Wright v. Crews et al
Filing
37
ORDER granting 30 Motion to Dismiss to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages against Defendants Morrell & White in their official capacities, as to the state law claim of assault and battery, for failure to state a claim agains t Defendant Barnes, for failure to state a claim for injunctive relief against Defendants Barnes and Kent, denying in all other respects; dismissing Defendants Barnes and Kent from the action; Defendants Morrell and White must answer or otherwise respond to the amended complaint by January 28, 2016; denying 34 Motion to Proceed to Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 12/29/2015. (LDO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
KENNEDY WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 3:14-cv-479-J-39JBT
MR. BARNES, WARDEN, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
I.
Status
This cause is before the Court on Defendants Morrell, Barnes,
Kent and White's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Motion)
30).1
(Doc.
Plaintiff
responded.
See
(Response) (Doc. 33); Order (Doc. 7).
Plaintiff's
Response
Plaintiff also filed a
document entitled Motion to Proceed for Summary Judgment (Doc. 34).
Plaintiff is proceeding on an Amended Civil Rights Complaint
(Complaint) (Doc. 26) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
He named as
Defendants Barnes, Morrell, White, and Kent, all employees of the
Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC).
II.
Motion to Dismiss
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to
1
In this opinion, the Court references the document and page
numbers designated by the electronic filing system.
relief that is plausible on its face.'"
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable
inference
that
the
defendant
is
liable
for
the
misconduct alleged."
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
"[T]he
court
tenet
that
a
must
accept
as
true
all
of
the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
III.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendant Morrell and White raise the defense of sovereign
immunity to the extent Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages
against them in her official capacities.
Motion at 11.
To the
extent Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages against Defendants
Morrell and White in their official capacities, the motion to
dismiss is due to be granted.
An official capacity claim for
monetary damages is barred by sovereign immunity.
Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-102 (1984).
Thus,
insofar as Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendants Morrell
and White in their official capacities, the Eleventh Amendment bars
suit.
Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam).
2
IV.
Failure to State a Claim for Assault and Battery
Liberally
construing
the
Complaint,
as
this
Court must,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the Defendants for a
state law claim of assault and battery.
None of these Defendants
were alleged to have assaulted or battered Plaintiff.
Motion at
11-12.
Based upon a careful review of the Complaint, there is no
facial plausibility as to a state law claim of assault and battery
against Defendants Morrell, Barnes, Kent, and White.
Indeed,
Plaintiff has not pled "enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face."
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted as to the
state law claim of assault and battery.
V.
Failure to State a Claim Against Warden Barnes
Again, liberally construing the Complaint, as this Court must,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Barnes.
Motion at 12–13.
Plaintiff alleges that on March 26, 2014, Warden
Barnes approached Plaintiff's cell door and said that they would
let him out of the box if he would contact his family and ask them
to stop calling the prison. Complaint at 5. Plaintiff then states
that Warden Barnes did not want to address the "issue at hand."
Id. Finally, Plaintiff states he is seeking unspecified injunctive
relief for his safety.
Id.
3
This vague and conclusory allegation against Defendant Barnes
will not support a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In
civil rights cases, more than conclusory and vague allegations are
required to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C § 1983.
Fullman
v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984).
Defendant Warden Barnes may not be held liable under a theory
of respondeat superior.
"Supervisory officials are not liable
under section 1983 on the basis of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability." Belcher v.
City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1396
(11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). "The standard by which
a supervisor is held liable in her individual
capacity for the actions of a subordinate is
extremely rigorous." Gonzalez,[2] 325 F.3d at
1234 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). "Supervisory liability occurs either
when the supervisor personally participates in
the alleged constitutional violation or when
there is a causal connection between actions
of the supervising official and the alleged
constitutional
deprivation."
Brown
v.
Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990).
Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008) (overruled on
other grounds); see Braddy v. Fla. Dep't of Labor & Emp't Sec., 133
F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding supervisory liability
requires something more than stating a claim of liability under a
theory of respondeat superior).
Based upon a careful review of the Complaint, there is no
facial plausibility as to a plausible civil rights claim against
2
Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003).
4
Defendant Warden Barnes.
Simply, Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim under the constitution against him.
Indeed, Plaintiff has
not pled "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face."
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Therefore, Defendant
Barnes' Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted.
VI.
Failure to State a Claim for Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against Defendants Barnes
and Kent in their individual capacities. Against Barnes, Plaintiff
states he is seeking injunctive relief for his safety.
at 5.
Complaint
Against Kent, Plaintiff states he is seeking injunctive
relief "for his corrupted act in this case."
