Knuckles v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
Filing
43
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 27 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, granting with respect to Defendant Crews' claim that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the following issues: the functioning wheelchair issue, canteen services, library services, positioning of dining room tables, sidewalk access, and job assignments, in all other respects, denying 27 motion to dismiss; granting 38 Motion to Dismiss for failure to exha ust administrative remedies, denying 38 in all other respects; dismissing Defendant Linda Uphaus from this action, with instructions to the Clerk; Defendant Crews shall respond to the Amended Complaint by November 6, 2014.. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 10/10/2014. (LDO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
DONALD F. KNUCKLES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 3:13-cv-411-J-39JRK
MICHAEL CREWS, etc.; et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
I.
Status
On April 16, 2013 (pursuant to the mailbox rule), Plaintiff
Donald F. Knuckles instituted this action by filing a civil rights
Complaint (Complaint) (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff is proceeding on an Amended Complaint (Amended Complaint)
(Doc. 24).1
This cause is before the Court on Defendant Crews'
Motion to Dismiss (Crews' Motion to Dismiss) (Doc. 27) and Linda
Uphaus' Motion to Dismiss (Uphaus' Motion to Dismiss) (Doc. 38).
Plaintiff has responded.
See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 37) and Plaintiff's Response to Defendant,
Linda Uphaus', Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 42).
Defendants
assert
that
Plaintiff
has
not
exhausted
his
administrative remedies and he has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
The parties provided documents
concerning the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
1
Plaintiff is represented by counsel.
II.
The Amended Complaint
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names two Defendants,
Michael
Crews,
the
Secretary
of
the
Florida
Department
of
Corrections (FDOC), in his official capacity, and Linda Uphaus, a
grievance coordinator, in her individual capacity. There are three
counts raised: (1) Count One - Discrimination on Account of
Disability
in
Violation
of
Title
II
of
the
Americans
with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.) seeking an
injunction directing the FDOC and Defendant Crews to take such
action as necessary to ensure Plaintiff has access to programs,
services, and activities and is not discriminated against on
account
of
his
disabilities;
(2)
Count
Two
-
Deliberate
Indifference to Serious Medical Needs (42 U.S.C. § 1983/Eighth
Amendment) seeking an injunction directing the Chief Health Officer
of Columbia Correctional Institution-Annex (CCI) and the FDOC to
take all such action necessary to treat Plaintiff for his serious
medical needs; and (3) Count Three - First Amendment Retaliation
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) against Defendant Uphaus seeking an injunction
ordering Defendant Uphaus not to address future grievances and to
refrain from taking action in retaliation for good faith use of the
grievance procedure in the future.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following. He
is an inmate confined at CCI who suffers from diabetes, congestive
heart
failure,
heart
disease,
chronic
2
obstructive
pulmonary
disease, Parkinson's disease, artery disease, diabetic neuropathy,
intermittent claudication [sic], and other illnesses.
He claims
that his physical impairments limit his major life activities,
including walking and breathing.
As a result, the FDOC officials
issued a wheelchair pass to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff claims that he has been discriminated against due to
his
disability,
including
being
denied
access
to
programs,
services, and activities for which he is otherwise qualified.
Specifically, he complains about the following: (1) lack of an
accessible water fountain in the recreation yard of his dormitory;
(2)
a
malfunctioning
wheelchair;
(3)
poor
access
to
canteen
services; (4) poor access to library services; (5) poor positioning
of wheelchair-accessible dining tables; (6) failure to provide a
stand-up locker; (7) failure to provide accessible living quarters,
shower facilities, and common areas; (8) failure to accommodate
wheelchair-bound inmates concerning sidewalk usage; (9) failure to
create job assignments in compliance with the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), instead requiring mobility-impaired inmates
to hold a receptacle for dirty utensils, subjecting them to being
hit with food flung by inmates; and (10) failure to provide key
locks.
Plaintiff complains that Defendant Crews has been deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff states that he
has been denied treatment, including an egg crate mattress to
3
prevent pressure sores, medication to relieve symptoms of various
diseases, a proper diet for his medical condition, and medical
boots.
