MacDougall v. City of St. Augustine, Florida et al

Filing 37

ORDER granting 20 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; granting, in part, and denying, in part, 21 Defendants' State of Florida and Shipp Motion to Dismiss. The Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the file. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 9/16/2014. (JW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MICHAEL DOUGLAS MACDOUGALL,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:13-cv-98-J-34JRK

CITY OF ST. AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA, et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________________/

ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Supporting
Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 20; City Motion) filed on October 30, 2013, and Defendants’
State of Florida and Shipp Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 21; State Motion) filed on November
4, 2013 (collectively Motions). Plaintiff filed a single response to both Motions on November
22, 2013. See Response to Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 22; Response). With the Court’s
leave, see Order (Doc. No. 28), all Defendants except the State of Florida and Thomas
Shipp filed a reply to the Response. See Defendants’ Reply in Support of Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 29; Reply). Accordingly, the Motions are ripe for judicial review.
I.

Standard of Review
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in
the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr.,

Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be
drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Omar ex. rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1247
(11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal
pleading requirements. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir.
2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint
should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372
F.3d at 1262 (explaining that “[c]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or
legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and
quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” which simply “are not entitled
to [an] assumption of truth.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680-81. Thus, in ruling on a motion
to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678
2

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this
leniency does not give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to
rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Alford v. Consol. Gov’t
of Columbus, Ga., 438 F. App’x 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2011)1 (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty.
of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted), overruled
on other grounds as recognized in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 706 (11th Cir. 2010)).
II.

Extrinsic Evidence
At the outset, the Court notes that Defendants, the City of St. Augustine (City), Joseph

Boles, James Piggot, John Regan, Ronald Brown, Donald Crichlow, and Commander
Stephen Fricke (collectively City Defendants),2 submitted several exhibits in support of the
City’s Motion. See generally City Motion, Ex. 1-6. When a party moves to dismiss under

1

“Although an unpublished opinion is not binding . . . , it is persuasive authority.” United
States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1;
11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited
as persuasive authority.”).
2

Plaintiff MacDougall brings this suit against the above individual Defendants in their
official capacities: Boles, in his capacity as Mayor of the City, Piggot as Director of General Services for
the City, Regan as City Manager, Brown as City Attorney, Crichlow as former City Commissioner, and
Fricke as the City’s Chief of Police. “[W]here a plaintiff brings an action against a public official in his
official capacity, the suit is against the office that official represents, and not the official himself.” Welch
v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1009 (11th Cir. 1995). Thus, the Court refers to the City Defendants collectively.
Additionally, the Court notes that the City Defendants contend that Fricke is an improper party because
MacDougall designated him as the Chief of Police when he has never served in that capacity. See City
Motion at 2 n.2, 5 n.3. MacDougall responds that he improperly referred to Fricke as the Chief of Police
but that he “is in charge of local law enforcement on the AICW for the City.” Response at 14. Because
suit against all of the City Defendants is suit against the City itself, and the City Defendants do not
contend that Fricke cannot be sued as a representative of the City nor do they separately move for
dismissal of Fricke as a Defendant, the Court need not determine Fricke’s official title with the City to
resolve the instant Motions.

3

Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and matters
outside of the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is
ordinarily treated as if it were a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. SFM Holdings,
Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2010); Jones v. Auto. Ins. Co.
of Hartford, Conn., 917 F.2d 1528, 1531-32 (11th Cir. 1990). Nevertheless, the Eleventh
Circuit has instructed that a district court may consider extrinsic evidence in ruling on a
motion to dismiss “if it is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim, and (2) its authenticity is not
challenged.” SFM Holdings, 600 F.3d at 1337; see also Trustmark Ins. Co. v. ESLU, Inc.,
299 F.3d 1265, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court, in its discretion, declines to consider
any documents beyond those which comply with the above exceptions, and thus, the City’s
Motion will not be converted to a motion for summary judgment. Harper v. Lawrence Cnty.,
Ala., 592 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2010); Jones, 917 F.2d at 1531-32.
Upon review of the City Motion, the Court notes that among the exhibits the City
Defendants have submitted are certain public records.3 City Motion, Exs. 1-5. Under
appropriate circumstances, a court may take judicial notice of and consider documents
attached to a motion to dismiss or response, which are public records that are “central” to
a plaintiff’s claims, without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment. This is so, as long as such documents are “public records that [are] ‘not subject
to reasonable dispute’ because they [are] ‘capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy [can] not reasonably be questioned.’” Horne v. Potter, 392

3

Exhibit 6 to the City Motion is a copy of a Florida statute enacted in 1925 establishing
the municipality known as the City of St. Augustine and delineating its boundaries.

