Gibbs v. Heritage Bank of North Florida
Filing
25
ORDER denying 19 Defendant's Motion for Injunctive Relief and Restraining Order; granting 9 Plaintiff's Motion to Withdraw Plaintiff's Request for Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41; granting in part and denying in part 16 Plaintiff& #039;s Motion for Leave to Re-File Plaintiff's Request for Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41(a) and Objection to Defendant's Response; vacating 8 8/6/2013 Order dismissing case; granting in part and denying in part 15 Defendant's Respon se to Plaintiff's Motion to Withdraw Plaintiff's Request for Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41, in the Alternative for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum of Law. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver for Heritage Bank of North Florida, and against Plaintiff Curtis Gibbs and to close the file. Signed by Judge Timothy J. Corrigan on 2/18/2014. (BJB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
CURTIS GIBBS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 3:13-cv-838-J-32JBT
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, as Receiver for
HERITAGE BANK OF NORTH
FLORIDA,
Defendant.
ORDER
This case is before the Court on Plaintiff Curtis Gibb’s Motion to Withdraw
Plaintiff’s Request for Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41 (“Motion to Withdraw”) (Doc. 9);
the Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw Plaintiff’s Request for Dismissal
Pursuant to Rule 41, in the Alternative for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum of Law (“Motion for Summary Judgment”) (Doc. 15) filed by Defendant
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver for Heritage Bank of North Florida
(“FDIC”); Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Re-File Plaintiff’s Request for Dismissal
Pursuant to Rule 41(a) and Objection to Defendant’s Response (“Motion for Leave”)
(Doc. 16); Plaintiff’s Supplemental Response to Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s
Motion to Withdraw Plaintiff’s Request for Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41, in the
Alternative for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum of Law
(“Supplemental Response”) (Doc. 24); and FDIC’s Motion for Injunctive Relief and
Restraining Order (“Motion for Restraining Order”) (Doc. 19). Upon due consideration,
the Court rules as follows.
I.
BACKGROUND
Though this case has been pending in this Court a relatively short time, its
complete history is longer and more complicated. Gibbs first filed his suit in the
Fourth Judicial Circuit for Duval County, Florida on February 18, 2011. (Doc. 1-2.)
In his complaint, Gibbs alleges that, in September 2010, Heritage Bank of North
Florida wrongfully evicted him from the property at 206 Arlington Road, Jacksonville,
Florida (“subject property), which he had contracted to purchase from Heritage Bank
and was leasing and had possession of pending the closing of the sale. (Doc. 2.) Gibbs
alleges that, through no fault of his own, the closing never happened, but he remained
in possession of the property, first under the terms of the lease and then pursuant to
a month-to-month periodic tenancy when the written lease expired. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-15.)
Gibbs alleges that Heritage Bank then unlawfully evicted him from the property and
destroyed all the personal property he had inside the building on the property. (Id. at
¶¶ 19-28.) His complaint seeks damages for the loss of his personal property. (Id. at
¶ 28.)
The state court docket does not evidence much activity.
Gibbs’s counsel
apparently withdrew on July 5, 2012, and Gibbs appears to have proceeded pro se after
that. (See Doc. 1-1; Doc. 11.) At some point, Heritage Bank fell into insolvency, and,
on April 19, 2013, FDIC was appointed as a receiver for the bank. (Doc. 15 at ¶ 2.)
Subsequently, FDIC substituted into the state case (Doc. 1-1) and, on July 16, 2013,
removed the case to this Court. (Doc. 1.)
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On August 5, 2013, FDIC filed a Notice of Filing Plaintiff’s Request for
Dismissal with Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). (Doc. 7.) The request attached to
the notice stated that Gibbs and FDIC had administratively resolved Gibbs’s claim and
requested that the case be dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. 7-1.) Accordingly, on
August 6, 2013, the Court dismissed the case with prejudice. (Doc. 8.) The very next
day, however, Gibbs filed the Motion to Withdraw, stating that a complete settlement
had not been reached and that he did not wish to close this case. (Doc. 9.) At the same
time, though, he filed a document requesting a $28,490.00 payment by FDIC for the
amount of the claim that FDIC had allowed against the receivership of Heritage Bank.
(Doc. 10.) In light of these filings, the Court ordered FDIC to file a response advising
the Court of its position. (Doc. 12.)
Before FDIC was due to file its response, Gibbs filed a document offering to
purchase the subject property “as is,” with the purchase money coming in the form of
a credit against a settlement of his claim against FDIC. (Doc. 14.) FDIC did not
respond to that filing but, on August 16, 2013, did timely file the response ordered by
the Court. (Doc. 15.) In its response, FDIC argues that Gibbs should not be permitted
to withdraw his request for dismissal because his claim had indeed been
administratively resolved and that, in the alternative, the administrative resolution
of his claim dictated entry of summary judgment in FDIC’s favor. (Id. at 3-9.)
