Simons v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
20
OPINION AND ORDER affirming the Commissioner's final decision pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); directing the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly and to close the file. Signed by Magistrate Judge James R. Klindt on 8/30/2013. (JLD)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
DIANE SIMONS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:12-cv-756-J-JRK
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,1
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER2
I. Status
Diane Simons (“Plaintiff”) is appealing the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration’s final decision denying her claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). Her
alleged inability to work is based on her “[a]nxiety, memory loss, lack of concentration, [and]
lack of staying on task,” and based on her bi-polar disorder and manic depressive disorder.
See Transcript of Administrative Proceedings (Doc. No. 11; “Tr.”), filed September 17, 2012,
at 77, 246. Relevant to this appeal, Plaintiff also has an issue with alcohol. See, e.g., Tr. at
19, 73-74, 433-34. On April 5, 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB, Tr. at 88-90,
1
Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for Michael J.
Astrue as Defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last
sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
2
The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge. See
Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge (Doc. No. 13), filed September 19, 2012;
Reference Order (Doc. No. 14), entered September 20, 2012.
alleging an onset date of October 1, 2007, Tr. at 247.3 Plaintiff’s application was denied
initially, Tr. at 92-93, and was denied on reconsideration, Tr. at 104-05. An Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing on August 9, 2011, during which Plaintiff testified. Tr. at
61-84. At the time of that hearing, Plaintiff was forty-four (44) years old. Tr. at 66. The ALJ
held a supplemental hearing on December 6, 2011. Tr. at 31-60. During the December 6,
2011 hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from a medical expert and a vocational expert (“VE”).
Tr. at 31-60. The ALJ issued a Decision on February 13, 2012, finding Plaintiff not disabled
through the date of the Decision.4 Tr. at 17-25. On May 24, 2012, the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request for review, Tr. at 1-3, thereby making the ALJ’s Decision the final
decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by
timely filing a Complaint (Doc. No. 1) on July 3, 2012, seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision.
II. The ALJ’s Decision
When determining whether an individual is disabled,5 an ALJ must follow the five-step
sequential inquiry set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations (“Regulations”), determining
3
Plaintiff’s application reflects that her alleged onset date is October 20, 2006. Tr. at 88. Other
documents in the record, including the Administrative Law Judge’s Decision from which Plaintiff appeals to this
Court, have the alleged onset date as October 1, 2007. Tr. at 17, 247. No dispute is raised as to the alleged
onset date. The Court, therefore, assumes the appropriate date is the date used by the Administrative Law
Judge: October 1, 2007. Tr. at 17.
4
The undersigned notes that the record contains other applications for DIB and Supplemental
Security Income completed by Plaintiff. See Tr. at 223-24, 225-27. Plaintiff’s appeal to this Court stems from
the ALJ’s Decision issued on Plaintiff’s April 5, 2010 application for DIB. Tr. at 17; see Tr. at 88-90. The
discussion that follows, therefore, deals only with that Decision.
5
“Disability” is defined in the Social Security Act as the “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months[.]” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A).
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as appropriate whether the claimant (1) is currently employed or engaging in substantial
gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals one listed in the Regulations; (4) can perform
past relevant work; and (5) retains the ability to perform any work in the national economy.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir.
2004). The claimant bears the burden of persuasion through step four and, at step five, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
In addition, the Social Security Act “preclude[s] the award of benefits when alcoholism
or drug addiction is determined to be a contributing factor material to the determination that
a claimant is disabled.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th Cir. 2001); see 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C). Accordingly, if an ALJ “determines a claimant to be disabled and finds
medical evidence of drug addiction or alcoholism, the [ALJ] then ‘must determine whether .
. . drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination of
disability.’” Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1279 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535). The “key factor” in
this materiality determination “is whether the claimant would still be found disabled if he
stopped using drugs or alcohol.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b)(1)). “[T]he claimant
bears the burden of proving that the substance abuse is not a contributing factor material to
the disability determination.” Id. at 1281.
Here, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential inquiry. See Tr. at 19-25. At step one,
the ALJ observed that Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October
1, 2007, the alleged onset date.” Tr. at 19 (emphasis and citation omitted). At step two, the
ALJ found Plaintiff suffers from “the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease
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of the cervical spine, bipolar disorder, and alcohol dependency.” Tr. at 19 (emphasis and
citation omitted). At step three, the ALJ ascertained that Plaintiff’s “impairments, including
the substance use disorder, meet the criteria of Listing 12.09B of 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1.”6 Tr. at 21 (emphasis and citation omitted). Although meeting a Listing
typically ends the inquiry and results in an individual being disabled, the ALJ engaged in a
second five-step sequential inquiry because substance abuse is involved.
