Hill v. Alford et al
Filing
26
ORDER denying 17 Motion for summary judgment; the parties shall confer regarding the possibility of settlement and notify the Court by October 30, 2015; if unable to settle the case, the parties shall notify the Court whether they wish to have the case referred to the Magistrate Judge for a settlement conference. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 9/15/2015. (LDO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
LESTER W. HILL,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:14-cv-764-J-39PDB
DAVID ALFORD
AN JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Lester W. Hill, an inmate of the Florida penal
system, is proceeding pro se in this action on his June 1, 2014
verified Complaint (Doc. #1; Complaint) filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
Hill names David Alford and a John Doe, both correctional
officers at Suwannee Correctional Institution (SCI), as Defendants.
Hill asserts a cause of action for excessive force in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.
Complaint at 2-8.
As relief, Hill seeks
declaratory relief, two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000)
compensatory damages and twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) punitive
damages from David Alford, two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000)
compensatory
damages
and
fifteen
thousand
dollars
($15,000)
punitive damages from John Doe, costs, and any other relief that
Hill is entitled.
Id. at 9.
This cause is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. #17; Motion).
Hill was advised of the
provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, notified that the
granting of a motion for summary judgment would represent a final
adjudication of this case which may foreclose subsequent litigation
on the matter, and given an opportunity to respond.
See Summary
Judgment Notice (Doc. #19). Hill responded. See Plaintiff’s Brief
in Opposition to Defendants’ [sic] Summary Judgement [sic] Motion
(Doc. #22; Response); Plaintiff’s Statement of Contested Facts
(Doc. #23; Statement).1
Thus, this case is now ripe for review.
II. Allegations in the Complaint
Hill
alleges
that,
while
confined
in
close
management
segregation at SCI, on February 16, 2014 while housed in mental
health overflow, Alford, and three other officers, Cox, Hayes, and
the dorm Sergeant, approached him.
Complaint at 2.
Alford stood
outside his cell and threatened him, stating that what happened the
day before was not over and that Hill still owed “taxes.”
1
Id.
The Court will refer to the exhibits appended to Defendant’s
Motion as “D. Ex.” and to the exhibits appended to Hill’s Response
as “P. Ex.”
- 2 -
Alford gave Hill two options: (1) to “cuff up and come out to the
nurses triage station, (where there are no surveillance cameras)
and let [the officers] take care of business” or (2) the officers
“will assemble the extraction team and come in and beat the shit
out of plaintiff anyway.”
Id.
Hill told Alford to leave him alone
because he did not owe any “taxes” as he was sprayed with six cans
of mace the previous day and roughed up by the extraction team.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Alford responded that “this is business not personal.”
Hill then pleaded to the dormitory Sergeant, but was rebuffed
and told that “what’s done is done ... he has been working in
DOC[2] since 1989 and has no understanding for plaintiff, and
whether plaintiff likes it or not its [sic] going down.”
Id.
Hill
then told the officers that he was not coming out of his cell, and
the officers dispersed.
Id.
Thirty minutes later, Alford and Cox returned and told Hill to
“cuff up for a cell search and to go to the nurses triage station
to have his vital signs checked.”
Id.
Hill responded that he
thought the officers would beat him, and Alford threatened that he
would kick Hill’s teeth down his throat before turning and leaving.
Id.
Twenty or thirty minutes later, all four officers returned,
attempting to cajole Hill out of his cell, but Hill again refused
and the officers left.
Id. at 4.
Thirty to forty-five minutes
later, Alford and Cox returned with their supervisor, Lieutenant
2
Florida Department of Corrections.
- 3 -
Wilson, because Hill had refused to leave the cell.
Id.
Alford
again told Hill to “cuff up for a cell search and to have his
vitals checked by the nurse,” but Alford again refused, explaining
to Wilson that the officers had previously threatened to beat him.
Id.
Only after Wilson assured him that the officers would not
“mess with plaintiff in front of him[,]” Hill reluctantly consented
to cuffing and to leave his cell.
