
an
otherwise
properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue
of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Unsupported, conclusory
allegations that a plaintiff suffered a
constitutionally
cognizant
injury
are
insufficient to withstand a motion for summary
judgment. See Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d
1530, 1532–34 (11th Cir. 1990) (discounting
inmate's claim as a conclusory allegation of
serious injury that was unsupported by any
physical evidence, medical records, or the
corroborating
testimony
of
witnesses).
Moreover, "[w]hen opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no
5
reasonable jury could believe it, a court
should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary
judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380,
127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
Howard v. Memnon, 572 F. App'x 692, 694-95 (11th Cir. 2014) (per
curiam) (footnote omitted); Hinkle v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc.,
827 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2016).
At the summary judgment stage, the Court views all facts in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the non-moving party, and
draws all inferences in Plaintiff's favor. See McKinney v. Sheriff,
520 F. App'x 903, 905 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). "[T]he dispute
about a material fact is genuine . . . if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Hinkle,
827
F.3d
at
1300
(internal
quotations
and
citation
omitted). Summary judgment should be granted "against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate
only when, under Lewis's version of the facts, "there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Felio v. Hyatt, 639 F. App'x 604, 606
(11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (internal quotations and citation
omitted). Partial summary judgment in favor of Defendant McFarland
would be proper in this action where no genuine issue of material
6
fact exists as to whether Lewis is entitled to compensatory and
punitive damages.
IV. Law and Conclusions
Defendant McFarland asserts that Lewis suffered only bruises
and
abrasions
compensatory
(road
and
rash),
punitive
and
damages
therefore
are
his
barred
claims
by
42
for
U.S.C.
§1997e(e),1 and he is limited to, at most, nominal damages. See
Motion at 13. However, Lewis testified that, after McFarland's
assault, several corrections officers carried him to the medical
triage room because he was unable to walk. See Lewis Dep. at 100,
101. Lewis's medical records show that Nurse Vance provided wound
care, documented seven injuries as a result of the incident, and
ordered a follow-up examination with Dr. Amador Nazareno, M.D. See
Def. Ex. C at 10, Emergency Room Record; 11, Diagram of Injury.
According to Lewis, McFarland "slammed" him on the concrete where
his face hit the ground, Lewis Dep. at 72-73; banged Lewis's head
on the concrete "about ten times" and choked him, see id. at 73-74,
105; and used his finger to penetrate Lewis's anus, see id. at 7475. Lewis testified that Nurse Vance failed to document all of his
1
The statute, amended on March 7, 2013, provides:
No Federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, for mental or emotional
injury suffered while in custody without a
prior showing of physical injury or the
commission of a sexual act (as defined in
section 2246 of Title 18).
7
injuries because Lieutenant Swayne instructed her not to "help"
him. Id. at 102-03, 111. Lewis's description of his injuries is as
follows: painful ribs and neck, bloody nose, sore neck, swollen
lip, scars and abrasions on his face, and a chipped tooth. See id.
at 106-11, 119-20. Lewis states that "they"2 put a clean uniform on
him, id. at 111, because there was "blood everywhere" after the
incident, id. at 110.
Additionally, inmate Batie, who was behind Lewis in the escort
line, testified that he saw McFarland slam Lewis to the ground, rub
his head onto the concrete, and choke him. See Batie Dep. at 8-18,
26-27. According to Batie, Lewis's face "was scraped up from the
concrete" and "he had a bandage on it." Id. at 16. Inmate Byrd, who
was in front of Lewis in the escort line, testified that Lewis "had
a rug burn and a few knots on his face," Byrd Dep. at 11, 12; he
did not see any blood, see id. at 11; and he saw a white gauze
"wrapping" on the right side of Lewis's face between his temple and
his cheek that the medical personnel had applied, id. at 12, 21.
In Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531-32 (11th Cir. 2002),
the Eleventh Circuit addressed the requirements of § 1997e(e):
Subsection (e) of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e
states that "[n]o Federal civil action may be
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for
mental or emotional injury suffered while in
2
Lewis never clarified whether medical personnel or
corrections officers instructed him to change to a clean uniform
before Nurse Vance's examination. See Lewis Dep. at 111.
8
custody without a prior showing of physical
injury." This statute is intended to reduce
the number of frivolous cases filed by
imprisoned plaintiffs, who have little to lose
and excessive amounts of free time with which
to pursue their complaints. See Harris v.
Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 976-79 (11th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (surveying the legislative history
of the PLRA). An action barred by § 1997e(e)
is barred only during the imprisonment of the
plaintiff; therefore, such action should be
dismissed without prejudice by the district
court, allowing the prisoner to bring his
claim once released and, presumably, once the
litigation cost-benefit balance is restored to
normal. Id. at 980.
Tracking the language of the statute, §
1997e(e) applies only to lawsuits involving
(1) Federal civil actions (2) brought by a
prisoner (3) for mental or emotional injury
(4) suffered while in custody. In Harris, we
decided that the phrase "Federal civil action"
means
all
federal
claims,
including
constitutional claims. 216 F.3d at 984-85.
As relevant to this action, the standard applicable to a
constitutional excessive use of force case is as follows:
[O]ur core inquiry is "whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore
discipline,
or
maliciously
and
sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117
L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). In determining whether
force
was
applied
maliciously
and
sadistically, we look to five factors: "(1)
the extent of injury; (2) the need for
application of force; (3) the relationship
between that need and the amount of force
used; (4) any efforts made to temper the
severity of a forceful response; and (5) the
extent of the threat to the safety of staff
and inmates[, as reasonably perceived by the
responsible officials on the basis of facts
known to them]..." Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d
1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotations
9
omitted).[3] However, "[t]he Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
necessarily
excludes
from
constitutional
recognition de minimis uses of physical force,
provided that the use of force is not of a
sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind."
Hudson,
112
S.Ct.
at
1000
(quotations
omitted).
McKinney v. Sheriff, 520 F. App'x 903, 905 (11th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam).
Here, at a minimum, the record before the Court reflects a
genuine issue of fact as to whether Lewis suffered multiple
injuries from the February 24, 2011 confrontation with McFarland.
In close proximity to the alleged assault,4 Nurse Vance assessed
Lewis's health at 10:50 a.m. and documented the following seven
injuries: (1) superficial abrasion above the right eyebrow; (2)
superficial abrasion at the right eyebrow with mild swelling; (3)
upper lip; (4) chin; (5) left wrist; (6) right knee; and (7) left
knee. See Def. Ex. C at 11, Diagram of Injury. Lewis himself
testified as to his injuries, and his fellow inmates support his
assertions. On this record, it appears that a genuine issue of
material
fact
exists
as
to
whether
Lewis
is
entitled
to
compensatory and punitive damages. Moreover, as previously stated,
Lewis testified that there were additional undocumented injuries as
a
result
3
of
the
incident,
see
Lewis
Dep.
at
106,
119-20,
See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986).
4
Notably, the alleged incident occurred at 10:35 a.m. on
February 24, 2011. See Def. Ex. A.
10
departmental personnel provided him with a clean uniform since his
pants and shirt had blood on them, see id. at 111, and medical
personnel provided wound care for his injuries, see id. at 112.
Given the record, including Lewis's testimony that McFarland's
finger penetrated his anus, see id. at 74-75, as well as Byrd and
Batie's testimony, see Batie Dep.; Byrd Dep., this Court finds that
genuine issues of material fact preclude entry of partial summary
judgment in favor of Defendant McFarland. As such, the Motion is
due to be denied.
In consideration of the foregoing, it is now
ORDERED:
Defendant McFarland's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 294) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 8th day of
December, 2017.
sc 12/8
c:
Counsel of Record
11
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