Plaintiff asserts that the denial of proper treatment is
based on cost saving measures, without proper diagnostic tests or
consideration of Plaintiff's serious medical needs.
Plaintiff
seeks injunctive relief, asking that he be provided with treatment
for his serious medical needs.
III.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants move to dismiss the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a).
Exhaustion of available administrative remedies is
required before an action with respect to prison conditions by a
prisoner may be initiated in this Court.
The Eleventh Circuit has
stated:
Before considering the merits of this
case, we must address a threshold matter.
According to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), enacted as
part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the
"PLRA"),
No action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 of this title, or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until
such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted.
The PLRA's effective date was April 26,
1996; because the prisoners filed their
complaint after this date, the PLRA applies.
Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1259, 1260
(11th Cir. 2000).
A district court must
dismiss the suit when it finds that the
plaintiff-inmate
has
not
exhausted
his
4
administrative remedies. Cf. Brown v. Sikes,
212 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2000). . . .
Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004).
Defendants
contend
that
administrative remedies.
Plaintiff
has
not
exhausted
his
Exhaustion of available administrative
remedies is "a precondition to an adjudication on the merits" and
is mandatory under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
Bryant v.
Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1074
(2008); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007); Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) ("Exhaustion is no longer left to the
discretion of the district court, but is mandatory.") (citation
omitted). The Supreme Court has stated that "failure to exhaust is
an affirmative defense under the PLRA[.]"
at
216.
However,
jurisdictional[.]"
"the
PLRA
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
exhaustion
requirement
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 101.
is
not
See Turner
v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that
the defense "is not a jurisdictional matter").
Discussing an unenumerated motion to dismiss under 12(b),
Fed.R.Civ.P., based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
the Eleventh Circuit states:
That motions to dismiss for failure to
exhaust are not expressly mentioned in Rule
12(b)
is
not
unusual
or
problematic.
"'Federal courts . . . traditionally have
entertained certain pre-answer motions that
are not expressly provided for by the rules.'"
Ritza, 837 F.2d at 369 (quoting 5C Wright &
Miller, supra, § 1360 at 77). For instance,
courts may decide motions to dismiss that are
5
"'closely related to the management of the
lawsuit and might generally be characterized
as
involving
matters
of
judicial
administration.'" Id.; see e.g., Int'l Ass'n
of Entrepreneurs of Am. v. Angoff, 58 F.3d
1266, 1271 (8th Cir. 1995) ("While pre-answer
motions
are
ostensibly
enumerated
in
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), district courts have the
discretion to recognize additional pre-answer
motions, including motions to stay cases
within federal jurisdiction when a parallel
state action is pending.").
Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d at 1375 (emphasis added).
The Eleventh
Circuit concludes that "exhaustion should be decided on a Rule
12(b) motion to dismiss[.]"
Id. (citation omitted).
If a prisoner fails to completely exhaust his administrative
remedies prior to initiating a suit in federal court, the complaint
must be dismissed.
"This is true even if the inmate thereafter
exhausts his administrative remedies after initiating his action in
federal court." Whitley v. Aldridge, No. 3:11-cv-491-J-25JBT, 2013
WL 4520883, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2013) (citations omitted).
Moreover, "the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper
exhaustion."
Woodford, 548 U.S at 93.
Because exhaustion requirements are designed
to deal with parties who do not want to
exhaust,
administrative
law
creates
an
incentive for these parties to do what they
would otherwise prefer not to do, namely, to
give the agency a fair and full opportunity to
adjudicate their claims. Administrative law
does this by requiring proper exhaustion of
administrative remedies, which "means using
all steps that the agency holds out, and doing
so properly (so that the agency addresses the
6
Pozo,[2] 286 F.3d, at
issues on the merits)."
1024. . . .
Id. at 90.
"Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's
deadlines and other critical procedural rules."
Id.
