Brown v. Crews et al
Filing
108
ORDER granting 76 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claims for Compensatory and Punitive Damages, and Motion to Dismiss Defendant Crews from this Action. To the extent Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages in Counts One and Two, those claims are dismissed. Count Two against Defendant Michael Crews is dismissed. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 2/20/2015. (JW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
JOHN BROWN,
Plaintiff,
-vs-
Case No. 3:13-cv-36-J-34PDB
MICHAEL CREWS, Secretary of the
Florida Department of Corrections, in his
official capacity, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims
for Compensatory and Punitive Damages, and Motion to Dismiss Defendant Crews from this
Action (Doc. No. 76; Motion) filed on April 18, 2014. Plaintiff filed his response in opposition
to the Motion on May 5, 2014. See Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Claims for
Damages and Against Crews (Doc. No. 77; Response). Accordingly, the Motion is ripe for
review.
I.
Background Facts1
Plaintiff John Brown (Brown) alleges that, while he was an inmate at the Reception
and Medical Center (RMC), he was exposed to friable asbestos. See Amended Complaint
(Doc. No. 72; Complaint) ¶¶3, 13. Like most inmates at RMC, Brown contends that he
1
In considering the Motion to Dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the
Complaint as true, consider the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such allegations. Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th
Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994). As such, the facts
recited here are drawn from the Complaint, and may well differ from those that ultimately can be proved.
suffers from chronic illness and disabilities. See id. ¶12. Brown alleges that, despite his
condition, he was forced to remove floor tile and mastic containing asbestos from the F
dormitory where he was housed. See id. ¶¶16-17, 21-26. This work was completed in two
phases: Brown and his fellow inmates first removed the flooring from the left side of the
dormitory between June 24, 2009 and June 28, 2009, and then removed the flooring from
the right side, from October 22, 2009 until October 26, 2009. Id. ¶¶21-22, 25, 40. Brown
further alleges that exposure to asbestos in high concentrations or over extended periods
of time can result in asbestosis and mesothelioma, both respiratory ailments. See id. ¶¶1314, 28.
Although the risks of exposure to asbestos are known, Brown alleges that
Defendants failed to disclose the danger, provide any training, gloves or masks, or ensure
that the area had adequate ventilation. See id. ¶¶23, 28, 32, 35.
While completing the removal of the tile from the right side of the dormitory on
October 25, 2009, Brown alleges that Sergeant Christopher Hancock (Hancock) saw the
inmates working and informed Officer Hartley (Hartley)2 to stop the project due to the
potential asbestos hazard. See id. ¶37. Brown alleges that Colonel Archie W. Clemons
(Clemons) instructed the inmates to keep working. Id. ¶¶38-39. The following day, Brown
and the other inmates completed the work, but when Hancock discovered this, the inmates
were evacuated. Id. ¶40. Subsequent environmental testing revealed the presence of
asbestos in the floor tile and mastic. See id. ¶43. Thereafter, Brown alleges that RMC staff
who had worked in the F dormitory were tested and treated off-site for the exposure, but he
2
The Complaint does not disclose Officer Hartley’s first name.
2
and the other inmates had to wait until three months after they filed grievances to receive
treatment. See id. ¶¶46-47. Even then, Brown avers that the treatment consisted only of
a chest x-ray and an instruction to seek medical attention if the inmates suffer from any
respiratory problems or chest pains. Id. ¶¶54-55.
In light of the alleged conduct, Brown filed the instant action, asserting a claim against
Brian Riedl (Riedl), Ellen Link (Link), Hancock, Clemons, and Hartley (collectively
Defendants) for violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by subjecting him to cruel and unusual
punishment (Count One). See id. at 8-9. Brown alleges that it was common practice, within
both the RMC and the entire Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC), “to use inmates to
remove tile, mastic, and other asbestos-containing materials from Department of Corrections
structures and to perform construction labor without personal protective equipment, without
proper tools, and with inappropriate chemicals.” Id. ¶64. He therefore also asserts a claim
of supervisory liability against Riedl, as warden of the RMC, and Michael Crews, as the
Secretary of the FDOC, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Two). See id. at 9-12. With
respect to Count One, Brown seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as
compensatory and punitive damages and fees and costs. Id. at 9. As to Count Two, Brown
seeks the same declaratory and injunctive relief and fees and costs against both Riedl and
Crews, but seeks compensatory and punitive damages against Reidl alone. See id. at 1112.
