Settle v. Williams et al
Filing
85
ORDER denying 54 Motion for summary judgment; granting 83 Motion for Leave to File to the extent stated in order; granting 84 Motion for Leave to File to the extent stated in order, denied in all other respects; striking [71-1] Declaration of John V. Pino. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 9/24/2014. (LDO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
JUSTIN W. SETTLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:12-cv-1064-J-39JRK
EVAN WILLIAMS, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff, an inmate of the Florida penal system who is
proceeding pro se, initiated this case by filing a Civil Rights
Complaint (Doc. 1).
He is proceeding on a Second Amended Civil
Rights Complaint (Complaint) (Doc. 28).
He names the following
correctional officers employed at Florida State Prison as the
Defendants in this action: (1) Officer Evan Williams; (2) Officer
Jesse Oliveros; (3) and Sergeant Brandon Woods.
Plaintiff claims
that his rights under the Eighth Amendment were violated on August
23, 2012, when Defendants Williams and Woods used unnecessary and
excessive force upon Plaintiff and Defendant Oliveros failed to
protect him from this abuse.
This cause is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (Motion for Summary Judgment) (Doc. 54).1
The
Court had previously advised Plaintiff of the provisions of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56, and gave him an opportunity to respond.
(Doc. 13).
See Order
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Leave to Amend his
response (Doc. 83). This motion will be granted and the Court will
consider Plaintiff's Amended Brief in Opposition to the Defendants'
Summary
Judgment
Motion
(Response)
(Doc.
81)
and
Statement of Disputed Factual Issues (Doc. 82).2
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Exhibit L (Doc. 71-1) will be stricken by the Court as it does not
include the date of the execution of the Declaration of Witness
John V. Pino; therefore, it does not comply with the requirements
of 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
Thus, Plaintiff's Exhibit L will not be
considered by the Court.
1
The Court will refer to the exhibits submitted in support of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as "Ex." The Court notes
that Defendants failed to provide the Court with Ex. A.
This
failure will not prevent the Court from addressing the Motion. The
Court also notes that Defendants filed exhibits B (Doc. 62), C
(Doc. 60), and D (Doc. 61) separately.
2
The Court hereinafter refers to the exhibits submitted in
support of the Response as "P. Ex." Plaintiff's Motion for Leave
to Amend (Doc. 84) will be granted to the extent that Plaintiff
asks that this Court to not consider Defendant J. Oliveros'
original admissions (prior to the amendment) as part of his
response. See P. Ex. 10. In all other respects the Motion for
Leave to Amend (Doc. 84) will be denied since Plaintiff states the
remaining portion of his Response (Doc. 81) is true and correct.
2
II.
Summary Judgment Standard
"Summary judgment is appropriate only if 'the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'"
Moton v.
Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a)).
"If the moving party meets this burden, 'the nonmoving
party must present evidence beyond the pleadings showing that a
reasonable jury could find in its favor.'" Ekokotu v. Federal Exp.
Corp., 408 F. App'x 331, 333 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) (quoting
Fickling v. United States, 507 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2007)),
cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 420 (2011).
III. Law and Conclusions
A.
"The
Eighth
Eighth Amendment Claim
Amendment
of
the
United
States
Constitution
forbids 'cruel and unusual punishments.' U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment."
Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175
(11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
The Eleventh
Circuit has set forth the standard for an excessive use of force
claim for an inmate:
In both Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment
excessive force claims, whether the use of
force violates an inmate's constitutional
rights "ultimately turns on 'whether force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore
discipline
or
maliciously
and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm.'" Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 3203
21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251
(1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) (establishing the
standard for an Eighth Amendment excessive
force claim); see Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d
1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying the
Whitley test in a Fourteenth Amendment
excessive force case).
If force is used
"maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm," then it necessarily
shocks the conscience.
See Brown v. Smith,
813 F.2d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments give
equivalent
protections
against
excessive
force). If not, then it does not.
Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam).
"Even when an officer is not a participant in the
excessive force, he can still be liable if he fails to take
reasonable steps to protect the victim." Ledlow v. Givens, No. 1212296, 2012 WL 6176471, at *4 (11th Cir. Dec. 12, 2012) (per
curiam) (not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter)
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 2802 (2013).
In this case, the parties have contradictory versions of what
happened on August 23, 2012.
On one hand, Defendant Williams
asserts that he used only the amount of force necessary to regain
control of Plaintiff after Plaintiff spat on him and resisted the
officer's efforts to restrain him.
Defendants Woods and Oliveros
contend that they did not use any force on Plaintiff. Woods claims
that Settle was resisting when he saw Williams restraining him.
Oliveros states that Williams released Plaintiff when Oliveros
arrived at the shower area.
4
On the other hand, Plaintiff asserts that he was severely
beaten in the shower by Defendants Williams and Woods, even though
he was not resisting or posing any threat to the officers, and
that, as a result of the beating, he suffered from hematomas on two
parts of his forehead; a laceration above his right eye, which
required sutures; a small laceration on each elbow; multiple
scratches on his shoulder, chest, and arms; a deformation of his
right shoulder; permanent scaring on his face and elbow; pain in
his neck and right shoulder, and emotional distress.
Plaintiff
claims that Defendant Oliveros failed to intervene and protect him
from the beating in the shower.
Both
parties
have
respective positions.
submitted
affidavits
to
support
their
Additionally, Defendants have submitted
fixed wing video footage depicting Plaintiff being escorted to the
shower area.
Ex. L.3
This video evidence is inconclusive.
