Brown v. Jarvis et al

Filing 102

ORDER denying 93 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 4/29/2016. (JW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

SHEA REBECCA BROWN,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:13-cv-915-J-34MCR
vs.
RUDOLPH DAVIS, individually, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order
Granting Summary Judgment (Doc. 93; Motion), filed on December 17, 2015. In the
Motion, Plaintiff Shea Rebecca Brown (Brown) seeks reconsideration of this Court’s Order
(Doc. 85; Summary Judgment Order) granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants
Rudolph Davis (Davis), Carlton Tunsil (Tunsil), and the City of Lake City, Florida (Lake
City). See Motion at 1. Specifically, Brown asserts that the Court committed “a manifest
error of law and fact, thus warranting reconsideration of the Court’s granting of summary
judgment for the Defendants.” Id. at 5. Defendants Lake City and Tunsil filed a response
on December 31, 2015, and Defendant Davis filed a response on January 14, 2016. See
Defendants’ [sic] City of Lake City and Carlton Tunsil’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration of Order Granting Summary Judgment (Doc. 97); Defendant Davis’s
Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Order
Granting Summary Judgment (Doc. 101). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.

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A motion to alter or amend a judgment may be filed pursuant to Rule 59(e),1 which
affords the Court substantial discretion to reconsider an order which it has entered. See
Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1137 (11th Cir. 2000); O’Neal v. Kennamer, 958 F.2d
1044, 1047 (11th Cir. 1992).

“The only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are

newly[ ]discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d
1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999)).
This Court has interpreted those parameters to include “(1) an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error
or manifest injustice.” Lamar Adver. of Mobile, Inc. v. City of Lakeland, Fla., 189 F.R.D.
480, 489 (M.D. Fla. 1999). For example, reconsideration may be appropriate where “the
Court has patently misunderstood a party.” O’Neill v. The Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 243
F.R.D. 469, 483 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
The purpose of Rule 59 is not to ask the Court to re-examine an unfavorable ruling
in the absence of manifest error of law or fact. Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d
1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010). As such, Rule 59(e) cannot be used “to relitigate old matters,
raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).
Additionally, motions to alter or amend “should not be used to raise arguments which could,
and should, have been made before the judgment was issued.” O’Neal, 958 F.2d at 1047.

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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991); Controlled
Semiconductor, Inc. v. Control Systemation, Inc., No. 6:07-cv-1742-Orl-31KRS, 2008 WL 4459085, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2008). It is widely recognized, however, that Rule 59(e) (which governs motions “to alter
or amend a judgment”) encompasses motions for reconsideration. Controlled Semiconductor, 2008 WL
4459085, at *1 (citing 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure
2d § 2810.1 (2007)).

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Indeed, permitting a party to raise new arguments on a motion for reconsideration
“essentially affords a litigant two bites at the apple.” Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Glenn
Estess & Assocs., Inc., 763 F.2d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1985) (quotation omitted); see also
Mincey, 206 F.3d at 1137 n.69; Mays v. U.S. Postal Serv., 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“[A] motion to reconsider should not be used by the parties to set forth new theories of
law.”).

As such, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the “[d]enial of a motion for

reconsideration is especially sound when the party has failed to articulate any reason for
the failure to raise the issue at an earlier stage in the litigation.” Sanderlin v. Seminole
Tribe of Fla., 243 F.3d 1282, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). Moreover, “[w]hen
evaluating a motion to reconsider, a court should proceed cautiously, realizing that ‘in the
interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources, reconsideration of a
previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly.’” United States v.
Bailey, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (quoting Lamar, 189 F.R.D. at 489).
Of the limited grounds for relief under Rule 59(e), Brown argues that reconsideration
is necessary here to correct clear error and prevent manifest injustice. See Motion at 4, 5.
Specifically, Brown contends that the Court erred in finding that she failed to establish a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether one of the reasons given by the Lake City
Police Department (LCPD) for terminating her employment, that her arrest brought
discredit both to Brown and to LCPD, was merely a pretext for discrimination. See Motion
at 3, 4–5.
In its Notice of Disciplinary Action dated August 31, 2009 (Doc. 69-6; Termination
Letter), LCPD gave five reasons for terminating Brown’s employment:
(1) You had several [internal affairs] complaints (4) filed against you in a short
time span[;]

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(2) You had several serious [internal affairs] policy violations which were
sustained[;]
(3) Your arrest and actions brought discredit to you, and this agency[;]
(4) You had two domestic disturbances at your residence within 4 months
[; and]
(5) Your behavior creates a liability for the City of Lake City.
Termination Letter.

