Sheffield v. Secretary, Department of Corrections et al
Filing
20
ORDER denying 1 petition, dismissing the action with prejudice, with instructions to the Clerk; denying a certificate of appealability, with instructions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 7/12/2016. (LDO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
AHMON KENSHON SHEFFIELD,
Petitioner,
vs.
Case No. 3:14-cv-694-J-39PDB
SECRETARY, DOC, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
I.
STATUS
Petitioner Ahmon Kenshon Sheffield, an inmate of the Florida
penal system, challenges a 2011 (Duval County) conviction for
trafficking in cocaine.
He is represented by counsel.
Petitioner
is proceeding on a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of
Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Petition) (Doc. 1). He
also relies on a Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition Filed
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Memorandum) (Doc. 2).
He raises two
grounds in the Petition. The Court will address these grounds, see
Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992), but no
evidentiary proceedings are required in this Court.
Respondents filed an Answer in Response to Order to Show Cause
(Response) (Doc. 15).
In support of their Response, they provide
an Index to Appendix (Exhibits) (Doc. 15).1
Petitioner filed a
Reply to State's Response to Petition Filed Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(Reply) (Doc. 16).
See Order (Doc. 5).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will analyze the claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA).
"By its terms [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d) bars
relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state
court, subject only to th[re]e exceptions." Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).
The three exceptions are: (1) the state
court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law;
or (2) there was an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law; or (3) the decision was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts.
Id. at 100.
The Court will give a
presumption of correctness of the state courts' factual findings
unless rebutted with clear and convincing evidence, 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1), and, the Court will apply this presumption to the
factual determinations of both trial and appellate courts. See Bui
v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003).
1
The Court hereinafter refers to the documents contained in
the Appendix as "Ex." Where provided, the page numbers referenced
in this opinion are the Bates stamp numbers at the bottom of each
page of the Appendix. Otherwise, the page number on the particular
document will be referenced. Also, the Court will reference the
page numbers assigned by the electronic docketing system where
applicable.
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III.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.
Ground One
In his first ground, Petitioner claims the trial court erred
in denying Petitioner's motion to suppress the physical evidence,
and Petitioner contends that he was not afforded full and fair
consideration of his claim by the state court.
Petition at 5.
The
record demonstrates that Petitioner filed a Motion to Suppress the
physical evidence.
Ex. A at 117-22, 135-58.
a Memorandum of Law.
Id. at 159-67.
The state submitted
The trial court conducted a
hearing and fully considered the testimony of the witnesses and the
content of the recorded telephone conversations.
Ex. C; Ex. A at
168-72.
As noted by the Supreme Court of the United States, "[t]he
Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that '[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.'
It is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an 'effect' as that term is
used in the Amendment." United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949
(2012).
Even a brief stop of a motor vehicle by the police
constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure, United States v. Durham,
491 F. App'x 169, 172 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citation
omitted), but a traffic stop is reasonable if the police have
probable cause to stop and search the vehicle.
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Although the Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,"
including vehicles, from unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Fourth Amendment itself does not have an exclusionary rule.
v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011).
not
an
individual's
constitutional
Davis
Indeed, exclusion is
right,
and
the
prudential
doctrine of exclusion is not meant to redress the injury to the
individual caused by an unconstitutional search.
Stone
v.
Powell,
exclusionary
428
rule's
U.S.
sole
465,
486
purpose
is
(1976)).
to
deter
Id.
(citing
Instead,
future
the
Fourth
Amendment violations by the police.
Petitioner's
first
ground
is
barred
from
pursuant to Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
consideration
Upon a thorough
review of the record, the Court finds that Petitioner had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the Fourth Amendment issue and
took full advantage of that opportunity.
suppress was filed.
A pre-trial motion to
The matter was fully briefed.
A hearing was
conducted on the motion to suppress, and the detectives and the
confidential informant testified.
Additionally, the trial court
listened to the recordings of the telephone conversations between
Petitioner and the confidential informant.
trial court made essential findings of fact.
Significantly, the
Ex. A at 168-72.
See
Tukes v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 513-14 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 898 (1991) (finding full and fair consideration
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requires consideration by the trial court and the availability of
meaningful appellate review by the higher state court).
The
appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.
See
Ex. H.