On August 23, 2013, Gibbs filed a response to FDIC’s response and motion for
summary judgment. (Doc. 16.) According to Gibbs, he did not knowingly participate
in the administrative resolution process; instead, FDIC tricked him into requesting
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that the case be dismissed by promising him immediate cash payments for his claim
and by holding out the possibility that he might yet be able to buy the subject property.
(Id.)
On October 18, 2013, FDIC filed a motion for a restraining order prohibiting
Gibbs from coming within 1,000 feet of the subject property or contacting anyone
working for FDIC or any of its brokers marketing the property. (Doc. 19.) In the
motion, FDIC alleges that Gibbs has been unlawfully living on the property and
harassing FDIC’s representatives. (Id.)
On October 25, 2013, the Court held a hearing on all pending motions. (Doc. 21.)
Gibbs had a full opportunity to explain his position and the history of the case. FDIC
had a full opportunity to respond with its position on these issues. In light of the
discussion, the Court directed Gibbs to advise the Court by December 1, 2013 whether
he wished to continue pursuing his motions to vacate the dismissal of the case. (Id.)
On December 1, 2013, Gibbs filed a notice advising that he intended to continue
to seek to vacate the dismissal and to continue with his claims in this case. (Doc. 22.)
The Court subsequently entered an order notifying the parties of their rights and the
consequences with respect to FDIC’s motion for summary judgment and gave Gibbs
until January 24, 2014 to file any supplemental response to the motion along with any
supporting materials. (Doc. 23.)
Gibbs timely filed a supplemental response in opposition to FDIC’s motion for
summary judgment. (Doc. 24.) In his response, Gibbs does not dispute the background
facts of the case, but does challenge the authenticity and sufficiency of certain
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documents FDIC has submitted as proof that his claim has been administratively
resolved by the FDIC. (Id. at 2-3.) Gibbs also argues that the law allows him to
continue his suit, filed before the FDIC was appointed receiver, while pursuing his
administrative claim with the FDIC. (Id. at 4-6.) With this submission, the motions
are now ripe for ruling.
II.
ANALYSIS
A.
Gibbs’s Requests to Withdraw Dismissal
The Court first briefly addresses together Gibbs’s Motion to Withdraw and
Motion for Leave. These short pro se filings do not identify a specific legal basis for
setting aside the dismissal, but the Court construes them together as a request for
relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
Rule 60(b) provides that, among other reasons, a court may order relief from a
judgment or order entered as the result of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect,” “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party,” or “any other reason that
justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
The Court does not reach Gibbs’s allegations that he was tricked into requesting
dismissal. (Doc. 16 at 1-2.) Instead, the Court is sufficiently satisfied that the original
request for dismissal and resulting order of dismissal were filed due to mistake or
inadvertence. For one thing, the request itself was filed by FDIC purportedly on behalf
of Gibbs and, it appears, was drafted by FDIC for him. (See Doc. 7, Doc. 7-1.) Then,
on the very next day after the request was filed, Gibbs filed a motion that he drafted
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himself, requesting that the dismissal be withdrawn because a settlement had not been
reached. (Doc. 9.) Finally, it was clear from the Court’s discussion with the parties at
the October 25, 2013 hearing that Gibbs likely did not understand or intend the
dismissal to end his case completely, and, at the very least, there was no meeting of
minds as to whether the case would be dismissed voluntarily. For these reasons, the
Court concludes that the voluntary dismissal should be vacated.
B.
FDIC’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Having addressed the voluntary dismissal, the Court now concludes, however,
that FDIC’s motion for summary judgment should be granted. FDIC argues that
summary judgment in its favor is appropriate under the Financial Institution Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”). The FIRREA provisions relevant
to the instant matter are codified in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d). FDIC argues that § 1821(d)
creates a mandatory administrative claims process that any claimant against the
assets of a failed bank in receivership must exhaust before seeking relief in federal
court. (Doc. 15 at 5.) In FDIC’s view, the statute divested courts of jurisdiction over
such claims generally, with judicial review coming into play only if the FDIC disallows
a claim under this process or has not made a determination on the claim by a certain
deadline. (Id.) Because Gibbs’s claim was allowed in full, no judicial review is
available according to FDIC, and even if judgment were eventually entered for Gibbs
in this case, § 1821(d)(13)(C) would prohibit him from attaching or executing against
the assets of Heritage Bank now in receivership. (Id. at 6-8.)
