Forsyth v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Monte C. Richardson on 12/21/2012. (MOH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
BRENDA FORSYTH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 3:11-cv-1015-J-MCR
MICHAEL ASTRUE, Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
_____________________________________/
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1
This cause is before the Court on Plaintiff’s appeal of an administrative decision
denying her application for Social Security benefits. The Court has reviewed the record,
the briefs, and the applicable law. For the reasons set forth herein, the Commissioner’s
decision is AFFIRMED.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, Disability Insurance Benefits
(”DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) on June 30, 2009. (Tr. 20). Plaintiff
alleged an onset date of January 1, 2000. Id. However, this date was amended to
January 1, 2003, during the hearing held on February 15, 2011. Id. The claims were
denied initially on October 2, 2009, and upon reconsideration on March 12, 2010. Id.
Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and on
February 15, 2011, a hearing was held before the Honorable John D. Thompson, Jr.
1
The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate
Judge. (Doc. 17).
Page 1
(Tr. 36-92). The ALJ issued his decision on March 25, 2011, finding Plaintiff was not
disabled. (Tr. 20-28). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Tr. 38). Having exhausted all administrative remedies, Plaintiff timely filed her Complaint on
October 17, 2011, seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s final decision. (Doc. 1).
II.
NATURE OF DISABILITY CLAIM
A.
Basis of Claimed Disability
Plaintiff claimed to be disabled since January 1, 2003, as a result of: history of
hypertension, history of drug abuse, and bipolar disorder. (Tr. 94).
B.
Summary of Evidence Before the ALJ2
Plaintiff was 58 years of age at the time the ALJ conducted the hearing on
February 15, 2011. (Tr. 24). Plaintiff has a high school education and can read, write,
and speak English, as well as do simple math. Id. Plaintiff does not have a valid
Florida Driver’s License because it has been permanently revoked due to multiple prior
DUIs. Id. Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as a greens keeper and fiber
optics grinder. Id. Plaintiff claims to be disabled since January 1, 2003, as a result of: a
history of hypertension, a history of drug abuse, and bipolar disorder. (Tr. 94).
The
relevant medical records begin in December of 2003, while Plaintiff was incarcerated in
Lee County Jail. Physicians noted Plaintiff was treated for alcohol abuse in 1998. (Tr.
318). In addition, physicians noted Plaintiff was on Prozac and Trazodone. (Tr. 312314). On December 12, 2003, Plaintiff had a mental examination at which the physician
2
Because Plaintiff’s appeal deals exclusively with issues involving her mental
impairments, the Court will limit its discussion of the medical evidence to those records
addressing Plaintiff’s mental impairments.
Page 2
noted: “depression per inmate history.” (Tr. 331).
The next available records begin in May, 2007. On May 1, 2007, Plaintiff
presented to Dr. William A. Rios, whose impression included: depression,
headaches/allergic rhinitis, obesity, question urge incontinence, and question
menopause. (Tr. 335-337). Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Rios on June 12, 2007, at
which time he diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar disorder. (Tr. 334).
Plaintiff presented to Meridian Behavioral Healthcare, Inc. between February
2007 and May 2010, for routine checkups regarding her medication management. (Tr.
438-500; 503-518). Plaintiff routinely met with psychologists for short appointments in
order to manage her prescription medications. (Tr. 439-500; 508-514). Multiple
physicians observed Plaintiff’s insight and judgment were poor. Id. Further, on August
21, 2009, Plaintiff was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, anti-personality disorder,
hypertension, and a thyroid disorder. (Tr. 452).
Plaintiff presented to Jane Cormier, Ph.D. on October 2, 2009, for a mental
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) examination. (Tr. 346-363). Dr. Cormier noted
Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability: (1) to maintain attention and concentration
for extended periods and (2) to complete a normal workday and workweek without
interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace
without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. (Tr. 346-347). Dr. Cormier
remarked:
[Plaintiff] appears capable of understanding and recalling
simple and detailed instructions and of sustaining attention
for at least simple tasks. In addition, [Plaintiff] appears
generally capable of interacting appropriately with the public
and with coworkers and supervisors. Also [Plaintiff] appears
Page 3
to be able to respond to changes in the work environment
and to recognize and respond appropriately to most work
hazards. Overall, [Plaintiff] appears capable of performing
routine, repetitive tasks on a sustained and independent
basis and in a socially appropriate manner, currently and
prior to the DLI.
