WILLIAMS v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al
Filing
41
ORDER denying 22 the third amended petition, dismissing the action with prejudice, with instructions to the Clerk; denying a certificate of appealability, with instructions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 11/16/2015. (LDO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
MOHAMMED WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
vs.
Case No. 3:13-cv-621-J-39PDB
SECRETARY, DOC, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
I.
STATUS
This cause is before the Court on a Third Amended Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition) (Doc. 22) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
as clarified by a more definite statement (Doc. 31).1
challenges
a
2012
state
court
(Duval
County)
The Petition
conviction
for
aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, resisting an
officer with violence, leaving the scene of an accident involving
attended property, reckless driving, and unauthorized temporary use
1
With respect to the Petition, the Court will reference the
page numbers assigned through the electronic docketing system.
of a motor vehicle.
Id. at 1.
Two grounds remain: (1) a claim
that Petitioner was illegally held because the trial court failed
to properly apply Rule 3.134, Fla. R. Crim. P., and release
Petitioner, and (2) a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
for failure to convey to Petitioner and the court that the motions
for pre-trial release were properly submitted and that Petitioner
was entitled to release from custody.2
Upon review, no evidentiary
proceedings are required in this Court.
Respondents filed an Answer in Response to Order to Show Cause
and Third Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 38)3
with Exhibits.4
Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 39).
See Order
(Doc. 24).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will analyze Petitioner's two claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA).
"By its terms [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d) bars
relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state
court, subject only to th[re]e exceptions." Harrington v. Richter,
2
Although the Petition contains four claims, Petitioner
sought to strike grounds three and four (Doc. 36), and the Court
struck grounds three and four. Order (Doc. 37).
3
Respondents do not contend that the Petition is untimely.
4
The Court will refer to the Exhibits (Doc. 38) as "Ex."
Where provided, the page numbers referenced in this opinion are the
Bates stamp numbers at the bottom of each page of the exhibit.
Otherwise, the page number on the particular document will be
referenced.
- 2 -
562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).
The exceptions are: (1) the state court's
decision was contrary to clearly established federal law; or (2)
there
was
an
unreasonable
application
of
clearly
established
federal law; or (3) the decision was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts.
Id. at 100.
Of import, there is a presumption of correctness of state
courts' factual findings unless rebutted with clear and convincing
evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness
applies to the factual determinations of both trial and appellate
courts.
See Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003).
III.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
With regard to this opinion, the following pertinent history
transpired.
On January 7, 2012, the police arrested and detained
Petitioner.
Ex. C at 1-6.
through
public
his
Preliminary Hearing.
On January 27, 2012, Petitioner,
defender,
filed
Id. at 15-16.
a
Motion
for
Adversary
On January 31, 2012, he filed
an Amended Motion for Adversary Preliminary Hearing. Id. at 17-18.
Thereafter, on February 8, 2012, he filed a Motion for Release Due
to Failure of the State to File Charges.
Id. at 19-20.
Finally,
on February 16, 2012, he filed a Motion for Release Due to Failure
of the State to File Charges.
Id. at 21-22.
the state filed an information.
On February 17, 2012,
Id. at 23-24.
On April 10, 2012, Petitioner signed a Plea of Guilty form.
Id. at 29-30.
Petitioner pled straight up to the court.
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Id. at
72.
On May 1, 2012, judgment and sentence were entered.
The court
sentenced Petitioner to four years imprisonment on counts one and
two,
115
days
incarceration
on
counts
three
and
four,
all
concurrent with 115 days credit for time served, and time served of
60 days on count six.
Id. at 32-40, 109.
Petitioner appealed.
Ex. D.
On December 3, 2012, the First
District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed.
issued on December 31, 2012.
Ex. E.
The mandate
Ex. F.
Petitioner filed a Rule 3.850, Fla. R. Crim. P., Motion for
Post-Conviction Relief.
Ex. U; Ex. V; Ex. W.
At the time of the
filing of the state's Response, Petitioner's motion for post
conviction relief remained pending.
IV.
Response at 3.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.
Ground One
In his first ground, Petitioner claims that he was illegally
held because the trial court failed to properly apply Rule 3.134,
Fla. R. Crim. P., and release him.
Respondents assert that this
claims is both moot and without merit.
Response at 7.
They also
contend that the claim is not cognizable in this habeas proceeding
because it is a matter of purely state law.
Id.
Petitioner, in ground one, is asking that this court enforce
a state created right.
§
2254
"was
not
The writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
enacted
to
enforce
State-created
rights."
Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing
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Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988)), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1170 (2001).
As a result, federal habeas relief
does not lie for errors of state law.
Petitioner complains that although motions for release were
filed, he was not provided pre-charge release pursuant to Rule
3.134, Fla. R. Crim. P.
Of import, the purpose of a federal habeas
proceeding is review of the lawfulness of Petitioner's custody to
determine whether that custody is in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States. See Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722 (1991). Only in cases of federal constitutional error
will a federal writ of habeas corpus be available.
See Jones v.
Goodwin, 982 F.2d 464, 471 (11th Cir. 1993); Krasnow v. Navarro,
909 F.2d 451, 452 (11th Cir. 1990).
It is not the province of this
Court to reexamine the state-court determination on an issue of
state law.
See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).
"This limitation on federal habeas review is of equal force when a
petition, which actually involves state law issues, is 'couched in
terms of equal protection and due process.'"