Although Plaintiff can be seen walking into the shower area
escorted by one officer, the incident which is the subject of the
Second Amended Complaint is not captured by the fixed wing camera
as the incident occurred in the shower, an area that is outside the
range of the fixed wing camera. The video evidence also shows that
shortly thereafter, two officers arrive at the shower area, but
then the two officers promptly go into the shower and the incident
is not captured by the fixed wing camera.
3
Defendants submitted Exhibit L in camera (Doc. S-58).
5
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar claim of
excessive force with respect to a claim of officers using excessive
force during an altercation in the prison shower room, and found
that the Court erred in crediting the Defendants' version of the
facts over the Plaintiff's on "issues not depicted by video
evidence."
Mathis v. Adams, No. 14-10605, 2014 WL 4067751, at *2
(11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Here too Plaintiff alleges that the
assault occurred in the shower, an area not captured by the fixed
wing camera.
Thus, the question remains as to whether the use of
force was applied maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
of causing harm, or was a justified use of force in response to
aggressive
and
threatening
actions
taken
by
Plaintiff.
The
question also remains as to whether Defendant Oliveros failed to
protect Plaintiff.
Moreover, Plaintiff's medical records reflect that when CMT-C
R.
McCall
examined
Plaintiff
on
August
23,
2012,
he
had
a
laceration above his right eye, hematomas on his forehead, a
scratch with redness on his right shoulder, neck pain, and multiple
superficial scratches on his arms and chest. P.Ex. 5 (Doc. 81-5 at
8).
Also, of import, Plaintiff was promptly taken to Memorial
Hospital for treatment, including sutures and x-rays.
Finally,
upon his return to prison, medical personnel continued to monitor
his condition.
Summary
Judgment
P. Ex. 5.
will
be
Accordingly Defendants' Motion for
denied
6
with
respect
to
Plaintiff's
excessive force claim because there are genuine issues of material
fact that prevent the entry of summary judgment at this stage of
the proceeding.4
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)
Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not suffered an injury
sufficient to withstand 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
Motion for Summary
Judgment at 19-21.
Subsection (e) of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e
states that "[n]o Federal civil action may be
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for
mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical
injury." This statute is intended to reduce
the number of frivolous cases filed by
imprisoned plaintiffs, who have little to lose
and excessive amounts of free time with which
to pursue their complaints.
See Harris v.
Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 976-79 (11th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (surveying the legislative history
of the PLRA). An action barred by § 1997e(e)
is barred only during the imprisonment of the
plaintiff; therefore, such action should be
dismissed without prejudice by the district
court, allowing the prisoner to bring his
claim once released and, presumably, once the
litigation cost-benefit balance is restored to
normal. Id. at 980.
Tracking the language of the statute, §
1997e(e) applies only to lawsuits involving
(1) Federal civil actions (2) brought by a
prisoner (3) for mental or emotional injury
4
Defendants also contend that they are entitled to qualified
immunity with respect to Plaintiff's excessive force claim. See
Motion for Summary Judgment at 18.
Because there are material
issues of fact with respect to this claim, the Court cannot address
whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity until these
disputed facts have been resolved.
7
(4) suffered while in custody. In Harris, we
decided that the phrase "Federal civil action"
means
all
federal
claims,
including
constitutional claims. 216 F.3d at 984-85.
Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531-32 (11th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1112 (2004).
The
Eleventh
Circuit
has
set
forth
the
standard
in
an
excessive use of force case.
[O]ur core inquiry is "whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore
discipline,
or
maliciously
and
sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117
L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). In determining whether
force
was
applied
maliciously
and
sadistically, we look to five factors: "(1)
the extent of injury; (2) the need for
application of force; (3) the relationship
between that need and the amount of force
used; (4) any efforts made to temper the
severity of a forceful response; and (5) the
extent of the threat to the safety of staff
and inmates[, as reasonably perceived by the
responsible officials on the basis of facts
known to them]..." Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d
1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotations
omitted).[5] However, "[t]he Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
necessarily
excludes
from
constitutional
recognition de minimis uses of physical force,
provided that the use of force is not of a
sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind."
112
S.Ct.
at
1000
(quotations
Hudson,
omitted).
McKinney v. Sheriff, 520 F. App'x 903, 905 (11th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam); Howard v. Memnon, Case No. 13-12049, 2014 WL 3411093, at
*2 (11th Cir. July 15, 2014) (per curiam) (not selected for
5
See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986).
8
publication in the Federal Reporter) ("Courts examine the facts as
reasonably perceived by the defendants on the basis of the facts
known to them at the time.") (citation omitted).
The record shows that Plaintiff suffered from several injuries
after this incident.
Not only was he treated in the emergency
room, he was transported to the hospital by ambulance.
Based on
the record before the Court, this is not an instance where the
injuries would be considered to be de minimis.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend his response (Doc.
83) is GRANTED to the extent that the Court will consider the
Amended Brief in Opposition to the Defendants' Summary Judgment
Motion (Doc. 81) and Plaintiff's Statement of Disputed Factual
Issues (Doc. 82).
2.
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 84) is
granted to the extent that Plaintiff asks that this Court to not
consider Defendant J. Oliveros' original admissions (prior to the
amendment) as part of his response.
See P. Ex. 10.
In all other
respects the Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 84) is DENIED since
Plaintiff states the remaining portion of his Response (Doc. 81) is
true and correct.
3.
Plaintiff's
Ex.
11
(Doc.
Witness John V. Pino, is STRICKEN.
9
71-1),
the
Declaration
of
4.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) is
DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida this 24th day of
September, 2014.
sa 9/19
c:
Justin W. Settle
Counsel of Record
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?