Pennington v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
28
OPINION AND ORDER affirming the Commissioner's final decision; Clerk to enter judgment accordingly and close the file. Signed by Magistrate Judge James R. Klindt on 9/4/2015. (KAW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
GARY D. PENNINGTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 3:14-cv-27-J-JRK
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
_____________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER1
I. Status
Gary D. Pennington (“Plaintiff”) is appealing the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration’s final decision denying his claim for supplemental security income (“SSI”).
Plaintiff’s alleged inability to work is a result of “2 fingers cut” on Plaintiff’s left hand and
“[b]ack [p]roblems[.]” See Transcript of Administrative Proceedings (Doc. No. 19; “Tr.” or
“administrative transcript”), filed June 3, 2014, at 233. On February 1, 2010, Plaintiff filed an
application for SSI, alleging an onset disability date of January 2, 2006. Tr. at 114-15, 20915. Plaintiff’s “protective filing date” is listed elsewhere in the administrative transcript as
January 11, 2010. Tr. at 12, 229. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially, see Tr. at 112,
122, 123-24, and was denied upon reconsideration, see Tr. at 113, 138-40.
On February 23, 2012, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing at which
Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. Tr. at 26-
1
The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge. See
Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge (Doc. No. 18), filed June 3, 2014;
Reference Order (Doc. No. 20), entered June 4, 2014.
75. At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was fifty (50) years old. Tr. at 30 (listing Plaintiff’s
date of birth). The ALJ issued a Decision on May 23, 2012, finding Plaintiff not disabled. Tr.
at 12-21. The Appeals Council then received additional evidence in the form of a brief from
Plaintiff’s representative. See Tr. at 4-5; see also Tr. at 286-87 (representative’s brief). On
October 31, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, Tr. at 1-3,
thereby making the ALJ’s Decision the final decision of the Commissioner. On December
23, 2013, Plaintiff commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as incorporated by 42
U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), by timely filing a Complaint (Doc. No. 1), seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision.
On appeal, Plaintiff argues there are four errors on the part of the ALJ. See
Memorandum of Law in Support of Complaint Against Commissioner of Social Security (Doc.
No. 23; “Pl.’s Mem.”), filed July 31, 2014. Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ’s credibility
finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Pl.’s Mem. at 3, 8-15. Second, Plaintiff
argues that the VE’s testimony and the ALJ’s findings about the jobs Plaintiff can perform are
not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ did not include all of Plaintiff’s
impairments and their effects in the hypothetical and because Plaintiff was placed in the
wrong age group. Id. at 3, 15-17. Third, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ “did not apply the
proper legal standard” regarding Listing 14.09 of the Listings set forth in 20 CFR Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“Listings”). Id. at 3, 18-19. Fourth, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s
entire Decision is not supported by substantial evidence, but Plaintiff rests this argument on
the alleged errors identified in the first three issues. Id. at 3, 19-20. On October 6, 2014,
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Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s arguments by filing a Memorandum in Support of the
Commissioner’s Decision (Doc. No. 26; “Def.’s Mem.”).
After a thorough review of the entire record and consideration of the parties’
respective memoranda, the undersigned finds the ALJ’s Decision is due to be affirmed for
the reasons explained herein.
II. The ALJ’s Decision
When determining whether an individual is disabled,2 an ALJ must follow the five-step
sequential inquiry set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations (“Regulations”), determining
as appropriate whether the claimant (1) is currently employed or engaging in substantial
gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals one listed in the Regulations; (4) can perform
past relevant work; and (5) retains the ability to perform any work in the national economy.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th
Cir. 2004). The claimant bears the burden of persuasion through step four and, at step five,
the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
Here, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential inquiry. See Tr. at 14-21. At step one,
the ALJ observed that Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January
11, 2010, the application date.” Tr. at 14 (emphasis and citation omitted). At step two, the
ALJ found Plaintiff suffers from “the following severe impairments: disorders of the spine,
2
“Disability” is defined in the Social Security Act as the “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months[.]” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A).
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right thumb osteoarthritis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease [(“COPD”)].” Tr. at 14
(emphasis and citation omitted). At step three, the ALJ ascertained Plaintiff “does not have
an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Tr. at 15
(emphasis and citation omitted).