(Tr. 348). Dr. Cormier also noted there was evidence of mood disorder, anxiety-related
disorder, personality disorder, and polysubstance abuse. (Tr. 348, 350).
Plaintiff presented to Chris J. Carr, Ph.D. on January 27, 2010, for a
psychological evaluation. (Tr. 364-370). In relation to her sensorium and cognition, Dr.
Carr found Plaintiff could: repeat six digits forward and four digits backwards, spell the
word “world” backwards, recall three of three objects after seven minutes, perform serial
three subtractions from twenty, perform simple multiplication, interpret a common
saying, and identify the similarity between an apple and banana. (Tr. 367). Plaintiff
could not complete one addition of double digit numbers or complete serial seven
subtractions from 100. Id. Dr. Carr diagnosed Plaintiff with:
Axis I: Bipolar NOS, Mild to Moderate Symptoms
Polysubstance Dependence (crack cocaine and alcohol), in long
term remission
Axis II: deferred
Id.
On March 12, 2010, Plaintiff presented to Thomas Conger, Ph.D. for another
mental RFC assessment. (Tr. 416-433). Dr. Conger found Plaintiff was moderately
limited in her ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, to
complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically
based symptoms, and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number
and length of rest periods. (Tr. 416-417). Further, Dr. Conger noted Plaintiff was
Page 4
“mentally capable of performing routine tasks on a sustained basis, if motivated” and
Plaintiff was “judged to have adequate understanding, social skills and adaption
abilities.” (Tr. 418). Dr. Conger also filled out a Psychiatric Review Technique form.
(Tr. 420-433). Dr. Conger’s diagnosis included: personality disorder, NOS with
antisocial features; depressive disorder, NOS; anxiety disorder, NOS; and,
alcohol/cocaine abuse, in reported remission. (Tr. 432). Dr. Conger noted Plaintiff
“ha[d] a history of antisocial behaviors as well as alcohol/cocaine abuse that has
resulted in legal problems and incarceration but she also show[ed] the ability to relate
effectively in general and d[id] not appear to have significant social difficulties at this
time.” Id. Furthermore, Dr. Conger observed that although Plaintiff “may experience
some depression and/or anxiety at times, she remain[ed] functional from a mental
perspective” and she appeared “to be capable of performing routine tasks
independently and there [was] no indication of a mental impairment that would equal
any listing at this time.” Id.
During the hearing on February 15, 2011, Dr. Olin Hamrick assessed Plaintiff’s
mental abilities using the Medical Source Statement of Ability To Do Work-Related
Activities (Mental). (Tr. 528-530). Dr. Hamrick opined Plaintiff was moderately limited
in her ability to understand and remember complex instructions, carry out complex
instructions, and make judgment on complex work-related decisions. (Tr. 528).
Further, Dr. Hamrick also opined Plaintiff’s ability to interact with the public,
supervisor(s), or co-workers was moderately limited. (Tr. 529). Finally, Dr. Hamrick
opined Plaintiff’s ability to respond appropriately to usual work situations and to changes
in a routine work setting was moderately limited. Id.
Page 5
C.
Summary of the ALJ’s Decision
A plaintiff is entitled to disability benefits when she is unable to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to either result in death or last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1505. The ALJ must follow five steps in evaluating a claim of disability. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. First, if a plaintiff is working at a substantial gainful
activity, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(a)(4)(I). Second, if a
plaintiff does not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly
limit her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, then she does not have a
severe impairment and is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
Third, if a plaintiff’s impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, she is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
416.920(a)(4)(iii). Fourth, if a plaintiff’s impairments do not prevent her from doing past
relevant work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). Fifth, if
a plaintiff’s impairments (considering her Residual Functioning Capacity (“RFC”), age,
education, and past work) prevent her from doing other work that exists in the national
economy, then she is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(a)(4)(v). Plaintiff
bears the burden of persuasion through step four, while at step five, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146, 107 S.Ct. 2287 n.5 (1987).
In this case, the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of
the Social Security Act through June 30, 2007. (Tr. 22). At step one, the ALJ found
Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her amended alleged onset
Page 6
date of January 1, 2003. Id. At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following
severe impairments: a history of bipolar disorder; hypertension; hypothyroidism; bilateral
disorder of the SI joints, more so on the left than the right; and a history of
polysubstance abuse. Id.
