Amos v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 32

OPINION AND ORDER reversing the Commissioner's decision and remanding for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. Signed by Magistrate Judge Monte C. Richardson on 11/2/2015. (ADM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
THOMAS AMOS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 3:14-cv-834-J-MCR

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
_______________________________/
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s appeal of an administrative
decision denying his applications for a Period of Disability, Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Plaintiff alleges he
became disabled on June 9, 2010. (Tr. 193, 200.) A hearing was held before the
assigned Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on April 26, 2012, at which Plaintiff
was represented by an attorney. (Tr. 84-112.) The ALJ found Plaintiff not
disabled from June 9, 2010 through May 16, 2012, the date of the decision.2 (Tr.
67-78.)
In reaching the decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following
severe impairments: diabetes mellitus, degenerative disc disease, hypertension,
1

The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States
Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 20, 21.)
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Plaintiff had to establish disability on or before December 31, 2015, his date
last insured, in order to be entitled to a period of disability and DIB. (Tr. 67.)

seizure disorder, and anxiety. (Tr. 69.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work,3 except:
[Plaintiff] is limited to occasionally climb stairs, balance, stoop, kneel
and crouch. He is never to climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds and
never crawl. He should avoid all exposure to hazards such as
machinery and heights. He is limited to simple, routine, repetitive
tasks involving up to 3-step commands. He is limited to occasional
interaction with the general public and occasional interaction with coworkers.
(Tr. 71.)
Plaintiff is appealing the Commissioner’s decision that he was not disabled
from June 9, 2010 through May 16, 2012. Plaintiff has exhausted his available
administrative remedies and the case is properly before the Court. The Court has
reviewed the record, the briefs, and the applicable law. For the reasons stated
herein, the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED and REMANDED.
I.

Standard of Review

The scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841
F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether the Commissioner’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390
(1971). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant

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By definition, light work involves lifting no more than twenty pounds at a time
with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to ten pounds; it requires a good
deal of walking or standing, or sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of
arm or leg controls. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b); SSR 83-10.
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evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir.
2004). Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence,
the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary
result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937
F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th
Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into
account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d
835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating the court must scrutinize the entire record to
determine the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s factual findings).
II.

Discussion

Plaintiff raises three issues on appeal. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
erred in determining that he had the RFC to perform a reduced range of light
work after failing to consider and weigh all pertinent evidence, including the
results of the brain MRI performed on June 7, 2011 and October 3, 2012, the
opinion of the examining consultant Dr. Keiter, and the opinions of the treating
physicians Dr. Urban and Dr. Anna Szafran-Swietlik. Plaintiff further argues that
the testimony of the Vocational Expert (“VE”) does not constitute substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s decision because the ALJ’s hypothetical question
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to the VE did not adequately reflect Plaintiff’s limitations. Plaintiff argues that it is
not clear from the record how the ALJ came up with the RFC of a reduced range
of light work, given that Dr. Keiter seemed to assess more restrictive limitations.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in weighing his credibility when the
record reveals that he suffered from documented impairments allegedly causing
significant limitations.
Defendant does not dispute that the ALJ mentioned only the June 7, 2011
brain MRI, which showed “[s]uspect right frontal floor encephalomalacia” (Tr.
524), but not the October 3, 2012 brain MRI. The October 3, 2012 brain MRI
showed: “Stable encephalomalacia in the inferior right frontal and anterior right
temporal lobes may represent prior trauma[.] Clinical correlation recommended[.]
Stable subcentimeter pineal gland cyst.” (Tr. 635.) These results appear to
contradict the ALJ’s statement that “the overall objective medical evidence is
benign” as “[a]ll of [Plaintiff’s] diagnostic testing including MRI of the brain, CT
scans, echocardiograms, etc. have been normal except for some degenerative
changes noted upon diagnostic testing of the spine.” (Tr. 75.)
The ALJ’s failure to discuss the October 3, 2012 brain MRI makes it
impossible for the Court to determine whether the ALJ even considered this
evidence. Although an ALJ is not required to refer to every piece of evidence in
his decision, the ALJ may not ignore relevant evidence, particularly when it
supports the claimant’s position. See, e.g., Lord v. Apfel, 114 F. Supp. 2d 3, 13
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(D.N.H. 2000); Meek v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4328227, *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2008)
(“Although an ALJ need not discuss all of the evidence in the record, he may not
ignore evidence that does not support his decision . . . . Rather, the judge must
explain why significant probative evidence has been rejected.”) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
The evidence at issue supports Plaintiff’s position because the brain
damage could certainly explain Plaintiff’s complaints of memory problems,
confusion, difficulty finding words, problems with attention and concentration, and
difficulty making appropriate decisions, all of which were noted in Dr. Keiter’s
evaluation. (Tr. 378-82.) However, as Plaintiff points out, the ALJ failed to clearly
state the weight accorded to Dr. Keiter’s opinions. It is unclear what parts of her
opinions were given “great weight” and what parts were given only “some weight.”
(See Tr. 76 (“[T]he undersigned gives great weight to the consultative examiner,
Dr. Keiter, the undersigned gives some weight to his [sic] opinion to the extent
that it supports that the claimant is capable of simple, routine, repetitive task
involving up to 3 step commands.”).)
Based on the foregoing, the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s decision
is supported by substantial evidence. See Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731,
735 (11th Cir. 1981) (“Unless the [ALJ] has analyzed all evidence and has
sufficiently explained the weight he has given to obviously probative exhibits, to
say that his decision is supported by substantial evidence approaches an
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abdication of the court’s ‘duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine
whether the conclusions reached are rational.’”). Therefore, on remand, the ALJ
will be directed to consider Plaintiff’s October 3, 2012 brain MRI, and explain the
weight given to Dr. Keiter’s opinions and the reasons therefor. In light of this
conclusion and the possible change in the RFC, the Court need not address
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments. See Jackson v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.2
(11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Freese v. Astrue, 2008 WL 1777722, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 18, 2008); see also Demenech v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 913 F.2d 882, 884 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1.

The Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED pursuant to sentence

four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and REMANDED with instructions to the ALJ to: (a)
consider the October 3, 2012 brain MRI, (b) explain the weight given to Dr.
Keiter’s opinions and the reasons therefor, (c) reconsider the RFC assessment, if
necessary, and (d) conduct any further proceedings deemed appropriate.
2.

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment consistent with this

Order and close the file.
3.

Should this remand result in the award of benefits, pursuant to Rule

54(d)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff’s attorney is
GRANTED an extension of time in which to file a petition for authorization of
attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Plaintiff’s attorney shall file such a
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petition within thirty (30) days from the date of the Commissioner’s letter sent to
Plaintiff’s counsel of record at the conclusion of the Agency’s past due benefit
calculation stating the amount withheld for attorney’s fees. See In re: Procedures
for Applying for Attorney’s Fees Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 406(b) & 1383(d)(2), Case
No. 6:12-mc-124-Orl-22 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2012). This Order does not extend
the time limits for filing a motion for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, on November 2, 2015.

Copies to:
Counsel of Record

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