The ALJ determined Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) as follows:
[Plaintiff can] perform light work as defined in 20 CFR [§] 416.967(b) except
with ability to change positions between sitting and standing with no more
than occasional bilateral feeling, climbing ramps/stairs, balancing, kneeling,
stooping, crouching, crawling and climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds; no
concentrated exposure to hazards, dangerous machinery or heights; no
concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants including dusts, fumes, odors,
gases.
Tr. at 15 (emphasis omitted). At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff “has no past relevant
work.” Tr. at 20 (emphasis and citation omitted). At step five, after considering Plaintiff’s
age (forty-eight (48) when he filed his SSI application), education (at least high school), lack
of work experience, and RFC, the ALJ relied on the testimony of the VE to find that “there
are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [Plaintiff] can
perform,” Tr. at 20 (emphasis and citation omitted), including “Ticket taker,” “Office helper,”
and “Assembler, plastic hospital parts,” Tr. at 20-21. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “has
not been under a disability . . . since January 11, 2010, the date the application was filed.”
Tr. at 21 (emphasis and citation omitted).
III. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision as to disability pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Although no deference is given to the ALJ’s conclusions
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of law, findings of fact “are conclusive if . . . supported by ‘substantial evidence’ . . . .”
Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d
1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998)). “Substantial evidence is something ‘more than a mere
scintilla, but less than a preponderance.’” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir.
2005) (quoting Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987)). The substantial
evidence standard is met when there is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Falge, 150 F.3d at 1322 (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It is not for this Court to reweigh the
evidence; rather, the entire record is reviewed to determine whether “the decision reached
is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143,
1145 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation and citations omitted); see also McRoberts v.
Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th
Cir. 1987). The decision reached by the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported
by substantial evidence–even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s
findings. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam).
IV. Discussion
As noted above, Plaintiff raises four issues on appeal. They are discussed in turn.
A. Plaintiff’s Credibility
Plaintiff first takes issue with the ALJ’s credibility finding. Pl.’s Mem. at 3, 8-15. “[T]o
establish a disability based on testimony of pain and other symptoms, the claimant must
satisfy two parts of a three-part showing: (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition;
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and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain; or
(b) that the objectively determined medical condition can reasonably be expected to give
rise to the claimed pain.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing
Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)).
“The claimant’s subjective
testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the standard is itself sufficient to
support a finding of disability.” Holt, 921 F.3d at 1223.
Although “credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ,” Moore v. Barnhart,
405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005), “explicit and adequate reasons” must be articulated
if the ALJ discredits the claimant’s testimony, Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225; see also Dyer, 395
F.3d at 1210; Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that “after
considering a claimant’s complaints of pain [or other subjective symptoms], the ALJ may
reject them as not creditable, and that determination will be reviewed for substantial
evidence”). “When evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptoms, the ALJ must consider
such things as: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the nature, location, onset, duration,
frequency, radiation, and intensity of pain and other symptoms; (3) precipitating and
aggravating factors; (4) adverse side-effects of medications; and (5) treatment or measures
taken by the claimant for relief of symptoms.” Davis v. Astrue, 287 F. App’x 748, 760 (11th
Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vi)).
Here, the ALJ found “that [Plaintiff’s] medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [Plaintiff’s] statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible
to the extent they are inconsistent with the [ALJ’s RFC] assessment.” Tr. at 18. The ALJ
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then provided a number of reasons why she discredited Plaintiff’s statements. Tr. at 19.
Plaintiff’s challenges to those reasons are addressed in turn.
First, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff “tend[ed] to exaggerate
as he reported [t]o the consultative examiner that he suffered from weakness and poor grip
strength in both hands but displayed 5/5 upper extremity strengt[h] and 5/5 bilateral grip
strength.” Tr. at 19 (citation omitted); see Pl.’s Mem. at 10. The ALJ elaborated: “[t]he
consultative examiner found that [Plaintiff’s] fine manipulation skills were intact at both upper
extremities and noted that he had no difficulty manipulating buttons or opening doors.” Tr.
at 19. Plaintiff contends that because there was no previous assessment of Plaintiff’s
strength, and because the medical records demonstrate Plaintiff has numerous issues with
his hands, “the medical evidence support[s Plaintiff’s] testimony that he [i]s not able to use
his hands as well as he once could.” Pl.’s Mem. at 10. The ALJ’s finding in this regard,
however, is supported by substantial evidence. Compare Tr. at 333 (Plaintiff’s report to the
consultative examiner David W. Carpenter, M.D. that his “weakness and poor grip strength
affect[] both hands”), and Tr. at 56 (Plaintiff’s testimony that he has difficulty buttoning his
shirt, tying a knot, and tying his shoes), with Tr. at 335 (examiner’s findings that Plaintiff’s
“[g]rip strength is 5/5 bilaterally”; his “[f]ine manipulation skills are intact at both upper
extremities”; and Plaintiff has “no difficulty manipulating buttons or opening doors”).
