Knuckles v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Filing 89

ORDER granting 78 Motion for summary judgment, with instructions to the Clerk to enter judgment in Defendant Secretary's favor with respect to Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint; instructions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 2/4/2016. (LDO)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

DONALD F. KNUCKLES,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 3:13-cv-411-J-39JRK

JULIE JONES,1 SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant.
ORDER
I.

Status

Plaintiff Donald F. Knuckles, on April 16, 2013 (pursuant to
the mailbox rule), instituted this action by filing a civil rights
Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Through counsel,

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Amended Complaint) (Doc.
24).2

Defendant Julie Jones' Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion)

(Doc. 78) is pending before the Court.
to

Defendant's

Motion

for

Summary

Plaintiff filed a Response
Judgment

with

Incorporated

Affidavit (Response) (Doc. 81).3 See Summary Judgment Notice (Doc.
80).
1

Julie Jones, the Secretary of the Florida Department of
Corrections, is substituted as the proper party Respondent for
Michael Crews, pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
2

3

Plaintiff is no longer represented by counsel.

The Court hereinafter refers to Defendant's Exhibits (Docs.
79 & 88) as "Ex."

Julie Jones, the Secretary of the Florida Department of
Corrections (FDOC), in her official capacity, is the remaining
Defendant in the case.

Two counts remain: (1) Count One -

Discrimination on Account of Disability in Violation of Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 (42 U.S.C. §
12131 et seq.) seeking an injunction directing the FDOC and the
Secretary to take such action as necessary to ensure Plaintiff has
access

to

programs,

services,

and

activities

and

is

not

discriminated against on account of his disabilities; and (2) Count
Two - Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs (42 U.S.C.
§ 1983/Eighth Amendment) seeking an injunction directing the Chief
Health Officer of Columbia Correctional Institution-Annex (CCI) and
the FDOC to take all such action necessary to treat Plaintiff for
his serious medical needs.
The

alleged

facts

Amended Complaint at 5-6, 8.

supporting

the

Amended

Complaint

are

thoroughly set forth in the Court's Order (Doc. 43) at 2-4, and
will not be repeated here.

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief as

stated above.
In the Motion, the Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has not
exhausted

his

administrative

remedies

and

he

cannot

prove

a

violation under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). Motion at 1. Plaintiff opposes the Motion in his Response.

2

II.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Secretary moves to dismiss the action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a), asserting that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies with regard to his medical claim.4

The

Secretary's motion constitutes an unenumerated motion to dismiss
under 12(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.

Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1375

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1074 (2008).

Since the

exhaustion of administrative remedies is a matter in abatement, it
does not go to the merits and it is not jurisdictional.

As such,

it is not regularly the proper subject for the basis of a summary
judgment motion.

Id.

Thus, this pre-answer type of motion for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies is addressed by the
Court as an unenumerated motion to dismiss.
Upon review, the Secretary previously raised an unenumerated
motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in
a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27) filed on May 21, 2014.
addressed

the

administrative

Secretary's
remedies

assertion

in

the

of

failure

Court's

Order

The Court
to

exhaust

(Doc.

43).

Thereafter, the Secretary filed an answer to the amended complaint
(Doc. 46) on October 29, 2014.
In its Order (Doc. 43), the Court found:
that Plaintiff adequately exhausted his
complaint about inadequate medical treatment

4

The Court will refer to the Defendant as the Secretary
throughout this opinion.
3

at CCI. With regard to Count Two, the section
1983 claim, Plaintiff repeatedly complained
about his medical care, the denial of
medication for his various ailments, denial of
oxygen, and the lack of a special diet,
medically prescribed equipment, clothing, and
other items. Plaintiff adequately exhausted
his claim of deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs.
Order (Doc. 43) at 7-8.
Not only is the motion for failure to exhaust improperly
raised in a motion for summary judgment after the Defendant
answered the Amended Complaint, the Court previously rejected this
threshold

matter,

finding

Plaintiff

adequately

exhausted

his

administrative remedies with respect to his medical claim raised in
ground two of the Amended Complaint.
III.

Ground One

The Secretary asserts that Plaintiff's claim for injunctive
relief, raised in ground one, is moot because the Department has
made adequate accommodations since Plaintiff filed his Amended
Complaint.

