Frazier v. Palmer et al
ORDER granting 63 Motion for summary judgment with respect to the request to dismiss the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1997e(a) with regard to the claim that the kosher meals in the Kosher Diet are not well-balanced and are without suff icient nutritional value to preserve health or are in some way deficient or sub-standard; granting 63 motion for summary judgment as Plaintiff's claim to be placed on the kosher food plan is moot; instructions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 9/14/2017. (LDO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 3:14-cv-771-J-39JBT
Plaintiff is an inmate confined in the Florida penal system.
He initiated the case, pro se, by filing a Complaint (Doc. 2) in
the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, in and for
Bradford County, Florida on March 12, 2014. Defendants removed the
case to this Court.
See Notice of Removal (Doc. 1).
represented by counsel and is proceeding on the Amended Complaint
of Kelvin Frazier (Amended Complaint) (Doc. 45) pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (RLUIPA).
This cause is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (Motion) (Doc. 63).
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Response)
(Doc. 72); Plaintiff's Notice of Filing Documents in Support of Its
Response to Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion (Notice) (Doc.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Reply) (Doc. 84).
Summary Judgment Standard
"Summary judgment is appropriate only if 'the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'"
Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
"If the moving party meets this burden, 'the nonmoving
party must present evidence beyond the pleadings showing that a
reasonable jury could find in its favor.'" Ekokotu v. Federal Exp.
Corp., 408 F. App'x 331, 333 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) (quoting
Fickling v. United States, 507 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2007)),
cert. denied, 565 U.S. 944 (2011).
dismissed as Plaintiff's claims are now moot.
Motion at 1, 7-8.
Also, to the extent that Plaintiff is now making an argument that
he has a problem with his kosher diet, Defendant asserts that
Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Plaintiff counters that summary judgment is improper because
he has not been provided "with healthy kosher meals."
Id. at 8
Plaintiff contends the case is not moot because "Defendant's
Plaintiff also filed a Request for Oral Argument on
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 74); however, the
Court declines to hold oral argument as a decision can
appropriately be rendered on the documents before the Court.
demonstrates its lack of conviction to the kosher program and along
with the timing of the decision to provide Plaintiff kosher meals
(years after this action was filed), further demonstrates the Court
should not determine the case is moot."
Id. at 7-8.
submits that his argument for the provision of healthy meals is not
a new claim because his "right to a healthy meal is part and parcel
of and implicit in the right to a kosher meal."
Id. at 7 n.2.
The Amended Complaint
At the time of the filing of the Amended Complaint Plaintiff
Complaint at 1.
He practices the Jewish faith, and keeping kosher
in his dietary needs is a key component of the practice of his
Plaintiff alleges that despite numerous attempts to
obtain kosher meals, he has been unable to do so over the years.
Plaintiff recognizes, however, that since the filing of his
original Complaint, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida (S.D. Fla.), in United States v.
Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., et al., Case No. 1:12-cv-22958-PAS,
entered a Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction (Judgment) (Doc.
Of note, Plaintiff is currently confined at Mayo
Correctional Institution-Annex (MCI), which is located in the
Northern District of Florida.
regarding an institution-wide kosher meal program.3
Complaint at 1-2.
Plaintiff states that he was provisionally approved for kosher
meals back in April 2013, but he was required to complete a 90-day
sincerity test (now discontinued).
Id. at 2.
Before he could
complete the 90-day test, he was transferred to a different
institution within the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC).
Plaintiff states that frequent transfers and changing rules
impeded his ability to obtain kosher meals since 2013.
Plaintiff alleges that despite his sincere religious basis for
keeping kosher, the FDOC forced Plaintiff to violate his beliefs in
violation of RLUIPA.
He contends that the FDOC's refusal to
accommodate this central tenet of Judaism substantially burdens the
exercise of Plaintiff's religious right to practice his faith. Id.
Plaintiff claims that the FDOC's refusal to provide kosher meals
and/or practice of constantly moving Plaintiff and changing program
requirements was done with the intent to violate RLUIPA or in
Plaintiff asserts that the FDOC continues to deny him a kosher
The Court takes judicial notice of United States v. Sec'y,
Fla. Dep't of Corr., et al., Case No. 1:12-cv-22958-PAS (S.D.
Fla.). The S.D. Fla. entered the Judgment (Doc. 548) on August 12,
impossible for him to comply with the new application procedures.
Amendment claim and also a claim for violation of RLUIPA.
In support, he states that the FDOC's dietary policies are not
necessary to achieve any compelling state interest. Id. Plaintiff
contends that he has a sincere religious basis for keeping kosher.
Id. at 5.
