Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
27
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Commissioner's decision is REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. Signed by Magistrate Judge Monte C. Richardson on 2/20/2015. (DLC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
TOMMIE SMITH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CASE NO. 3:13-cv-1563-J-MCR
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s appeal of an administrative
decision denying her July 6, 2010 applications for a period of disability, Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Plaintiff asserts
a disability onset date of April 30, 2010 (Tr. 20, 147, 152), the same date on which
Plaintiff’s earlier applications for Social Security disability assistance were denied.1 On
April 21, 2011, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) David W. Carstetter held a hearing
on the current applications. (Tr. 34-39.) Plaintiff attended the hearing and was
represented by an attorney. The ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled from April 30, 2010
through June 14, 2012, the date of the decision. (Tr. 17-29.)
In reaching the decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe impairments of:
“degenerative disc disease with radiculopathy, degenerative joint disease, and
hypertension” (Tr. 22). The ALJ determined Plaintiff’s “medically determinable mental
1
On April 30, 2010, ALJ Patrick McLaughlin entered a decision finding Plaintiff was
not disabled from December 10, 2007 through the date of his decision. (Tr. 40-52.)
impairments of post-traumatic stress disorder, adjustment disorder with depressed
mood, and polysubstance abuse (cocaine)” were “non-severe” (Tr. 23). He also found
that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with
“no climbing of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; only occasional climbing of ramps and
stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; and must avoid even
moderate exposure to pulmonary irritants (fumes, odors, gases, dusts, poor ventilation,
etc.) and hazards (machinery, heights, etc.)” (Tr. 24). Based on this RFC, the ALJ
determined Plaintiff could return to her past relevant work and she was not disabled (Tr.
27-28).
Plaintiff has exhausted her available administrative remedies and the case is
properly before the Court. The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a
United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. 18.) The undersigned has reviewed the record,
the briefs, and the applicable law. For the reasons stated herein, the Commissioner’s
decision is REVERSED and REMANDED.
I. Issues on Appeal
Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal. First, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in
failing to credit “critical parts” of the examining physician’s opinion, to which the ALJ
gave “great weight. Second, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred at step four and step five
in determining Plaintiff’s ability to work. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges: (a) the ALJ
misclassified Plaintiff’s past relevant work (“PRW”) as a “medical secretary;” and, (b)
vocational expert testimony was necessary to determine if Plaintiff could perform other
work in the economy.
2
The Commissioner argues substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation
of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity and the finding Plaintiff could return to her past
relevant work.
Upon review, the Court finds substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s
finding of Plaintiff’s past relevant work. The Court also finds the ALJ erred in failing to
utilize a vocational expert. Therefore, the Court will limit its discussion to these errors
and remand the case to the Commissioner for further development and consideration.
II. Standard of Review
The scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d
1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported
by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). “Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004).
Where the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer
would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds
that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. Edwards v.
Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356,
1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into
account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote v. Chater, 67
F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th
3
Cir. 1992) (stating the court must scrutinize the entire record to determine the
reasonableness of the Commissioner’s factual findings).
III. Discussion
An ALJ must apply the five step sequential evaluation process provided by 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) and 416.920(a)(4).2 Claimants bear the burden of persuasion
through the fourth step, but the burden temporarily shifts to the Commissioner at the
fifth step. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146, 107 S. Ct. 2287 n.5 (1987).
Erroneous Finding of Past Relevant Work
As part of the step four evaluation, the ALJ is called upon to determine whether
Plaintiff can return to her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). “The
regulations require that the claimant not be able to perform her past kind of work, not
that she merely be unable to perform a specific job she held in the past.” Jackson v.
Bowen, 801 F.2d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 1986) citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (emphasis
in original).
In this instance, the past kind of work is identified by the ALJ with reference to
a single classification in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) (Tr. 27).3 The
DOT constitutes substantial evidence for the listed occupations, however the identified
occupation must reflect the past relevant work. Here, there is a marked incongruence
2
As the Regulations for SSI disability payments mirror those set forth for DIB on the
matters presented in this case, from this point forward the Court may refer only to those
sections in 20 C.F.R. pertaining to part 404 and DIB.
3
The references to “DOT” are short form citations to the United States Dep't of
Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (4th ed. 1991).
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between Plaintiff’s stated work history (Tr. 210-17), other record evidence (Tr. 50-51,
174), and the ALJ’s classification of Plaintiff’s past relevant work (Tr. 27).
