Willich v. Secretary, Department of Corrections et al

Filing 27

ORDER denying 1 Petition for writ of habeas corpus and dismissing with prejudice this action. Signed by Judge Timothy J. Corrigan on 3/10/2017. (HMJ)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ALLEN ROBERT WILLICH,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 3:13-cv-1387-J-32MCR

SECRETARY OF THE FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________________

ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action by filing a pro
se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) (Petition). 1
Petitioner challenges his 2009 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction
and sentence for one count of attempted first degree murder. Petitioner is serving a life
sentence. He challenges the judgment of conviction and sentence on nine grounds, all
premised upon allegations of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.
Respondent Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections filed her response. See
Respondent’s Answer in Response to Order to Show Cause and Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (Doc. 20) (Response). 2 On September 20, 2016, the Court entered an

1

Citations to Petitioner’s filings refer to the page numbers assigned by the Court’s
electronic case filing system.
2

The Court refers to the exhibits attached to the Response as “Ex.”

order directing Petitioner to either file a reply or a notice advising the Court that Petitioner
did not intend to file a reply. (Doc. 22). On October 19, 2016, Petitioner filed a letter
that the Court construes as his notice of intent not to file a reply. (Doc. 26-1). The case
is ripe for review.
II. Evidentiary Hearing
“In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the
need for an evidentiary hearing.” Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299,
1318 (11th Cir. 2016). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal
court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the
petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas
relief.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). “It follows that
if the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas
relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The pertinent
facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court
can “adequately assess [Petitioner’s] claim[s] without further factual development,”
Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not
be conducted.
III. Standard of Review
“A state prisoner’s § 2254 habeas petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996" (AEDPA). Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic &
Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to
ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in
the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.’” Id. (quoting

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Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011)).
Under AEDPA, when a state court has adjudicated the
petitioner’s claim on the merits, a federal court may not grant
habeas relief unless the state court’s decision was “contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. §
2254(d)(2). A state court’s factual findings are presumed
correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.[ 3]
Id. § 2254(e)(1); Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199, 1223 (11th Cir.
2011).
AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating
state court rulings” and “demands that state-court decisions
be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S.
766, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s determination that
a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as
fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the
state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, ––– U.S. ––––,
––––, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “It bears repeating that even a
strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary
conclusion was unreasonable.”
Id. (citing Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144
(2003)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower
federal courts that an unreasonable application of law
requires more than mere error or even clear error. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d
263 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (“The gloss of clear error
fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating
error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389
(2000) (“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is
different from an incorrect application of federal law.”).
Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013).

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“This presumption of correctness applies equally to factual determinations made
by state trial and appellate courts.” Pope v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 680 F.3d 1271, 1284
(11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003)).

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“[A] federal court reviewing the judgment of a state court must first identify the last
adjudication on the merits. It does not matter whether that adjudication provided a
reasoned opinion because section 2254(d) ‘refers only to a decision’ and does not
‘requir[e] a statement of reasons.’” Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 834 F.3d
1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011)). When
the last adjudication on the merits “‘is unaccompanied by an explanation,’ a petitioner’s
burden under section 2254(d) is to ‘show[ ] there was no reasonable basis for the state
court to deny relief.’” Id. (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). “‘[A] habeas court must
determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state
court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could
disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior
decision of [the] Court.’” Id. (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102).
When the reasoning of the state trial court was reasonable,
there is necessarily at least one reasonable basis on which
the state supreme court could have denied relief and our
inquiry ends. In this way, federal courts can use previous
opinions as evidence that the relevant state court decision
under review is reasonable. But the relevant state court
decision for federal habeas review remains the last
adjudication on the merits, and federal courts are not limited
to assessing the reasoning of the lower court.
Id. at 1239.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner “must meet both
the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland.” Wong v. Belmontes, 558
U.S. 15, 16 (2009) (per curiam) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984)).

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To establish deficient performance, a person
challenging a conviction must show that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. A court considering a claim of
ineffective assistance must apply a strong
presumption that counsel’s representation was within
the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance. The challenger’s burden is to show that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment.
With respect to prejudice, a challenger must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. It is not enough to show
that the errors had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding. Counsel’s errors must be
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 104 (citations and quotations omitted). Because both prongs of the
two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a court
need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong,
and vice-versa.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
A state court’s adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is accorded great
deference.
The question is not whether a federal court believes
the state court’s determination under the Strickland
standard was incorrect but whether that
determination was unreasonable - a substantially
higher threshold. And, because the Strickland
standard is a general standard, a state court has even
more latitude to reasonably determine that a
defendant has not satisfied that standard.