At step three, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments listed
in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. The ALJ further determined Plaintiff
had the RFC to perform “medium” work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§404.1567(b) and
416.967(b). (Tr. 27). Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff could:
lift/carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds or less more
frequently; she can sit for up to 6 hours and stand/walk up to
six hours; she can climb stairs and ramps, but not ropes,
ladders or scaffolds; she can balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or
crawl frequently; she can understand, remember and carry out
simple routine and repetitive work tasks and can make
associated judgments; she can occasionally interact with
supervisors, co-workers and the public.
(Tr. 23-24). In making this determination, the ALJ considered all symptoms and the
extent to which those symptoms may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the
objective medical and other evidence. (Tr. 24). However, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her alleged
symptoms were not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the RFC
assessment. Id.
At step four, the ALJ utilized the testimony of a Vocational Expert (“VE”) during
the hearing to determine if Plaintiff could perform any of her past relevant work. (Tr.
27). The VE determined Plaintiff’s past relevant work included a golf course greens
keeper and a hand grinder, and that Plaintiff could still perform these occupations as
Page 7
actually and generally performed. (Tr. 28-29). Since the VE found Plaintiff could
perform her past relevant work, the ALJ did not need to proceed to step five. Id.
Therefore, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act. (Tr. 28).
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
The Standard of Review
The scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the ALJ
applied the correct legal standards, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir.
1988), and whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (1971). The Commissioner’s findings of fact
are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla – i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a
suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a
reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835,
838 (11th Cir. 1982) and Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401).
Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the
district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as
finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the
Commissioner’s decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991);
Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view
the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable
to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837
Page 8
(11th Cir. 1992) (explaining how the court must scrutinize the entire record to determine
reasonableness of factual findings).
The district court will reverse a Commissioner’s decision on plenary review,
however, if the decision applies incorrect law, or if the decision fails to provide the
district court with sufficient reasoning to determine the Commissioner properly applied
the law. Keeton v. Department of Health and Human Services, 21 F.3d 1064, 1066
(11th Cir. 1994).
B.
Issues on Appeal
Plaintiff’s brief raises three arguments regarding the alleged errors committed by
the ALJ. Specifically, Plaintiff argues: (1) the ALJ committed reversible error by failing
to include Plaintiff’s chronic anxiety and personality disorders as severe impairments at
Step 2; (2) by failing to consider Plaintiff’s anxiety and personality disorders as severe
impairments, the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff’s impairments in combination; and (3)
the ALJ failed to properly determine Plaintiff’s mental RFC at Step 4, and in turn failed
to pose a proper hypothetical question to the VE. (Doc. 21, pp. 6-15). In response, the
Commissioner contends the ALJ’s decision finding Plaintiff not disabled is supported by
substantial evidence. (Doc. 22 at 4). Specifically, the Commissioner argues the ALJ
considered all of the relevant medical evidence and accounted for the mental limitations
in his RFC and hypothetical posed to the VE. (Doc. 22, p. 6).
1.
Whether the ALJ erred at Step 2 by failing to find Plaintiff’s
anxiety and personality disorders constituted severe
impairments.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to find Plaintiff’s anxiety and personality
disorders constituted severe impairments at step two of his evaluation. (Doc. 21, p. 6Page 9
10). The Commissioner responds by arguing the ALJ did not err because he found
Plaintiff had several severe impairments, including multiple mental impairments such as
a history of bipolar disorder and a history of polysubstance abuse, in remission. (Doc.
22, p. 4). Furthermore, the Commissioner notes that even if the ALJ erred by failing to
find Plaintiff’s anxiety and personality disorders were severe, that error is harmless as
the ALJ found Plaintiff suffered from severe impairments, which is all that step two
requires. (Doc. 22, p. 5).
In the instant case, Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ did not find her anxiety and
personality disorders to be severe impairments. At step two, the claimant bears the
burden of proving the existence of a severe impairment. See Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146.
In considering an alleged impairment, the ALJ must evaluate evidence about its
“functionally limiting effects” to determine how it affects the claimant’s ability to do basic
work activities. Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-3p. At step two, the ALJ is not
required to identify all of the impairments that should be considered severe. See Heatly
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 382 F.App’x 823 (11th Cir. 2010). Instead, the only requirement
of step two is to identify if a severe impairment does in fact exist. Id.
In the instant case, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: a history of bipolar disorder; hypertension; hyperthyroidism; bilateral
disorder of the SI joints, more so on the left than right; and a history of polysubstance
abuse, in remission. (Tr. 22, Finding 3). Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred in failing to
include Plaintiff’s chronic “anxiety and personality disorders” in the list of severe
impairments. (Doc. 21, p. 6).
