Mathis v. Slominski et al

Filing 9

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with directions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 2/16/2012. (BL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

THURMAN L. MATHIS,

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:11-cv-961-J-34JBT

J. SLOMINSKI, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Plaintiff Mathis, an inmate of the Florida penal system,
initiated this action by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint on
September 26, 2011, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

He filed an

Amended Complaint (Doc. #7) on December 7, 2011, in which he names
the following individuals, as the Defendants, in this action: (1)
J. Slominski, a nurse at Florida State Prison (FSP), and (2) J.
Gaines, a correctional officer at FSP.
Defendants

violated

his

federal

Mathis asserts that

constitutional

rights

when

Slominski permitted Gaines to distribute medication to Mathis
outside of Slominski's presence.

Upon discovering that Gaines had

allegedly given him the wrong medication, Mathis declared a medical
emergency.

As relief, Mathis requests monetary damages in the

amount of $100,000.00.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires the Court to dismiss
this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

Additionally, the Court must read Plaintiff's pro se allegations in
a liberal fashion.

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).

"A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either
in law or fact."

Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.)

(citing Battle v. Central State Hospital, 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th
Cir. 1990)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1044 (2001). A complaint filed
in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous.
U.S. 319, 328 (1989).
only

be

ordered

meritless,"

id.

Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should

when
at

Neitzke v. Williams, 490

the

327,

or

legal
when

theories
the

are

claims

"indisputably

rely

on

factual

allegations which are "clearly baseless." Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 32 (1992).
fantastic

or

"Frivolous claims include claims 'describing

delusional

scenarios,

claims

district judges are all too familiar.'"
(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).

with

which

federal

Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349

Additionally, a claim may be

dismissed as frivolous when it appears that a plaintiff has little
or no chance of success.

Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d at 1349.

2

"To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured under
the

United

States

Constitution

or

federal

law

deprivation occurred under color of state law."

and

(2)

such

Richardson v.

Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations
omitted).

Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit "'requires proof of an

affirmative

causal

connection

between

the

official's

acts

or

omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation' in § 1983
cases."

Rodriguez v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 625

(11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401
(11th Cir. 1986)).

More than conclusory and vague allegations are

required to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

See

L.S.T., Inc., v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 684 (11th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir.
1984).
Thus, in the absence of a federal constitutional deprivation
or violation of a federal right, Plaintiff cannot sustain a cause
of action against the Defendants under section 1983.

The Eleventh

Circuit has explained the requirements for an Eighth Amendment
violation.
"The Constitution does not mandate
comfortable prisons, but neither does it
permit inhumane ones . . . ."
Farmer, 511
U.S. at 832, 114 S.Ct. at 1976 (internal
quotation and citation omitted).[1] Thus, in

1

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
3

its
prohibition
of
"cruel
and
unusual
punishments," the Eighth Amendment requires
that
prison
officials
provide
humane
conditions of confinement. Id. However, as
noted above, only those conditions which
objectively amount to an "extreme deprivation"
violating contemporary standards of decency
are subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8-9, 112 S.Ct. at 1000.[2]
Furthermore, it is only a prison official's
subjective deliberate indifference to the
substantial risk of serious harm caused by
such conditions that gives rise to an Eighth
Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828,
114 S.Ct. at 1974 (quotation and citation
omitted); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303, 111 S.Ct.
at 2327.[3]
Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2010).
"To

show

that

a

prison

official

acted

with

deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy
both an objective and a subjective inquiry." Brown v. Johnson, 387
F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d
1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)).

First, the plaintiff must satisfy

the objective component by showing that he had a serious medical
need. Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).
"A serious medical need is considered
'one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious
that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor's attention.'" Id.
(citing Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr.,
40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994)).
In
either case, "the medical need must be one
that,
if
left
unattended,
pos[es]
a

2

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).

3

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
4

substantial risk of serious harm."
(citation and internal quotations
omitted).

