Adeniji v. Florida State College
Filing
22
ORDER granting, in part, and denying, in part, 4 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. This case is dismissed. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the file. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 10/24/2014. (JW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
DIANNE ROBERTA ADENIJI,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 3:14-cv-252-J-34MCR
FLORIDA STATE COLLEGE,
Defendant.
_____________________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Florida State College’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 4; Motion) filed on March 10, 2014. In response to
the Motion, Adeniji filed a document titled “Motion New Case 2014 Continued
Discrimination Case Should Not be Dismissed” (Dkt. No. 11; Response), which the Court
construes to be her response to the Motion. Thus, this matter is ripe for review.
I.
Factual Background
On February 7, 2014, Adeniji filed her Cause of Action (Dkt. No. 2; Complaint) in the
Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida. In the Complaint,
Adeniji alleges that Florida State College violated the Florida Civil Rights Act, Florida
Statutes section 760.07, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000, and 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Complaint at 1-2. Adeniji asserts that on April 25, 2011, she was denied
entrance to Florida State College Downtown Campus despite the fact that she had her
Florida driver’s license and a United States Army photo identification card. See id. at 2. She
further alleges that on that same date she was given a trespass order (Trespass Order),
and that the Trespass Order continues to be enforced as recently as February 2014. As
a result of these actions, Adeniji contends that she has been discriminated against on the
basis of her race, color, national origin, and age. See id. at 1. She seeks an order from this
Court vacating the Trespass Order and awarding her $2,000,000. See id. at 2.
Notably, Adeniji has filed two previous lawsuits in this Court raising claims related
to the events that took place on April 25, 2011, and the Trespass Order. She first filed a
complaint on May 4, 2011. See Adeniji v. Florida State College, et al., Case No. 3:11-cv443-J-34TEM (Adeniji I). This Court dismissed Adeniji I without prejudice on May 14, 2012.
See Adeniji I, Order, Dkt. No. 44 at 2-3. Adeniji appealed the dismissal to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.1 On September 20, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit denied Adeniji’s
request to pursue her appeal in forma pauperis, see Order Denying Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis, No. 12-12747-D, and on December 21, 2012, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute, see Entry of Dismissal, No. 12-12747-D.
Adeniji filed a second lawsuit on April 8, 2013, again alleging the same cause of
action as she did in Adeniji I. See Adeniji v. Florida State College, et al., Case No. 3:13-cv361-J-34JRK (Adeniji II). On December 3, 2013, this Court dismissed the action with
prejudice. See Adeniji II, Order, Dkt. No. 40. In doing so, the Court found that the claims
set forth in the Adeniji II complaint were barred by the doctrine res judicata. See id. at 1-3.
1
The appeal was docketed as Case No. 12-12747-D.
2
In the instant Complaint, Adeniji for the third time alleges claims of discrimination
stemming from the April 25, 2011 Trespass Order and its continued enforcement.
Defendant Florida State College removed the action to this Court on March 5, 2014, see
Notice of Removal (Dkt. No. 1), and then filed the Motion. In the Motion, Florida State
College urges this Court to dismiss Adeniji’s Complaint as it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Florida State College further requests that the Court award it
the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending this action, and enjoin Adeniji from filing
any future lawsuits against it. See Motion at 1. In the Response, Adeniji does not actually
address Florida State College’s arguments, instead she restates the allegations of her
Complaint
II.
Standard of Review
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must
accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508
n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th
Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff.
See Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 631 n.5 (11th Cir. 2010).
Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v.
Bellsouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed,
while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
3
555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that “[c]onclusory
allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts
will not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that
a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions,” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” See Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1949, 1951. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine
whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And,
while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148
F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give the court a license to serve
as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to
sustain an action.’” Alford v. Consol. Gov’t of Columbus, Ga., 438 F. App’x 837, 839 (11th
4
Cir. 2011)2(quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th
Cir. 1998)(internal citation omitted), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall
v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 706 (11th Cir. 2010)).
