Mazzola v. McNeal et al
Filing
69
ORDER granting 57 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this Order and close the case. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 9/28/2017. (JW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
SAMUEL A. MAZZOLA,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:12-cv-1055-J-34JRK
DONALD DAVIS, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Samuel A. Mazzola, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this
action on September 26, 2012, by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1). Mazzola
filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) on November 6, 2012; a Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 10) on April 30, 2013; and a Third Amended Complaint (TAC; Doc. 13)
with exhibits (P. Ex.) on June 20, 2014. Mazzola names the following individuals as
Defendants: (1) Walter McNeil, former Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections
(FDOC); (2) Donald Davis, Warden of Columbia Correctional Institution (CCI); (3) Michael
Willis, Assistant Warden of Programs at CCI; (4) Crawford, a canteen manager at CCI;
(5) D. Anderson, a canteen manager at CCI; and (6) the Chief Executive Officer of the
Keefe Corporation. In the TAC, Mazzola, a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair, asserts
that Defendants are discriminating against him and other wheelchair-bound inmates by
failing to hire them as canteen operators in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). TAC at 5. As relief, he requests nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages.
He also seeks modification of one canteen within the FDOC, so that, if or when a qualified
wheelchair-bound inmate is selected to work in the canteen, he may enjoy the same
benefits as non-handicapped inmates.
On June 17, 2015, the Court dismissed Defendants McNeil and the Chief
Executive Officer of the Keefe Corporation (Doc. 15) without prejudice because Mazzola
failed to state a claim for relief against them. Then, after Mazzola’s voluntary requests for
dismissal, the Court dismissed Defendant D. Anderson (Doc. 39) on August 1, 2016, and
Defendant Crawford (Doc. 45) on August 24, 2016. Therefore, the only remaining
defendants in this case are Davis and Willis.
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Davis
and Willis (Motion; Doc. 57) with exhibits (Def. Ex.). The Court advised Mazzola of the
provisions of Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, notified him that the granting of
a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment would represent a final
adjudication of this case which may foreclose subsequent litigation on the matter, and
gave him an opportunity to respond to the Motion. See Summary Judgment Notice (Doc.
58); Order of Special Appointment; Directing Service of Process Upon Defendants; Notice
to Plaintiff (Doc. 14). Mazzola filed his response to the Motion. See Plaintiff’s Opposed to
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Response; Doc. 65) with exhibits (Resp.
Ex.).
2
II. Statement of Facts1
On September 29, 2009, Mazzola submitted an ADA Form DC2-530 to notify the
FDOC that there "is no wheelchair accessible canteen's, [sic] so that we (I) may be a
canteen operator(s) and have the same opportunity as other's [sic] without a wheelchair."
P. Ex. 1A, State of Florida, Department of Corrections, Reasonable Modification or
Accommodation Request. He recommended that the FDOC lower the shelves and widen
the aisles in one canteen to accommodate handicapped inmates. Id. In response to the
submission, Defendant Willis interviewed Mazzola on October 12, 2009, and concluded
that: "If [an] inmate that is wheelchair bound was selected to work in the canteen,
appropriate accommodations would be made as necessary if the physical structure of the
building allows." P. Ex. 1B, Reviewer's Action.
On November 2, 2009, Mazzola submitted a formal grievance to Defendant Davis
and requested that the FDOC modify a canteen and select him as a canteen operator. P.
Ex. 4A, Request for Administrative Remedy or Appeal; Resp. Ex. G. The FDOC (T.
Birchard and Defendant Davis) responded, stating in part:
Your request for administrative remedy has been received,
reviewed and evaluated. The response that you received on
the informal grievance has been reviewed and is found to
appropriately address the concerns that you raised. As stated
by Mr. Willis, you currently are not a Canteen Operator, so this
issue does not affect you. Furthermore, a review of your
request for Reasonable Modification or Accommodation
1
The facts recited in this section are either undisputed, or any disagreement has been indicated.
Because this case is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion, the facts recited herein, and all reasonable
inferences therefrom, have been viewed by the Court in a light most favorable to Plaintiff Mazzola. See TMobile S. LLC v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2008). Additionally,
because Mazzola’s TAC is verified under oath, his assertions are given the same weight as if made in an
affidavit. See Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 F. App'x 948, 950 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted) ("The factual
assertions that [Plaintiff] made in his amended complaint should have been given the same weight as an
affidavit, because [Plaintiff] verified his complaint with an unsworn written declaration, made under penalty
of perjury, and his complaint meets Rule 56's requirements for affidavits and sworn declarations.").