The second five-step sequential inquiry was performed as “[i]f [Plaintiff] stopped all
substance use.” Tr. at 22. At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s “remaining
impairments would cause more than a minimal impact on [her] ability to perform basic work
activities; therefore, [Plaintiff] would continue to have a severe impairment or combination of
impairments.” Tr. at 22 (emphasis omitted). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “would
not have an impairment or combination or impairments that meets or medically equals the
criteria of any impairment listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Tr. at 22
(emphasis and citation omitted).
The ALJ determined Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) as follows:
If [Plaintiff] stopped all substance use, she would have the [RFC] to perform
light work, . . . except that she would have to avoid more than frequent
climbing, kneeling, or crawling; that she would have to avoid more than
occasional crouching or exposure to unprotected heights or hazards; and that
she would be restricted to simple, routine, repetitive tasks with no more than
occasional interaction with the general public.
6
Listing 12.09 is the Listing dealing with Substance Addiction Disorders, and it states in pertinent
part: “Behavioral changes or physical changes associated with the regular use of substances that affect the
central nervous systems. The required level of severity for these disorders is met when the requirements in any
of the following (A through I) are satisfied. . . . B. Depressive syndrome. Evaluate under 12.04.” 20 C.F.R. Pt.
404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.09B.
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Tr. at 23 (emphasis omitted). At step four, the ALJ found that “[Plaintiff] would be unable to
perform her past relevant work,” as a “practical nurse.” Tr. at 24 (emphasis and citation
omitted from first quotation). At step five, after “[c]onsidering [Plaintiff’s] age, education, work
experience, and [RFC],” the ALJ found that “there would be a significant number of jobs in
the national economy that [Plaintiff] could perform,” including housekeeper, mail clerk, and
office helper. Tr. at 24-25 (emphasis and citation omitted). The ALJ determined that
Plaintiff’s “substance use disorder is a contributing factor material to the determination of
disability, because she would no longer be disabled if she stopped all substance use.” Tr.
at 25 (emphasis omitted). Therefore, concluded the ALJ, “[Plaintiff] has not been disabled
. . . at any time from the alleged onset date through the date of th[e D]ecision.” Tr. at 25
(emphasis omitted).
III. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision as to disability pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Although no deference is given to the ALJ’s conclusions
of law, findings of fact “are conclusive if . . . supported by ‘substantial evidence’ . . . .”
Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320,
1322 (11th Cir. 1998)). “Substantial evidence is something ‘more than a mere scintilla, but
less than a preponderance.’” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987)). The substantial evidence
standard is met when there is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Falge, 150 F.3d at 1322 (quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It is not for this Court to reweigh the evidence; rather,
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the entire record is reviewed to determine whether “the decision reached is reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence.” Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir.
1991) (internal quotation and citations omitted); see also McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d
1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). The
decision reached by the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial
evidence–even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings. Crawford
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
IV. Discussion
Plaintiff alleges three (3) specific points of error: 1) “[t]he ALJ improperly determined
that substance abuse was a material factor contributing to [Plaintiff’s] disability”; 2) “[t]he ALJ
improperly determined [Plaintiff] was capable of light work”; and 3) “[t]he ALJ failed to give
special weight to [Plaintiff’s] treating physicians as required by law.” Memorandum in Support
of Complaint (Doc. No. 18; “Pl.’s Mem.”), filed November 30, 2012, at 2. Although Plaintiff
delineates these points of error as three (3) separate issues, Plaintiff relies solely on the
opinion of one treating physician, James Moore, M.D. (“Dr. Moore”), to support her
contentions.7 See id. at 6-9. In fact, the allegations of error can all be discussed within one
(1) general category: whether the ALJ assigned the appropriate weight to Dr. Moore’s
opinion. Defendant, in response, contends that the ALJ assigned the appropriate weight to
the opinion of Dr. Moore and that the ALJ’s Decision is supported by substantial evidence.
7
Throughout Plaintiff’s Memorandum, she refers to treating physicians, but Plaintiff’s argument
relies solely on Dr. Moore’s opinion, and Plaintiff makes no arguments relating to other physicians.