Id.
Then, Alford took Hill to the nurses’ triage station while Cox
and Wilson stayed to search his cell.
Id. at 4-5.
As Hill was
lead to the nurses’ station, he saw Sergeant Limblade and an
unidentified correctional officer, John Doe, in the laundry room
directly across from the station and Nurse Lemming in the nurses’
station.
Id. at 5.
Once inside the nurses’ station, Alford
severely beat Hill, smashing his face into a concrete wall,
tripping Hill to the ground, and repeatedly punching and kicking
Hill in his face and upper body.
Id. at 5-6.
During this time,
John Doe entered the nurses’ station and also kicked Hill in his
face and upper body.
Id. at 6.
Still in handcuffs behind his
back, Hill pleaded with the Defendants to stop, but the Defendants
continued and stomped Hills’ head into the concrete ground.
Id.
After approximately twenty kicks, the Defendants stopped, leaving
Hill nearly unconscious and bleeding from a cut over his right eye.
Id. at 6-7. Hayes and the Echo dormitory Sergeant replaced the two
Defendants, picked Hill off the floor, lifted him to his feet, and
- 4 -
steadied him so that nurse Lemming could inspect Hill’s injuries.
Id. at 7.
Nurse Lemming cleaned Hill’s wounds, bandaged the major
lacerations,
and
directed
the
infirmary for further treatment.
officers
Id.
to
take
Hill
to
the
Before leaving, Hill asked
Nurse Lemming to “remember what they did to him, and what she
witnessed.”
Id.
to the infirmary.
Hill was then taken to a cell to await transfer
Id.
While in the cell, Captain W. Cannon
approached him and told Hill that they were now even for Hill’s
prior disrespect to Cannon.
Id.
Hill was then transferred to the infirmary for ten days of
treatment for his injuries, pain, and infection.
Id.
summarizes his injuries:
[P]laintiff
suffered
many
painful
and
significant physical and emotional injuries.
Plaintiff suffered several deep lacerations to
his face that would require multiple deep
tissue stitches.
As a result of these
injuries plaintiff’s face is now permanently
scarred in several places. Plaintiff suffered
a very severe, painful and debilitating injury
to his left upper jaw, which (3) months after
the original injury plaintiff is still
experiencing pain and disability with his jaw.
Plaintiff also suffered a painful injury to
his upper left ribs/sternum region, plaintiff
believes he suffered fractured ribs or
severely bruised ribs, x-rays were taken
however plaintiff is unaware of the results at
this time. Plaintiff also suffered injury to
his neck, and his right knee that caused
plaintiff many days of pain and suffering.
Plaintiff suffered a concussion from the
trauma to his head and skull; plaintiff
suffered severe visual impairment, extreme
dizzyness [sic] and disorinetation [sic] for
days, confusion, and nausea and vomiting.
- 5 -
Hill
Other injuries that plaintiff suffered were
large multiple contusions to his head and
skull, (2) blackend [sic] and swollen eyes, as
well as other minor abrations [sic] to
plaintiff’s face and body.
Id. at 8.
Hill then describes his psychological and emotional
injuries: “plaintiff suffered humiliation, severe anxiety, and
depression.
Plaintiff’s mental state has been seriously impacted
by the violence of these defendants against plaintiff.
is
currently
being
treated
with
therapy
and
Plaintiff
psychotropic
medications by mental health to help plaintiff alleviate and cope
with his ongoing mental health issues.”
III.
Id.
Summary Judgment Standard
The Eleventh Circuit set forth the summary judgment standard.
Summary Judgment is proper when “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The substantive
law controls which facts are material and
which are irrelevant. Raney v. Vinson Guard
Service, Inc., 120 F.3d 1192, 1196 (11th Cir.
1997). Typically, the nonmoving party may not
rest upon only the allegations of his
pleadings, but must set forth specific facts
showing there is a genuine issue for trial.
Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th
Cir. 1990). A pro se plaintiff’s complaint,
however, if verified under 28 U.S.C. § 1746,
is equivalent to an affidavit, and thus may be
viewed as evidence. See Murrell v. Bennett,
615 F.2d 306, 310 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1980).
Nevertheless, “[a]n affidavit or declaration
used to support or oppose a motion must be
made on personal knowledge.”
Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)(4). “[A]ffidavits based, in part, upon
information and belief, rather than personal
knowledge, are insufficient to withstand a
- 6 -
motion for summary judgment.”
Ellis v.
England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005).
As we’ve emphasized, “[w]hen the moving party
has carried its burden under Rule 56[], its
opponent must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts ... Where the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the non-moving party, there is no
‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Unsupported, conclusory allegations that a
plaintiff
suffered
a
constitutionally
cognizant injury are insufficient to withstand
a motion for summary judgment. See Bennett v.
Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1532-34 (11th Cir.
1990) (discounting inmate’s claim as a
conclusory allegation of serious injury that
was unsupported by any physical evidence,
medical
records,
or
the
corroborating
testimony of witnesses).
Howard v. Memnon, 572 F. App’x 692, 694-95 (11th Cir. 2014)
(footnote omitted).
IV. Defendant’s Motion
In his Motion, Alford contends that he is entitled to summary
judgment because (1) Hill failed to show a constitutional violation
for excessive use of force; (2) Alford is entitled to qualified
immunity;
and
(3)
even
if
Hill
had
provided
evidence
of
a
constitutional violation, he is precluded from compensatory or
punitive damages under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
- 7 -
because his injuries were not more than de minimis.
14.
Motion at 6-
In support of his motion, Alford provides declarations of
Alford and Worthey,3 D. Exs. B and C; two Use of Force packets, D.
Exs. A and D; and two disciplinary reports issued to Hill on
February 16, 2014, D. Exs. E and F.
The first use of force report describes a very different
version of February 16, 2014. In the report, Alford summarizes the
incident as a reactionary physical force.
Ex. A at 1.
Alford
described the incident that occurred at 9:24 a.m.:
I was escorting the inmate from his assigned
cell to the medical triage room for the
purpose of medical assessment[. W]hile inside
the medical room the inmate became physically
combative by attempting to break my custodial
grasp and attempting to lunge at the on duty
nurse. At this time, I redirected inmate Hill
to the floor chest down utilizing my body
weight[.
]I pinned Inmate Hill to the
ground[. A]t this time all force was ceased.
I used only the minimum amount of force
necessary
to
bring
inmate
Hill
into
compliance.
Id.
This report further states that there were no staff injuries,
but that Hill received a “0.5 inch laceration to [the] chin [and a]
0.25 inch laceration [to the] left eyebrow.” Id. at 2.
The second use of force report, written by an Officer Hessley,
describes an incident of reactionary physical force that occurred
3
Nurse Lemming subsequently changed her last name to Worthey.
D. Ex. C. For consistency, the Court will refer to her as Nurse
Lemming.
- 8 -
shortly after the first, at 9:48 a.m..
D. Ex. D.
Officer Hessley
explains that,
While assigned as Internal Security Officer, I
was escorting Inmate Hill from E-Dormitory to
Medical assisted by Officer Austin Dampier.
Upon reaching the main unit medical treatment
room doorway I observed a metallic object in
Inmate Hill’s right hand.
I ordered Inmate
Hill several time to relinquish the metallic
item in his hand to no avail. As a result of
Inmate Hill’s refusing all verbal orders to
relinquish the item in his hand and to prevent
injury to [m]yself or Officer Dampier, I
maintained a hold of Inmate Hill’s upper right
arm with my left hand and placed my right hand
on Inmate Hill’s right shoulder and forced
Inmate Hill to the floor chest first assisted
by Officer Dampier.
Subsequent to being
forced chest first on the floor I gave Inmate
Hill several verbal orders to relinquish the
metallic [i]tem in his hand to which he
reluctantly complied[.