Motion at 10-11.

The Court previously found that

Plaintiff adequately exhausted the following matters with regard to
his ADA claim: the water fountain issue; the stand-up locker issue;
accessible living quarters, shower facilities, and common areas
issue; and the key lock issue.

Order (Doc. 43) at 7.

Plaintiff,

in his Response states that "[i]f it's o.k. now, it wasn't when I
filed my injunction."

Response at 5.

4

The Court finds no remaining case or controversy with respect
to the ADA claim raised in ground one of the Amended Complaint:
"Article III of the Constitution requires that
there be a live case or controversy at the
time that a federal court decides the case; it
is not enough that there may have been a live
case or controversy when the case was filed."
Id.
(citation
and
internal
quotations
omitted). "The doctrine of mootness provides
that the requisite personal interest that must
exist at the commencement of the litigation
(standing) must continue throughout its
existence (mootness)."
Id. (citations,
alterations, and internal quotations omitted).
KH Outdoor, L.L.C. v. Clay Cnty., Fla., 482 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th
Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
The Defendant's expert, Randall Atlas, states that since the
filing of this litigation, the FDOC has taken the necessary steps
to comply with the ADA and Florida Accessibility Code.

Ex. B at 1.

Of note, he states this litigation prompted the steps taken by the
Department

to

come

into

compliance.

Id.

An

institutional

inspection was undertaken on April 13, 2015, with a follow-up visit
on June 1, 2015.

Id. at 6.

This inspection confirms that the

water fountain issue is moot, Ex. B at 6-7; the stand-up locker and
key lock issues are moot, id. at 7; the accessible living quarters
and common areas issues are moot, id. at 7-10; and the shower issue
is moot, id. at 9.
the photographs.

Also of import, there are visible grab bars in
Thus, all of the properly exhausted issues have

been addressed and the modifications undertaken since the filing of

5

the initial Complaint.

Therefore, the ADA claim raised in ground

one is moot.
IV.
The

Secretary

Ground Two

contends

that

"Plaintiff's

ADA

deliberate

indifference medical claim is not properly before the Court."
Motion at 11. Upon review, Plaintiff raises the following claim in
his second ground: "Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical
Needs (42 U.S.C. § 1983/Eighth Amendment)."
6.

Amended Complaint at

Clearly the second ground is an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs claim raised pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, not an ADA claim.
Also

of

note,

Plaintiff

raises

a

claim

for

prospective

injunctive relief against the Secretary in her official capacity.
This claim for injunctive relief is properly lodged against the
Secretary in her official capacity since she currently holds office
and

has

the

authority

to

respond

to

such

relief.

Indeed,

"[d]efendants who currently have official capacity to provide a
remedy through declaratory or injunctive relief may be sued in
their

official

capacities

Amendment is no bar."

for

such

relief

and

the

Eleventh

Muhammad v. Crosby, 4:05CV193-WS, 2008 WL

2229746, at *19 (N.D. Fla. May 29, 2008) (citing Socialist Workers
Party v. Leahy, 145 F.3d 1240, 1248 (11th Cir.1998), Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908)), aff'd sub nom. Muhammad v. Sapp,
388 F. Appx. 892 (11th Cir. 2010).

6

The Secretary also asserts that Plaintiff cannot proceed
against her under section 1983 based on a theory of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability, relying on Cottone v. Jenne, 326
F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003).

Motion at 14.

The Court is not

convinced, based on a review of the Amended Complaint, that
Plaintiff's intention is to sue the Secretary based on a theory of
respondeat superior.

Although not a model of clarity, the Court

finds the Amended Complaint states otherwise.
Plaintiff alleges that even though the doctors in the FDOC are
aware of Plaintiff's serious medical needs, they refuse to perform
tests or provide treatment "for the sole purpose of saving money on
inmate treatment."

Amended Complaint at 7.

Plaintiff contends

that the denial of needed treatment poses a substantial risk of
serious harm due to his numerous ailments and diseases.

Id.

Plaintiff claims the FDOC is aware of his serious medical needs and
has the ability to order treatment, but refuses to do so.

Id.