The Court finds no error in the step two finding in the instant case. The ALJ
Page 10
found not only one, but five severe impairments suffered by Plaintiff. (Tr. 22). This is all
that is required at step two. See McDavid v. Astrue, No. 1:11-cv-81, 2012 WL 2541733,
*6 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2012) (citing Heatly and finding no error in ALJ’s failure to find
psychotic disorder to be severe impairment when ALJ listed anxiety and depression at
step two).
Additionally, as the Commissioner points out, although the ALJ did not
specifically list anxiety and/or personality disorder at step two, it is clear he considered
and evaluated these conditions at later steps in his analysis. Indeed, in his PRTF
findings, the ALJ found Plaintiff suffered from moderate limitations in her ability to
maintain concentration, persistence, and pace. (Tr. 23). Additionally, at step four, the
ALJ posed a hypothetical in which he noted Plaintiff had moderate limitations in her
social functioning and her ability to make routine adjustments to work settings. (Tr. 87).
Plaintiff has failed to identify and the record is devoid of any evidence of any additional
limitations arising from the anxiety or personality disorder. Accordingly, the undersigned
finds no error in the ALJ’s failure to include anxiety and personality disorder as severe
impairments at step two.
2.
Whether the ALJ erred by failing to consider Plaintiff’s impairments
in combination.
Because this Court finds the ALJ did not err in excluding the anxiety and
personality disorders from the list of Plaintiff’s severe impairments at step two, the
undersigned also rejects Plaintiff’s second argument that as a result of the ALJ’s step
two error, the ALJ also erred by failing to consider Plaintiff’s impairments in
combination.
Page 11
If a claimant alleges several impairments, the ALJ “has a duty to consider the
impairments in combination and to determine whether combined impairments render
claimant disabled.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (11th Cir. 2001)(citing
Jones v. Department of Health and Human Services, 941 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir.
1991)). An ALJ’s finding is sufficient if he or she simply states: “the medical evidence
establishes that [the claimant] had [several injuries] which constitute a ‘severe
impairment,’ but that [s]he did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
listed in, or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.”
Wilson, 284 F.3d 1224-25; Jones, 941 F.2d at 1533.
In this case, the Court is satisfied the ALJ’s decision contains evidence that he
considered the combined effects of all of Plaintiff’s impairments. The decision reads:
“the claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1.” (Tr. 22) (emphasis added). In addition, this Court is also convinced by the ALJ’s
discussion in the decision of Plaintiff’s various mental impairments and the limitations
arising from them. (Tr. 25-27). This is sufficient evidence that the ALJ considered
Plaintiff’s impairments in combination and therefore, the Court finds no error.
3.
Whether the ALJ erred by not properly determining Plaintiff’s Mental
RFC and not posing a proper hypothetical question to the VE.
Plaintiff next argues the ALJ erred by failing to properly determine Plaintiff’s
mental RFC and posing an incomplete hypothetical to the VE. (Doc. 21 p. 11-15).
Specifically, Plaintiff contends the RFC and hypothetical were deficient because they did
not adequately include limitations arising from Plaintiff’s anxiety and personality disorder
Page 12
traits. (Doc. 21, p. 13).
With respect to Plaintiff’s mental RFC, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform
medium work and was able to:
understand, remember and carry out simple routine and
repetitive work tasks and [] make associated judgments; she
[could] occasionally interact with supervisors, co-workers
and the public.
(Tr. 23-24). Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by failing to specifically find Plaintiff suffered
from moderate limitations in her ability to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace
and in social functioning. (Doc. 21, p. 14). While the ALJ does not specifically state
Plaintiff has moderate limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace
and social functioning, it appears he did find Plaintiff suffered some limitations in these
areas as reflected in the restrictions to simple routine and repetitive work tasks and only
occasionally interacting with supervisors, co-workers, and the public.
In any event, as this Court noted in Corbitt v. Astrue, when the ALJ relies on the
testimony of a VE, “the key inquiry shifts to the adequacy of the RFC description
contained in the hypothetical posed to the VE” rather than the RFC simply cited in the
ALJ’s decision. Corbitt v. Astrue, No. 3:07-CV-518-J-HTS, 2008 WL 1776574, at *3
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2008) (citing Dowell v. Barnhart, No. 06-1023-WEB, 2006 WL
4046164, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 31, 2006)). In the Corbitt case, the ALJ did not include in
his RFC the plaintiff’s moderate limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence and
pace as noted in the PRTF. Corbitt, 2008 WL 1776574 at *2. However, the ALJ
specifically included the moderate difficulty in maintaining concentration, persistence
and pace in the hypothetical to the VE. Id. at *3. As such, the court found no error. Id.