A]t this time all
force ceased.
Only the minimum amount of
force necessary was used to bring Hill into
compliance.
Id.
at
1.
This
report
also
documents
Hill’s
injuries
as
“[l]acerations to right and left eyebrow, bottom of chin, [s]wollen
area on forehead and cheek, [a]brasion to right shoulder.”
2.
Id. at
Further, this report notes that Inmate Hill would receive
disciplinary reports for possession of or manufacture of weapons,
ammunition or explosives and disobeying a verbal or written order.
Id.
It also notes that this use of force was further witnessed by
Officer Rodgers, Nurse Crews, and Nurse Batson.
Id.
This report
describes additional injuries:
Laceration to right side of [right] eyebrow:
2cm x 1 mm x >1mm, Laceration to [left]
- 9 -
eyebrow 2" x 1 mm wide, jagged edges,
laceration to bottom of chin 2" x 1mm and deep
with jagged edges, swollen area approx. size
and shape of a grape to [right] forehead, two
swollen areas approx. size and shape of a
grape to [right] forehead, two swollen areas
approx[.] size and shape of a grape to [right]
cheek.
2" abrasion to [right] shoulder,
laceration to top [right] side of upper lip 1
cm x 1 mm.
Id. at 10.
The two disciplinary reports describe the February 16,
2014 events in the same manner.
See D. Exs. E and F.
Hill pled
guilty to the disciplinary report for possession of a weapon.
Ex. E at 1.
A picture of the metallic weapon that was confiscated
during the second use of force is included.
report
also
D.
notes
that
Hill
was
Id. at 11-13.
transferred
to
Santa
This
Rosa
Correctional Institute Annex (SRCIA) following this incident on
March 3, 2014.
Id. at 1.
The disciplinary report for attempting
to assault a staff member was dropped because it was not timely
processed.
D. Ex. F.
In his declaration, Alford explains that his use of force was
a reaction to Hill’s lunging at Nurse Lemming.
D. Ex. B at 1.
He
denies punching, kicking, stomping, or otherwise hitting Hill,
except for the minimal use of force required to take him to the
floor and subdue him.
Id. at 1-2.
He claims that Nurse Lemming
was in the medical triage room and witnessed his use of force.
at 2.
Id.
After Alford regained control, he called for backup, left
Hill with Officer Hayes and Sergeant Rogers, and had no further
contact with Hill. Id. at 1-2. Nurse Lemming, in her declaration,
- 10 -
corroborated Alford’s description that Hill lunged at her while she
was attempting to take his vital signs, prompting Alford’s use of
force.
D. Ex. C at 1.
She also confirms that she conducted a post
use of force physical, documenting Hill’s lacerations, notifying
the doctor, and referring Hill to the main unit medical department.
Id.
Nurse Lemming also confirms that Alford did not hit, kick,
stomp, punch, or otherwise harm Hill and that she did not witness
Alford push or throw Hill into a wall, but that she did complete a
witness statement for the related incident report.
Id.
Based on this evidence, Alford first argues that Hill fails to
provide sufficient evidence to show a constitutional violation.
Alford argues that Hill’s “version of events is implausible in
light of Nurse Lemming (Worthey’s) declaration [because] any force
that was used on HILL was used in a good-faith effort to restore
order and protect Nurse Lemming from HILL’s attempt to break away
from ALFORD’s custodial grasp and lunge at her.”
Motion at 8.
He
claims that the first post use of force medical records reflect
only
two
minor
lacerations,
received a brutal beating.
making
Id.
it
implausible
that
Hill
Alford further argues that Nurse
Lemming, rather than confirming Hill’s version, as he claimed she
would, wholly contradicts Hill and supports Alford.
Id.
Next,
Alford argues that he is protected by qualified immunity because
Hill has not shown that Alford violated Hill’s rights, but instead
that Alford’s actions were reasonable.
- 11 -
Id. at 11-12.