He notes that the S.D. Fla. has ordered FDOC to provide
a system-wide kosher diet. Id. Plaintiff states that despite this
order, the FDOC continues to deny a kosher diet to Plaintiff "under
the pretext that he has not applied for one, or for other, unknown
but improper reasons."
Id. at 7.
In conclusion, Plaintiff says
he "just needs to be placed on a kosher food plan."
Claims for Relief
In his first claim for relief, Plaintiff claims Defendant's
refusal to provide kosher meals to Plaintiff violates RLUIPA.
Amended Compliant at 8.
In support of this claim, he states that
he has been denied kosher meals from 2013 to present.
explains that the FDOC currently denies Plaintiff a kosher diet
despite his sincere religious beliefs requiring he keep kosher.
Id. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's failure to provide a kosher
diet substantially burdens Plaintiff's free exercise of religion
without a compelling reason to do so.
He contends that this
failure does not further a compelling governmental interest, and is
not the least restrictive means to do so.
Defendant's policy of refusing to provide Plaintiff with kosher
Defendant violated RLUIPA "by failing to offer kosher meals to
inmates in their custody who desire a kosher diet to exercise their
religious beliefs[,]" and the Defendant violated section 1983 "by
violating Frazier's right to practice his religion by denying him
kosher meals[.]" Id. at 9. Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief
ordering Defendant "to provide nutritionally sufficient kosher
meals to Frazier[.]" Id.
Finally, Plaintiff asks for "such other
relief as the interests of justice may require."
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides: "No action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." Thus, the
available administrative remedies before an action with respect to
prison conditions by a prisoner may be initiated in this Court.
Defendant moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to
properly avail himself of the grievance process with regard to his
claim that the kosher meals being served are not nutritionally
adequate or a problematic.
Motion at 8 n.4.
In this instance, Defendant bears the burden of proving a
failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.
Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082-83 (11th Cir. 2008), relying on Jones
reviewing a prisoner civil rights action for exhaustion compliance:
prison-conditions suit under § 1983, the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requires
that he exhaust all available administrative
remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Booth
v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736, 121 S.Ct. 1819,
1822, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001). The purpose of
the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is to
opportunity to address complaints internally
before allowing the initiation of a federal
case." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93, 126
S.Ct. 2378, 2387, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006)
(quotation omitted). To properly exhaust, a
grievance procedures." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
199, 218, 127 S.Ct. 910, 922–23, 166 L.Ed.2d
Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1208 (11th
A number of factors guide the Court.
Initially, the Court
recognizes that exhaustion of available administrative remedies is
"a precondition to an adjudication on the merits" and is mandatory
under the PLRA.
Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1074 (2008); Jones, 549 U.S. at 211;
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) ("Exhaustion is no longer
left to the discretion of the district court, but is mandatory.")
The Supreme Court has stated that "failure to
exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA[.]"
U.S. at 216.
Although, "the PLRA exhaustion requirement is not
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 101, "exhaustion is
mandatory under the PLRA[;]" therefore, "unexhausted claims cannot
Pavao v. Sims, 679 F. App'x 819, 823 (11th Cir. 2017)
(per curiam) (citation omitted).
As recognized by this Court,
"The only limit to § 1997e(a)'s mandate is the
one baked into its text: An inmate need
exhaust only such administrative remedies as
are 'available.'" 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1862
(2016). For an administrative remedy to be
available, the "remedy must be 'capable of use
for the accomplishment of [its] purpose.'"
Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084 (11th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510
F.3d 1312, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2007)).
In Ross, the Supreme Court identified
three circumstances in which administrative
remedies would be considered unavailable.
unavailable when (despite what regulations or
guidance materials may promise) it operates as
a simple dead end—with officers unable or
consistently unwilling to provide any relief
to aggrieved inmates." 136 S. Ct. at 1859.
Second, "an administrative scheme might be so
Ross v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850 (2016).
opaque that it becomes, practically speaking,
incapable of use. In this situation, some
mechanism exists to provide relief, but no
ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it."
Id. Third, an administrative remedy is
unavailable "when prison administrators thwart
inmates from taking advantage of a grievance
misrepresentation, or intimidation." Id. at
Davis v. Sec'y, Dept. of Corr., No. 3:15-CV-649-J-34JRK, 2017 WL
1885366, at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2017).
Thus, the relevant question before this Court is whether
Plaintiff properly exhausted available administrative remedies
prior to seeking judicial relief.
To construe the exhaustion
requirement otherwise would render the PLRA "a toothless scheme."
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 95.
exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion."
U.S at 93.