Plaintiff further states that he suffering from the untreated
effects of diseases and conditions to the detriment of his health.
Id. at 8.

As such, he seeks an injunction to obtain treatment for

his alleged serious medical needs.

Id.

Of import,
To create the required causal connection
between the Secretary's actions or inactions
and the alleged constitutional violation,
plaintiff must demonstrate that either "1) a
history of widespread abuse put[ ] [the
Secretary] on notice of the need to correct
7

the alleged deprivation, and he ... fail[ed]
to do so; 2) [the Secretary's] custom or
policy result[ed] in deliberate indifference
to constitutional rights; or 3) facts support
an inference that the [Secretary] directed
subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that
subordinates would act unlawfully and failed
to stop them from doing so." Valdes v. Crosby,
450 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2006).
Doby v. Berry, 3:04-cv-1044-J-32MMH, 2006 WL 3518611, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Dec. 6, 2006).

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff is

apparently claiming a custom or de facto policy of refusing medical
treatment

based

on

cost

saving

measures

which

resulted

in

deliberate indifferent to his serious medical needs and/or there
exists a history of widespread abuse, deliberate indifference, that
puts the Secretary on notice of unconstitutional conditions due to
the deprivation of medical care.
In support of his deliberate indifference claim, Plaintiff, in
his sworn Affidavit (Doc. 81) at 3, states that he is being treated
for only some of his ailments and diseases.

See Plaintiff's

Exhibit A (Doc. 81-1). He also contends that he was diagnosed with
Parkinson's Disease prior to his entry into the prison system and
he is not being treated for it now.

Id.

In the Motion, the

Secretary asserts that Plaintiff is receiving treatment for his
illnesses, and he cannot prove deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs.

Motion at 14-15.

The requirements to establish an Eighth Amendment claim with
respect to medical care are:

8

The
Eighth
Amendment's
prohibition
against "cruel and unusual punishments"
protects
a
prisoner
from
"deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs."
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct.
285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). To state a claim
of
unconstitutionally
inadequate
medical
treatment, a prisoner must establish "an
objectively
serious
[medical]
need,
an
objectively insufficient response to that
need, subjective awareness of facts signaling
the need, and an actual inference of required
action from those facts."
Taylor v. Adams,
221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000).
Kuhne v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 745 F.3d 1091, 1094 (11th Cir. 2014).
"A serious medical need is 'one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that
even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor's attention.' In the alternative, a serious medical need is
determined by whether a delay in treating the need worsens the
condition."

Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th

Cir. 2009) (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d
1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994)).

The Secretary does not dispute that

Plaintiff has serious medical needs.

Instead, she claims that he

is receiving treatment and cannot show deliberate indifference.
To satisfy the subjective component, a plaintiff must prove
the following:
"(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious
harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by
conduct that is more than [gross] negligence."
Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th
Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although we have
occasionally stated, in dicta, that a claim of
9

deliberate indifference requires proof of
"more than mere negligence," McElligott v.
Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999),
our earlier holding in Cottrell, 85 F.3d at
1490[5], made clear that, after Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128
L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), a claim of deliberate
indifference requires proof of more than gross
negligence.
Townsend v. Jefferson County, 601 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2010).
The record reflects the following. Dr. Albert Maier, a Senior
Physician medically trained in the area of emergency medicine and
pathology, reviewed Plaintiff's FDOC medical records and Veteran's
Administration records provided to him, and found that Plaintiff
received medical treatment for all diseases alleged in the Amended
Complaint, except for Parkinson's. Ex. A at 1. Dr. Maier recorded
that Plaintiff received a wheelchair upon receipt into the FDOC,
and received regular medical assessments and approval for continued
use of the wheelchair.

Id.

Upon admission to the FDOC, Plaintiff

received a complete physical examination with lab studies.

Id.

Plaintiff is seen approximately monthly at "neurology, endocrine,
lipid, and chronic pulmonary disease clinics[.]" Id. at 2.

His

medications are reviewed and adjusted by the clinicians.

Id.

Plaintiff made 144 visits to clinics, and refused treatment fortyfive times.

Id.

Beyond those ailments mentioned in the Amended

Complaint, additional medical conditions were identified by medical
staff and treated.