The ALJ identified Plaintiff’s past relevant work as that of a medical secretary
listed under DOT 201.362-014 (Tr. 27). The ALJ does not refer to any record evidence
in support of this finding. Moreover, the ALJ failed to question Plaintiff at the hearing
regarding her past work or her functional capabilities (Tr. 34-39).4 The ALJ did not
utilize the services of a vocational expert. Although the ALJ determined Plaintiff had
worked as a medical secretary, which is classified as a skilled occupation performed
at the sedentary level, he contemporaneously found Plaintiff performed this sedentary
occupation at the medium exertional level (Tr. 27).
Notwithstanding the greater
physical exertion noted by the ALJ, the record reveals Plaintiff’s prior work falls outside
the description of a medical secretary.
In a work history and a Social Security Disability Report-Adult, Plaintiff identified
her past work from 2002 to 2009 as a resident assistant at a drug rehabilitation facility,
as a unit secretary and as a clerk technician at a nursing home and hospital (Tr. 174,
210-13). While working as a resident assistant, Plaintiff described her job duties as
driving a fifteen (15) passenger vehicle in which she transported clients to and from
appointments, climbing stairs between floors to “make sure clients were safe and make
sure they had their meds,” and inputting data on a computer and keeping up files (Tr.
4
In fact, it is troubling to the Court that the transcript of the administrative hearing
reveals the hearing lasted approximately five (5) minutes and contains practically no direct
questioning of Plaintiff. (Tr. 34-39.)
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211). As a unit secretary, Plaintiff stated she answered telephones, input data, handled
upkeep of medical files, ran errands, lifted heavy medical records, went with patients
to different tests outside of the nursing home, helped patients to and from beds,
ordered and put up supplies (Tr. 212). When working as a clerk technician, Plaintiff
transcribed doctors’ orders and kept files updated, input information into the computer,
transported patients back and forth to appointments and errands, answered multiple
telephone lines, ordered tests and made appointments for clients, and reported test
results to the doctors (Tr. 213).
Given the time frame of Plaintiff’s reported work, it is quite probable this same
record evidence was before ALJ McLaughlin when he issued the decision to deny
Plaintiff’s disability applications in April 2010. ALJ McLaughlin’s decision is contained
within the record submitted to this Court (Tr. 40-52). He utilized the services of a
vocational expert to assist in finding Plaintiff’s PRW was classified as a medical record
clerk (DOT 245.362-010) and a psychiatric aide (DOT 355.377-014) (Tr. 51). According
to ALJ McLaughlin’s decision, these occupations are identified as light semi-skilled and
medium semi-skilled work, respectively (Tr. 51). With this evidence in the record before
the Court, and the noticeable lack of Plaintiff’s testimony from the hearing, the
undersigned is unable to discern on what basis ALJ Carstetter classified Plaintiff’s past
relevant work as a medical secretary.
As noted above, the ALJ failed to identify the evidence supporting his
determination of Plaintiff’s PRW. The Court declines to make an arbitrary assumption
regarding what the ALJ may have considered in making his findings. See, e.g., Cook
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v. Barnhart, 347 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (noting that even where the
Commissioner’s argument on an issue might not be unreasonable, the courts will not
make routine or arbitrary assumptions regarding what an ALJ did and did not consider
if the ALJ fails to state what evidence contributed to his findings). This Court’s review
of the record reveals substantial evidence does not exist to support the ALJ’s
identification of Plaintiff’s PRW as that of a medical secretary.
Failure to Use Vocational Expert
The ALJ’s alternate step five finding is also concerning. Without citation to
record evidence or vocational resources, the ALJ determined Plaintiff's additional
non-exertional limitations do not significantly reduce the number of available jobs a
person with Plaintiff’s RFC could perform in the national economy (see Tr. 28). Such
a conclusion is difficult to make without the assistance of a vocational expert,
particularly in view of Plaintiff's environmental restrictions and her non-severe mental
impairments. Cf. Young v. Apfel, No. 98 C 1058, 1999 WL 354776, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May
27, 1999) (suggesting vocational expert assistance may be necessary to determine the
extent to which a claimant's environmental restrictions impact the jobs the claimant
could perform).5 Here, the ALJ used Medical-Vocational Rule 202.14 in the “Grids” as
framework for finding Plaintiff not disabled (Tr. 28).6
5
Unpublished opinions may be cited as persuasive on a particular point. The Court
does not rely on unpublished opinions as precedent.