4

F. App’x 800, 802 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). Moreover, “a court may
take notice of another court’s order . . . for the limited purpose of recognizing the ‘judicial
act’ that the order represents or the subject matter of the litigation.” United States v. Jones,
29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994). Exhibits 1-5 attached to the City Motion are documents
that were filed in the prior state court proceedings in which the state court addressed Plaintiff
Michael Douglas MacDougall’s claims, therefore, they are public records not capable of
reasonable dispute, and appropriate for judicial notice. Horne, 392 F. App’x at 802 (“The
district court properly took judicial notice of the documents in [plaintiff’s] first case . . . .”).
Moreover, because the state court proceedings are central to MacDougall’s claims in this
action, the Court will consider these documents in ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. Talley
v. Columbus, Ga. Hous. Auth., 402 F. App’x 463, 465 n.4 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Although the
district court was ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court properly examined extrinsic
documents detailing [plaintiff’s] previous state and federal court cases that related to the
condemnation of his property: the cases were central to [plaintiff’s] instant federal claim.”).4
III.

Background
MacDougall, proceeding pro se, initiated this action on January 23, 2013, by filing an

initial pleading entitled “Complaint Action for Delaratory [sic] Judgment and Summons” (Doc.
No. 1). Seeking to avoid paying the filing fee, MacDougall also filed an Affidavit of Indigency
(Doc. No. 2), which the Court construed as a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and took
under advisement, directing MacDougall to file an amended complaint and complete a

4

Additionally, to the extent that the City Motion raises a factual attack on the Court’s lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may consider matters outside the complaint. Lozman v. City of
Riviera Beach, Fla., 713 F.3d 1066, 1071 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013).

5

second indigency form. See Order (Doc. No. 6). MacDougall complied with the Court’s
directives and filed an amended “Complaint Action for Delaratory [sic] Judgment and
Summons” (Doc. No. 7; Complaint) as well as the additional form. See Application to
Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. No. 8). The Court thereafter
permitted MacDougall to proceed in forma pauperis. See Order (Doc. No. 9).
In his Complaint, MacDougall alleges that the City has issued citations to him based
on his failure to anchor his boat in a location that complies with section 7-93 of the Code of
the City of St. Augustine (Section 7-93). Complaint at 4. He contends that he “is currently
being sued in the County Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit in St. Johns County Florida for a
permanent mandatory injunction.” Id. MacDougall contends that he has a legally registered
vessel anchored thirty-nine feet “outside of the marked channel in the San Sebastian River
of St. Augustine.” Id. However, he alleges that Section 7-93, pursuant to the authority under
section 327.4105, Florida Statutes, prohibits the anchoring of any vessel within fifty feet of
that marked channel. See id. at 4-5. MacDougall contends that Section 7-93, which also
restricts anchorage during certain times of day, for periods longer than thirty consecutive
days, and without a medallion which MacDougall contends is essentially a license, obstructs
his right to navigate the waters of the United States, and violates federal laws and the
Constitution of the United States. See id. at 4-5.
In each Count of the Complaint, MacDougall identifies an aspect of Section 7-93 that
purportedly conflicts with federal law.

Specifically, in Count One of the Complaint,

MacDougall alleges that the restrictions regarding anchoring in Section 7-93 violate the
public rights of navigation and exceed the scope of the City’s authority because the authority
6

to regulate navigable waters is exclusively federal. See id. at 7-9. In Count Two of the
Complaint he argues that Section 7-93 illegally imposes a license requirement on the use
of the navigable waterway. See id. at 10. As to Count Three, MacDougall contends that the
anchorage requirements violate Congress’s exclusive authority to regulate commerce. See
id. at 11-12. Lastly, in Count Four, MacDougall more generally alleges that “City policy, as
it relates to management of the Municipal mooring fields, violates Constitutional rights to
equal treatment and enforcement of the law.” Id. at 12.
In his prayer for relief, MacDougall globally requests “a declaratory judgment that the
State of Florida and the City of St. Augustine’s refusal to allow anchorage in the navigable
waters of the United States and in particular within the interstate waterways and its
tributaries is repugnant to United States law and is null and void.” Id. at 13. Additionally, he
requests a declaration that MacDougall “has the right to navigate all the waters of the United
States including the interstate waterways and its tributaries unless prohibited by federal law,”
and that “the particular location of plaintiff’s vessel lies within a direct tributary of the Atlantic
Intra Coastal Waterway thereby affording it all the legal and maritime protections entitled to
the interstate waterway it self [sic].” Id. at 13-14.
Prior to MacDougall’s filing of the instant suit, the City initiated a non-criminal
proceeding in the County Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Johns County,
Florida in Case No. 12000066MOMA (the State Action), charging MacDougall with the
“violation of vessel anchorage mooring field regulation (7-93).” See Exhibit 1 to City Motion.5
5