5

Id.

Plaintiff receives medication for chronic

Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480 (11th Cir. 1996).
10

obstructive pulmonary disease.

Id.

He is on a 2800 calorie diet

"prescribed for and is satisfactory for hypothyroidism."

Id.

also has received medication for obstructive lung disease.

He

Id.

Dr. Maier states that Plaintiff does not meet the criteria for
medical boots, and he has not been issued a prescription for an egg
crate

mattress.

Id.

However,

Plaintiff

has

been

seen

for

"multiple regular Chronic Illness Clinic visits with appropriate
medical specialties including cardiovascular disease, hypertension,
neurology, endocrinology, [and] pulmonary disease."
Finally,

Dr.

Maier

Parkinson's disease.

Id.

states

that

Plaintiff

Id.

does

not

have

He states that Plaintiff has a tremor,

but "there is a neurology consult by Dr. Gama[,]" a neurologist at
the Reception and Medical Center, concluding that Plaintiff's
condition is "a more benign look-a-like condition known as Benign
Familial Tremor."
tremor.

Id.

Plaintiff receives medication for this

Id.

A plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant's responses to
his medical needs were poor enough to constitute an unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain, and not merely accidental inadequacy,
negligence in treatment, or even medical malpractice actionable
under state law.

Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir.

2000) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1976)),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1077 (2001).

Again, Plaintiff complains

that he has not been treated for Parkinson's disease, but the

11

neurologist for the FDOC diagnosed Plaintiff with suffering from
Benign Familial Tremor, not Parkinson's disease. This, at most, is
a difference in medical opinion, not a constitutional violation.
Of further significance, Plaintiff is receiving medication for his
tremor; therefore, a medical assessment was undertaken and his
symptoms are being treated with medication.
Although Plaintiff has not been prescribed an egg crate
mattress or medical boots, he has been prescribed many other
medications and treatments for his ailments and diseases, including
being provided a wheelchair.
prescribed

these

particular

constitutional violation.

The fact that he has not been
items

does

not

amount

to

a

At most, he has presented a claim of

negligence or medical malpractice in this regard.

In Granda v.

Schulman, 372 F. App'x 79, 83 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), the
Eleventh Circuit clarified whether a course of treatment would
state a claim under the Eighth Amendment:
Nevertheless,
"a
complaint
that
a
physician has been negligent in diagnosing or
treating a medical condition does not state a
valid claim of medical mistreatment under the
Eighth Amendment." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106,
97 S.Ct. at 292; see Hamm v. DeKalb County,
774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir.1985) ("Although
[the prisoner] may have desired different
modes of treatment, the care the jail provided
did not amount to deliberate indifference.").
In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that a
prisoner failed to state a claim of deliberate
indifference
by
alleging
that
medical
personnel failed to diagnose and treat his
back injury properly, which caused him to
suffer pain for a three-month period, because
12

he admitted to receiving treatment, including
painkillers and muscle relaxants, on multiple
occasions. 429 U.S. at 99-101, 106-07, 97
S.Ct. at 288-89, 292-93.
Plaintiff's dissatisfaction with his medical treatment is
insufficient to sustain a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation.
Here, it is quite apparent that Plaintiff is receiving extensive
and frequent medical treatment for a variety of ailments and
diseases.

He has a wheelchair, constant and regular medical care,

prescribed medications, and a prescribed diet. Even if Plaintiff's
treatment were to be considered less than adequate or medical
malpractice,

"[a]ccidents,

mistakes,

negligence,

and

medical

malpractice are not 'constitutional violation[s] merely because the
victim is a prisoner.'"

Harris v. Coweta Cnty., 21 F.3d 388, 393

(11th Cir. 1994) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106).
In

this

case,

Plaintiff

may

desire

different

modes

of

treatment, but the treatment he has received does not amount to
deliberate indifference. Thus, the Secretary's Motion is due to be
granted as to ground two.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED:
1.

The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 78) is

GRANTED.
2.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in Defendant Secretary's

favor with respect to Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint.

13

3.

The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions and close

this case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 4th day of
February, 2016.

sa 2/4
c:
Donald F. Knuckles
Counsel of Record

14