In its Summary Judgment Order, the Court found that Brown

introduced sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether the first two of these
reasons – the internal affairs complaints and violations – were pretext for discrimination.
See Summary Judgment Order at 27–28. Moreover, the Court found an issue of fact as to
whether the domestic disturbances were proffered as a pretext for discrimination because
Brown introduced evidence that she was the victim in both incidents of domestic violence
and because Defendant Tunsil admitted “[i]t would be questionable” whether LCPD could
terminate an officer’s employment for being a victim of domestic violence.

See id.;

Deposition of Carlton Tunsil, dated June 24, 2014, at 49 (Doc. 68-12; Tunsil Dep.).2
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that “Brown fail[ed] to rebut [LCPD’s] proffered reason
that her ‘arrest and actions brought discredit to [Brown], and this agency.’” Summary
Judgment Order at 28 (quoting Termination Letter).
Brown argues that the Court erred in finding that she failed to establish that the
arrest was a pretext for discrimination because the Court found an issue of fact as to
whether the internal affairs actions were pretextual, and “the set of facts” from which both
the arrest and the internal affairs actions arose were the same. See Motion at 2 ¶ 4.
However, as the Court explained in its Summary Judgment Order, “Brown does not dispute

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The Court also found that there was an issue of fact as to the fifth reason for Brown’s termination
stated in the Termination Letter, that Brown’s behavior created a liability for Lake City, because the Court
found that Brown’s arguments regarding the internal affairs actions and domestic violence incidents were
equally applicable to this reason for termination. See Summary Judgment Order at 28 n.21.

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that neither Davis, nor Tunsil, nor any officer with LCPD had anything to do with the State
Attorney’s Office’s decision to criminally investigate, charge, and arrest [Brown].”
Summary Judgment Order at 29. Although Brown introduced evidence sufficient to create
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Davis improperly influenced the internal
affairs actions against her because of racial and/or gender-based animus, Brown
introduced no evidence suggesting that the State Attorney’s Office was so influenced.
Indeed, in arguing that her arrest and the internal affairs actions “arose out of one set of
circumstances,” see Motion at 3 ¶ 9, Brown ignores the fact that the State Attorney’s
Office’s decision to arrest her was untainted by any alleged discriminatory motive on the
part of any of the Defendants and ignores the Court’s holding that “Brown’s arrest
constitutes a separate, legitimate reason for termination, independent of the internal
investigation.” Summary Judgment Order at 30.
Brown next argues that an issue of fact exists because Defendant Davis admitted
that he did not believe Brown committed any “wrongdoing” and that he had witnessed other
officers engage in the same conduct that led to her arrest. See Motion at 2 ¶¶ 5, 7.
However, as the Court has already noted, Brown does not argue that the State Attorney’s
Office’s decision to arrest Brown was influenced by any LCPD employee—thus, Davis’s
statement that Brown “was treated unfairly . . . compared to what other officers have done
. . . and because of who investigated her internal[ly]” is of no moment with regard to Brown’s
arrest. See Davis letter dated February 10, 2013 (Doc. 76-1; Davis Letter). Brown also
argues that because the Defendants knew that her arrest arose out of her decision to follow
the unwritten LCPD policy, “the Defendants knew that the arrest and charge[] were not
valid.” See Motion at 2 ¶ 6. However, Brown has introduced no evidence to support her