Because exhaustion requirements are designed
to deal with parties who do not want to
incentive for these parties to do what they
would otherwise prefer not to do, namely, to
give the agency a fair and full opportunity to
adjudicate their claims. Administrative law
does this by requiring proper exhaustion of
administrative remedies, which "means using
all steps that the agency holds out, and doing
so properly (so that the agency addresses the
issues on the merits)." Pozo, 286 F.3d, at
1024. . . .
Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 949 (2002).
Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
In fact, "[p]roper exhaustion demands
compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural
The Court must now make findings on the disputed
issues of fact to decide whether administrative remedies were
available to Plaintiff, and if so, whether he properly exhausted
his administrative remedies.6
The FDOC provides an internal grievance procedure.
Chapter 33-103, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.).
matter was grieved and the documents complied with the deadlines
and other procedural rules as set forth in the F.A.C., the issues
raised therein are exhausted.
Generally, the FDOC provides a three-step grievance procedure.
consists of a three-step procedure. An inmate
must first file an "informal grievance ... to
the staff member who is responsible in the
particular area of the problem." Fla. Admin.
Code Ann. § 33–103.005(1). The second step
requires the inmate file a formal grievance
with the warden. Id. § 33–103.006(1)(a). If
the inmate is unsuccessful at this point, he
may submit an appeal to the Secretary of the
DOC. Id. § 33–103.007.
Kozuh v. Nichols, 185 F. App'x 874, 877 (11th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1222 (2007).
Since the parties have not requested an evidentiary hearing
on this issue and they have submitted evidence for the Court's
consideration, the Court proceeds to resolve the material questions
of fact based on the documents before the Court. Bryant, 530 F.3d
1377 n.16 (recognizing that a district court may resolve material
questions of fact on the submitted papers when addressing the
PLRA's exhaustion of remedies requirement).
Of initial significance, if Plaintiff filed a grievance and
attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies, he would have
needed to submit an initial grievance with the appropriate staff,
a formal grievance with the warden, and then an appeal to the
Secretary to properly grieve the matter in compliance with the
procedural requirements of the administrative grievance process.
As noted by the Defendant, Plaintiff could not have exhausted
his administrative remedies with regard to the Kosher Diet because
the Kosher Diet currently in existence was not in place.
The Kosher Diet currently offered by the prison system is now
offered at all facilities run by the Defendant.
Motion at 4.
February 9, 2017, at the request of Plaintiff's attorney, Defendant
placed Plaintiff on the Kosher Diet. Id. at 5. Plaintiff received
the Kosher Diet from February 19, 2017 through February 23, 2017.
Plaintiff voluntarily withdrew from the Kosher diet on
February 23, 2017.
Program Coordinator for the FDOC, shows the following. The General
Counsel's Office for FDOC approved Plaintiff's placement in the
Religious Diet Program (RDP), without requiring Plaintiff to apply
for the program.
Exhibit A (Doc. 63-1 at 2).
receiving religious meals on February 19, 2017 at MCI. Id. at 2-3.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filled out an inmate request stating that he
wished to voluntarily withdraw from the RDP.
Id. at 3.
Chaplain accepted Plaintiff's voluntary withdrawal from the program
and removed him from the RDP.
administrative remedies with regard to the nutritional value and
adequacy of the meals adopted for the Kosher Diet prior to seeking
As such, there was not proper exhaustion.
Therefore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has exhausted his
concerning the nutritional value and adequacy of the Kosher Diet
provided to him in 2017.
Upon review, the Court finds that the administrative process
was available to Plaintiff; it did not operate as a simple dead
end, it was clearly capable of use, and prison administrators did
In Case No. 1:12-cv-22958-PAS, the S.D. Fla. explained that
the RDP consists of three options: (1) the previously-offered
alternate, non-meat entree from the mainline; (2) the previouslyoffered vegan meal option; and (3) the newly-offered Certified Food
Option (CFO), a kosher food option. Order on Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 498 at 5, S.D. Fla.). The S.D. Fla. noted that
originally, the CFO consisted of pre-packaged processed foods and
The S.D. Fla.
included two hot meals per day.
Id. at 5 n.6.
recognized that the CFO was substantially modified to consist of
all cold meals, and this switch to all cold meals apparently took
place "in late summer 2014." Id. Of import, Plaintiff filed his
case in the spring of 2014, prior to this institution-wide switch.