Upon review of the documents submitted to the Court, the Court
is convinced that Plaintiff has adequately exhausted the following
matters.
access
to
With respect to Count One, the ADA claim concerning
programs,
services,
and
exhausted the following complaints:
stand-up
locker
issue;
activities,
Plaintiff
the water fountain issue; the
accessible
living
quarters,
shower
facilities, and common areas issue; and the key lock issue.
failed
to
exhaust
the
has
functioning
wheelchair
issue,
He
canteen
services, library services, positioning of dining room tables,
sidewalk access, and job assignments.3
The Court also finds that Plaintiff adequately exhausted his
complaint about inadequate medical treatment at CCI.
to
Count
Two,
the
section
1983
claim,
Plaintiff
With regard
repeatedly
complained about his medical care, the denial of medication for his
various ailments, denial of oxygen, and the lack of a special diet,
2
Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 949 (2002).
3
Plaintiff failed to provide any documentation showing that
he grieved these matters.
He also failed to present any
documentation showing that he was prevented from grieving these
matters. Based on the record before the Court, Plaintiff presented
numerous complaints about the conditions of his confinement, but
these particular matters were not included in his complaints.
7
medically
prescribed
equipment,
clothing,
and
other
items.
Plaintiff adequately exhausted his claim of deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs.
The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claim of
retaliation raised in Count Three prior to the filing of his
Complaint on April 16, 2013.
Plaintiff wrote a grievance of
reprisal to the Warden on April 13, 2013.4
Exhibit A (Doc. 42-1 at
4). Without obtaining a response or allowing for the response time
to expire, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court.
Because
Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to
initiating this suit, Count Three against Linda Uphaus will be
dismissed without prejudice.
IV.
Failure to State a Claim
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'"
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable
inference
that
the
defendant
is
liable
for
the
misconduct alleged."
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
"[T]he
court
tenet
that
a
must
4
accept
as
true
all
of
the
Although the grievance is dated 4-13-12, apparently this is
a scrivener's error as Plaintiff complains about an event which
occurred on April 12, 2013. Exhibit A (Doc. 42-1 at 4).
8
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Apparently Defendants Crews is claiming that Plaintiff has
failed to adequately allege an Eighth Amendment violation.
Motion to Dismiss at 9.
Crews'
Upon review of the Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff has adequately presented an Eighth Amendment claim with
respect to his claim of denial of medical care for his serious
medical needs in Count Two of the Amended Complaint.
Amended
Complaint at 6-8. Indeed, Plaintiff claims deliberate indifference
to his rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
7.
Id. at
As relief, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring that he be
treated for his serious medical needs.
Id. at 8.
The matters raised in the Defendant Crews' Motion to Dismiss
would more properly be raised in a Rule 56 motion with supporting
medical
records,
affidavits,
and
other
relevant
documents.
Plaintiff has pled "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face."
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
When Defendant
Crews files his motion for summary judgment, he is directed to
state with particularity the supporting evidentiary basis for
granting summary disposition of this case.
The Court need not
scour the record for evidentiary materials on file; instead, the
Court need ensure that the allegedly dispositive motion itself is
9
supported by the appropriate evidentiary materials.
Reese v.
Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing One Piece of
Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d
1099, 1101-02 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED:
1.
Linda Uphaus' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 38) is GRANTED
based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies
prior to the filing of this action.
In all other respects, Linda
Uphaus' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.5
2.
Linda Uphaus is DISMISSED from this action.
The Clerk
shall terminate Linda Uphaus on the docket.
3.
Defendant Crews' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27) is GRANTED
with respect to Defendant Crews' claim that Plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the following
issues: the functioning wheelchair issue, canteen services, library
services, positioning of dining room tables, sidewalk access, and
job assignments. In all other respects, Defendant Crews' Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 27) is DENIED.
5
Plaintiff raises a First Amendment retaliation claim against
Defendant Uphaus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and he seeks
injunctive relief. Plaintiff has not raised an ADA claim against
Defendant Uphaus in the Amended Complaint. See Defendant Uphaus'
Motion to Dismiss at 8.
10
4.
Defendant Crews shall respond to the Amended Complaint by
November 6, 2014.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 10th day of
October, 2014.
sa 10/7
c:
Counsel of Record
11
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