Finally,
Alford argues that Hill is not entitled to compensatory or punitive
damages because the minor lacerations on his face were not more
than de minimis injuries, as required by the PLRA.
Id. at 14.
Thus, Alford concludes, summary judgment should be granted his
favor.
V. Hill’s Response
In response, Hill provides the following exhibits: (1) a
declaration by Hill, P. Ex. A; (2) grievances Hill filed at SRCIA
about the February 16, 2014 incident, P. Ex. B; (3) letters Hill
sent to the FBI and Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE)
regarding the February 16, 2014 incident, P. Ex. C; (4) Hill’s
radiology reports and sick call requests, P. Ex. E; (5) Alford’s
responses to Hill’s requests for admissions and interrogatories, P.
Ex. G; and (6) documentation provided by Alford related to the two
uses of force against Hill on February 16, 2014, disposition papers
of Hill’s disciplinary report regarding attempted assault of a
staff member, and the declarations of Alford and Nurse Lemming, P.
Exs. D, F, H, I, J, K.
In his sworn declaration, Hill generally disputes Alford’s
depiction of the February 16, 2014 incident and reiterates his
verified allegations in the complaint that he was beaten without
provocation as some type of payback by the SCI officers.
P. Ex. A.
Hill does add some additional information. He states that Alford’s
beating was a punishment and retaliation for his disrespect the
- 12 -
prior day to Officer Linblade and Captain Cannon.
Id. at 4, 9.
He
also adds that, after the beating, Nurse Lemming cleaned his
wounds, but did not ever ask him about pain or how he was feeling.
Id. at 5.
Hill further explains that he tried to explain to
Lieutenant John Wilson, who was conducting the post use of force
video operations, that he had just been beaten and that his
allegations were recorded.
Id. at 5-6.
Hill further claims that,
while being transported to medical, he spoke with the acting duty
warden, Major Ronny Morgan, and explained that he had just been
beaten.
Id. at 6.
Hill does generally agree with the substance of Alford’s
description of the second use of force.
In fact, he admits that he
was carrying a “small dull razor blade that was wrapped in a
coating of soft black putty.”
Id. at 7.
Hill further states that
“[t]his razor was not in the form of a weapon, or intended as one.”
Id.
He admits that Officers Hessley and Dampier noticed it while
they were waiting outside the infirmary, restrained him on the
ground, without causing any injury, and took the razor.
7.
Id. at 6-
He notes, however, that he was not punched, kicked, hit, or
harmed during this incident but instead was restrained until he
released the contraband.
Id. at 7.
Hill also states that this was
a legitimate use of force, and he did not allege or file any
complaints against these officers.
- 13 -
Id.
Hill claims that he then was taken into the infirmary where
the nurses better documented his injuries from the prior beating.
Id.
He remained in the infirmary for ten days where he underwent
a procedure to suture the major lacerations on his face, received
antibiotics and pain medication, underwent x-rays of his skull, and
had his vital signs checked regularly.
Id. at 7-8.
Hill claims
that Alford falsely accused him of attempting to assault Nurse
Lemming in his disciplinary report as a guise or pretext for the
beating.
Id. at 8.
Hill notes that this report was not processed,
and he was not disciplined.
Id.
Hill further describes an incident with Nurse Lemming on his
last day in the infirmary, on February 26, 2014 at approximately
2:30 p.m.
Id. at 8.
Nurse Lemming approached Hill and asked why
he kept mentioning her, that he needed to stop because she had a
family to take care of, and that she was in the nurses’ station but
is trained to leave whenever there is any use of force.
9.
Id. at 8-
Hill responded that he couldn’t let it go after receiving such
a beating and that he was not trying to cause her problems, but
only mentioned her because she was there. Id. Hill informed Nurse
Lemming that Alford claimed that Hill had lunged at Lemming, and
Lemming responded that “maybe” he had.
Id. at 9.
Hill rebuffed
her and asked her to do the right ting and tell the truth.
Id.