Rather than file the actual citation against MacDougall, the City Defendants submit the
City’s Notice of Filing Certified Copy of Motion to Amend Proposed Ordinance 2011-10, Ordinance 201110 and Notice of Public Hearing for Ordinance 2011-10 (Doc. No. 20-1). However, the Court gleaned
the above information from the case style. Additionally, the Court notes that MacDougall refers in his

7

On March 2, 2012, the City issued MacDougall a citation for violating Section 7-93 by
anchoring his vessel approximately thirty-two feet from the navigational channel in the San
Sebastian River. See Amended Order, Exhibit 2 to City Motion (Doc. No. 20-2; State Court
Order) at 1. The county court held a hearing on April 30, 2012, at which MacDougall, several
representatives of the City, and two City law enforcement officers were present. Id. at 1-2.
During this hearing, the county court received evidence and heard argument from the City
regarding the “foundation for the enactment and enforcement of the ordinance.” Id. at 2. In
turn, MacDougall “presented legal argument challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance
based on federal navigation rights” and was given an opportunity to provide legal support for
his argument. Id. MacDougall did so on June 1, 2012, and the county court held an
additional hearing on June 4, 2012, to address the legal issues both parties raised. See id.
Shortly after the second hearing, on June 8, 2012, the county court entered its State Court
Order, concluding that the “City of St. Augustine did lawfully enact municipal code section
7-93, pursuant to section 327.4105, Florida Statutes (2011), and consistent with section
327.60 Florida Statutes (2011), and Barber v. State of Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1994).”
Id. (footnote omitted). The county court also held that MacDougall caused his vessel to be
anchored in violation of Section 7-93 on March 2, 2012, and ordered him to pay a fine of
$128.00 along with court cost and fees of $40.00. See id. at 2-3.6

Complaint to another action, Case No. CC12-1894, which the City appears to have initiated after the
resolution of the State Action. See Complaint at 4.
6

In his Response, MacDougall contends that the City agreed to waive the fine to prevent
him from challenging Section 7-93 in a separate civil suit in state court and such a waiver constitutes a
violation of his right to equal protection under the law. See Response at 1-3. It is unclear what legal
basis would prevent MacDougall from making such a challenge based on the waiver of a fine in the State
Action. Nevertheless, assuming the payment of the fine was a prerequisite to filing suit as MacDougall

8

On July 12, 2012, MacDougall attempted to file a notice of appeal of the State Court
Order. See Notice of Appeal, Exhibit 3 to City Motion (Doc. No. 1-3; Notice). However, the
circuit court struck the Notice and dismissed the appeal because MacDougall did not timely
file the Notice and the appellate court lacked jurisdiction. See Order on Appellee’s Motion
to Strike Notice of Appeal and Dismiss the Appeal, Exhibit 4 to City Motion (Doc. No. 20-4).
MacDougall then moved to reinstate the appeal on July 27, 2012, but the circuit court denied
that motion on August 2, 2012, because he filed the Notice more than thirty days after the
State Court Order, and he was not entitled to any additional time to file his appeal under the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Order on Appellant’s Motion to Reinstate Case,
Exhibit 5 to City Motion (Doc. No. 20-5). Almost six months later, MacDougall filed the
instant action seeking a declaration invalidating Section 7-93.
IV.