In the Motion, Defendants seek dismissal of Brown’s claims for compensatory and
punitive damages in both counts, as well as dismissal of Brown’s claim against Crews in
Count Two in its entirety. See generally Motion. Specifically, Defendants argue that
3
Brown’s claim for compensatory and punitive damages should be dismissed because he
does not allege sufficient physical injury as required by the Prisoner Litigation Relief Act
(PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). See id. at 4-8. Additionally, they argue that the claims
against Crews in Count Two should be dismissed because Brown has not alleged that
Crews caused the constitutional violations to occur and § 1983 does not allow for vicarious
liability. See id. at 8-11. In response, Brown argues that he alleges that he suffered a
physical injury and he need not allege such injury with further specificity. See Response at
2-5. Brown also contends that he alleges that there was a widespread custom of using sick
inmates for physical labor, including the handling of hazardous materials without protective
equipment, sufficient to put Crews on notice of the practice. See id. at 5-8. Based on these
allegations, Brown argues that he has sufficiently pled causes of action for compensatory
and punitive damages against all Defendants and supervisory liability against Crews.
II.
Standard of Review
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in
the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be
drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Omar ex. rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1247
(11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal
pleading requirements. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir.
2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint
4
should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372
F.3d at 1262 (explaining that “[c]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or
legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and
quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” which simply “are not entitled
to [an] assumption of truth.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680-81. Thus, in ruling on a motion
to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).3
3
Prior to Iqbal, Eleventh Circuit precedent instructed that a heightened pleading standard
applied in § 1983 actions where “the defendants are individuals who may seek qualified immunity.” See
Amnesty Int’l, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1179 (11th Cir. 2009). However, in Randall v. Scott, 610
F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010), the Eleventh Circuit determined that “[a]fter Iqbal it is clear that there is no
‘heightened pleading standard’ as it relates to cases governed by Rule 8(a)(2), including civil rights
complaints.” See Randall, 610 F.3d at 707-10. In light of this Eleventh Circuit precedent and because
Crews does not assert that the heightened pleading standard applies, the Court will apply the standard
5
III.
Discussion
“[S]ection 1983 provides individuals with a federal remedy for the deprivation of rights,
privileges, or immunities protected by the Constitution or the laws of the United States that
are committed under color of state law.” Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 733
n.12 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to state a claim for
relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege that he or she was “deprived of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation
was committed under color of state law.” See Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast
Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). Here, Brown
alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to cruel and
unusual punishment in the form of exposure to asbestos.
A prisoner’s medical treatment and conditions of confinement are subject to scrutiny
under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). Indeed, the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires that
prisoners be provided “humane conditions of confinement,” including adequate food, shelter,
clothing, and medical care. Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). It further imposes a duty upon prison
officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates.” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). Thus, an inmate may
of review set forth in Twombly and Iqbal. Id. at 710; see also Nettles v. City of Leesburg Police Dep’t,
415 F. App’x 116, 120-21 (11th Cir. 2010); but see Harper v. Lawrence Cnty., Ala., 592 F.3d 1227, 1233
(11th Cir. 2010) (applying the heightened pleading standard post-Iqbal); Keating v. City of Miami, 598
F.3d 753, 762-63 (11th Cir. 2010) (same).
6
maintain a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment based on either a condition of
confinement or a failure to provide medical care. Evans v. St. Lucie Cnty. Jail, 448 F. App’x
971, 973 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Each of these claims requires “an
objective showing of a deprivation or injury that is ‘sufficiently serious’ to constitute a denial
of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’ and a subjective showing that the
official had a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304
(11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). In addition to these two requirements,
a plaintiff must also allege causation. See Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2007) (“[A]s with any tort claim, [the plaintiff] must show that the injury was caused by
the defendant’s wrongful conduct.”).
Here, in complaining about his exposure to asbestos, Brown could be challenging
both his conditions of confinement and the failure to provide him medical care in the months
following that exposure. Nonetheless, in the Motion, Defendants do not challenge the
sufficiency of Brown’s allegations as to his conditions of confinement or the failure to
address a serious medical need.4 Nor do they argue that Brown has failed to plead facts to
show that Defendants’ state of mind amounted to deliberate indifference.5 Instead, with
4
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on conditions of confinement, a
prisoner must show that the challenged condition is “extreme,” generally involving “the wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain,” or that the condition poses “an unreasonable risk of serious damage to
his future health’ or safety.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal citations
omitted). “[A] serious medical need is considered ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal
citation omitted).