Second, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff “has a fairly poor work
history with no real past relevant work, which also does not enhance his credibility and
suggests some secondary motivational issues.” Tr. at 19; see Pl.’s Mem. at 10-11. The
administrative transcript, however, supports the ALJ’s finding. Plaintiff reported having three
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(3) jobs in the last fifteen (15) years: working as a “[h]andy [m]an” performing maintenance
where he lives from 2003 to the present; doing “[o]dd [j]obs” for a temporary agency from
1991 to 2002; and working as a “[m]echanic” in 1995. Tr. at 241. Plaintiff had no reported
earnings after 2002 (four (4) years prior to his alleged disability onset date). Tr. at 222-23.
The ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s poor work history, among other factors, in assessing
Plaintiff’s credibility. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3) (stating that the Administration “will
consider all of the evidence presented, including information about your prior work
record . . .”).
Third, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s “activities of daily living
suggest a capacity for light work as he [i]s capable of caring for his dogs, doing some yard
work and housecleaning.” Tr. at 19; see Pl.’s Mem. at 11. This finding, too, is supported
by substantial evidence. See Tr. at 55 (Plaintiff testifying he helps “cut the grass” and “weed
eat”); Tr. at 65 (Plaintiff testifying he lifts his eighteen (18) pound dog when she shows him
attention, which is “all the time”); Tr. at 66 (Plaintiff testifying on a good day, he “could help
do the laundry, clean the house, maybe go out and . . . start on cleaning the yard”).
Fourth, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s “treatment records show
that his treatment has been rather conservative and primarily consisted of medication
management through the VA.” Tr. at 19; see Pl.’s Mem. at 12-13. The ALJ elaborated:
Although [Plaintiff] underwent a one-time evaluation with . . . Dr. Kollmer
(orthopedic), there is no indication that he has continued treatment with this
specialist. There is no recommendation for injections or surgery. Lastly,
[Plaintiff’s] medication regimen has remained essentially unchanged with no
significant side effects reported.
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Tr. at 19. On the whole, the ALJ properly took into account Plaintiff’s treatment, along with
the other factors the ALJ considered, in assessing Plaintiff’s credibility. The ALJ accurately
described Plaintiff’s treatment as rather conservative and consisting of medication
management. Tr. at 19; see Tr. at 39-40 (Plaintiff acknowledging at the hearing that his
treatment is limited to medication). The ALJ also accurately recounted that Plaintiff’s
medication regimen for his pain has remained essentially constant, consisting of Naproxen
for low back pain and Methocorbomal for muscle spasms. Tr. at 15, 19; see, e.g., Tr. at
314, 385-86, 389-91, 396-97, 400-01, 409, 428, 439, 446. Further, Plaintiff testified during
the hearing that his medications reduce his back pain from a 7 or 8/10 to between 2 and
4/10. Tr. at 51-53. Although Plaintiff testified that his medications can make him drowsy,
Tr. at 39, he did not complain about this alleged side effect to his treating and examining
doctors, Tr. at 333-35, 387-403, 435-55. Further, despite his alleged drowsiness, Plaintiff
is not precluded from driving “[a]s needed, a few times a week, two or three times a week”
from one city to another to “go to the grocery store” and “look for work.” Tr. at 31.