Id. at 7.
As noted
by Defendants, injunctive relief is properly brought against a
defendant in his official capacity, not his individual capacity.
Motion at 13.
Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff sought injunctive
relief against these Defendants in their official capacities, he
has still failed to state a claim for injunctive relief because he
has failed to identify the injunctive relief he is seeking against
each Defendant.
Further he has failed to explain why he is
entitled to injunctive relief.
In the Court's Order (Doc. 25 at 4), the Court directed
Plaintiff to clearly identify the relief he is seeking from each
Defendant, and if seeking injunctive relief, he must state what
injunctive relief he is seeking from a particular Defendant.
Plaintiff has failed to do.
This
Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is
5
due to be granted as to the claims for injunctive relief against
Barnes and Kent.
Since Plaintiff only seeks injunctive relief
against Defendant Barnes and Kent, they are due to be dismissed
from this action.
VII.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants move to dismiss the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a).
Motion at 5-11.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff
failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies with respect
to his claims against them. Exhaustion of available administrative
remedies is required before a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action with respect
to prison conditions by a prisoner may be initiated in this Court.
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit provided these guidelines:
Before
a
prisoner
may
bring
a
prison-conditions suit under § 1983, the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requires
that he exhaust all available administrative
remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Booth
v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736, 121 S.Ct. 1819,
1822, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001). The purpose of
the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is to
"afford
corrections
officials
time
and
opportunity to address complaints internally
before allowing the initiation of a federal
case." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93, 126
S.Ct. 2378, 2387, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006)
(quotation omitted). To properly exhaust, a
prisoner
must
"[c]ompl[y]
with
prison
grievance procedures." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
199, 218, 127 S.Ct. 910, 922–23, 166 L.Ed.2d
798 (2007).
Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1208 (11th
Cir. 2015).
6
The
district
court
must
employ
a
two-step
process
for
resolving motions to dismiss relying on assertions of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies:
After a prisoner has exhausted the
grievance procedures, he may file suit under §
1983. In response to a prisoner suit,
defendants may bring a motion to dismiss and
raise as a defense the prisoner's failure to
exhaust these administrative remedies. See
Turner,[3] 541 F.3d at 1081. In Turner v.
Burnside we established a two-step process for
resolving motions to dismiss prisoner lawsuits
for failure to exhaust. 541 F.3d at 1082.
First, district courts look to the factual
allegations in the motion to dismiss and those
in the prisoner's response and accept the
prisoner's view of the facts as true. The
court should dismiss if the facts as stated by
the prisoner show a failure to exhaust. Id.
Second, if dismissal is not warranted on the
prisoner's view of the facts, the court makes
specific findings to resolve disputes of fact,
and should dismiss if, based on those
findings, defendants have shown a failure to
exhaust. Id. at 1082–83; see also id. at 1082
(explaining that defendants bear the burden of
showing a failure to exhaust).
Whatley, 802 F.3d at 1209.
Defendants
contend
administrative remedies.
that
Plaintiff
has
not
exhausted
his
Exhaustion of available administrative
remedies is "a precondition to an adjudication on the merits" and
is mandatory under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
Bryant v.
Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1074
(2008); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007); Woodford v. Ngo,
3
Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2008).
7
548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) ("Exhaustion is no longer left to the
discretion of the district court, but is mandatory.") (citation
omitted). The Supreme Court has stated that "failure to exhaust is
an affirmative defense under the PLRA[.]"
at
216.
However,
jurisdictional[.]"
"the
PLRA
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
exhaustion
requirement
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 101.
is
not
See Turner
v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that
the defense "is not a jurisdictional matter").
If a prisoner does not completely exhaust his remedies prior
to initiating a suit in federal court, the complaint must be
dismissed. This is true even if the inmate thereafter exhausts his
administrative remedies after initiating his action in federal
court.
See Oriakhi v. United States, 165 F. App'x 991, 993 (3d
Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
Moreover, "the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper
exhaustion."
Woodford, 548 U.S at 93.
Because exhaustion requirements are designed
to deal with parties who do not want to
exhaust,
administrative
law
creates
an
incentive for these parties to do what they
would otherwise prefer not to do, namely, to
give the agency a fair and full opportunity to
adjudicate their claims. Administrative law
does this by requiring proper exhaustion of
administrative remedies, which "means using
all steps that the agency holds out, and doing
so properly (so that the agency addresses the
8
issues on the merits)."
1024. . . .
Id. at 90.
Pozo,[4] 286 F.3d, at
"Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's
deadlines and other critical procedural rules."
