Thomas et al v. City of Jacksonville
Filing
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ORDER granting 13 motion to dismiss. The claims against Sheriff Rutherford, Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, and Jacksonville Sheriff's Office Division of Health Services are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs' claims seeking punit ive damages against the City of Jacksonville are also dismissed with prejudice. In all other respects, the motion is granted with leave to amend the complaint. Plaintiffs should file their amended complaint by September 17, 2014. Defendants should respond to the amended complaint by October 17, 2014. Signed by Judge Timothy J. Corrigan on 7/17/2014. (WG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
MOZELLE J. THOMAS and JALYNNE
SANTIAGO, as Personal Representatives
of the Estate of Javon Thomas, deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Case No. 3:13-cv-737-J-32MCR
CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a Florida
municipal corporation by and through
its JACKSONVILLE SHERIFF’S OFFICE
and its DIVISION OF HEALTH SERVICES
and JOHN RUTHERFORD, in his official
capacity as Sheriff for Duval County,
Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiffs, personal representatives of Javon Thomas’s estate, brought suit against
the City of Jacksonville (the “City”), Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (“JSO”), Sheriff John
Rutherford in his official capacity, and Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office Division of Health
Services (“DHS”) for the death of Javon Thomas while in police custody. (Doc. 12.)
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 13), to
which Plaintiffs responded in opposition (Doc. 29). On July 11, 2014, the Court held a
hearing on the motion, the record of which is incorporated by reference.
I. Background1
On July 29, 2010, JSO officers arrested Javon Thomas for assault and interference
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For motion to dismiss purposes, the Court takes Plaintiffs’ allegations as true.
with custody of a child under the age of seventeen. (Doc. 12 at 3.) The officers placed
Thomas in a police vehicle with the ignition in the off position and the windows rolled up for
approximately four hours. (Id.) A neighbor noticed Thomas in a disorientated state inside the
vehicle and informed the officers of her concerns, but the officers ordered her to “mind her
own business.” (Id.)
After being transported to the detention facility, Thomas called his fiancée, but was
barely able to speak because of his physical condition. (Id.) During the night of July 29,
several inmates reported to officers that Thomas complained of breathing difficulties. (Id.)
On the morning of July 30, Thomas suffered a seizure while in JSO custody at the detention
facility. (Id.) Medical staff at the detention facility placed Thomas in restraints on a stretcher
and recommended he be transported to Shands Emergency Room. (Id. at 4.) Prior to
transport, the medical staff administered “Zyprexa 10 Mg IM” to Thomas. (Id.) Shortly after
receiving the medication, Thomas suffered another seizure and passed away. (Id.) An
examination conducted on July 31 revealed the cause of death to be a seizure disorder of
unknown etiology. (Id.) The report also noted that Thomas had a history of seizures and that
cocaine may have been in his system. (Id.)
Plaintiffs sued the City, Sheriff Rutherford in his official capacity, JSO, and DHS in
a five-count, twice-amended complaint, alleging (1) negligence; (2) municipal liability under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983; (3) negligent supervision; (4) wrongful death under Fla. Stat. § 768.16;
and (6) negligent hiring, training, and supervision.2 (Doc. 12.) For each count, Plaintiffs
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Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint erroneously calls what should be Count V “Count
VI.” For consistency, the Court has retained the original numbering of “Count VI” as it
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request (a) a trial by jury; (b) actual and compensatory damages; (c) punitive damages; (d)
an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and (e) any other relief
that this Court deems just and proper. (Id.)
II. Standard of Review
When considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must
accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Castro v. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., 472 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir.
2006); Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). While Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
requires a pleading to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,” it does not require “detailed factual allegations.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court should dismiss a claim where a party fails to
plead facts that make the claim facially plausible. Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible
when the Court can draw a reasonable inference, based on the facts pled, that the opposing
party is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). This “plausibility standard” requires “more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully,” and where the complaint only alleges facts “merely
consistent with” liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
appears in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.
