Primo v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Filing
124
ORDER re 122 Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law on Collateral Sources Issue Regarding Final Judgment and 123 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant State Farm's Motion for Determination of Set-Off. The Court will enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $16,221.80. Signed by Judge Timothy J. Corrigan on 12/1/2014. (BJB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
WILLIAM PRIMO,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:13-cv-64-J-32MCR
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Florida insurance
corporation,
Defendant.
ORDER
This underinsured motorist (“UM”) coverage case comes before the Court for
determination of Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s
entitlement to any setoff from the jury award for payments made by collateral sources.
Jury trial began on September 9, 2014. (Docs. 113.) Before trial, the parties agreed
that non-party Carole Fudge, an underinsured motorist, was negligent in rear-ending
Plaintiff William Primo’s vehicle in a September 22, 2010 accident. (Doc. 69, ¶¶ 8(1),
(3).) The parties also agreed that the Court would decide post-trial any collateral
source issues, including any potential setoffs against a damages award. (Id. ¶¶ 10(3),
(4).) Thus, the issues for the jury were whether and to what extent Fudge’s negligence
caused Primo’s injuries.
On September 12, 2014, the jury returned a verdict finding that Fudge’s
negligence had caused $50,000 in damages for past medical expenses and $7,560 in
past lost earnings. (Doc. 120.) However, the jury also found that Fudge’s negligence
caused $0 in future medical expenses and that Plaintiff William Primo had not
sustained a permanent injury in the accident. (Id.) The jury therefore did not assess
past or future noneconomic damages. (Id.)
After the trial, the parties submitted their opening briefs on the issue of setoff
(Docs. 122, 123) and apparently elected not to file any responsive briefs (see Doc. 110).
In his brief, Primo contends that he has proven damages in excess of payments already
made to him by other sources, but that State Farm cannot prove that any of those
payments are duplicated by the sums awarded by the jury. (Doc. 122 at 2-3.) Thus,
according to Primo, he is entitled to the full jury award, less whatever part of a $10,000
settlement with Fudge’s insurer the Court might find duplicative. (Id. at 4.)
State Farm, on the other hand, believes it is entitled to a total setoff of
$41,793.10, comprised of the full $10,000 settlement with Fudge’s insurer, $3,399.98
in personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits and $794.59 in medical payment
(“Medpay”) benefits State Farm has already paid to Primo, $7,093.63 in past medical
bills and lost wages paid by Primo’s employer’s workers’ compensation carrier, and a
$20,050 lump sum settlement with the workers’ compensation carrier. (Doc. 123 at 69.) Alternatively, State Farm suggests a total setoff of $67,550, comprised of the full
settlements with Fudge’s insurer and Primo’s employer’s workers’ compensation
carrier and an “equitable setoff” amounting to 75% of the jury’s medical expenses
award. (Id. at 8-9.)
The Court addresses each setoff State Farm claims, starting with Primo’s
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settlement with Fudge and her insurer GMAC. The settlement was for $10,000, the
limits on Fudge’s GMAC policy (Docs. 122-1, 123-1). Primo argues that because the
release does not split the $10,000 between economic and noneconomic damages, the
settlement cannot be fully duplicated by the jury award, which was only for economic
damages. (Doc. 122 at 2-3.) Primo contends State Farm may therefore be entitled to a
partial, but not a complete, setoff for the settlement. (Doc. 122 at 2-3.) State Farm, on
the other hand, seeks a setoff for the full amount. (Doc. 123 at 6-7.)
The Court finds that the jury award should be set off by the entire settlement
amount. A review of the settlement release reveals that it was intended to cover
Primo’s total damages. (See Doc. 123-1.) The jury award in this case determined
Primo’s total damages. The jury was presented with evidence on economic and
noneconomic damages and was instructed as to both, and found that Primo was
entitled only to past economic damages. (Doc. 120.) The jury’s total award thus fully
duplicates the settlement for Primo’s total damages. Somoza v. Allstate Indemnity Co.,
929 So. 2d 702, 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 842 So. 2d 1031,
1034 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); see GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Cirillo-Meyer, 50 So. 3d 681, 68384 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). State Farm is therefore entitled to a setoff for the full $10,000
settlement.