Id.
In the first step of the analysis, in analyzing the Complaint,
the Court recognizes that Plaintiff is not required to plead
exhaustion, and did not do so; therefore, the Complaint is not
subject to dismissal on its face. In this case, there are disputed
issues of fact as to whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative
remedies.
Thus, the Court must now make findings on the disputed
issues of fact to decide whether administrative remedies were
available to Plaintiff, and if so, whether he properly exhausted
his administrative remedies.2
The Florida Department of Corrections provides an internal
grievance procedure.
Code (F.A.C.).
See Chapter 33-103, Florida Administrative
Thus, to determine whether Plaintiff exhausted his
administrative remedies, this Court must examine the relevant
documents to determine whether the incidents in question were
4
Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 949 (2002).
2
Since the parties have not requested an evidentiary hearing
on this issue and they have submitted evidence for the Court's
consideration, the Court proceeds to resolve the material questions
of fact based on the documents before the Court. Bryant, 530 F.3d
1377 n.16 (recognizing that a district court may resolve material
questions of fact on the submitted papers when addressing the
Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion of remedies requirement).
9
grieved.
If these incidents were grieved and the documents
complied with the deadlines and other procedural rules as set forth
in the F.A.C., the issues raised therein are exhausted.
Plaintiff filed a formal grievance to the Warden dated March
9, 2014, complaining that Sgt. Salisbury, on March 9, 2014, made
disrespectful comments towards him.
30-1) at 2.
Defendants' Exhibit A (Doc.
Plaintiff states that he told Salisbury that he was
"only disrespecting me because [of] his fellow officers[.]"
Id.
Finally, Plaintiff claims that Salisbury pushed him to the ground
without cause, resulting in Plaintiff hurting his back.
Id.
In a
March 12, 2014, Response, the grievance was approved and the matter
referred for investigation by the Inspector General.
Id. at 3.
Granted, this grievance alone may not have been sufficient to
address the actions of the officers Plaintiff alleges failed to
intervene or protect him; however, on March 11, 2014, Plaintiff
filed an informal grievance to the Inspector's Office, entitled
Inmate Request.
Id. at 12-13.
This grievance states that a
correctional officer put his hands on Plaintiff and pushed him down
to the ground.
Id.
Of import, it also alleges that three other
officers stood by laughing during the incident which took place on
March 9, 2014 in front of the Chow Hall.
Id.
The March 13, 2014
Response to this grievance states: "This incident has already been
reported to the IG'S Office.
As action has already been taken, no
10
further action is necessary at this time."
Id. at 12-13 (emphasis
added).
Defendants assert all of Plaintiff's informal grievances were
returned without action or denied on the merits.
Motion at 8.
Additionally, they contend that Plaintiff failed to appeal the
denial
of
the
informal
grievances.
Id.
Upon
review,
grievance was not denied or returned without action.
this
Instead, the
reviewer advised Plaintiff that the incident had been reported to
the Inspector General's Office and no further action was necessary.
Under these circumstances, there was nothing for Plaintiff to
appeal.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff states that Defendants Morrell and
White witnessed the excessive use of force by Salisbury and failed
to intervene or protect Plaintiff, a handicapped person. Complaint
at 5-6.
Given these alleged facts, the March 11, 2014 grievance
exhausted administrative remedies with respect to Plaintiff's claim
that
officers
stood
by
and
failed
to
intervene
or
protect
Plaintiff.
Also, the reviewer advised Plaintiff that no further
action
necessary.
was
Under
these
particular
circumstances,
Defendants Morrell and White have not met their burden of showing
a failure to exhaust.
In
light
of
the
above,
the
Court
finds
that
Plaintiff
exhausted his administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit to
seek judicial redress.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the
11
Motion to Dismiss should be denied with respect to the claim of
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED:
1.
Defendants Morrell, Barnes, Kent, and White's Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 30) is granted to the extent that Plaintiff is
seeking monetary damages against Defendants Morrell and White in
their official capacities; is granted as to the state law claim of
assault and battery; is granted for failure to state a claim
against Defendant Barnes; and is granted for failure to state a
claim for injunctive relief against Defendants Barnes and Kent. In
all other respects, the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 30) is DENIED.
2.
Defendant Barnes and Kent are DISMISSED from this action.
3.
Defendants Morrell and White must answer or otherwise
respond to the Amended Complaint by January 28, 2016.
4.
Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed to Summary Judgment (Doc.
34) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 29th day of
December, 2015.
sa 12/28
c:
Kennedy Wright
Counsel of Record
12
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