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III. Discussion
A. Duplicative Claims Against Sheriff Rutherford, JSO, and DHS
Plaintiffs assert claims against the City, Sheriff Rutherford in his official capacity, JSO,
and DHS. Defendants moved to dismiss Sheriff Rutherford, JSO, and DHS from the action,
reasoning that having these parties in a suit in which the City is also a party is duplicative.
(Doc. 13 at 3-4.)
Plaintiffs sue Sheriff Rutherford in his official capacity for all claims. (Doc. 12.)
Because Sheriff Rutherford is only being sued in his official capacity, the suit is merely
another way to plead a case against the entity of which he is an agent–the City. Busby v.
City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165 (1985)); see also Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985) (explaining that “a
judgment against a public servant ‘in his official capacity’ imposes liability on the entity that
he represents”). Thus, suing Sheriff Rutherford in his official capacity and suing the City are
functionally equivalent. Busby, 931 F.2d at 776. Because the City has been sued directly,
it is proper to dismiss the claims against Sheriff Rutherford in his official capacity as
redundant and potentially confusing. Id.
Plaintiffs also include JSO and DHS as defendants in the action. The law of the state
in which the district court is located governs whether an entity can be sued in federal court.
Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir.1992) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)). Florida’s
Constitution empowers municipalities to “perform municipal functions and render municipal
services.” Fla. Const. art. VIII, § 2, cl. b. With these powers, the City, a municipality, renders
policing services through JSO and DHS, which are not distinct legal entities recognized by
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Florida’s Constitution. See id. Furthermore, “[w]here a police department is an integral part
of the city government as the vehicle through which the city government fulfills its policing
functions, it is not an entity subject to suit.” Eddy v. City of Miami, 715 F. Supp. 1553, 1556
(S.D. Fla. 1989). JSO and DHS are integral to the City’s policing functions, as no other
police departments exist to police the City. Therefore, JSO and DHS are not legally distinct
entities from the City. It is proper to dismiss JSO and DHS, leaving the City as the only
defendant.
B. Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the City in Count II asserts: (1) the City fails to
adequately discipline, train, or otherwise direct its police officers and (2) JSO has a custom
or policy of disregarding the constitutional right to medical care under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. “[T]o impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, a plaintiff
must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a
custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3)
that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289
(11th Cir. 2004) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).
Defendants argue that no custom or policy exists that constitutes deliberate
indifference to a constitutional right. “A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the
municipality . . . .” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997).
However, a custom, or “a practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes on the force
of law,” may substitute for a policy. Id. Constitutional polices can also become
unconstitutionally applied through a repeated failure to train. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387.
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Because a municipality, such as the City, will not likely have an express written or oral policy
of inadequately training or supervising its employees, a plaintiff may prove a “policy” by
showing that the City’s failure to train amounts to a “deliberate indifference” to the rights of
its citizens. See Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing City of
Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-89). “To establish a ‘deliberate or conscious choice’ or such
‘deliberate indifference,’ a plaintiff must present some evidence that the municipality knew
of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular area and the municipality made a
deliberate choice not to take any action.” Id. (citations omitted).
Claims involving a violation of a constitutional right for a pretrial detainee are
governed by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth
Amendment. Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996). In turn, the standards
under the Eighth Amendment inform the analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause for alleged constitutional violations against a pretrial detainee. Hamm v.
DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently articulate
this claim and the elements required by law.3 Moreover, with discovery already taken and
to be taken, Plaintiffs should be capable of including more factual content in their next
amended complaint.
C. Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision
In Count VI, Plaintiffs assert a claim for negligent hiring, training, and supervision.
Defendants assert that sovereign immunity shields the City from liability under this claim.
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The Court also has concerns over whether the examples of past deliberate indifference
by the City alleged by Plaintiffs are appropriately tailored to this action.