Cisneros v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., No. 8:13-cv-449-T-36JSS, 2016 WL
1068486, at *5 (M.D. Fla. March 18, 2016), appeal filed, No. 1613006 (11th Cir. May 27, 2016) (concluding that the state court
made
findings
"on
matters
essential
to
the
Fourth
Amendment
issue[,]" and the petitioner "was provided the opportunity for a
full and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim before the
state trial and appellate courts.").
Upon review, the trial court made essential findings of fact:
A. The Court conducted a hearing on the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress on June 30,
2011 and heard testimony from three (3)
witnesses,
to
wit:
Detective
Moodispaw
("Moodispaw"), a seven (7) year veteran of the
Jacksonville
Sheriff's
Office
Narcotics
Division with substantial experience dealing
with confidential informants and investigating
drug trafficking cases; Detective R. Hughey,
("Hughey"), a thirteen (13) year veteran of
the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office Narcotics
Squad; and Kelly Goldson ("Goldson"), the
informant used in this case.
B. The Defendant, Ahmon Sheffield, was
arrested on September 11, 2009 and charged
with trafficking in cocaine. At approximately
6:00 p.m. the Defendant, who was driving a
white Mercedes and traveling in the direction
of his mother's home, was stopped by law
enforcement and found to be in possession of
two kilograms of cocaine.
The Defendant's
arrest was the direct result of informant
Goldson's cooperation with law enforcement.
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C.
Goldson became a confidential
informant shortly after he was apprehended on
September 8, 2009, while in possession of 1
1/2 kilograms of cocaine.
Goldson began to
cooperate immediately with the Jacksonville
Sheriff's Office narcotics detectives in hopes
of receiving leniency. Goldson identified the
Defendant, Ahmon Sheffield, as an individual
from
whom
he
had
previously
purchased
trafficking quantities of cocaine.
D. Because Goldson had never been used
as
a
confidential
informant,
Moodispaw
testified that part of his focus during his
conversations with Goldson was to judge his
credibility.
Moodispaw stated that no
promises regarding a sentence were discussed
and that if any of Goldson's information
proved to be false or misleading he would not
continue to work with Goldson. The Detective
acknowledged that Goldson was hoping for
leniency, but also stated that he appeared to
be truthful throughout all their conversations
and dealings.
E.
Goldson revealed to the detectives
that he bought trafficking amounts of cocaine
from the Defendant in the past, described the
types of cars the Defendant owned and drove
and that a recent transaction took place at
the Defendant's mother's house. Goldson also
provided information in subsequent trafficking
and crack cocaine possession cases that proved
to be reliable.
F.
Pursuant to Goldson's decision to
cooperate and based on his belief that he
could set up a "deal" with the Defendant
quickly, Goldson made contact with the
Defendant on September 11, 2009 in an effort
to purchase a large amount of cocaine. Some
of the conversations between Goldson and the
Defendant were in person and not monitored or
recorded. Other conversations were made via
the telephone and were monitored and recorded.
G. Each time Goldson had a conversation
with the Defendant he would immediately relay
to Moodispaw the content of the conversation.
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Moodispaw personally observed Goldson meet
with the Defendant at approximately 1:30 p.m.
at Goldson's Confectionary.
Surveillance
revealed that the Defendant met with Kelvin
Blackshear, a known drug trafficker, later in
the day and within hours of his [Defendant's]
arrest.
Additionally, just prior to the
Defendant's arrest at 6:00 p.m. on September
11, 2009, Moodispaw monitored three (3)
telephone conversations between Goldson and
the Defendant.
From the time the Narcotics
Squad began surveilling the Defendant until
his arrest, he was observed driving a white
Mercedes, which was one of the vehicles
Goldson had described to the Detectives in
their initial meeting on September 8, 2009.
H. Detective Moodispaw acknowledged that
Goldson never observed the Defendant in actual
possession of any drugs and that the
conversations regarding any "deal" were
extremely vague and never included language to
the extent that the "deal" was for two (2)
kilograms of cocaine and the price was
$30,000.00 per kilogram. Moodispaw went on to
state, however, that it was not unusual for
individuals to speak in code or to speak
vaguely about such dealings.
I. During Goldson's testimony the Court
noted that he was extremely reluctant to be a
witness and give testimony against the
Defendant.
At points during Goldson's
testimony he broke down, cried and indicated
that he considered the Defendant to be a
friend and did not want to be in this
position. Goldson admitted that he was hoping
for leniency, but reiterated that he was being
truthful and had no reason to lie.
