Brown v. Jarvis et al

Filing 31

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 24 motion to stay. Signed by Magistrate Judge Monte C. Richardson on 9/17/2013. (MOH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

SHEA REBECCA BROWN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No: 3:13-cv-915-J-34MCR

ROBERT L. JARVIS, JR. , Individually,
JEFF SEIGMEISTER, In his official
capacity as State Attorney for the Third
Judicial Circuit of Florida, RUDOLPH
DAVIS, Individually, CARLTON TUNSIL,
Individually, and CITY OF LAKE CITY,
Florida,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant, Robert L. Jarvis’s Motion to Stay
(Doc. 24) filed September 6, 2013. On September 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed a response in
opposition to this Motion. (Doc. 30). Accordingly, the matter is now ripe for judicial
review.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 30, 2013, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this case. The Complaint
consists of five counts, each against a different defendant. For example, Count I
alleges malicious prosecution against Defendant Jarvis, who was the State Attorney for
the Third Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida. Count II alleges municipal liability
against Defendant Seigmeister in his official capacity as the new State Attorney for the
Third Judicial Circuit of Florida. Counts III, IV, and V allege racial and sexual

discrimination against Defendants, Davis, Tunsil, and Lake City regarding Plaintiff’s
employment with the Lake City Police Department.
On August 21, 2013, Defendant Jarvis filed a Motion to Dismiss Count I of the
Complaint on the basis of immunity. (Doc. 12). On September 3, 2013, Defendants
Tunsil and Lake City filed their Answer to the Complaint. (Doc. 19). That same day,
Defendant Davis filed a Motion to Dismiss Count III, the count against him. (Doc. 21).
On September 6, 2013, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Count II and Defendant
Seigmeister. (Doc. 25).
Defendant Jarvis filed the instant Motion (Doc. 24) to stay all proceedings until
the Court ruled on his Motion to Dismiss. Jarvis argues that because he is seeking to
dismiss the count against him on the basis of immunity, he is entitled to a stay of all
further proceedings and discovery with respect to all Defendants. (Doc. 24, p.3).
Plaintiff responds that a stay on discovery with respect to all Defendants is improper as
Jarvis’s Motion to Dismiss is not dispositive of the entire case. (Doc. 30).
II. ANALYSIS
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes that trial courts
have the authority to limit the scope of discovery by court order. Federal courts also
have the broad discretion to stay proceedings as part of their inherent authority to
control their docket. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 1650 (1997).
The Eleventh Circuit has held that facial challenges to the legal sufficiency of a
complaint in a dispositive motion to dismiss should be resolved before discovery begins.
Cotton v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1292 (11th Cir. 2005); see
also Moore v. Potter, 141 F.App’x. 803, (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding the staying of

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discovery until ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss). Moreover, staying
discovery is warranted when a government official raises an immunity defense. Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815 (1985) (quoting Harlow and stating “such
pretrial matters as discovery are to be avoided if possible, as ‘[i]nquires of this kind can
be peculiarly disruptive of effective government’”).
In the instant case, Defendant Jarvis asks the Court to stay all proceedings and
discovery with respect to all Defendants until the Court rules on his Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff responds by arguing that staying discovery with respect to all Defendants is not
necessary as Jarvis’s Motion to Dismiss is not dispositive of the entire case. Plaintiff
points out that as Defendants Tunsil and Lake City have answered the Complaint,
Counts IV and V will necessarily remain after the Court resolves Jarvis’s Motion to
Dismiss. Further, Plaintiff explains that Count I against Defendant Jarvis relates to the
malicious prosecution of Plaintiff for the charge of tampering with evidence, whereas the
remaining counts relate to discrimination and denial of equal protection regarding
Plaintiff’s employment with the Lake City Police Department. Accordingly, Plaintiff takes
the position that “discovery should be permitted to proceed against the other
Defendants in this cause.” (Doc. 30, p.5).
As an initial matter, the Court notes that “[a] request to stay discovery pending a
resolution of a motion is rarely appropriate unless resolution of the motion will dispose
of the entire case.” McCabe v. Foley, 233 F.R.D. 683, 685 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (citing
Feldman v. Flood, 176 F.R.D. 651, 652 (M.D. Fla. 1997)). In order for a motion to stay
to be granted, the moving party must meet his burden of establishing good cause and

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reasonableness. Id. “’In deciding whether to stay discovery pending resolution of a
pending motion, the Court inevitably must balance the harm produced by a delay in
discovery against the possibility that the motion will be granted and entirely eliminate
the need for such discovery. This involves weighing the likely costs and burdens of
proceeding with discovery.’” Id. (quoting Feldman, 176 F.R.D. at 652).
In the present case, the Court is satisfied Defendant Jarvis has met his burden of
showing good cause and reasonableness with respect to a stay of discovery regarding
the malicious prosecution claim. However, he has failed to show good cause or
reasonableness with respect to discovery on Plaintiff’s discrimination claims. It is
undisputed that those claims will survive Defendant Jarvis’s Motion to Dismiss. Further,
Defendant Jarvis has made no showing that discovery regarding those claims will
involve him in any way much less cause him any harm. As motions to stay “are not
favored because when discovery is delayed or prolonged, it can create case
management problems which impede the Court’s responsibility to expedite discovery
and cause unnecessary litigation expenses and problems,” the Court believes any
potential burden on Defendant Jarvis is outweighed by the harm to Plaintiff in staying
discovery for all Defendants S.D. v. St. Johns County School Dist., 3:09-cv-250, 2009
WL 3231654 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2009) amended, 3:09-cv-250, 2009 WL 4349878 (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 24, 2009) (citing Kron Medical Corp. v. Groth, 119 F.R.D. 636
((M.D.N.C.1988)). Indeed, in deciding whether to grant a stay, the Court “‘must
exercise its discretion so that officials are not subjected to unnecessary and
burdensome discovery or trial proceedings.’” Fleming v. Barber, 383 F.App'x 894, 896
(11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 1596

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(1998)). As there has been no showing that Defendant Jarvis may be subjected to
unnecessary and burdensome discovery if Plaintiff is permitted to conduct discovery on
the discrimination claims, the Court is satisfied it has done so.
Accordingly, after due consideration, it is
ORDERED:
Defendant, Robert L. Jarvis’s Motion to Stay (Doc. 24) is GRANTED in part. All
discovery regarding Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint is hereby stayed until the Court rules
on Defendant Jarvis’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12). Discovery regarding Plaintiff’s
discrimination claims (Counts III – V) shall be permitted.
DONE and ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 17th day of September, 2013.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record

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