3
Request indicated that if an inmate that is wheelchair bound
was selected to work in the canteen, appropriate
accommodations would be made as necessary if the physical
structure of the building allows.
P. Ex. 4B, Response, dated November 19, 2009; Resp. Ex. G-1.
On July 28, 2010, Mazzola submitted another ADA Form DC2-530 in which he
stated that he submitted his name to “the canteen supervisor and classification” to be a
canteen operator on September 7, 2009, and because he was never selected as a
canteen operator, he believed CCI was discriminating against him. P. Ex. 5A-5B, Resp.
Ex. B-B1. He asserted that six other inmates had been selected to be canteen operators
since he submitted his name, yet none of those inmates were on a “canteen list.” P. Ex.
5B, Resp. Ex. B1. Mazzola requested that one canteen be modified and one wheelchairbound inmate be placed in the canteen. P. Ex. 5A, Resp. Ex. B. Defendant Willis
responded: "The ICT [(Institutional Classification Team)] will make job assignments. The
ICT is not bound to give any particular inmate a canteen job assignment." P. Ex. 5C,
Reviewer's Action, dated August 5, 2010.
On August 22, 2010, Mazzola submitted an informal grievance to Defendant Davis
to inquire about the selection process for the position of canteen operator. P. Ex. 6A-6B,
Inmate Request. Mazzola stated that he requested to be a canteen operator and was told
he would be placed on the “list” to be a canteen operator. Id. He complained, however,
that since he made his request in August 2009, six other inmates were selected to be a
canteen operator even though those inmates were never on the “list.” Id. Mazzola
asserted that the staff discriminated against him because he was a wheelchair-bound
inmate. Upon referral of the grievance to the Classification Department, Mrs. Collins
responded as follows:
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Received, reviewed, and evaluated. (1) received all [seven]
documents [and] a[g]grieved issue. The selection process is
up to the work supervisor and then reviewed by the ICT for
approval or denial. Based on my review of you for the job
assignment[,] you would not ever be approved regardless of
physical abilities. (2) Second, you have not provided sufficient
proof an inmate confined to a wheelchair could not work in a
specific area. You simply allege [sic]. Should the need be
found to modify a specific area we also state [we] will
accommodate.
P. Ex. 6A, Response, dated August 30, 2010.
On September 2, 2010, Mazzola submitted a formal grievance to Defendant Davis
seeking to clarify Mrs. Collins's August 30th response. P. Ex. 7A-7B, Request for
Administrative Remedy or Appeal. As a remedy, he sought the modification of one
canteen and placement as the next canteen operator. Id. at 7B. The FDOC (T. Birchard
and Defendant Willis) responded in part:
Your request for administrative remedy has been received,
reviewed and evaluated. The response that you received on
the informal grievance has been reviewed and is found to
appropriately address the concerns that you raised. As stated
by Mr. Willis, you currently are not a Canteen Operator, so this
issue does not affect you. Furthermore, a review of your
request for Reasonable Modification or Accommodation
Request indicated that if an inmate that is wheelchair bound
was selected to work in the canteen, appropriate
accommodations would be made as necessary if the physical
structure of the building allows. One of the primary objectives
of staff of the Department of Corrections is the placement of
inmates in appropriate job assignments, custody levels and
institutional assignments in order to minimize the risk to the
general public and maintain order and security. Even if an
inmate fits the minimum basic criteria for a particular program,
that is not a guarantee that s/he will be recommended or
approved for that program. In addition, placement in such
programs is a privilege not a right of the inmate and the
ultimate decision as to whether or not the inmate is assigned
to a specific program or facility is based on a professional
review made by staff in accordance with the rules of the
Department.
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P. Ex. 7C, Response, dated September 13, 2010.
In 2011 and 2012, Mazzola continued to inquire about being considered for a job
as an inmate canteen operator. P. Exs. 10, 11, 12, 13. In November 2011, a prison official
submitted Mazzola's name to the Classification Department for consideration. See P. Ex.