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Memorandum in Support of the Commissioner’s Decision (Doc. No. 19; “Def.’s Mem.”), filed
January 29, 2013, at 5-10.
A. Dr. Moore’s Opinion and Treatment Notes
On May 27, 2011, Dr. Moore completed a “Physician Questionnaire,” Tr. at 461-65,
in which he opined that Plaintiff is “[u]nable to meet competitive standards” in the categories
listed under mental abilities and aptitudes needed to do unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled
work, as well as in the categories listed under mental abilities and aptitude needed to do
particular types of jobs, Tr. at 463-64.
Dr. Moore noted that prior to completing the
questionnaire, he saw Plaintiff four (4) times beginning in October 2010. Tr. at 461. He listed
Plaintiff’s medications as seroquel, abilify, and xanax, and he indicated that Plaintiff has short
term memory loss as a side effect of one or more of those medications. Tr. at 461. In
response to the question that asks the physician to “[d]escribe the clinical findings including
results of mental status examination that demonstrate the severity of your patient’s mental
impairment and symptoms,” Dr. Moore wrote “see office notes.” Tr. at 461. He opined that
Plaintiff’s prognosis is “guarded.” Tr. at 461. He further opined that Plaintiff would miss more
than four (4) days per month of work. Tr. at 465.
Of particular importance to this Court’s analysis, Dr. Moore indicated that Plaintiff has
signs and symptoms of “intermittent” substance dependence, Tr. at 462, and that Plaintiff’s
alcohol or substance abuse contributes to her limitations, Tr. at 465. Dr. Moore left blank
the space provided to list the limitations affected by Plaintiff’s alcohol or substance abuse and
the space provided to explain the changes he would make to his description of Plaintiff’s
limitations if she were totally abstinent from alcohol or substance abuse. Tr. at 465.
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Dr. Moore’s treatment notes reflect the following. On August 17, 2010, Dr. Moore saw
Plaintiff, who was accompanied by her husband. Tr. at 405. He noted that Plaintiff’s last
hospitalization was April 1, 2010 and “[i]t was alcohol related.” Tr. at 405. After a discussion
with Plaintiff and her husband, including a discussion of the “dangers of combining Xanax
with alcohol,” Dr. Moore noted his belief that Plaintiff “has rapid cycling/mixed state.” Tr. at
405. Dr. Moore’s September 14, 2010 treatment note reflects, in total, that Plaintiff “stopped
the Lamictal because she thought it was really messing up her memory. Memory has
improved some. She still has racing thoughts.” Tr. at 407.
On March 18, 2011, Dr. Moore again saw Plaintiff. Tr. at 466-67. His notes reflect
that she was “seen at her request with her husband.” Tr. at 467. At that time, her
medications were abilify and xanax. Tr. at 467. She reported to Dr. Moore that “[s]he
currently uses alcohol” and that “[s]he consumes varuabke [sic] alcoholic beverages per
week.” Tr. at 466. Dr. Moore, Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s husband “spent over 30 minutes
discussing [Dr. Moore’s] assessment that the main problem is [Plaintiff’s] borderline
personality disorder and [Plaintiff and her husband’s] interpersonal difficulties and the[ ]
significant danger of xanax, especially in conjunction with alcohol.” Tr. at 467. Dr. Moore
diagnosed Plaintiff with “borderline personality,” “nondependent alcohol abuse,” and “bipolar
affective mixed mod [sic].” Tr. at 467 (capitalization omitted).
Plaintiff reported to Dr. Moore on May 11, 2011 that “seroquel has caused great
improvement” in that “she is less moody.” Tr. at 468. Plaintiff also reported some family
situations that were causing her angst. Tr. at 468. Dr. Moore’s diagnoses generally
remained the same as they were on March 18, 2011: “bipolar affective mixed mild,”
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“nondependent alcohol abuse,” and “borderline personality.” Tr. at 468 (capitalization
omitted). Plaintiff was to return to see Dr. Moore in three (3) months. Tr. at 469.
On May 27, 2011, Plaintiff returned to see Dr. Moore “primarily to review [her]
application for disability.” Tr. at 471. Plaintiff told Dr. Moore that “[s]he feels [her] memory
impairment is [the] main factor preventing her from being able to work, also [her] anxiety.”
Tr. at 471.