Page 13
In the instant case, the ALJ presented the following hypothetical to the VE:
[F]rom a mental standpoint . . . no limitations with regard [to
her] ability to understand, remember, carry out and make
judgments on simple work-related decisions. Moderate
limitation defined as there is more than a slight or minimal
limitation of function, but can still do the task in a satisfactory
manner with regard to her ability to understand, remember,
carry out and make judgments on more than simple, rote,
repetitive-type instructions or job task. And the same
moderate limitation regarding her ability to undertake, work
in proximity to members of the general public, co-workers,
supervisors and to make routine adjustments to work
settings. All those would be moderate as well. Within those
limitations and no others, would she be able to perform her
past relevant work either as performed by the claimant or as
described in the DOT?
(Tr. 87). The VE responded that Plaintiff would be able to perform both of her prior
relevant work positions. (Tr. 87). Plaintiff claims this hypothetical “completely left out
her moderate impairment of concentration, persistence, and pace and her moderate
impairment of social skills” and therefore, the VE’s testimony cannot be considered to
be based on substantial evidence. (Doc. 21, p. 14).
Plaintiff is correct that “[i]n order for a [VE’s] testimony to constitute substantial
evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the
[plaintiff’s] impairments.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th
Cir. 2011). However, it is well settled in the Eleventh Circuit that a hypothetical to a VE
sufficiently accounts for limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace when these
limitations are either implicitly or explicitly accounted for. Jarrett v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 422 F.App’x. 869, 872 (11th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, when medical evidence
demonstrates a plaintiff can engage in simple, routine tasks or unskilled work despite
limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace, courts have concluded a
Page 14
hypothetical which includes a limitation of “only unskilled work” sufficiently accounts for
such limitations. Winschel 631 F.3d at 1181 (citing Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503,
521–22 (7th Cir. 2009)).
Here, the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE indicated Plaintiff was moderately limited
in her to ability to understand, remember, carry out and make judgments on more than
simple, rote, repetitive-type instructions or job tasks. (Tr. 87). The ALJ defined a
moderate limitation as having more than a slight or minimal limitation of function, but still
having the ability to do the task in a satisfactory manner. Id. To support these findings,
the ALJ pointed to the findings of two doctors. For example, the ALJ referenced Dr.
Carr’s findings that despite her mild to moderate bipolar disorder, Plaintiff “had the
capacity to understand, remember, concentrate, persist, adapt and to conduct
interaction for jobs for which she [was] suited.” (Tr. 26). Additionally, the ALJ pointed to
Dr. Hamrick’s opinion that despite her moderate limitations in concentration,
persistence, and pace, Plaintiff was capable of understanding, remembering, and
carrying out simple instructions and had the ability to make simple work related
decisions. (Tr. 27). Dr. Hamrick also found Plaintiff would be moderately limited in her
ability to understand, remember, and carry out more complex instructions and to make
complex work related decisions. Id. The hypothetical utilized by the ALJ similarly
restricted Plaintiff, and thereby sufficiently accounted for Plaintiff’s limitations in
concentration, persistence, and pace. See Rosario v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1210704, 2012 WL 4074421, at *2 (11th Cir. Sept. 17, 2012) (Eleventh Circuit found ALJ’s
hypothetical limiting the claimant to performing simple, routine, and repetitive tasks in an
environment with only brief interactions with co-workers and the public sufficiently
Page 15
accounted for moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace where
medical evidence supported the findings); see also Hopson v. Astrue, No. 3:11-cv-623,
2012 WL 1155294 at *7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2012) (ALJ’s hypothetical including a
limitation of simple, routine and repetitive tasks adequately accounted for moderate
restrictions in concentration, persistence and pace because the medical evidence
supported plaintiff’s ability to complete those tasks). Accordingly, the hypothetical
posed to the VE adequately accounted for all of Plaintiff’s limitations.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds the ALJ’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter
judgment AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s decision and, thereafter, to close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this
2012.
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
Page 16
21st
day of December,
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?