11, Resp. Ex. I. In response to a July 2012 inquiry from Mazzola regarding the
qualifications needed for the position of canteen operator, Defendant Anderson, a
canteen manager and representative of Keefe Group, advised Mazzola as follows:
I do not know what classification looks at other than the social
security issue[.] [Y]ou must have a verified social security
number and card, and your disciplinary record[.] Keefe
requires fairly good TABE [(Test of Adult Basic Education)]
scores and you can not have any type of sex crimes.
P. Ex. 13, Response, dated July 27, 2012.
III. Standard of Review
Under Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The record
to be considered on a motion for summary judgment may include “depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).2 An issue is genuine when the
2
Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding summaryjudgment motions.” Rule 56 advisory committee’s note 2010 Amends.
The standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged. The language of
subdivision (a) continues to require that there be no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The amendments will not
affect continuing development of the decisional law construing and applying these phrases.
6
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-movant.
See Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere
scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat
a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381
F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
252 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to
the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to
be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.
1991). “When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then
go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th
Cir. 1995) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantive law determines the
materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510.
In determining whether summary
judgment is appropriate, a court “must view all evidence and make all reasonable
Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 F. App’x 874, 879 n.3 (11th Cir. 2013). “[A]lthough the interpretations in the
advisory committee[‘s] notes are not binding, they are highly persuasive.” Id. Thus, case law construing
the former Rule 56 standard of review remains viable and applies here.
“Although an unpublished opinion is not binding . . ., it is persuasive authority.” United States v.
Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R.
36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive
authority.”).
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inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52
F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del
Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).
IV. Summary of Arguments
In their Motion, Defendants Davis and Willis argue that Mazzola fails to state a
claim against them in their individual capacities because Title II of the ADA does not
provide for individual capacity suits against state officials. Motion at 9-10. Further, they
state that even assuming individual capacity suits are authorized, Mazzola fails to state
an ADA claim. Specifically, Defendants Davis and Willis assert that Mazzola (1) does not
cite to any evidence that he was discriminated against because of his disability; (2) cannot
connect them to any decision regarding whether to hire him; and (3) did not qualify for the
position of canteen operator. Id. at 10-12. To the extent Mazzola sues Defendant Davis
and Willis in their official capacities, they contend that Mazzola’s monetary damages
claims are barred by the state’s sovereign immunity. Id. at 12-13. Further, they assert that
Mazzola is not entitled to either monetary damages or injunctive relief because Mazzola
does not demonstrate that any discrimination occurred or that the alleged discrimination
was intentional. Id. at 13-15.
In his Response, Mazzola argues that he is suing Defendants Davis and Willis in
their individual capacities. Response at 2. Mazzola also contends that he was
discriminated against because of his disability as evidenced by the failure of Defendants
Davis and Willis to hire him or other disabled inmates as canteen operators. In support of
his claim, Mazzola submits eight affidavits from other wheelchair-bound inmates. See
Resp. Ex. C-C7. Inmate Thomas Fondura states that he has never been asked to be a
8
canteen operator, and knows the FDOC would never hire him as a canteen operator
because the FDOC does not have wheelchair accessible canteens. Id. at C. Inmate
William Towning declares that he never asked to be a canteen operator because he
believes he would not be hired given the fact that the FDOC has never hired a wheelchairbound inmate for the canteen operator position and there are no wheelchair accessible
canteens. Id. at C1. Inmates Randolph Phillips, Wesley Caruthers, and Wayne Brasby
state that they have requested to be a canteen operator, but have not been selected to
be a canteen operator. Id. at C2-C4. Inmates Leslie Hill and Kent Murray assert that they
made requests to be canteen operators, but were told by unidentified persons that they
could not be canteen operators because the canteens were not designed to
accommodate a wheelchair-bound inmate. Id. at C6-C7. Inmate Clark Ronald asserts that
he has been to six FDOC’s institutions and has “never seen nor heard” of a wheelchairbound inmate “working in any canteen run by Keefe.” Id. at C5.
V. Laws and Conclusions
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by
any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “Only public entities are liable for violations of Title
II of the ADA.” Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 2010).
A. Individual Capacity Claims
Mazzola expressly states that he seeks to sue Defendants Davis and Willis in their
individual capacities. See Response at 2. Because only public entities may be liable under
the ADA, Mazzola fails to state an ADA claim against Defendants Davis and Willis in their
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individual capacities. See Owens v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 602 F. App’x 475, 477, 478
(11th Cir. 2015); Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he
Disabilities Act does not provide for individual liability, only for employer liability”).