Forty-five minutes later, Hill was discharged from the infirmary.
Id.
- 14 -
Hill’s additional documentation consistently supports his
version of events.
In his grievances, which could not be filed
until March 7, 2014 at SRCIA, where he first received papers, forms
and pens, Hill similarly describes the incident.
P. Ex. B.
Hill
receives an initial denial, appeals, and the appeal is similarly
denied.
Id.
On April 16, 2014 and May 18, 2014, respectively,
Hill wrote letters describing the February 16, 2014 incident to the
FBI and FDLE.
P. Ex. C.
On February 18, 2014, Hill received a
radiograph of the skull due to multiple head and facial wounds
showing there were no fractures to Hill’s skull and a radiograph of
the chest due to pain showing no acute concerns.
P. Ex. E. at 1-3.
Hill’s sick-call requests document continuing pain in his jaw
through May 2014.
Id. at 4-5.
In the discovery documents
provided, Alford admits some of Hill’s background assertions, but
claims to be without knowledge to much of the relevant requests
because institutional rules prevented him from any contact with
Hill after the use of force and because he is no longer employed by
FDOC and does not have access to FDOC documents.
P. Ex. G.
Based on these documents and his verified Complaint, Hill
argues that summary judgment would be inappropriate as there are
clear disputes of material facts. Response at 5. Hill then argues
that Alford is not entitled to qualified immunity because there is
a factual dispute regarding whether he used excessive force.
at 6-10.
Id.
Hill argues that Nurse Lemming is a biased and partial
- 15 -
witness with a motive to lie, i.e. to protect her career, and that
it is unlikely that Nurse Lemming would have stayed to treat him
had he actually attempted to attack her.
Id. at 9-10.
While this
argument goes more towards credibility, which the Court does not
consider at this stage, it also points out factual disputes.
Hill also argues that there is sufficient evidence to show
that
his
injuries
were
not
de
minimis.
Id.
at
11-13.
Specifically, Hill notes that he only suffered injuries from
Alford’s beating, not from the appropriate second use of force, and
that the first post use of force documentation was incomplete. Id.
at 11-12.
Hill further observes that, although Nurse Lemming’s
post use of force documentation was lacking, she still considered
his injuries serious enough to send him for further observation and
care in the infirmary, where he stayed for ten days and received
sutures on his face and radiology of his upper body.
Id. at 12.
Finally, Hill lists his injuries, some which are supported by the
second
post
use
of
force
documentation,
as
multiple
deep
lacerations to his face, a painful injury to his jaw, a concussion,
bruised ribs, injured neck and knee, as well as other minor
lacerations and abrasions to Hill’s face and head.
Id. at 12-13.
Finally, Hill has provided a Statement of Contested Facts
(Doc. #23), detailing material facts in dispute.
Hill disputes
that Alford took him to the nurses’ triage station to check his
vital signs but rather to beat him in retaliation for disrespect to
- 16 -
his superior in a place where he knew there were no cameras.
Hill
disputes that he made any attempt to lunge at Nurse Lemming or to
provide any reason for Alford to take him to the ground and claims
that Nurse Lemming did witness the beating, even though she stated
otherwise in her declaration.
Hill further claims that Nurse
Lemming’s post use of force documentation did not describe all of
Hill’s injuries and that the disciplinary report for attempting to
assault a staff member was intentionally not processed.
VI. Law and Conclusions
“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
In considering an
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, [the Court] must consider
both
a
subjective
and
objective
component:
(1)
whether
the
‘officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind,’ and
(2) ‘if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to
establish a constitutional violation.’”
Tate v. Rockford, 497 F.
App’x 921, 923 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)).
In both Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment
excessive force claims, whether the use of
force violates an inmate’s constitutional
rights “ultimately turns on ‘whether force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore
discipline
or
maliciously
and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm.’” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 32021, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251
(1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) (establishing the
standard for an Eighth Amendment excessive
- 17 -
force claim); see Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d
1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying the
Whitley test in a Fourteenth Amendment
excessive force case).