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Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (citations and quotations omitted).
Thus, the standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, “and
when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so[.]” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105
(quoting Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123). As such, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never
an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
V. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Petitioner alleges trial counsel was
ineffective for violating the Federal and State Constitutions. (See Doc. 1 at 6, 11, 15, 18,
22, 27, 31, 34, 38). To the extent Petitioner attempts to assert claims based purely on a
violation of the Florida Constitution, such claims are not cognizable in a federal habeas
petition and are denied. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).
A. Ground One
Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a juror who
appeared to be sleeping during the testimony of the victim. Petitioner raised this claim in
his amended motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 (Amended Rule 3.850 Motion) in state trial court. Ex. K at 4-7. The
state trial court summarily denied Petitioner’s claim. Ex. M. The First District Court of
Appeal (First DCA) per curiam affirmed without a written opinion. Ex. Q. Therefore,
there is a qualifying decision under the AEDPA from the state appellate court that requires
deference.
Upon thorough review of the record, the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of the claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not
involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not based

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on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
state court proceedings. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on ground one.
B. Ground Two
Petitioner argues trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to
challenge the trial testimony of witness Patricia Salamanca with her prior inconsistent
statement. Petitioner raised this claim in his Amended Rule 3.850 Motion in state trial
court. Ex. K at 7-10. The state trial court summarily denied the claim (Ex. M) which was
overturned by the First DCA because the claim was not conclusively refuted by the record.
Ex. Q. On remand the state trial court held an evidentiary hearing and again denied the
claim. Ex. S. The state trial court found that
counsel was clearly aware of Salamanca’s inconsistent
statement at the time of trial.
The jury heard that
Salamanca’s story changed or may have changed.
However, if counsel continued to confront Salamanca with her
inconsistent report to Officer Miller, it is likely that Salamanca
would have continued to maintain that she had not heard
Lee’s statement first hand. Such a course would have only
served to prejudice the defense as the witness would have
emphasized that she had no direct knowledge of the other
suspect’s incriminating statement. Moreover, highlighting
Salamanca’s inconsistency could have provided further
support for the State’s contention that the Defendant ordered
his friends and family to lie to authorities on his behalf.
Counsel also had a reasonable fear of opening the door to
prejudicial testimony from Salamanca that the Defendant
abused her. Therefore, it is unclear how further crossexamination would have benefitted the defense, particularly in
light of the possible prejudicial testimony counsel sought to
avoid.
Counsel appears to have adequately and
competently excogitated his strategy on this point and
therefore did not render ineffective assistance.

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Ex. S at 3.

The First DCA per curiam affirmed without a written decision.

Ex. U.

Therefore, there is a qualifying decision under the AEDPA from the state appellate court
that requires deference.
Upon thorough review of the record, the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of the claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not
involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
state court proceedings. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on ground two.
C. Ground Three
Petitioner argues trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to
an erroneous jury instruction regarding the definition of the lesser-included offense of
attempted voluntary manslaughter. Petitioner raised this claim in his Amended Rule
3.850 Motion in state trial court. Ex. K at 10-12. The state trial court denied Petitioner’s
claim finding that “the Defendant fail[ed] to provide a basis for ineffective assistance of
counsel.” Ex. N at 2. The state trial court found “[t]he jury instruction . . . was not
improper” and the jury was advised “of an ‘intentional act’, as approved by the Florida
Supreme Court in State v. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252, 257 (Fla. 2010), and the First
District Court of Appeals in Montgomery v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D360 (Fla. 1st DCA
2009).” Ex. N at 1. Further, the state trial court found that
even if there was some irregularity or error in the jury
instruction . . ., this error was not fundamental error.
Because the Defendant was convicted as charged, this case
[was] distinguishable from any error committed in the
Montgomery cases. See Joyner v. State, 41 So. 3d 306 (Fla.
1st DCA 2010). Thus, even if the defendant was correct in
his argument that the instruction read was improper, his
Motion still fail[ed].
“Accordingly, the erroneous

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manslaughter instruction here ‘did not interfere with the jury’s
deliberative process in a way that tainted the underlying
fairness of the entire proceeding’ and was thus not
fundamental error.” Id. at 306-07.
Ex. N.