J. Goldson admitted that there was never
a specific price nor an exact amount of drugs
discussed. Goldson further acknowledged that
he bought drugs from the Defendant on several
prior occasions, always in the kilogram amount
and that during the most recent transaction,
which took place outside the Defendant's
mother's home, the Defendant retrieved the
drugs from his car.
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K.
As Goldson is an informant of
untested
reliability,
this
Court
must
determine whether the information he proved to
law enforcement was sufficiently reliable to
establish probable cause to stop and search
the Defendant's vehicle.[2]
L. In that regard, the Court finds that
that [sic] Goldson was a friend of the
Defendant and had no reason to provide false
2
Petitioner asserts that the trial court improperly relied on
the fact that Goldson provided information concerning subsequent
trafficking and crack cocaine possession cases that should never
have been considered in determining the informant's reliability.
Memorandum at 7. In reviewing the trial court's findings, it did
initially recognize that there was testimony that Goldson not only
provided reliable information in this instance, he provided it in
subsequent drug cases. Ex. A at 169. However, when addressing the
question of giving credence to the information provided by an
informant of untested reliability, in that regard, the court
specifically relied on a number of factors to find that the
information provided to law enforcement by the informant was
sufficiently reliable, and these findings did not include the
informant's testimony regarding subsequent drug transactions. Ex.
A at 170-71 (finding Goldson was Petitioner's friend, reluctant to
testify against Petitioner, with no reason to provide false or
misleading information; finding Goldson disinclined to provide
false testimony as he hoped to receive leniency for his own
charges; finding Goldson had personal knowledge of Petitioner's
illicit activities based on prior drug dealings with Petitioner;
finding Moodispaw was able to judge Goldson's demeanor and
credibility; finding the information provided by Goldson was
immediately relayed to the detectives and corroborated by recorded
conversations; finding the physical surveillance corroborated the
information, including Petitioner's interaction with a known drug
dealer; finding any discrepancies explained by the nature of phone
calls concerning drug deals, with the parties utilizing code or
vague terminology to avoid detection; and finding the recorded
conversations between the informant and Petitioner confirmed the
commitment to and location of the planned drug transaction).
Although the court recognized the fact that the informant provided
reliable information concerning subsequent drug transactions, there
were specific, essential findings of fact made supporting the
court's conclusion that Goldson's information was reliable and
independently corroborated, and these particular findings did not
include the information concerning subsequent drug transactions
that proved reliable.
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or misleading information concerning the
Defendant's involvement in drug trafficking.
In fact, Goldson would be particularly
disinclined to provide false or misleading
information given his desire to receive
leniency on his own charges. Goldson, based
on his prior drug dealings with the Defendant,
was in a position to have personal knowledge
of
the
Defendant's
illicit
activities.
Moodispaw was able to judge Goldson's demeanor
and credibility during the course of their
conversations.
The information Goldson
provided concerning the Defendant's actions
and
plans
were
relayed
immediately
to
Moodispaw and were corroborated by recorded
telephone conversations.
M.
The physical surveillance of the
Defendant
on
September
11,
2009,
also
corroborated the information Goldson had
provided, that the Defendant was someone who
trafficked in drugs and was known to and
acquainted with another drug trafficker
(Blackshear) who was on bond awaiting trial on
a pending trafficking case.
N. While the defense argues that there
are inconsistencies and/or conflicts between
the testimony of Moodispaw and Goldson, it is
clear from the Court's observations that
Moodispaw and Goldson were being truthful and
that any discrepancies are explained by the
vague nature of the conversations typically
had regarding such a transaction.
O.
Lastly, the Court listened to the
actual
recorded
telephone
conversations
between Goldson and the Defendant.
During
these conversations, the Defendant tells
Goldson the deal will take place at his
mother's home and attempts to give him
directions as Goldson could not recall exactly
where she lived or how to get there.
In a
subsequent call the Defendant indicated to
Goldson that he was en route to his mother's
home, to which Goldson replied something to
the effect. . . . . "Oh, you are already in
motion". The Defendant acknowledged that he
was en route, but apparently detected some
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surprise and/or confusion on Goldson's part
and asked Goldson if "you want me to come that
way?", indicating that he was in possession of
the drugs and ready to do the deal at either
location.
Goldson replied that he did not
want to do the deal at his location but would
meet the Defendant at the Defendant's mother's
home.
Ex. A at 168-71.
In this instance, the trial court took into account the
totality of the circumstances presented.