Branan v. Booth, 861
F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Willeford v. Estelle, 538
F.2d 1194, 1198 (5th Cir. 1976)).
This Court is bound by the Florida court's interpretation of
its
own
laws
unless
constitutional mandate.
that
interpretation
breaches
a
federal
McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1264
(11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 944 (1992).
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Here, there has been no breach of a federal constitutional mandate.
Petitioner has presented a state law claim, not a claim of
constitutional dimension.
Since ground one presents an issue of
state law that is not cognizable in this proceeding, this ground
cannot
provide
a
basis
for
federal
habeas
corpus
relief.
Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on ground one.
Alternatively, this ground is without merit since the state
filed an information before a hearing on the motion for release,
thus curing any error.
(Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Ford v. Campbell, 697 So.2d 1301, 1303
The intended purpose of this type of rule is
to "force the state to formally charge the accused as soon after
arrest as practical."
1991).
Bowens v. Tyson, 578 So.2d 696, 697 (Fla.
A motion to release is used to put the state on notice that
it must file an information or indictment, show good cause for
delay, or prompt the release of the accused.
Id.
If prior to the
hearing on the motion to release the state files an information,
"the purpose of the rule is served."
Id.
In the alternative, ground one is moot.
A claim for pretrial
release is rendered moot once Petitioner enters a plea and is
convicted:
Courts have held that a claim concerning
pretrial bail becomes moot upon a defendant's
plea or conviction. See Murphy v. Hunt, 455
U.S. at 481-82, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183 (holding
that claim to pretrial bail was rendered moot
by conviction); see, e.g., United States v.
Vachon, 869 F.2d 653, 656 (1st Cir. 1989)
(same); United States v. O'Shaughnessy, 772
F.2d 112, 113 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
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(observing
that
after
the
defendant's
conviction, "[n]either pretrial detention nor
release on pretrial bail may now be ordered");
United States v. Buckbee, 3 Fed. Appx. 563
(7th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion) ("Any
claim to pretrial release became moot once
[the defendant] pleaded guilty."); United
States v. Taylor, 814 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir.
1987) (holding that the following claims were
rendered moot by guilty plea: claims that the
prosecution breached a pretrial agreement or
acted vindictively, that the defendant was not
promptly
taken
before
a
United
States
Magistrate, that the court did not rule on
pretrial motions, and that the defendant's
pretrial detention was illegal); Johnson v.
Glover, 2006 WL 1008986 (M.D. Fla. 2006)
(dismissing § 2254 petition as moot where
petitioner sought a reduction in the pretrial
bail amount set on a second degree assault
charge,
concluding:
"It
is
clear
that
Johnson's claim regarding pretrial bail became
moot upon either his conviction of the
underlying offense and/or his transfer to
state custody for service of sentences imposed
for various felony convictions) see also,
e.g., Hernandez v. Brooks, 176 F.3d 488 (10th
Cir.
1999)
(Table,
text
in
WestLaw)
(concluding that a habeas petitioner's claim
for release pending his parole revocation
hearing became moot once the revocation
hearing was held).
Bilal v. Hadi, No. 3:06cv224/LAC/MD, 2006 WL 3201324, at *2 (N.D.
Fla. Nov. 2, 2006).
Based on the above, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas
relief on ground one.
Therefore, ground one is due to be denied.
B.
Ground Two
In his second ground, Petitioner raises a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for failure to convey to Petitioner and the
court
that
the
motions
for
pre-trial
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release
were
properly
submitted and that Petitioner was entitled to release from custody.
Petitioner claims he received the ineffective assistance of counsel
in
violation
Constitution.
of
the
Sixth
Amendment
to
the
United
States
In order to prevail on this Sixth Amendment claim,
he must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), requiring that he show both
deficient performance (counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness) and prejudice (there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different).
Petitioner
has
failed
performance was deficient.
motions to release.
to
demonstrate
that
his
counsel's
His counsel filed the appropriate
Ex. C at 19-22.
Prior to a hearing on the
substance of the motion to release, the state cured any error by
filing
the
information.
As
noted
by
Respondents,
performance was "plainly not deficient" in this regard.
counsel's
Response
at 13.
Counsel's representation did not fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness.
Moreover, Petitioner has not shown
that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different if his lawyer had given the
assistance that Petitioner has alleged should have been provided.
The state cured the error by filing the information; therefore,
Petitioner's claim for pre-trial release was no longer viable.
There
were
no
additional
actions
- 8 -
defense
counsel
could
have
undertaken after the state filed the information that would have
altered
the
fact
that
the
state
had
cured
its
deficiency.
Accordingly, Petitioner's ineffectiveness claim is without merit
since he has neither shown deficient performance nor resulting
prejudice.
Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on ground
two.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.
The Third Amended Petition (Doc. 22) is DENIED, and this
action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2.
The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly
and close this case.
3.
Petition,
Because
If Petitioner appeals the denial of his Third Amended
the
this
Court
denies
Court
has
a
certificate
determined
that
of
a
appealability.5
certificate
of
appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the
pending motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper
5
This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only
if a petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right."
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
To make this
substantial showing, Petitioner "must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district court's assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v. Dretke, 542
U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000)), or that "the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further,'" Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893
n.4 (1983)).
Upon due consideration, this Court will deny a
certificate of appealability.
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that may be filed in this case.
Such termination shall serve as a
denial of the motion.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 16th day of
November, 2015.
sa 11/10
c:
Mohammed Williams
Counsel of Record
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