Therefore, the Court will grant the Motion and dismiss the TAC to the extent Defendants
Davis and Willis are sued in their individual capacities.
B. Official Capacity Claims
Mazzola does not assert in his Response or TAC that he seeks to sue Defendants
Davis and Willis in their official capacities. Nevertheless, any ADA claim against
Defendants Davis and Willis in their official capacities would be a claim against the FDOC.
See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (noting that suits against state officials in their
official capacities should be treated as suits against the State); Owens, 602 F. App’x at
478. “State prisons [, like the FDOC,] are public entities for purposes of the ADA[,]” and
are therefore subject to suit under the ADA. Owens, 602 F. App’x at 477 (citing Pa. Dep’t
of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998)). In the TAC, Mazzola seeks injunctive relief
that can only be imposed against the FDOC. Therefore, liberally construing the TAC, the
Court considers Mazzola’s ADA claim as a claim against the FDOC through Defendants
Davis and Willis in their official capacities.
To state a claim of under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate
(1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he
was either excluded from participation in or denied the
benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities,
or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity;
and (3) that the exclusion, denial of benefit, or discrimination
was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.
Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2007). With regard to the first
element, a “qualified individual with a disability” is “someone who has a disability and
10
‘meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation
in programs or activities provided by a public entity,’ with or without reasonable
modifications.” Owens, 602 F. App'x at 478 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)).
Defendants do not dispute that Mazzola has a disability. However, the parties do
dispute whether Mazzola meets the essential eligibility requirements of being a canteen
operator. Defendants Davis and Willis argue that Mazzola is unable to perform the
essential functions of a canteen operator; namely loading items, lifting items, stocking
items, and pushing or pulling a cart. Motion at 11-12. However, during his deposition,
Mazzola stated that he was able to lift boxes, bend down, touch the ground with his hand,
and pick up items off the floor. Def. Ex. A at 14. Further, Mazzola asserted that he
requested that one of the canteens’ shelves be lowered to allow him access, presumably
to allow him to stock items. Id. at 6. While there is no dispute that Mazzola cannot push
or pull a cart, Mazzola indicated that the canteen operators assisted each other in
transporting items via the carts to the canteens. See id. at 7. Viewing this evidence in the
light most favorable to Mazzola, a jury could conclude that Mazzola (1) can load and lift
items; (2) with a reasonable modification to the shelves, stock items; and (3) with the
assistance from other canteen operators, pull or push a cart. Therefore, the Court
concludes that there is a genuine and disputed issue of material fact regarding whether
Mazzola is a qualified individual with a disability. However, the inquiry does not end here.
The Court also must determine whether there is a disputed issue of material fact
regarding whether the FDOC failed to select Mazzola as a canteen operator because he
was disabled. Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1334 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding that to succeed an ADA plaintiff must prove that the challenged action was
11
“because of” the disability). Defendant Davis explains the process of selecting canteen
operators in his affidavit. First, “[t]he Classification Department generates a list of
candidates with the appropriate skills and or aptitude to perform the daily duties of a
canteen operator.” Def. Ex. B. Next, the Institutional Classification Team (ICT) reviews
the list of candidates and makes the decision to assign a candidate as a canteen operator.
Def. Exs. A at 19, B, C. The ICT consists of “the warden or assistant warden, classification
supervisor, chief of security, and other members as necessary when appointed by the
warden or designated by rule.”3 Def. Exs. B, C.
The evidence reflects that Mazzola requested that his name be submitted to the
Classification Department for consideration as a canteen operator. See P. Ex. 11, Resp.
Ex. I. He points to no evidence that the Classification Department ever found him to have
the “appropriate skills and aptitude” to be placed on the list for consideration by the ICT,
or that he had an acceptable TABE score. Nor does he suggest how he would have any
knowledge of what inmates’ names were actually forwarded to the ICT. His conclusory
allegation that his name was placed on the “list,” see Declaration of Samuel Mazzola
(Doc. 65-1), does not create a genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Daniel v. Dekalb
Cty. School Dist., 600 F. App’x 632, 635 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Conclusory allegations or
allegations that are unsupported by the record do not create genuine issues of material
fact that withstand summary judgment.”). This is particularly true given the fact that
Defendant Willis states that “[f]rom [his] recollection, Mr. Mazzola did not ever make it to
the ICT stage with respect to a position with the canteen.” Def. Ex. C. And, Defendant
3
Defendant Davis was the Warden of CCI from “approximately spring of 2010 until [his] retirement
in January 0f 2013” and a member of the ICT. Def. Ex. B. Defendant Willis was the Assistant Warden of
CCI “from approximately June of 2003 until March of 2012” and was a member of the ICT team. Def. Ex.