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Under Florida law, “a governmental agency is immune from tort liability based upon
actions that involve its ‘discretionary’ functions, such as development and planning of
governmental goals and policies.” Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 260 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th
Cir. 2001) (citing Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d 258, 260
(Fla. 1988)). While sovereign immunity is waived for implementation or operation of a city’s
police training program, a city cannot be held liable for suits about the content of police
training and supervision. Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402
F.3d 1092, 1118 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding a finding of sovereign immunity where the
plaintiffs argued for implementation of different suicide prevention techniques and practices);
see also Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1162 (11th Cir. 2005). To distinguish
claims involving police operation from claims involving a discretionary policy-making
function, the Court looks to see whether the claim challenges implementation of an already
established policy or whether it seeks to alter the content of a training program. Wynn v. City
of Lakeland, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1318 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
Plaintiffs appear to allege both operational and policy content claims against
Defendants. (Doc. 12 at 13.) Plaintiffs assert that Defendants failed to properly instruct
officers about the protocols involving inmates who suffer seizures (Id. at ¶ 52). This claim
may well be operational in nature and not protected by sovereign immunity, as Plaintiffs
seek to challenge Defendants’ implementation of an existing training program. Cook, 402
F.3d at 1118. However, Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants had a duty to promulgate
regulations concerning treatment of those who suffer a seizure while in custody. (Id. at ¶ 53.)
Similar to Cook, which upheld sovereign immunity where the plaintiffs argued for
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implementation of suicide prevention practices, sovereign immunity may well protect
Defendants from being forced to implement specific policies regarding treatment of seizures.
Id. When Plaintiffs amend their complaint, they must properly allege only operational issues.
D. Punitive Damages
In all counts, Plaintiffs request punitive damages. (Doc. 12.) A municipality is immune
from punitive damages in a § 1983 action. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247, 271 (1981). Under Florida law, “[t]he state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be
liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances, but liability shall not include punitive damages or interest for the period
before judgment.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(5). Under Florida law, a municipality is considered a
state agency or subdivision, Fla. Stat. § 768.28(2), so the City, a municipality, is a
subdivision of the state for the purposes of § 768.28(5). Therefore, punitive damages are
not recoverable against the City for the § 1983 action in Count II or for any of the state
claims in Counts I, III, IV, and VI.
E. Remaining State Law Claims Not Dismissed
Defendants moved to dismiss the remaining state law claims in this action for lack of
jurisdiction, based on the absence of any valid federal claim. However, because Plaintiffs
are being granted an opportunity to replead their § 1983 claim, dismissal of the remaining
state law claims–Negligence in Count I, Negligent Supervision in Count III, and Wrongful
Death in Count IV–would be premature.
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F. Future Amended Complaint
At oral argument, Plaintiffs stated that they have found additional facts from discovery
and request the opportunity to focus the complaint on the issues. The Court will grant
Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend the complaint. Additionally, the Court is willing to allow
Plaintiffs to name individual defendants in the amended complaint, so long as Plaintiffs have
a legal basis for doing so. Further, Plaintiffs must evaluate the state law claims to ensure
they meet all of the elements required by law and are not duplicative of one another. As the
complaint reads now, some count titles do not match what is alleged in the actual count; this
should be redressed in the subsequent amended complaint. Plaintiffs should ensure each
count contains a non-redundant, separate cause of action.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) is GRANTED as to the claims against
Sheriff Rutherford, Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office, and Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office Division of
Health Services, which defendants are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ claims seeking
punitive damages against the City of Jacksonville are also dismissed with prejudice. In all
other respects, the motion is GRANTED but with leave to amend as discussed in this order.
2. Plaintiffs shall file a Third Amended Complaint no later than September 17, 2014.
3. Defendant(s) shall respond to the Third Amended Complaint no later than October
17, 2014.
4. Once the pleadings are settled, the Court will ask Judge Richardson to conduct a
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settlement conference. The Court will delay entering the case scheduling order until
settlement discussions conclude, but the parties are permitted to engage in discovery in the
meantime.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida this 17th day of July, 2014.
c.w .
Copies:
counsel of record
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