III.
Analysis
In the Motion, Florida State College, argues that this action should be dismissed
because it is apparent from the face of the Complaint that Adeniji cannot state a claim
because all of her claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Motion at 5
(quoting Horne v. Potter, 392 F. App’x 800, 801 (11th Cir. 2010)). In support of this
contention, Florida State College provides copies of relevant pleadings from both Adeniji
I and Adeniji II. In light of Florida State College’s reliance on these documents, the Court
first examines whether they are properly considered in this motion seeking dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6). While a court is ordinarily limited to the allegations of a plaintiff’s complaint,
the district court may consider an extrinsic document in ruling on a motion to dismiss if the
document is “(1) central to the plaintiff’s claim, and (2) its authenticity is not challenged.’”
Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir.
2010)(quoting SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Secs., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th
Cir. 2010)). Additionally, a court may take judicial notice of and consider documents
attached to a motion to dismiss or response, which are public records that are “central” to
a plaintiff’s claims, without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
2
“Although an unpublished opinion is not binding . . . , it is persuasive authority.” United States
v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R.
36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive
authority.”).
5
judgment. This is so, as long as such documents are “public records that [are] ‘not subject
to reasonable dispute’ because they [are] ‘capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy [can] not reasonably be questioned.’” Horne v. Potter,
392 F. App’x 800, 802 (11th Cir. 2010)(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). Moreover, “a court
may take notice of another court’s order . . . for the limited purpose of recognizing the
‘judicial act’ that the order represents or the subject matter of the litigation.” United States
v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994).
Adeniji does not dispute the fact that the proffered documents are accurate public
records, nor does she dispute that the Court should take judicial notice of the documents.
See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Thus, the Court takes judicial notice of the documents that were
filed in Adeniji I and Adeniji II which are “central” to plaintiff’s claims, SFM Holdings, 600
F.3d at 1337, because such documents are in the public record, capable of accurate and
ready determination, and not reasonably questioned. See Horne, 392 F. App’x at 802
(holding that district court properly took judicial notice of documents in plaintiff’s first
discrimination case and affirming dismissal of the complaint based on res judicata);
Universal Express, Inc. v. S.E.C., 177 F. App’x 52, 53-54 (11th Cir. 2006)(district court
could take judicial notice of complaint filed in the Southern District of New York without
converting motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment); Bryant v. Avado Brands,
Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 1999)(court at motion to dismiss stage was
authorized to take judicial notice of relevant public record documents required to be filed
with the SEC); Redner v. Citrus County, Fla., 919 F.2d 646, 651 n.14 (11th Cir. 1990)(in
considering the applicability of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)(“Younger
6
abstention”), court would take judicial notice of outcome of state criminal proceedings);
Sergeon v. Home Loan Center, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-01113-J-32JBT, 2010 WL 5662930, at
*1 n.5 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2010)(court took judicial notice of state court public records in
determining whether Younger abstention applied), adopted, 2011 WL 308176 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 27, 2011); Hammond v. Anderson, No. 8:10-CV-1557-T-30EAJ, 2010 WL 2836716,
at *2 n.1 (M.D. Fla. July 19, 2010)(court takes judicial notice of state court clerk’s Internet
website to determine that state court proceedings are currently pending in considering
applicability of Younger abstention); York v. Hoskins, No. 8:08-cv-106-T-24TGW, 2008 WL
784999, at *2 (M.D. Fla. March 20, 2008)(in finding Younger abstention applies, court takes
judicial notice of state court clerk’s online docket which shows that state criminal
proceeding is pending).
Next, the Court turns to Defendant’s substantive argument - that Adeniji’s claims are
barred by res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata bars the litigation of claims that were
raised or could have been raised in an earlier proceeding. See Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid,
Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
explained that res judicata is a judicially created doctrine, the purpose of which is to provide
finality and conserve judicial resources. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Atlanta Retail, Inc., 456
F.3d 1277, 1284 (11th Cir. 2006).3 For res judicata to warrant dismissal of an action, four
elements must be present:
(1) there is a final judgment on the merits; (2) the decision was rendered by
3
A Federal Court must apply federal law to determine the preclusive effect of a prior federal
action or judgment. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008).