The CFO cold meals are comprised of (1) breakfast: peanut butter,
cold cereal and bread; (2) lunch and dinner: sardines, cabbage,
beans, carrots, peanut butter, bread or crackers, and occasional
fruit. Id. Also of import, the kosher meals are estimated to be
more costly than mainline meals ($3.554 per prisoner per day,
compared to approximately $1.888 per prisoner per day). Id. at 10.
inferences, Plaintiff had access to the grievance process at MCI.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Plaintiff did not
properly exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his
claim that the Kosher Diet provided at MCI is not nutritionally
sound or healthy or is in some other way inadequate or substandard.
In light of the above, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit to seek judicial
Therefore, the Court concludes that the Motion should be
granted for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies against the Defendant with regard to the adequacy and
nutritional value of the Kosher Diet of the RDP.
exhaustion of available administrative remedies is required before
an action with respect to prison conditions by a prisoner may be
initiated, and Plaintiff failed to avail himself of this process.
"To plead a valid free exercise claim, [Plaintiff] must allege
'sincerely held religious beliefs.'" Watts v. Florida Int'l Univ.,
495 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Frazee v. Ill. Dep't
of Emp't Sec'y, 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989)).
"A [prison] should
accommodate an inmate's religious dietary restrictions, subject to
budgetary and logistical limitations, but only when the belief is
"truly held.'" Hatchcock v. Cohen, 287 F. App'x 793, 801 (11th Cir.
2008) (per curiam) (quoting Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499,
1504-06, 1508 (11th Cir. 1987)). "'[P]rison regulations alleged to
infringe constitutional rights are judged under a reasonableness
test'—not the more stringent least restrictive means test. . . ."
Muhammad v. Sapp, 388 F. App'x 892, 898 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation omitted) (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342, 349, (1987) (explaining that this test ensures that courts
afford appropriate deference to prison officials)).
Plaintiff, an inmate confined in the FDOC, is provided with
the heightened statutory protection to religious exercise under
Section 3 of RLUIPA provides:
"'[n]o government shall
impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise' of an
demonstrates that the burden 'is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest' and 'is the least restrictive means of
furthering' that interest. § 2000cc–1(a); cf. §§ 2000bb–1(a), (b)."
Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1656 (2011).
In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-33 (1997),
the United States Supreme Court found the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) to be unconstitutional as applied to state
and local governments because it exceeded Congress' power under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Institutionalized persons
can sue pursuant to the RLUIPA, which preserves the compelling
governmental interest/least restrictive means test but avoids the
pitfalls of RFRA.
The Eleventh Circuit explains:
institutionalized persons who are unable
freely to attend to their religious needs and
are therefore dependent on the government's
permission and accommodation for exercise of
their religion." Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709, 721, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020
(2005). More expansive than prisoners' rights
under the First Amendment, RLUIPA "affords to
prison inmates a heightened protection from
government-imposed burdens, by requiring that
substantial burden on the prisoner's religious
exercise is justified by a compelling, rather
interest." Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1266
(11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted), abrogated on other grounds by
Sossamon v. Texas, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct.
1651, 179 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011). Thus, if
Gardner's RLUIPA rights were not violated,
neither were his First Amendment rights.
"To establish a prima facie case under
section 3 of RLUIPA, a plaintiff must
demonstrate 1) that he engaged in a religious
exercise; and 2) that the religious exercise
was substantially burdened." Smith, 502 F.3d
at 1276. "The practice burdened need not be
central to the adherent's belief system, but
the adherent must have an honest belief that
the practice is important to his free exercise
of religion." Sossamon v. Lone Star State of
Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 332 (5th Cir. 2009).
"Although RLUIPA bars inquiry into whether a
particular belief or practice is 'central' to
a prisoner's religion, ... the Act does not
preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a
prisoner's professed religiosity." Cutter, 544
U.S. at 725 n. 13, 125 S.Ct. 2113.
Gardner v. Riska, 444 F. App'x 353, 354-55 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
Thus, the inmate must demonstrate (1) that he engaged in a
Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1276 (11th
Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Sossamon, 563 U.S. 277
(2011); Knight v. Thompson, 797 F.3d 934, 942-43 (11th Cir. 2015)
(recognizing that the Act broadly defines religious exercise),
cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1824 (2016).
The Court may consider the
sincerity of the inmate's beliefs and inquire as to whether the
prisoner's religiosity is authentic. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709, 725 n.13 (2005).
Once sincerity is addressed, the defendant
must demonstrate that the imposition of the burden or refusal to
accommodate a sincere belief furthers a compelling government
interest by the least restrictive means.
Benning v. Georgia, 845
F.Supp.2d 1372, 1377 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
declaratory/injunctive relief. Defendant submits that Plaintiff's
claims are moot due to all of the changes that have transpired
since the filing of the original Complaint.