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
In the Motions, the City Defendants7 argue that MacDougall is asking this Court to

review a state court judgment and this Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

suggests, the City agreed to waive the fine on the condition that MacDougall remove his vessel within
seven days of the date of the State Court Order, comply with all the aspects of the regulation, and provide
the City with proof of his compliance. See State Court Order at 3. Therefore, to the extent MacDougall
contends that the City’s alleged waiver would deny him some right, he need only fail to move his vessel
or otherwise fail to comply with Section 7-93 to assure the right was not waived.
7

Defendants, the State of Florida and Thomas Shipp in his official capacity (the State
Defendants), adopt and incorporate the arguments in the City Motion into the State Motion. State Motion
at 1. Although the State Defendants were not parties to the State Action, MacDougall brings this suit
against them only to the extent that he seeks to prevent the enforcement of Section 7-93. “Complete
identity of the parties is unnecessary if each parties’ interests were represented in the state proceeding.”
Van Benthuysen v. Florida, No. 8:10-cv-1646-T-23AEP, 2010 WL 5060877, at *2, n.1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 6,
2010).

9

this case under Rooker-Feldman.8 See City Motion at 2-5, 8-10. “The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine makes clear that federal district courts cannot review state court final judgments
because that task is reserved for state appellate courts or, as a last resort, the United States
Supreme Court.” Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Feldman,
460 U.S. at 482). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “[i]t is well-settled that a federal
district court lacks jurisdiction to review, reverse, or invalidate a final state court decision.”
Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1997). Prior to the Supreme Courts’ decision
in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), the Eleventh
Circuit applied the doctrine when (1) the parties in federal court are the same as in state
court; (2) the final state court ruling was a final or conclusive judgment on the merits; (3) the
party seeking relief in federal court had a reasonable opportunity to raise its claims in the
state court proceeding; and (4) the issue before the federal court was either adjudicated by
the state court or was inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment. Storck v. City
of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1310 n.1 (11th Cir. 2003). In Exxon Mobile, the Supreme
Court cautioned “that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine ‘has sometimes been construed to
extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases.’” Cormier v. Horkan, 397
F. App’x 550, 552 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283).
Thereafter, the Eleventh Circuit receded from the above four-part test in favor of a two-part
inquiry. See id.
First, the Court must determine whether the state court proceedings have ended by

8

See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

10

applying the three tests the Eleventh Circuit adopted in Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266
(11th Cir. 2009). Velazquez v. S. Fla. Fed. Credit Union, 546 F. App’x 854, 856 (11th Cir.
2013) (per curiam). A case in state court has ended:
(1) when the highest state court in which review is available has affirmed the
judgment below and nothing is left to be resolved, (2) if the state action has
reached a point where neither party seeks further action, and (3) if the state
proceedings have finally resolved all the federal questions in the litigation, but
state law or purely factual questions (whether great or small) remain to be
litigated.
Id. at 857 (quoting Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1275). Second, the Court considers whether the
plaintiff is a state court loser who is complaining of injuries a state court judgment caused
and inviting review and rejection of those judgments. Id. at 856-57 (quoting Exxon Mobil,
544 U.S. at 284). In making this determination, the Eleventh Circuit still applies the fourth
factor of its earlier test—“evaluating whether the plaintiff’s claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’
with the state court judgment.” Cormier, 397 F. App’x at 553 (quoting Casale, 558 F.3d at
1260)). “A claim is inextricably intertwined if it would ‘effectively nullify’ the state court
judgment, or it ‘succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues.’”
Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260 (internal quotations omitted).
In this case, the State Court Order was entered on June 8, 2012. See State Court
Order at 3. Although MacDougall attempted to appeal it, he did so only after the time to file
a notice of appeal had lapsed. Because the time for appeal expired thirty days after the
entry of the State Order, the State Action ended at that time. See Velazquez, 546 F. App’x
at 857. Therefore, the first Rooker-Feldman inquiry is met.
Further, MacDougall, the defendant in the State Action, unsuccessfully challenged the

11

validity of Section 7-93 in the State Action.9 There, the State Court Order reflects that he
“presented legal argument challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance based on federal
navigation rights.” State Court Order at 2. In the Complaint, MacDougall raises similar
arguments regarding his rights to use navigable waters without interference from local
governments. Indeed, in his Response, MacDougall does not dispute the fact that the
county court previously decided these issues, stating:
In an attempt to defend his constitutionally guaranteed rights of navigation,
MacDougall, presented the court with a defense which included U.S. codes of
Federal Regulation, Supreme Court decisions, and U.S. Constitutional Law.
The case was lost in spite of the federal protections pointed out to the court.
Federal Maritime law was not enforced and State Law was allowed to trump
federal regulation.
Response at 1. Although it is unclear whether MacDougall raised all of his arguments
regarding the validity of Section 7-93 from the State Court Order, such as his argument that
Section 7-93 interferes with Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce, the
Rooker-Feldman “doctrine applies both to federal claims raised in the state court and to
those ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment” so long as the plaintiff had a
reasonable opportunity to raise those federal claims in the state proceeding. Casale, 558
F.3d at 1260; see also Velazquez, 546 F. App’x at 858 (“Rooker-Feldman may bar federal
jurisdiction even where federal claims were not fully addressed by the state court so long as
‘those [federal claims were] inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment.’”); Jallali
v. Am. Osteopathic Ass’n, No. 11-60604, 2011 WL 2601257, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2011)
9