7
a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity with them,
are identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause of action is involved in both
cases.
Ragsdale, 193 F.3d at 1238.
All of the requirements of res judicata are satisfied here. In Adeniji I, this Court and
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals were courts of competent jurisdiction, and entered
dismissal orders which operated as final judgments on the merits. Additionally, in Adeniji
II, this Court was also a court of competent jurisdiction, and entered a dismissal with
prejudice, a second final judgment on the merits. See Rule 41(b).4 Additionally, in this
action Adeniji again sues Florida State College, the same Defendant named in Adeniji I and
Adeniji II. Further, she alleges claims based upon the same facts which she alleged in
Adeniji I and Adeniji II. In Adeniji I, Adeniji complained that on April 25, 2011, a security
guard at Florida State College’s Downtown Campus denied her entry to the campus in
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Adeniji I, Dkt. No. 22 at 2-3. She contended that
Florida State College discriminated against her and denied her equal protection of the law
based on race, sex, religion, national origin, and/or color. Id. at 3-4. In Adeniji II, Adeniji
alleged more claims of discrimination arising from the same April 25, 2011 Trespass Order.
Adeniji II, Dkt. No. 1. Finally, in the current Complaint, Adeniji again alleges claims arising
from the April 25, 2011 Trespass Order. Indeed, in all three complaints, Adeniji asserts
claims of discrimination arising from the April 25, 2011 Trespass Order, seeks damages
stemming from it and its enforcement, and seeks to vacate the Trespass Order. Compare
4
Pursuant to Rule 41(b), “a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this
rule . . . operates as an adjudication on the merits.”
8
Adeniji I, Dkt. No. 22 with Adeniji II, Dkt. No. 1, and with Complaint.
With regard to the fourth and final element of res judicata - whether the same cause
of action is involved in the current and prior lawsuit(s) - the Eleventh Circuit has explained
that “if a case arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact, or is based upon the same
factual predicate, as a former action, . . . the two cases are really the same ‘claim’ or ‘cause
of action’ for purposes of res judicata.” Citibank v. Data Lease Financial Corp., 904 F.2d
1498, 1503 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Ragsdale, 193 F.3d at 1239. Looking at the factual
predicate of Adeniji’s claims, it is apparent that this action presents the same claim or cause
of action which she pursued in Adeniji I and Adeniji II. While Adeniji’s allegation concerning
the February 2014 enforcement of the April 2011 Trespass Order is new to this action, the
claim is predicated on the alleged invalidity of the April 25, 2011 Trespass Order. As such,
the February 2014 enforcement is part of the same cause of action as the previous claims
raised in Adeniji I and Adeniji II. The current action is therefore barred by the doctrine of res
judicata, and due to be dismissed.
In addition to seeking dismissal of this action, in the Motion, Florida State College
requests that this Court award it fees and costs incurred in its defense and also that the
Court enjoin Adeniji from filing any future lawsuits against it. See Motion at 1. As Florida
State College fails to provide any substantive argument or any authority in support of these
requests, they are due to be denied.
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According, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.
Defendant Florida State College’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt.
No. 4) is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.
A.
The Motion is GRANTED to the extent that this Court dismisses this
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B.
The Motion is DENIED to the extent that Defendant seeks attorney’s
fees and costs and an injunction prohibiting Adeniji from filing future
lawsuits.5
2.
This case is DISMISSED.
3.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate all pending motions and
deadlines as moot and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 24th day of October, 2014.
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
Pro Se Parties
5
Although the Court denies Defendant’s request at this time, Plaintiff is cautioned that if she
continues to file the same claim, she may find herself being ordered to pay attorney’s fees and/or costs in the
future.
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