Upon review, there is
no longer a live controversy with respect to which this Court can
give meaningful relief.
Of paramount importance,
"Article III of the Constitution requires that
there be a live case or controversy at the
time that a federal court decides the case; it
is not enough that there may have been a live
case or controversy when the case was filed."
omitted). "The doctrine of mootness provides
that the requisite personal interest that must
exist at the commencement of the litigation
(standing) must continue throughout its
alterations, and internal quotations omitted).
KH Outdoor, L.L.C. v. Clay Cty., Fla., 482 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th
institution-wide Kosher Diet plan, implemented in its current form
after a federal court's admonition to adopt a system-wide plan
under strict parameters.
Pursuant to the Judgment in Case No.
1:12-cv-22958-PAS (Doc. 548, S.D. Fla), the FDOC is required to
offer a kosher diet to all prisoners with a sincere religious basis
for keeping kosher. Kosher Diet is defined in the Judgment. Also,
the Judgment sets forth requirements for audits, monitoring, and
inspections of FDOC facilities to ensure compliance.
Since the filing of the Complaint, Plaintiff was added to the
RDP list at MCI and received kosher meals until he elected to
voluntarily withdraw from the RDP program.
Plaintiff received the
relief he requested; the FDOC placed him on the kosher food plan.
Therefore, the Amended Complaint is due to be dismissed as his
claim to be placed on the food plan is moot.9
Plaintiff, more recently, raised the issue that the meals
provided to him in 2017 under the RDP were deficient, not wellbalanced, and were without sufficient nutritional value to preserve
There is no factual dispute that Plaintiff voluntarily
withdrew from the RDP meal plan.
Notice, Plaintiff's Exhibit A, Declaration Under
Penalty of Perjury (Doc. 73-1 at 2).
More specifically, he
complains that the Kosher Diet adopted by the FDOC does not contain
sufficient vitamins, minerals and proteins. Id. at 4. He explains
that under the current Kosher Diet, inmates are served cold food
seven days a week, 365 days a year, and he does not want the
RDP/CFO approved kosher meals because they are unappetizing and
upset his stomach and "real adequate kosher meal[s]" are served
Notice, Plaintiff's Exhibit B, Declaration Under Penalty of
Perjury of Plaintiff (Doc. 73-1 at 7).
He wants "a kosher meal
Id. at 6.
In this regard, "[a]n injunction defining in detail the
requirement for a kosher meal would be broader than necessary and
would impose greater restrictions on the Department. See 18 U.S.C.
§3626(a)(1)(A)." Watkins v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 669 F.
App'x 982, 983 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
Plaintiff has been provided a Kosher Diet as defined in the
Judgment ("The Defendants currently rely upon the certified kosher
listings on the website maintained by the Chicago Rabbinical
Council . . . .").
Case No. 1:12-cv-22958-PAS, Judgment (Doc. 548
All of the food in the Kosher Diet is to be handled and
prepared in accordance with set procedures.
Also, it is
Apparently, Plaintiff seeks a requirement that kosher meals
be served hot, and include a wide variety of foods.
significant that prior to entering the permanent injunction, the
S.D. Fla. was fully apprised that the newly-offered CFO, the kosher
food option, consists of all cold meals.
Case No. 1:12-cv-22958-
PAS, Order on Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. 498, S.D. Fla.);
Judgment (Doc. 548, S.D. Fla.).
Also, the Court found that
modification and termination of the injunction is governed by the
PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60.
(Doc. 548 at 7, S.D. Fla.).11
At this point, Plaintiff raises a more recent complaint; the
See Response and Notice.
As noted previously, he has
not exhausted the claim that the kosher meals in the Kosher Diet
provided at MCI are not well-balanced and are without sufficient
nutritional value to preserve his health or are in some way
deficient or sub-standard. Thus, this claim is due to be dismissed
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Therefore, it is now
Although not an issue that needs to be addressed due to the
disposition of this case, any apparent attempt to seek modification
of the injunction is a matter for the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida.
Of note, the CFO kosher food option, described in Case No.
1:12-cv-22958-PAS (S.D. Fla.) (Doc. 498 at 5 n.6), includes
sardines, peanut butter and beans, significant sources of protein.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies] (Doc. 63) is GRANTED with respect
to the request to dismiss the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a) with regard to the claim that the kosher meals in the
Kosher Diet are not well-balanced and are without sufficient
nutritional value to preserve Plaintiff's health or are in some way
deficient or sub-standard.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 63) is
GRANTED as Plaintiff's claim to be placed on the kosher food plan
The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close this
The Court appreciates the service of appointed counsel.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 14th day of
Counsel of Record
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