The First DCA per curiam affirmed without a written opinion. Ex. Q. Therefore,

there is a qualifying decision under the AEDPA from the state appellate court that requires
deference.
Respondent contends that resolution of Petitioner’s claim depends on a question
of pure state law and couching the claim in terms of a federal constitutional provision does
not transform the substance of the state law claim into a federal claim.
Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable in a § 2254 proceeding.

As such,

In the alternative,

Respondent contends counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a correct jury
instruction. Respondent asserts that the jury instruction was consistent with the current
jury instruction approved by the Florida Supreme Court in Williams v. State, 123 So. 3d
23, 27 (Fla. 2013).
Assuming a cognizable federal claim and upon thorough review of the record, the
Court concludes that the state court’s adjudication of the claim was not contrary to clearly
established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.

Therefore, Petitioner is not

entitled to relief on ground three.
D. Ground Four
Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony of a
Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) analyst regarding tests performed by
another FDLE employee. The FDLE analyst testified to the following:

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Q I’m showing you State’s Exhibit 33. Please take a look at
that. What does State’s 33 purport to be?
A This is a preserved sample from the knife.
Q. And specifically what was obtained from that knife, if
anything?
A. This knife was tested by a member of my section, and it
gave positive results for the presence of blood. A portion of
that body fluid was preserved in this particular exhibit and
forwarded for my analysis for DNA testing.
Q I’m showing you State’s 32. What does State’s 32 purport
to be?
A This is a swabbing from a front door.
Q And did that swabbing go through the same procedure that
you explained for the knife?
A Yes, it did.
Q Did you receive standards for the victim? And by
standards I mean something that was swabbed from the
victim as well as the defendant in this case?
A Yes, I did.
Q And if you could please take a look at State’s 29 and 30 and
let the jury know whether or not those are in fact those
standards?
A Yes, they are.
Q Did FDLE also receive some white Reebok tennis shoes
with stains on them?
A Yes, we did.
Q And were those shoes also screened by the forensic
technologists?
A Yes, they were.
...

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Q Now, referring you back to the swabbing from the knife,
were you able to obtain a DNA profile from that swab?
A Yes, I did.
Q And did you compare that swab to the standards that you
received?
A Yes, I did.
Q And what was the result of your examination?
A The DNA profile that was obtained from the knife matched
the DNA profile developed from Richard Walker.
Q And did you also examine the swab for the door?
A Yes, I did.
Q Were you able to develop a DNA profile there?
A Yes, I did.
Q And were you able to examine that in comparison with the
standards you were given?
A Yes.
Q And what profile did you come up with?
A Again, it is the same result as the swabbing from the knife.
The DNA profile matches the DNA profile represented as
coming from Richard Walker.
...
Q And you didn’t analyze any of the shoes then?
A A member of my laboratory did. She examined the shoes
looking for the presence of any blood staining, and none was
demonstrated.
Ex. B at 256-57, 259, 260. Petitioner raised this claim in his Amended Rule 3.850 Motion
in state trial court. Ex. K at 12-14. The state trial court summarily denied Petitioner’s

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claim. Ex. M. The First DCA per curiam affirmed without a written opinion. Ex. Q.
Therefore, there is a qualifying decision under the AEDPA from the state appellate court
that requires deference.
Upon thorough review of the record, including that Petitioner’s own trial strategy
and testimony conceded the results of the DNA testing, the Court concludes that the state
court’s adjudication of the claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did
not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the state court proceedings. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on ground four.
E. Ground Five
Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek independent
testing of the “getaway” car’s steering wheel for the presence of the victim’s blood.
Petitioner raised this claim in his Amended Rule 3.850 Motion in state trial court. Ex. K
at 15-18. The state trial court summarily denied Petitioner’s claim. Ex. M. The First
DCA per curiam affirmed without a written opinion.

Ex. Q.

Therefore, there is a

qualifying decision under the AEDPA from the state appellate court that requires
deference.
Upon thorough review of the record, the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of the claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not
involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
state court proceedings. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on ground five.