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contention that her arrest or the charge against her was invalid. Instead, she established
only that the charge was dismissed after a mistrial. See Deposition of Shea Brown, dated
June 23, 2013, at 79–80 (Doc. 68-11; Brown Dep.); see also Summary Judgment Order at
29. Although Brown was not convicted of a crime, “[t]hat a defendant is subsequently
acquitted or charges dropped against the defendant is of no consequence in determining
the validity of the arrest itself.” Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1990).3
Notably, regardless of whether Davis or LCPD may not have believed Brown committed
any wrongdoing, the undisputed facts reflect that the State Attorney thought differently.
Indeed, the evidence reflects that despite being informed that after its own investigation
the Florida Department of Law Enforcement found no basis to pursue charges against
Brown, the State Attorney undertook his own investigation after which he decided to charge
Brown with the felony offense of tampering with evidence.

It is the fact that the State

Attorney charged and arrested Brown that caused LCPD to terminate her employment.
Moreover, although Brown contends that she “was treated unfairly,” she did not point
to evidence of any LCPD employee who was not terminated after having been arrested.
Brown also failed to contest Defendant Tunsil’s testimony that the Human Resources
Manager and City Manager told him that if Brown were arrested, LCPD would have to
terminate her employment. See Tunsil Dep. at 53–54; see also Summary Judgment Order
at 29. By arguing that other officers had disposed of drugs in the same manner without
being punished or arrested, Brown focuses on the conduct underlying her arrest, and
attempts to justify it by noting that she was merely following LCPD policy. However,

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Moreover, even if LCPD tacitly allowed officers to dispose of contraband in the same manner as
Brown, the existence of such a policy does not foreclose the possibility that such conduct was, in fact, against
the law.

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focusing on the conduct underlying her arrest ignores, and fails to rebut, the reason given
for her termination: that her arrest on the charge filed by the State Attorney, in and of itself,
was grounds for termination. See Termination Letter; see also Tunsil Dep. at 53–54. Thus,
Brown’s invitation for the Court to “look[] one step beyond the fact that she was arrested to
the litany of information of which Defendants were aware,” Motion at 2 ¶ 6, entirely fails to
rebut LCPD’s proffered reason for terminating her employment—that is, the simple fact
that she was arrested, regardless of the misconduct that gave rise to the arrest.
Finally, Brown argues that the almost two-month delay between her arrest on July
7, 2009, and LCPD’s termination of her employment on August 31, 2009, is evidence of
pretext, because LCPD would have terminated her immediately upon her arrest if the arrest
were a true reason for her termination. See Motion at 3 ¶ 8. This is a new argument that
Brown did not present at the summary judgment stage, and Brown makes no attempt to
explain why she was unable to advance that argument earlier; thus, the Court need not
consider it. See O’Neal, 958 F.2d at 1047; Sanderlin, 243 F.3d at 1292. For this reason
alone the Court could deny the request for relief. See Am. Home Assur. Co., 763 F.2d at
1239 (“There is a significant difference between pointing out errors in a court’s decision . . .
and raising altogether new arguments on a motion to amend; if accepted, the latter
essentially affords a litigant two bites at the apple.”) (quotation omitted). Nevertheless,
Brown has not pointed to any evidence demonstrating that a two-month delay between an
offense and LCPD’s termination of an officer’s employment was unusual. Nor has she
pointed to any evidence that terminations of other officers who had been arrested were
immediate. Merely raising the hypothetical question of why LCPD waited nearly two
months to terminate her employment, without pointing to any evidence in the record, does

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not give rise to a genuine dispute of fact or affect the Court’s reasons for granting summary
judgment to Defendants.
Ultimately, Brown makes no argument in the Motion to cast doubt on LCPD’s reason
for terminating her employment—that her arrest “brought discredit” to her and to LCPD.
See Termination Letter. Thus, having carefully considered the arguments raised in the
Motion, the Court finds no reason to reconsider its Summary Judgment Order. Accordingly,
the Motion is due to be denied. Thus, it is hereby
ORDERED:
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Summary Judgment (Doc.
93) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, this 29th day of April, 2016.

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Copies to:
Counsel of Record

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