Id.
marks

Brown, 387 F.3d at 1351.
Next, the plaintiff must satisfy the subjective component,
which requires the plaintiff to "allege that the prison official,
at

a

minimum,

acted

with

deliberate indifference."
2010)

(setting

forth

a

state

of

mind

that

constituted

Richardson, 598 F.3d at 737 (11th Cir.
the

three

components

of

deliberate

indifference as "(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious
harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than
mere negligence.")

(citing Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1245)).

the
Supreme
Court
In
Estelle[4],
established that "deliberate indifference"
entails more than mere negligence. Estelle,
429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285; Farmer, 511
U.S. at 835, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
The Supreme
Court clarified the "deliberate indifference"
standard in Farmer by holding that a prison
official
cannot
be
found
deliberately
indifferent under the Eighth Amendment "unless
the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511
U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (emphasis added).
In interpreting Farmer and Estelle, this Court
explained in McElligott[5] that "deliberate
indifference
has
three
components:
(1)
subjective knowledge of a risk of serious
harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by

4

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).

5

McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 1999).
5

conduct that is more than mere negligence."
McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255; Taylor,[6] 221
F.3d at 1258 (stating that defendant must have
subjective awareness of an "objectively
serious need" and that his response must
constitute
"an
objectively
insufficient
response to that need").
Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245-46.
Here, Plaintiff states that both Defendants Slominski and
Gaines came to his cell on July 3, 2011, at approximately 6:25
a.m., to provide him with blood pressure medication.

However,

Plaintiff asserts that, when Officer Gaines claimed that he did not
have the proper key to open the cell's flap, both Slominski and
Gaines left that area of the wing.

According to Plaintiff, within

minutes, Officer Gaines returned, without Nurse Slominski, and
provided

medication

to

Mathis.

Mathis

complains

that

"the

medication was different," but he "took it anyway" because his
blood pressure was high.

Amended Complaint at 9.

Mathis claims

that Officer Gaines interfered with proper medical treatment by
distributing medication without the nurse and that Nurse Slominski
inappropriately placed medication in the hands of a correctional
officer and failed to ensure that Mathis received the correct
medication.

Mathis complains that the medication that Gaines gave

him made him "real" sick.

Id.

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim
under the Eighth Amendment in that he has not shown that the

6

Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2000).
6

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs.

While

malpractice,

Plaintiff's

"[accidents,

allegations

mistakes,

may

suggest

negligence,

and

medical
medical

malpractice are not 'constitutional violation[s] merely because the
victim is a prisoner.'"

Harris v. Coweta County, 21 F.3d 388, 393

(11th Cir. 1994) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106).
A violation of the Eighth Amendment requires a showing of
"deliberate indifference" to an inmate's health or safety. Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834. "Deliberate indifference is not the same thing as
negligence or carelessness."

Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1083

(11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit has

stated:
For medical treatment to rise to the
level of a constitutional violation, the care
must be "so grossly incompetent, inadequate,
or excessive as to shock the conscience or to
be intolerable to fundamental fairness."
Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th
Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
A medical
need may be considered serious if a delay in
treating it makes it worse. Danley v. Allen,
540 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2008). To show
deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
defendants' response to the need was more than
"merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in
diagnosis or treatment, or even medical
malpractice actionable under state law."
Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th
Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotations
omitted).
Palazon v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 361 Fed.Appx. 88, 89 (11th
Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (not selected for publication in the

7

Federal Reporter).

Here, Plaintiff's allegations center upon

carelessness and the allegedly one-time improper distribution of
medication by a correctional officer.

Because Plaintiff has not

alleged facts supporting a claim that the Defendants acted with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, this case
will be dismissed without prejudice as frivolous.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.

This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as frivolous.

2.

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment dismissing

this case without prejudice.
3.

The Clerk of the Court shall close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 16th day of
February, 2012.

sc 2/8
c:
Thurman L. Mathis

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