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F. Ground Six
Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain the deposition
transcript of witness Patricia Salamanca until the day of trial. Petitioner raised this claim
in his Amended Rule 3.850 Motion in state trial court. Ex. K at 19-21. The state trial court
summarily denied Petitioner’s claim. Ex. M. The First DCA per curiam affirmed without
a written opinion. Ex. Q. Therefore, there is a qualifying decision under the AEDPA
from the state appellate court that requires deference.
Upon thorough review of the record, the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of the claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not
involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
state court proceedings. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on ground six.
G. Ground Seven
Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek independent
testing of a shoeprint discovered at the crime scene. Petitioner raised this claim in his
Amended Rule 3.850 Motion in state trial court. Ex. K at 21-22. The state trial court
summarily denied Petitioner’s claim. Ex. M. The First DCA per curiam affirmed without
a written opinion. Ex. Q. Therefore, there is a qualifying decision under the AEDPA
from the state appellate court that requires deference.
Upon thorough review of the record, which included Petitioner’s own testimony that
the shoeprint was his (Ex. B. at 294-98), the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of the claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not
involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not based

13

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
state court proceedings. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on ground seven.
H. Ground Eight
Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission
of the 911 taped call because it lacked a proper foundation. Petitioner raised this claim in
his Amended Rule 3.850 Motion in state trial court. Ex. K at 22-25. The state trial court
summarily denied Petitioner’s claim. Ex. M. The First DCA per curiam affirmed without
a written opinion. Ex. Q. Therefore, there is a qualifying decision under the AEDPA
from the state appellate court that requires deference.
Upon thorough review of the record, the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of the claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not
involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
state court proceedings.
In fact, a proper foundation was laid for the admission of the 911 taped call. Prior
to the State publishing the 911 taped call to the jury, the victim who made the call to 911
testified to the following:
Q Now, you said that you did in fact call 911; is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q I’m showing you State’s Evidence 34. Do you recognize
that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you have the opportunity to listen to it?
A Yes, sir.

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Q Did you initial it?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is that a copy of the 911 call that you made that night?
A Yes, sir.
Ex. B 155-56. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on ground eight.
I. Ground Nine
Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Officer Barker,
Officer Gaston, and Officer Wolcott (collectively called “LEOS”) to testify about a prior
inconsistent statement made by the victim. At trial, trial counsel acknowledged that the
LEOS were not under the defense’s subpoena, but were listed by the State. Ex. B at
266. The trial counsel presumed the LEOS would be called by the State as witnesses,
and he would then have the chance to cross-examine the LEOS. Id. However, the
State did not call the LEOS as witnesses. Id. Nevertheless, the parties and the state
trial court agreed to read to the jury a portion of a police report written by Officer Von Eiff
that was based on Officer Gaston’s representations.

Id. at 310-14.

The following

statements were read to the jury: “The victim advised the suspect and the other unknown
black male went to the victim’s house. They knocked on the front door. The victim
stated that he let them both in and offered them each a drink. They both turned down
the offer for the drink.” Id. at 316-17. Further, “[t]he victim stated that the suspect then
started stabbing and cutting him. The victim did state that the unknown black male had
no part in the crime and was just present.” Id. at 317.
Petitioner raised this claim in his Amended Rule 3.850 Motion in state trial court.
Ex. K at 32-37. The state trial court summarily denied Petitioner’s claim. Ex. M. The

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First DCA per curiam affirmed without a written opinion. Ex. Q. Therefore, there is a
qualifying decision under the AEDPA from the state appellate court that requires
deference.
Upon thorough review of the record, the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of the claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not
involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
state court proceedings. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on ground nine.
VI. Conclusion
The Court has considered Petitioner’s claims and reviewed the state court record.
After due consideration, it is
ORDERED:
1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this case is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case with
prejudice.
3. If Petitioner appeals the denial of the Petition, the Court denies a
certificate of appealability. 4 Because this Court has determined that a

4

This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if Petitioner makes “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To
make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would
find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,”
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further,’” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Here, after consideration of the record as a whole,
a certificate of appealability is not warranted.

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certificate of appealability is not warranted, the Clerk of the Court shall
terminate from the pending motions report any motion to proceed on
appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this case. Such termination shall
serve as a denial of the motion.
4. The Clerk shall close this case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida this 10th day of March, 2017.

sflc
c:
Allen Robert Willich
Counsel of Record

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