MacDougall suggests that Rooker-Feldman cannot apply because he was the defendant
in the State Action, not the plaintiff. However, he cites to no authority to support such a distinction and
Rooker-Feldman applies to state court losers, regardless of which side they were on in the state court
proceedings. See, e.g., Casale, 558 F.3d at 1259-60 (affirming dismissal under Rooker-Feldman where
the plaintiff had been the defendant in a contempt proceeding).

12

(“Rooker-Feldman extends to claims that ‘could have been raised in the state courts.’”
(quoting Johnson v. Baker, No. 08-11589, 2008 WL 4657823, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 20,
2008))).
The county court in the State Action gave MacDougall ample opportunity to raise his
constitutional arguments regarding Section 7-93 both in writing and in person. See State
Court Order at 1-2. After doing so, the county court ruled that the City lawfully enacted the
ordinance and that MacDougall had violated it. See id. at 2-3. Having failed to pursue a
timely appeal, MacDougall appears before this Court as the party who lost in state court
asking for what he failed to get in state court, a declaration that Section 7-93 is not valid and
that he has a constitutional right to anchor his vessel where he chooses. See generally
Complaint. Indeed, MacDougall’s Response makes clear that it is his contention that he lost
in the State Action “in spite of the federal protections pointed out to the court.” Response
at 1. In other words, MacDougall believes he lost because the State Court Order ignores
federal law, and is thus incorrect.

However, it is well settled that “a state court’s

‘interpretation of federal law is no less authoritative than that of the [corresponding] federal
court of appeals.’” Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467
(11th Cir. 1996)).
Moreover, a judgment in MacDougall’s favor “would imply that the state court wrongly
decided the issues before it” and thus, his claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the State
Court Order. See Blankenship v. Childers, No. 3:12cv216/MW/EMT, 2013 WL 6536827, at
*5 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2013). Indeed, MacDougall prevails in this action only if the Court
determines that the state court resolved the issues before it erroneously. If MacDougall felt
13

that the court incorrectly decided the constitutionality of Section 7-93, then he could have
filed a timely appeal. As the Eleventh Circuit in Casale explained:
If Casale believed the state court’s result was based on a legal error, the
proper response was the same one open to all litigants who are unhappy with
the judgment of a trial court: direct appeal. We are not a clearinghouse for
Casale’s overstock arguments; if he did not offer them to the state courts—or
if the state courts did not buy them—he cannot unload them by attempting to
sell them to us. Casale is just the sort of “state-court loser[]” the RookerFeldman doctrine was designed to turn aside. See Exxon Mobile, 544 U.S. at
284.
Casale, 558 F.3d at 1261. The Court finds that the issues MacDougall raises in this
Complaint were decided or could have been decided by the county court in the State Action,
and that by this action he is, in essence, seeking a reversal of the State Court Order.
Accordingly, the Court does not have jurisdiction over MacDougall’s claims pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and his Complaint is due to be dismissed, without prejudice.10
In light of the foregoing, it is
ORDERED:
1.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. No.

20) is GRANTED.
2.

The Complaint (Doc. No. 7) is DISMISSED without prejudice.

10

The Court notes that MacDougall has previously been given the opportunity to file an
amended complaint, see Order (Doc. No. 6), and that he has not requested further leave to amend, nor
suggested how he might amend his Complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in this Order. See
generally Response. As such, the Court will dismiss his Complaint without prejudice.

14

3.

Defendants’ State of Florida and Shipp Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 21) is

GRANTED to the extent that the Complaint is dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the Motion is DENIED.
4.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate all pending motions and

deadlines as moot and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, this 16th day of September, 2014.

lc16
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
Pro Se Party

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