The undersigned does not find particularly persuasive the ALJ’s observation that
Plaintiff saw consultative examiner Charles E. Kollmer, M.D. only once and has not
continued treatment with that examiner. See Tr. at 19. As Plaintiff represents in his
memorandum, Dr. Kollmer was asked to evaluate Plaintiff in connection with his social
security application because Plaintiff’s treating physician at the Veteran’s Administration is
unable to perform such evaluations. See Pl.’s Mem. at 12; Tr. at 387 (treating physician’s
letter to Plaintiff indicating he is “not allowed to complete these types of physicals”); Tr. at
466 (Dr. Kollmer’s report indicating he was asked to complete a “[o]ne time evaluation
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only”). These types of evaluations are not uncommon. It is unclear, then, why the ALJ
found it noteworthy that Plaintiff did not continue treatment with Dr. Kollmer. Nevertheless,
in light of the ALJ’s overall correct finding regarding Plaintiff’s medical treatment being
conservative in nature, combined with the numerous other factors the ALJ articulated in
discounting Plaintiff’s credibility, this one questionable observation made by the ALJ in
assessing Plaintiff’s credibility is harmless and does not require remand.3
B. VE’s Testimony / ALJ’s Step Five Findings
Plaintiff next argues that the VE’s testimony is not supported by substantial evidence
because the hypothetical “did not address [Plaintiff’s] fatigue”; because it did not sufficiently
account for Plaintiff’s COPD; and because “the ALJ placed [Plaintiff] in the wrong age
group.” Pl.’s Mem. at 16-17. In the fifth step of the sequential evaluation process, an ALJ
may pose a hypothetical question to a VE as part of his determination of whether the
claimant can obtain work in the national economy. See Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1227 (citing
Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1077-78 (11th Cir. 1996)). When the ALJ relies on the
testimony of a VE, “the key inquiry shifts” from the RFC assessment in the ALJ’s written
decision to the adequacy of the RFC description contained in the hypothetical posed to the
VE. Corbitt v. Astrue, No. 3:07-cv-518-J-HTS, 2008 WL 1776574, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 17,
2008) (unpublished) (citation omitted).
3
The ALJ, in the part of the Decision discussing the medical opinions of record (which discussion
Plaintiff does not specifically challenge), noted that the treating physician “was unwilling to assess any
limitations.” Tr. at 19 (citation omitted). Plaintiff recognizes that the ALJ did not use this alleged unwillingness
to discredit Plaintiff but nevertheless takes issue with the ALJ’s characterization of the treating physician’s letter.
Pl.’s Mem. at 14-15. It does appear that the letter may have been mischaracterized to a degree because, as
explained above, the physician actually wrote that he is “not allowed to complete these types of physicals.” Tr.
at 387. Nevertheless, this does not substantially affect the ALJ’s credibility finding.
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In determining an individual’s RFC and later posing a hypothetical to a VE that
includes the RFC, the ALJ “must consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an
individual’s impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.’” SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184,
at *5; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2); Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222, 226 (11th Cir.
1990) (stating that “the ALJ must consider a claimant’s impairments in combination”) (citing
20 C.F.R. § 404.1545; Reeves v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 519, 525 (11th Cir. 1984)); Hudson v.
Heckler, 755 F.2d 781, 785 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that “[w]here a claimant has alleged a
multitude of impairments, a claim . . . may lie even though none of the impairments,
considered individually, is disabling”) (internal quotation and citations omitted). “[F]or a
[VE]’s testimony to constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical
question which comprises all of the claimant’s impairments.” Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1227
(citing Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1229 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also Winschel v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
Here, the ALJ did not have to address Plaintiff’s alleged fatigue in the hypothetical
to the VE that was ultimately adopted as the RFC because, as explained above, the ALJ
properly found those allegations incredible to the extent they conflict with the ALJ’s RFC
determination.
Regarding Plaintiff’s contention about the hypothetical not properly
accounting for Plaintiff’s COPD, the undersigned finds that it did.
The ALJ clearly
considered Plaintiff’s COPD, because she found it to be a severe impairment at step two
of the sequential inquiry. Tr. at 14. The ALJ also acknowledged the COPD in discussing
the medical evidence of record, Tr. at 16, and Plaintiff’s testimony regarding shortness of
breath, Tr. at 18. Moreover, the ALJ specifically stated: “I have considered [Plaintiff’s]
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pulmonary issues and although there is no pulmonary function testing that has been done,
[I have] limited [Plaintiff] to no concentrated exposure of pulmonary irritants.” Tr. at 19-20.
It is abundantly clear that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s COPD in assessing the RFC, and
the ALJ sufficiently accounted for the disorder in the RFC.
Finally, Plaintiff contends the ALJ placed him in the wrong age group (younger
individual) in the hypothetical to the VE, and had he been placed in the right age group
(closely approaching advanced age), the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“Grids”) would
have required a finding of disabled. Pl.’s Mem. at 17. The ALJ did assume in the
hypotheticals to the VE that Plaintiff belonged in the younger age group. See Tr. at 68-73.