The same reasoning applies to Primo’s settlement with the workers’
compensation carrier. Perhaps under the mistaken belief that worker’s compensation
is not subject to setoff, Fla. Stat. § 627.727(1); see Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh v. Blackmon, 754 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), Primo does not address
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worker’s compensation benefits at all in his brief. But the limited evidence submitted
by State Farm shows that Primo received $20,050 for a general release to the Clay
County Board of Commissioners and its workers’ compensation claim administrator.
(Doc. 123-2.) Just as with the settlement with Fudge and her insurer, the worker’s
compensation settlement was for Primo’s total damages, which were decided and
duplicated by the jury’s award. Thus, State Farm is entitled to a setoff for the full
$20,050 workers’ compensation settlement, as well.
According to Primo, there should be no setoff of the jury award for PIP and
Medpay benefits State Farm has already paid because State Farm cannot prove which
medical bills were duplicated in the jury award. (Doc. 122 at 3.) State Farm argues
that its payments and the workers’ compensation benefits paid are “plainly” covered
by the jury award for past medical expenses and should be set off. (Doc. 123 at 7-8).
State Farm suggests alternatively that, because the jury award was not itemized by
medical provider, the Court could apply some kind of “equitable setoff” of 75% of the
past medical expenses awarded by the jury. (Id.at 9.)
The Court agrees with State Farm’s initial proposal and finds that the PIP,
Medpay, and workers’ compensation benefits should be set off from the jury award.
Though the award was not broken down by provider and is somewhat imprecise, it is
not difficult to square the verdict with the evidence and conclude that these benefit
payments are duplicated in the award. The main disputes in this case were whether
Primo injured or aggravated injuries to his neck and shoulder in the accident and
whether the accident left him permanently injured. State Farm conceded that Primo
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had temporary pain after the accident, but contended that the neck and shoulder
conditions that eventually resulted in surgery were pre-existing. Through its verdict,
the jury essentially agreed with State Farm. The jury declined to award Primo all of
the past medical expenses he requested or any future medical expenses, and found
that he had not sustained a permanent injury. Since none of the PIP, Medpay, and
workers’ compensation benefits paid were for the disputed conditions and predate the
surgeries for these conditions, it is not difficult to conclude that the payments were
duplicated in the jury award. 1
Lastly, Primo contends State Farm cannot prove what portion of the jury award
for lost wages is duplicative of other collateral source payments because there is no
way to tell for “what particular months or weeks, or even days, the lost wages were
being awarded.” (Doc. 122 at 3.) Primo does not, however, explain why the jury’s
verdict would need to be so fine-grained. In any event, based on the limited evidence
Primo presented at trial regarding his work on the Florida Times-Union loading dock,
the Court does find that the lost wages award is duplicative of Primo’s settlements
with Fudge and with his employer’s workers’ compensation carrier and should be
subject to setoff for these prior payments.
In sum, the Court will set the total jury award of $57,560 off for $3,399.98 in
PIP benefits, $794.59 in Medpay benefits, $7,093.63 in workers’ compensation
Primo also contends that Medpay benefits are not a collateral source and
should not be set off. (Doc. 122 at 3). However, the Florida Supreme Court has held
directly to the contrary. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rudnick, 761 So. 2d 289, 291 (Fla. 2000)
(“[M]edpay benefits are a collateral source to which the general collateral source
statute is applicable.”)
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benefits, $10,000 for Primo’s settlement with Fudge and her insurance carrier, and
$20,050 for his workers’ compensation settlement. The Court will therefore enter
judgment in favor of Plaintiff William Primo in the amount of $16,221.80.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida this 1st day of December,
2014.
bjb
Copies:
Counsel of record
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