On July 7, 2011, Plaintiff reported that she felt “so so,” and she explained to Dr. Moore
that she and her husband had an argument. Tr. at 476. Apparently, either after that
argument or a different argument, Plaintiff “went to spend the night with her parents, [she]
started drinking, [her parents] threw her out, she returned home, made some suicidal
com[m]ents, [and] consider[ed] [going] to the hospital[ but] did not.” Tr. at 476.8 Dr. Moore
again “urged [Plaintiff] to avoid alcohol, especially when angry or depressed.” Tr. at 476.
B. Legal Standard
The Regulations instruct ALJs how to weigh the medical opinions9 of treating
physicians10 properly. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Because treating physicians “are likely
to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a
claimant’s] medical impairment(s),” a treating physician’s medical opinion is to be afforded
8
Dr. Moore noted that Plaintiff’s story was “a bit confusing.” Tr. at 476.
9
Medical opinions are statements from physicians that reflect judgments about the nature and
severity of the claimant’s impairment, including symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, and what the claimant can still
do despite the impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2).
10
A treating physician is a physician who provides medical treatment or evaluation to the claimant
and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with the claimant, as established by medical
evidence showing that the claimant sees or has seen the physician with a frequency consistent with accepted
medical practice for the type of treatment and/or evaluation required for the medical condition. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1502.
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controlling weight if it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in the
record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). When a treating physician’s medical opinion is not due
controlling weight, the ALJ must determine the appropriate weight it should be given by
considering factors such as the length of treatment, the frequency of examination, the nature
and extent of the treatment relationship, as well as the supportability of the opinion, its
consistency with the other evidence, and the specialization of the physician. Id.
If an ALJ concludes the medical opinion of a treating physician should be given less
than substantial or considerable weight, he or she must clearly articulate reasons showing
“good cause” for discounting it. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997).
Good cause exists when: (1) the opinion is not bolstered by the evidence; (2) the evidence
supports a contrary finding; or (3) the opinion is conclusory or inconsistent with the treating
physician's own medical records. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir.
2004); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1991); Schnorr v.
Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that a treating physician’s medical opinion
may be discounted when it is not accompanied by objective medical evidence). The ALJ
must “state with particularity the weight he [or she] gave the different medical opinions and
the reasons therefor.” Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279-80 (11th Cir. 1987); see also
MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986).
Generally, a non-examining physician’s opinion is given less weight than that of a
treating or examining physician. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). Nevertheless, every medical
opinion should be considered in making the disability determination.
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20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d). The same factors are relevant in determining the weight to be given to a nonexamining physician’s opinion as are relevant in determining the weight to be given to a
treating physician’s opinion: (1) the “[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the frequency
of examination”; (2) the “[n]ature and extent of [any] treatment relationship”;
(3) “[s]upportability”; (4) “[c]onsistency” with other medical evidence in the record; and (5)
“[s]pecialization.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2)-(5), 416.927(d)(2)-(5); see also 20 C.F. R.
§§ 404.1527(f), 416.927(f). “[T]he ALJ is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the
evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th
Cir. Unit B 1981) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526 (1980)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
C. Analysis
In the ALJ’s Decision, he discussed the totality of the medical evidence, including Dr.
Moore’s treatment notes. Tr. at 20-21. Pertinent to the instant dispute, the ALJ summarized
Dr. Moore’s May 2011 opinion (memorialized on the Physician Questionnaire form). Tr. at
21. The ALJ found that Dr. Moore’s opinion was deserving of “little weight” because 1) “Dr.
Moore offered no analysis or rationale to support his opinions, which appear inconsistent with
his stated global assessment of functioning (GAF) of 50”; and 2) “Dr. Moore failed to address
the significance of [Plaintiff’s] ongoing alcohol dependency in his assessment of her mental
and social functioning.” Tr. at 21.
The ALJ assigned “great weight” to the opinions of the non-examining State agency
consultants who “opined that [Plaintiff] was capable of performing a limited range of light
work, restricted to relatively simple tasks with limited social interaction” because those
opinions “were consistent with the medical record.” Tr. at 24 (citing Tr. at 392-95, 423-30,
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449-51). The ALJ also assigned “considerable weight” to the opinion of Carlos Kronberger,
Ph.D., a psychological expert who testified at the December 6, 2011 hearing, finding that Dr.