The court found "after
reviewing all the testimony presented and considering the totality
of the circumstances that Goldson's information was reliable, there
was independent corroboration of the information developed during
the
investigation
through
law
enforcement's
observations
and
recorded telephone conversations, and that law enforcement had
probable cause to stop and search the Defendant's vehicle." Id. at
171.
Ground one is not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding because Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the Fourth Amendment issue and took full advantage of that
opportunity.
The trial court made explicit findings on matters
essential to the Fourth Amendment issue. See Hearn v. Florida, 326
F. App'x 519, 522 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (finding the
district court erred in concluding that Stone foreclosed review of
the claim because the state court failed to make essential findings
of fact).
Under the principles of Stone v. Powell, federal habeas
review of Petitioner's claim is precluded.
- 10 -
See Streets v. Sec'y
Dep't of Corr., No. 8:10-cv-1131-T-33TGW, 2011 WL 3171263, at *12
(M.D. Fla. July 27, 2011) (finding "Stone bars federal habeas
review"
of
the
Fourth
Amendment
claim
when
"Florida
clearly
afforded [Petitioner] a full and fair opportunity to litigate" his
claim); Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1125-26 (11th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 926 (2001).
Thus, ground one, asserting a
Fourth Amendment violation, is barred and will not be addressed by
this Court.
In the alternative, AEDPA deference should be given to the
state
court
determination.
Petitioner
presented
the
Fourth
Amendment claim to the trial court and the trial court denied the
motion to suppress finding that the state established that the
search and seizure in question was legal, after conducting a very
thorough hearing. Ex. C at 8-110. Detectives Robert Moodispaw and
Richard
Hughey
testified,
as
well
as
Kelly
Goldson,
the
confidential informant.
The circuit court denied this ground, and the First District
Court of Appeal affirmed.
The adjudication of the state court
resulted in a decision that involved a reasonable application of
clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States
Supreme Court.
Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on
this claim because the state court's decision was not contrary to
clearly established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law, and was not based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
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evidence presented in the state court proceedings.
Thus, ground
one is due to be denied.
B.
Ground Two
In his second ground, Petitioner claims the trial court erred
in denying his motion to dismiss. The record shows that Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss, moving the trial court to dismiss the
information based on the reasoning in Shelton v. Sec'y, Dep't of
Corr., 802 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (Shelton I) (finding
Florida's Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act,
Chapter 893, Fla. Stat., facially unconstitutional). Ex. A at 17588. Petitioner admits that under controlling case law, the statute
has been found to be facially constitutional.
Reply at 6.
Memorandum at 10;
Petitioner seeks to preserve this claim, apparently
hoping that the matter will be reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court and a favorable decision rendered.
See Ex. G at 10-
11.
Upon review of the relevant case law, the Eleventh Circuit and
the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the holding in Shelton I,
finding "Florida's Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act, Chapter 893, Fla. Stat., facially constitutional." Alvarez v.
Crews, No. 13-60664-CIV, 2014 WL 29592, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3,
2014) (citing Shelton v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 691 F.3d 1348 (11th
Cir. 2012) (Shelton II) and State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412 (Fla.
2012)).
Neither case (Shelton II or Adkins) has been reversed,
vacated, or called into doubt. Shelton v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.,
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691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1856
(2013).
See Blake v. Sec'y, DOC, No. 3:12-cv-201-J-39JRK, 2014 WL
6673253, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2014) (noting this Court's
holdings contrary to Shelton I).
As such, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on ground
two.
In the alternative, deference under AEDPA should be given to
the state court's decision.
appellate court affirmed.
claim
is
not
contrary
Petitioner raised the issue, and the
The state court's adjudication of this
to
or
an
unreasonable
application
of
constitutional law, or based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts.
Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief
on this ground.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.
The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this action is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2.
The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly
and close this case.
3.
If Petitioner appeals the denial of his Petition, the
Court denies a certificate of appealability.3
3
Because this Court
This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only
if a petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right."
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
To make this
substantial showing, Petitioner "must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district court's assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v. Dretke, 542
U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
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has
determined
that
a
certificate
of
appealability
is
not
warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions
report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be
filed in this case.
Such termination shall serve as a denial of
the motion.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 12th day of
July, 2016.
sa 7/8
c:
Counsel of Record
(2000)), or that "the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further,'" Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893
n.4 (1983)).
Upon due consideration, this Court will deny a
certificate of appealability.
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