If force is used
“maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm,” then it necessarily
shocks the conscience.
See Brown v. Smith,
813 F.2d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments give
equivalent
protections
against
excessive
force). If not, then it does not.
Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam).
The following factors are examined to distinguish between
good-faith and malicious or sadistic use of force: (1) the need for
application of force; (2) the relationship between that need and
the amount of force used; (3) the extent of injury inflicted upon
the prisoner; (4) the extent of threat to the safety of staff and
inmates; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a
forceful response.
Id.
“Although the extent of the injury is a relevant factor in
determining
the
amount
of
force
applied,
it
is
not
solely
determinative of an Eighth Amendment claim.” Muhammad v. Sapp, 494
F. App’x 953, 957 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Wilkins v.
Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010)).
When
prison
officials
maliciously
and
sadistically
use
force
to
cause
harm,
contemporary standards of decency always are
violated.
See Whitley, supra, 475 U.S., at
327, 106 S.Ct., at 1088. This is true whether
or
not
significant
injury
is
evident.
Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit
any physical punishment, no matter how
- 18 -
diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some
arbitrary quantity of injury. Such a result
would have been as unacceptable to the
drafters of the Eighth Amendment as it is
today.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
In this case, the parties have contradictory versions of what
happened on February 16, 2014. On one hand, Alford asserts that he
used the minimal amount of force to restrain Hill from lunging at
Nurse Lemming, merely taking him to the ground and holding him
until other officers arrived.
On the other hand, Hill asserts
that, out of revenge for perceived disrespect to Captain Cannon and
other officers the day before, Alford coaxed Hill out of his cell,
took him to the nurses’ triage station because there were no
cameras there, and then kicked and beat Hill while Hill was
handcuffed and on the ground as payback.
Both parties have submitted contrasting declarations and
documents to support their respective positions. See D. Exs. A, B,
C, D; P. Exs. A, B, C, E.4
Specifically, the parties disagree over
(1) Alford’s intent in directing Hill into the nurses’ triage
4
This Court expresses no view as to the persuasiveness of
either party’s evidence but notes that credibility considerations
of competing affidavits and supporting materials are inappropriate
on summary judgment so long as such evidence is not too incredible
to be accepted by reasonable minds. Reid v. Secretary, Fla. Dep’t
of Corr., 486 F. App’x 848, 852 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[F]or purposes
of summary judgment, there is nothing inherently wrong with ‘selfserving testimony,’ and it may not be disregarded by the district
court in determining whether there is a genuine dispute of fact on
a material issue in the case.”).
- 19 -
station; (2) whether Alford lunged at Nurse Lemming; (3) the
purpose of Alford’s use of a force; (4) whether Alford hit Hill
after he was subdued; and (5) the extent of Hill’s injuries and
their causation.
These disputed facts are both material and
genuine because they speak directly to the relevant factors to
determine if Alford’s force was excessive or Hill’s injuries were
more than de minimis. If Hill’s evidence is believed, a reasonable
jury could return a verdict in his favor.
Accordingly, Alford’s
Motion will be denied because there are genuine issues of material
fact that prevent the entry of summary judgment at this stage of
the proceeding.
Alford
immunity.
also
contends
that
See Motion at 9-12.
he
is
entitled
to
qualified
Because there are material issues
of fact in dispute, the Court cannot address whether Alford is
entitled to qualified immunity until these disputed facts have been
resolved.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED:
1.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #17) is
DENIED.
2.
The parties shall confer regarding the possibility of
settlement and notify the Court of the outcome of their settlement
negotiations by October 30, 2015.
If the parties are unable to
settle this matter privately, they shall notify the Court whether
- 20 -
they wish to have this case referred to the assigned Magistrate
Judge for a settlement conference.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida this 15th day of
September, 2015.
tc 9/14
c:
Lester W. Hill
Counsel of Record
- 21 -
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?