Kronberger’s opinion was “consistent with the medical evidence.” Tr. at 24; see Tr. at 33-52,
192. The ALJ noted that “Dr. Kronberger, the medical expert, testified that the medical
evidence supports a diagnosis of alcohol dependency and non-compliance with prescribed
medication.” Tr. at 24. The ALJ summarized Dr. Kronberger’s observation “that Dr. Moore’s
assessment of [Plaintiff’s] mental functioning did not sort out the effects of her alcohol
dependency or address what [Plaintiff] might be able to do if she were sober and stable on
medications.” Tr. at 24.
After reviewing the ALJ’s Decision and the evidence in the record, the undersigned
finds that the ALJ’s Decision is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff argues that “[t]he
ALJ improperly determined that substance abuse was a material factor contributing to
[Plaintiff’s] disability.” Pl.’s Mem. at 6 (emphasis and capitalization omitted). Plaintiff
contends that Dr. Moore’s opinion that Plaintiff has “intermittent” dependence on alcohol and
that her alcohol abuse contributes to her limitations adequately addresses the issue. Id.
Plaintiff’s contentions are flawed. Dr. Moore did not address the “key factor” related to
Plaintiff’s alcohol problem. See Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1279 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b)(1)
(recognizing that the “key factor” in the materiality determination “is whether the claimant
would still be found disabled if he stopped using drugs or alcohol”). A review of Dr. Moore’s
opinion reveals that he failed to opine as to what limitations would remain if Plaintiff stopped
drinking alcohol or how the alcohol abuse contributes to Plaintiff’s limitations. In fact, Dr.
Moore left blank the portion of the questionnaire specifically asking him to explain what
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limitations Plaintiff would have if she “were totally abstinent from alcohol or substance abuse.”
Tr. at 465. Given the opportunity to adequately address the issue, Dr. Moore failed to do so.
The ALJ appropriately observed, therefore, that Dr. Moore “offered no analysis or rationale
to support his opinions.” Tr. at 21.
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record. Pl.’s
Mem. at 6-7. While the ALJ has a duty to develop the record, the burden remains on Plaintiff
to prove that she is disabled and that her alcohol abuse is not a contributing factor material
to her disability.11 See Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted) (stating that “the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and,
consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim”). Plaintiff did
not carry her burden in this instance.
Moreover, as explained by the ALJ, there exists substantial evidence in the record to
support his Decision. While a non-examining physician’s opinion is typically given less weight
than that of a treating or examining physician, any opinion can be rejected if “the evidence
supports a contrary conclusion.” Oldham, 660 F.2d at 1084. Here, the ALJ did not outright
“reject” or completely discount Dr. Moore’s opinion; the main infirmity with Dr. Moore’s
opinion is that it provides no insight on the key factor in the materiality determination.
Nevertheless, the ALJ provided more weight to the opinions of non-examining physicians.
11
At the beginning of the hearing held on August 9, 2011, the ALJ stated on the record before
Plaintiff and her counsel that Dr. Moore opined “that alcohol contributes to the limitations but [he] doesn’t say
to what extent.” Tr. at 65. At the close of that hearing, the ALJ explained his intentions of holding a
supplemental hearing and calling a “psych [medical expert] and a VE.” Tr. at 81. Plaintiff’s counsel stated, “I’m
confident that everything we would want is in, but I didn’t know if you would leave [the record] open to still submit
additional [evidence] or not?” Tr. at 82. The ALJ indicated that the record would be left open for one week for
counsel to submit any additional evidence. Tr. at 82. Counsel did not submit additional evidence.
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Plaintiff does not challenge the weight assigned to those physicians, and upon review, the
undersigned finds the ALJ’s assignment of weight to those opinions to be supported by
substantial evidence.
In sum, Plaintiff has selected one (1) opinion from the record (Dr. Moore’s opinion) and
seeks to have only that opinion form the basis of a finding of disability. Considering the
totality of the evidence, however, including the other medical opinions in the record and the
testimony of Plaintiff, the ALJ reasonably found that Plaintiff’s alcohol abuse is a contributing
factor material to her disability and but for Plaintiff’s continued alcohol abuse, she would not
be disabled. These findings are supported by substantial evidence.
V. Conclusion
Upon review, the undersigned finds that the ALJ properly assessed Dr. Moore’s
opinion, and the ALJ did not err in assigning that opinion little weight. The ALJ’s Decision is
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment pursuant to sentence four of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s final decision.
2.
The Clerk is further directed to close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida on August 30, 2013.
jlk
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
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