C.
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Davis states that he does not “recall Mr. Mazzola and [he does not] believe [he] was ever
involved in a canteen employment decision regarding Mr. Mazzola.” Def. Ex. B. Moreover,
the grievance response from the Classification Department itself states that based on her
review, Mazzola would not be approved for a canteen operator position regardless of his
physical abilities. See P. Ex. 6A.
Assuming arguendo that the Classification Department placed Mazzola’s name on
the list of candidates for review by the ICT, Mazzola points to no evidence suggesting
that the ICT failed to select him as a canteen operator because of his disability. As
explained in response to Mazzola’s September 2, 2010 grievance,
One of the primary objectives of staff of the Department of
Corrections is the placement of inmates in appropriate job
assignments, custody levels and institutional assignments in
order to minimize the risk to the general public and maintain
order and security. Even if an inmate fits the minimum basic
criteria for a particular program, that is not a guarantee that
s/he will be recommended or approved for that program. In
addition, placement in such programs is a privilege not a right
of the inmate and the ultimate decision as to whether or not
the inmate is assigned to a specific program or facility is based
on a professional review made by staff in accordance with the
rules of the Department.
P. Ex. 7C. Mazzola presents no evidence of the discussions the ICT had regarding the
selection of canteen operators, whether or not they involved him, or the actual decisions
made in selecting canteen operators. Indeed, Mazzola acknowledges that he was neither
aware of nor had any personal knowledge of the ICT’s communications regarding the
selection for canteen operators. Def. A. at 19-20. Further, the affidavits from the other
wheelchair-bound inmates submitted by Mazzola do not aide Mazzola’s contention that
the FDOC discriminated against him because of his disability. First, the inmates lack any
personal knowledge about any consideration of Mazzola as a canteen operator. Second,
13
the inmates do not provide any details regarding their own qualification or efforts to be
considered to be a canteen operator to allow the Court to even infer discrimination.
Indeed, two inmates admit that they never sought a position as a canteen operator, and
as for the remaining inmates, the Court can only guess whether they were qualified
individuals with a disability.4 The Court is left with only Mazzola’s speculation that he was
not selected as a canteen operator because of his disability. Mazzola’s speculation is
insufficient to avoid summary judgment. See Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169,
1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (“unsupported speculation … does not meet a party’s burden of
producing some defense to a summary judgment motion. Speculation does not create
a genuine issue of fact; instead, it creates a false issue, the demolition of which is a
primary goal of summary judgment.”(emphasis and internal quotes omitted)).
The ADA requires a plaintiff to prove that he was discriminated against “because
of” a disability. Farley, 197 F.3d at 1334. Thus, Mazzola must point to some evidence that
his disability was “a determinative” factor in the decision. Id. Because he has failed to
point to any evidence that either the Classification Department or the ICT even considered
his disability, he fails to create a genuine issue of fact for trial. Moreover, both Davis and
Willis affirmatively state they have not denied a qualified inmate any opportunity because
of a disability. Def. Exs. B, C. Mazzola fails to rebut any of this evidence. In this record,
4
Although inmates Hill and Murray state that they were told they could not be canteen operators
because the canteens were not accessible, they do not identify who made this statement or in what context.
This unattributed hearsay is at best a scintilla of evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment. See
Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (“A mere “scintilla” of evidence supporting the
opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably
find for that party.”); Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 962 (11th Cir. 1997) (speculation and
hearsay are insufficient to create an issue of fact for trial).
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Mazzola has failed to point to evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on his
claim that the FDOC, through Defendants Davis and Willis, discriminated against him
because of a disability when it failed to select him to be a canteen operator. Therefore,
the Court will grant the Motion and dismiss the TAC to the extent Defendants Davis and
Willis are sued in their official capacities. Based on the foregoing, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Davis and Willis (Doc.
57) is GRANTED.
2. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Donald Davis
and Michael Willis.
3. The Clerk is further directed to terminate any pending motions and close this
case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 28th day of September, 2017.
sflc
c:
Samuel A. Mazzola, #043378
Counsel of Record
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