The ALJ recognized in the Decision, however, that when Plaintiff filed his application, he
was forty-eight (48) years old, which is defined as a “younger individual age 18-49,” and by
the time the Decision was issued, Plaintiff had “changed age category to closely
approaching advanced age.” Tr. at 20 (emphasis and citation omitted).
Plaintiff cites no authority to support his contention that the ALJ should have used the
older age category in the hypothetical to the VE, and Plaintiff does not contend the VE’s
testimony was flawed as a result. See Pl.’s Mem. at 17. Rather, Plaintiff argues that the
use of the older age group “would place [Plaintiff] in Grid Rule 201.12, which provides for
a finding of disabled.” Id. (citation and some capitalization omitted). Plaintiff is mistaken.
The Grid upon which Plaintiff relies, 201.12, applies to individuals who can perform
sedentary work. See Rule 201.12, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2. The ALJ,
however, found that Plaintiff is capable of light work with additional restrictions. See Tr. at
15. The most appropriate Grid to reference in Plaintiff’s case, 202.13, applies to individuals
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who can perform the full range of light work – which Plaintiff cannot do – and directs a
finding of not disabled. The ALJ recognized this in the written Decision. Tr. at 20. Because
the ALJ found that Plaintiff can perform less than the full range of light work, the ALJ
appropriately relied on the testimony of a VE, rather than the Grids, in determining whether
Plaintiff can perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See
Walker, 826 F.2d at 1002-03 (stating that “[e]xclusive reliance on the grids is not appropriate
. . . when the claimant is unable to perform a full range of work at a given functional level”).
Thus, even if the ALJ erroneously placed Plaintiff in the wrong age group for the
hypothetical, such error was harmless.
C. Listing 14.09
Plaintiff argues that he meets Listing 14.09, and the ALJ “did not apply the proper
legal standard” in determining he does not meet or equal any Listing. Pl.’s Mem. at 18-19
(emphasis omitted). Regarding the Listings, the ALJ found:
Neither [Plaintiff] nor his representative attorney has identified findings
establishing that [Plaintiff] has met or equaled any listed impairment. Moreover,
I find that the record does not establish that [Plaintiff] has had an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of [the Listings]
at any time through the date of this decision. Furthermore, no treating or
examining physician has mentioned findings equivalent in severity to the criteria
of any listed impairment.
Tr. at 15. Despite these findings, Plaintiff contends on appeal that he meets Listing 14.09,
which addresses Inflammatory Arthritis. Pl.’s Mem. at 18-19. That Listing requires the
arthritis to be:
As described in 14.00D6. With:
D. Repeated manifestations of inflammatory arthritis, with at least two of the
constitutional symptoms or signs (severe fatigue, fever, malaise, or involuntary
weight loss) and one of the following at the marked level:
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1. Limitation of activities of daily living.
2. Limitation in maintaining social functioning.
3. Limitation in completing tasks in a timely manner due to deficiencies in
concentration, persistence, or pace.
Listing 14.09D.
The burden rests on the claimant to prove the existence of a Listing-level impairment.
Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991). Mere diagnosis of a listed
impairment is not sufficient. See, e.g., id.; Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1224. “To meet a Listing,
a claimant must have a diagnosis included in the Listings and must provide medical reports
documenting that the conditions meet the specific criteria of the Listings and the duration
requirement.” Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1224 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “To
equal a Listing, the medical findings must be at least equal in severity and duration to the
listed findings.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiff does not cite any medical reports documenting the requirements of the
Listing he now contends he meets. See Pl.’s Mem. at 18-19. The ALJ appropriately found
that Plaintiff does not meet or equal a Listing.
D. Decision Supported by Substantial Evidence
As noted above, Plaintiff’s last argument – that the Decision is not supported by
substantial evidence – rests on the previous three alleged points of error. See Pl.’s Mem.
at 19-20. For all of the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds no error in the ALJ’s
Decision and finds that it is supported by substantial evidence in the administrative
transcript.
V. Conclusion
After due consideration, it is
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ORDERED:
1.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment pursuant to sentence four of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as incorporated by § 1383(c)(3), AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s final
decision.
2.
The Clerk is further directed to close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida on September 4, 2015.
kaw
Copies to:
Counsel of record
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