6
The Grids are a series of rules which use a matrix of a claimant's RFC for
sedentary, light, medium or heavy work and the claimant's vocational profile of his age,
education and past relevant work, to direct a conclusion on the issue of whether the
claimant is capable of substantial gainful activity in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. Pt.
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In relatively simple cases, when the Grids are used as a framework for evaluating
additional impairments of a non-exertional nature, the Commissioner’s guidelines
suggest an ALJ utilize the vocational/work-related publications listed in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1566 to determine what jobs exist that a claimant can perform. SSR 83-14, 1983
WL 31254 at *3-4, (SSA 1983). See also, Allen v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200, 1201 (11th
Cir. 1989) (an ALJ must articulate specific jobs that the claimant is able to perform, and
this finding must be supported by substantial evidence). In more complex cases, the
Commissioner has found “a person or persons with specialized knowledge would be
helpful.” SSR 83-14, 1983 WL 31254, at *4.
Eleventh Circuit case law strongly suggests a preference for use of a vocational
expert where non-exertional impairments may limit a claimant's ability to work. As
stated in Williams v. Halter, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 2001), "[i]t is only
when the claimant can clearly do unlimited types of work at a given residual functional
level that it is unnecessary to call a vocational expert to establish whether the claimant
can perform work which exists in the national economy."
In this case, it is evident Plaintiff cannot do unlimited types of work because she
is precluded from "even moderate exposure to pulmonary irritants . . . and hazards" (Tr.
24). See Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding expert
testimony was required to determine whether the plaintiff’s limitations around
404, Subpt. P, App. 2, §§ 200.00-204.00; Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-62
(1983). Only when the assessed RFC is for a full range of work and there are no nonexertional limitations to further diminish a claimant’s ability to perform work at a given
exertional level, may the ALJ rely exclusively on the Grids. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d
834, 836 (11 th Cir. 1985); Holley v. Chater, 931 F.Supp. 840, 851 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
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unprotected heights or dangerous moving machinery would preclude him from
performing a wide range of light work). Moreover, the Court finds the instant action is
not a simple case in which reference to the various acceptable vocational publications
would suffice. Under both Eleventh Circuit precedent and the Commissioner’s program
policy statement for evaluating a combination of exertional and non-exertional
impairments (SSR 83-14), vocational expert testimony should have been obtained in
this case.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is not supported by
substantial evidence or decided according to proper legal standards. Accordingly, the
Commissioner’s decision is hereby REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for
additional proceedings consistent with the findings herein.
On remand, the
Commissioner shall: (1) conduct a new hearing at which Plaintiff may appear and be
heard and vocational expert testimony shall be obtained, (2) reassess Plaintiff’s past
relevant work and her ability to return to it, (3) re-evaluate the examining physician, Dr.
Harper-Nimock’s, medical opinion, and if parts of the opinion are disregarded explicitly
state the reasons therefor, (4) reassess Plaintiff’s RFC, and (5) conduct other
proceedings as may appear necessary.
In light of this conclusion and the possible change in the RFC assessment, the
Court finds it unnecessary to address Plaintiff’s other arguments. See Jackson v.
Bowen, 801 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.2 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Freese v. Astrue, 2008
WL 1777722, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2008); see also Demenech v. Sec’y of the Dep’t
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of Health & Human Servs., 913 F.2d 882, 884 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1.
The Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED pursuant to sentence four
of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and REMANDED with the instructions stated above.
2.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment consistent with this Order
and close the file.
3.
Should this remand result in an award of benefits, pursuant to Rule
54(d)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff’s attorney is GRANTED an
extension of time in which to file a petition for authorization of attorney’s fees under 42
U.S.C. § 406(b). Plaintiff’s attorney shall file such a petition within thirty (30) days from
the date of the Commissioner’s letter sent to Plaintiff’s counsel of record at the
conclusion of the Agency’s past due benefit calculation stating the amount withheld for
attorney’s fees. See In re: Procedures for Apply for Attorney’s Fees Under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 406(b) & 1381(d)(2), Case No. 6:12-mc-124-Orl-22 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2012). This
Order does not extend the time limits for filing a motion for attorney’s fees under the
Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 20th day of February 2015.
Copies to counsel of record
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