Upon review of the relevant Eleventh Circuit precedent, the Court agrees with
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Gibbs that the Court does have jurisdiction over this lawsuit, which he filed before
FDIC was appointed receiver for Heritage Bank. FIRREA does not automatically
divest federal courts of jurisdiction over pre-appointment lawsuits, Aguilar v. FDIC,
63 F.3d 1059, 1062 (11th Cir. 1995), and, in certain circumstances, the district court
where the failed bank had its principal place of business may review de novo a claim
that has gone through the administrative process. Bank of Am. Nat’l Ass’n v. Colonial
Bank, 604 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010); Placida Prof’l Ctr., LLC v. FDIC, 512 F.
App’x 938, 945 (11th Cir. 2013); see 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A). Thus, dismissal of this
case on jurisdictional grounds is inappropriate.1
Summary judgment in FDIC’s favor is appropriate, however. “The court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether to grant summary judgment, “the evidence and
inferences drawn from the evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, and all reasonable doubts are resolved in his favor.” WSB-TV v. Lee,
842 F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 1988); Augusta Iron & Steel Works, Inc. v. Employers
Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir. 1988).
1
Given the ultimate conclusion reached here, the Court does not undertake a
detailed discussion of FIRREA, a statute that the First Circuit first described as, and
the Eleventh Circuit later seconded, amounting to “‘an almost impenetrable thicket,”
ensuring that “‘confusion over its proper interpretation is not only unsurprising-it is
inevitable,” with § 1821(d) in particular constituting “‘an avalanche of words.’”
Damiano v. FDIC, 104 F.3d 328, 333 n.7 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Marquis v. FDIC,
965 F.2d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1992)).
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The record demonstrates that Gibbs’s claim was fully resolved in the
administrative claims process and is now moot. His complaint in this case requests
compensation for the personal property destroyed when he was evicted from the subject
property. (Doc. 2 at ¶ 28.) Gibbs later filed an administrative claim with FDIC2 and
listed the property destroyed and its estimated value. (Doc. 15-3.) FDIC allowed the
claim in full in the form of a receivership certificate for $28,490.00 against the
distribution of the assets of Heritage Bank. (Doc. 15-4.)
FDIC is authorized to pay claims in receivership certificates signifying a claim
on the eventual distribution of the failed bank’s assets. Placida Prof’l Ctr., LLC, 512
F. App’x at 951; Battista v. FDIC, 195 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999). The claims of
a general unsecured creditor such as Gibbs fall under the asset distribution priority set
out in § 1821(d)(11)(A), which limits him to a pro rata share of the proceeds after
liquidation.3 Placida Prof’l Ct., LLC, 512 F. App’x at 951. Moreover, even if the Court
were to find that additional damages were warranted, Gibbs would not be able to
attach any resulting judgment as a lien on the assets of Heritage Bank. 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(13)(C); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chesire Mgmt. Co., 18 F.3d 330, 335 (6th Cir.
1994). Thus, Gibbs has already received the relief he requested, and his claim is now
2
Gibbs challenges the authenticity of the proof of claim materials attached to
FDIC’s motion (Doc. 24 at 2-3), but actually attached the same documents to his
Motion for Leave and identified them as documents he completed and submitted to
FDIC. (Doc. 16 at 2-5, 9-12.) So, while Gibbs may dispute the effect of these
documents, he has admitted their authenticity.
3
As of the October 25, 2013 hearing, the liquidation had not yet occurred, so the
actual amount Gibbs might recover is undetermined.
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moot.
C.
FDIC’s Motion for Restraining Order
Finally, the Court declines to enter any restraining order as requested in FDIC’s
Motion for Injunctive Relief and Restraining Order. Assuming arguendo that the
Court could enter such an order in this case, the undersigned is satisfied with Gibbs’s
assurances at the October 25, 2013 hearing that he understood that he should not go
on the subject property. Thus, this motion is due to be denied.
In closing, the Court understands Gibbs’s frustration here. Unfortunately, when
a bank becomes insolvent, most people involved are not made whole and are
disappointed. Congress enacted FIRREA to make the best of an inherently bad
situation. The Court can only act within the limitations Congress has set.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.
FDIC’s Motion for Injunctive Relief and Restraining Order (Doc. 19) is
DENIED.
2.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw Plaintiff’s Request for Dismissal Pursuant
to Rule 41 (Doc. 9) is GRANTED.
3.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Re-File Plaintiff’s Request for Dismissal
Pursuant to Rule 41(a) and Objection to Defendant’s Response (Doc. 16) is GRANTED
in part to the extent that Gibbs’s request for dismissal is hereby WITHDRAWN, but
otherwise DENIED.
4.
The August 6, 2013 Order (Doc. 8) is VACATED.
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5.
Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw Plaintiff’s Request
for Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41, in the Alternative for Summary Judgment and
Supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. 15) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part as stated herein.
6.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver for Heritage Bank of North Florida, and
against Plaintiff Curtis Gibbs and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, on this 18th day of February,
2014.
bjb.
Copies:
Counsel of record
Pro se plaintiff
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