5
In both conditions of confinement and failure to provide medical treatment cases, the
“deliberate indifference” standard applies. Helling, 509 U.S. at 32. The Eleventh Circuit has explained
that “deliberate indifference has three components: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm;
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regard to both Counts One and Two, Defendants contend that Brown cannot seek either
compensatory or punitive damages because of his failure to allege that he suffered a
physical injury. With regard to Count Two, Defendants contend that Brown has failed to
plead facts to support finding liability as to Defendant Crews. The Court addresses
Defendants’ argument regarding Brown’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages
first because it relates to both counts of the Complaint.
A.
PLRA
The PLRA imposes certain restrictions on prisoners seeking judicial relief “to reduce
the number of frivolous cases filed by imprisoned plaintiffs, who have little to lose and
excessive amounts of free time with which to pursue their complaints.” Al-Amin v. Smith,
637 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th
Cir. 2002)). One such restriction, found in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), provides: “No Federal civil
action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility,
for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
injury or the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18).” Section
1997e(e) “applies only to lawsuits involving (1) Federal civil actions (2) brought by a prisoner
(3) for mental or emotional injury (4) suffered while in custody.” Napier, 314 F.3d at 532.
While the statute does not define “physical injury,” the Eleventh Circuit has clarified that, “in
order to satisfy section 1997e(e), the physical injury must be more than de minimis, but need
not be significant.” Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999), reh’g en banc
(2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245
(quoting McElligot v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999)).
8
granted and opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), opinion reinstated in relevant
part, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000). A prisoner must allege more than a trivial or
de minimis injury because permitting otherwise “would almost render the congressional
exclusion an empty set” and “would make no sense in light of our basic understanding that
‘routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society.’” Id. (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)). In Luong v. Hatt, 979 F.
Supp. 481 (N.D. Tex. 1997), the court identified a standard for determining whether an
alleged injury qualifies as a “physical injury” under § 1997e(e):
A physical injury is an observable or diagnosable medical condition requiring
treatment by a medical care professional. It is not a sore muscle, an aching
back, a scratch, an abrasion, a bruise, etc., which lasts even up to two or
three weeks. People in the regular and ordinary events and activities in their
daily lives do not seek medical care for the injuries they receive unless it
obviously appears to be of a serious nature, or persists after home remedy
care.
Id. at 486; see also Daughtry v. Moore, No. 08-00215-KD-C, 2009 WL 1151858, at *5 (S.D.
Ala. Apr. 27, 2009) (applying Luong to determine that bumps on the plaintiff’s neck and
shoulders did not constitute “physical injury”).
Brown does not dispute the applicability of § 1997e(e) to his claims, but rather
contends that he has alleged sufficient injury. In the Complaint, Brown alleges that he was
exposed to asbestos and that asbestos is known to be dangerous because it can cause
respiratory problems. Nowhere in the Complaint does Brown contend that he has suffered
such respiratory problems as a result of his exposure. Instead, in Count One, Brown simply
alleges that he “suffered physical injury as a result of the aforementioned deliberate
9
indifference.” Complaint ¶61. This allegation is vague and conclusory.6 In Brown’s
Response, he contends that Defendants are attempting to hold him to a higher pleading
standard than that required by Rule 8. Response at 2-5. However, even the minimal
pleading requirements of Rule 8 demand more than conclusory allegations.
Nevertheless, Brown argues that “[t]he full extent of this physical injury, and its
causation, are the proper subject of discovery in this action.” Response at 5. The problem
with this argument is that it places the discovery cart before the pleading horse. The
Supreme Court in Twombly expressly stated that a mere “formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (emphasis added).
Brown must plead sufficient facts in his Complaint to survive a motion to dismiss in order to
proceed with discovery. He has not done so.
In the Complaint, Brown alleges that he was given a chest x-ray, but does not
suggest that the x-ray indicated he was suffering from any respiratory ailment or injury. He
alleges that he was told to report any ensuing difficulties, but does not allege that he
suffered any. While Brown does not specifically seek emotional or mental damages, he
alleges no other injuries for which he could be seeking damages. Based on a review of the
allegations, it appears that Brown’s injury is limited to the unknown future effects of his
exposure to asbestos. Such an injury is insufficient to support a claim for compensatory or
punitive damages under the PLRA. “[T]he term ‘physical injury’ in § 1997e(e) is not broad
6
In Count Two, Brown makes a similar conclusory allegation that “[t]he exposure of the
Plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious harm including caustic chemical fumes and asbestos exposure
caused the Plaintiff to suffer physical injury.” Complaint ¶73.
10
enough to encompass mere inhalation or ingestion of asbestos particles without proof of
resulting disease or other adverse physical effects.” Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F. Supp. 1318,
1323 (S.D. Ind. 1997); see also Herman, 238 F.3d at 665-66 (concluding plaintiff was not
entitled to money damages based on exposure to asbestos and mental and emotional stress
from knowledge of increased risk of possible future asbestos-related illnesses). Although
Brown is correct that he need not prove his injuries at this stage of the proceedings, he must
allege facts showing that he suffered an injury. Section 1997e(e) requires that, in order to
pursue an action for damages resulting from alleged asbestos exposure, Brown must allege
that he suffered a sufficient “physical injury.” He has failed to do so in the Complaint.
Therefore, § 1997e(e) precludes the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, and
Brown’s claims for such damages in Counts One and Two are due to be dismissed.
B.
Supervisory Liability
The Court turns next to Defendants’ argument that Brown’s claims against Crews in
Count Two must be dismissed because Brown has failed to plead facts supporting a claim
against him. “[S]upervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts
of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Hartley v.
Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
“Instead, supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs either when the supervisor personally
participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection
between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional violation.”
Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Keating v. City of Miami,
598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010).
11
Upon review of the Complaint, the Court first notes that Brown does not assert that
Crews personally participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct of Riedl, Link,
Clemons, and Hancock. Therefore, in order to state a claim for relief against Crews, Brown
must allege a causal connection between Crews’s actions and the constitutional violations
allegedly committed by Riedl, Link, Clemons, and Hancock. See Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360.
To establish the requisite causal connection, a plaintiff must allege “facts which support an
inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the
subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Keating, 598 F.3d
at 762 (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003)). This requisite
causal connection may be established “‘when a history of widespread abuse puts the
responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails
to do so,’ . . . or when the supervisor’s improper ‘custom or policy . . . resulted in deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights.’” Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234 (quoting Braddy v. Fla.
Dep’t of Labor and Emp’t Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir. 1998); Rivas v. Freeman, 940
F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991)). “The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse
sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of
continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667,
671 (11th Cir. 1990). The necessary causal connection may also be demonstrated through
“facts which support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act
unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from
doing so.” Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1235.
12
In the Motion, Crews argues that Brown has alleged only two isolated instances in
which he and “several other inmates” at RMC were exposed to asbestos which, even if true,
would be insufficient to establish the type of widespread custom necessary to impose
supervisory liability under § 1983. See Motion at 9-11. In response, Brown argues that his
allegations “amply delineate the nature of the alleged customs” and he is without knowledge
of the customs at other facilities outside of RMC in light of his limited opportunity to obtain
information as a prisoner. See Response at 7. Upon review, Brown’s allegations fail to
satisfy the minimal pleading requirements necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. The
Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations to support Brown’s conclusory allegation that
both RMC and the entire FDOC have a custom of requiring inmates to handle hazardous
materials without providing safety equipment. He alleges only two incidents in which he and
several others handled hazardous material, occurring at only one facility within the FDOC.
Brown alleges no facts to support the conclusion that Crews directed these projects or that
he even knew about them. Indeed, based on Brown’s allegations, the work of Brown and
his fellow inmates was not known even to Defendant Hancock, who actually worked at the
RMC, until Hancock saw them working on October 25, 2009. See Complaint ¶¶ 7; 37.
Perhaps recognizing the pleading deficiencies of his Complaint, Brown suggests that
he need not prove the custom at this stage of the proceeding, prior to discovery. See
Response at 7. However, as discussed above, Brown must allege facts supporting a claim
of the existence of such a custom, not legal conclusions, to survive a motion to dismiss. He
is not entitled to discovery to find such facts. The purpose of discovery is to seek evidence
in support of a properly plead claim. Because Brown has not met his burden to allege
13
sufficient facts to state a cause of action against Crews, the Motion is due to be granted to
the extent that Brown’s claim against Defendant Crews in Count Two is due to be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims for Compensatory and
Punitive Damages, and Motion to Dismiss Defendant Crews from this Action (Doc. No. 76)
is GRANTED.
2.
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages in
Counts One and Two, those claims are DISMISSED.
3.
Count Two against Defendant Michael Crews is DISMISSED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 20th day of February, 2015.
lc16
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Counsel of Record
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