Eggleston v. Secretary, Department of Corrections et al
Filing
17
ORDER dismissing 1 the petition with prejudice, with instructions to the Clerk; denying a certificate of appealability, with instructions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 1/30/2017. (LDO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
MYRICK EGGLESTON,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 3:14-cv-913-J-39MCR
SECRETARY, DOC, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Myrick Eggleston raises one ground in his Petition
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in
State Custody (Petition) (Doc. 1).
Respondents provide a succinct
summary of Petitioner's claim:
Eggleston has filed a Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus challenging the order of a
Florida Circuit Court in dismissing his
mandamus petition as well as a Florida
District Court of Appeal's summary affirmance
of the Circuit Court order dismissing his
petition. (Doc. 2 at 4) Eggleston claims that
the Circuit Court erred in the granting of the
Department's motion to dismiss which is the
result of a violation of his due process of
law. (Doc. 2 at 4) Eggleston asserts that the
Department's decision to discipline him for an
infraction that could not have occurred is the
result of a fundamental error. (Doc. 2 at 4)
As relief, Eggleston requests this Court
overturn the disciplinary report and find that
Eggleston's due process rights were violated.
(Doc. 2 at 6)
Response at 1-2.
See Petition at 5.
Thus, Petitioner challenges
the Florida Department of Corrections' (Department) disciplinary
report for escape or attempted escape, resulting in the loss of 180
days of gain time.
Respondents filed a Response to Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response) (Doc. 11).
In support of their
Response, they submitted Exhibits (Doc. 11).1
As relief, Petitioner asks that the Court direct that the
disciplinary report be overturned and his 180 days of gain time be
restored. He states that this loss of gain time effects the length
of his incarceration.
Petitioner also submitted a Memorandum of
Law (Memorandum) (Doc. 2) with Exhibits.
Petitioner filed a Reply
to the Respondents' Response (Reply) (Doc. 13).2
See Order (Doc.
6).3
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas
corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic &
Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), petition
for cert. filed, – U.S. - (U.S. Oct. 14, 2016) (No. 16-6444).
"'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief
1
The Court hereinafter refers to the Respondents' exhibits
as " R. Ex." The Court will reference the page numbers assigned by
the electronic docketing system where applicable.
2
The Court hereinafter refers to the exhibits attached to
Petitioner's Reply as "Exhibit." The Court will reference the page
numbers assigned by the electronic docketing system where
applicable.
3
No evidentiary proceedings are required in this Court.
- 2 -
functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'"
Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 132 S.Ct. 38, 43 (2011)).
Under
AEDPA,
when
a
state
court
has
adjudicated the petitioner's claim on the
merits, a federal court may not grant habeas
relief unless the state court's decision was
"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or
"was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding," id. §
2254(d)(2). A state court's factual findings
are presumed correct unless rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence.[4] Id. § 2254(e)(1);
Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199, 1223 (11th
Cir. 2011).
..."It bears repeating that even a strong case
for relief does not mean the state court's
contrary
conclusion
was
unreasonable."
[Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101
(2011)] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.
63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144
(2003)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly
instructed lower federal courts that an
unreasonable application of law requires more
than mere error or even clear error. See,
e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18,
124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003); Lockyer,
538 U.S. at 75 ("The gloss of clear error
fails to give proper deference to state courts
by conflating error (even clear error) with
unreasonableness."); Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389
(2000) ("[A]n unreasonable application of
4
"This presumption of correctness applies equally to factual
determinations made by the state trial and appellate courts." Bui
v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003) (footnote omitted)
(citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981)).
- 3 -
federal law is different from an incorrect
application of federal law.").
Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253–54 (11th Cir. 2013),
cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 67 (2014).
In applying AEDPA deference, the first step is to identify the
last state court decision that evaluated the claim on its merits.
See Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 834 F.3d 1227, 1235
(11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, - U.S. (U.S. Nov. 10, 2016) (No. 16-6855); Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't
of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016).
Regardless of
whether the last state court provided a reasoned opinion, "it may
be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the
merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural
principles to the contrary."
Richter, 562 U.S. at 99; see also
Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013).
Where the last adjudication on the merits is "'unaccompanied
by an explanation,' a petitioner's burden under section 2254(d) is
to 'show [ ] there was no reasonable basis for the state court to
deny relief.'" Wilson, 834 F.3d at 1235 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S.
at 98). "[A] habeas court must determine what arguments or theories
supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's
decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded
jurists
could
disagree
that
those
arguments
or
theories
are
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the] Court."
Richter, 562 U.S. at 102; see also Wilson, 834 F.3d at 1235;
- 4 -
Marshall, 828 F.3d at 1285. To determine which theories could have
supported the state appellate court's decision, the federal habeas
court may look to a state trial court's previous opinion as one
example of a reasonable application of law or determination of
fact; however, the federal habeas court is not limited to assessing
the reasoning of the lower court.
Wilson, 834 F.3d at 1239. As
such,
even when the opinion of a lower state court
contains flawed reasoning, [AEDPA] requires
that [the federal court] give the last state
court to adjudicate the prisoner's claim on
the merits "the benefit of the doubt," Renico
[v. Lett, 449 U.S. 766, 733 (2010)] (quoting
[Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24
(2002)] ), and presume that it "follow[ed] the
law," [Woods v. Donald, ––– U.S. ––––, 135
U.S. 1372, 1376 (2015)] (quoting Visciotti,
537 U.S. at 24).
Wilson at 1238; see also Williams, 133 S.Ct. at 1101 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
III.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A brief procedural history will be provided.
On August 16,
2012, an officer of the Department charged Petitioner with escape
or attempted escape.
R. Ex. B (Doc. 11-1 at 11).
The Statement of
Facts charge:
On August 26, 2012 at approximately 11:56AM,
while assigned as Public Works Supervisor, I
was present at the City Yard with 7 inmates.
At approximately 12:02PM after being advised
of a possible escape attempt, I conducted an
informal
count
and
discovered
inmate
Eggleston, Myrick DC#R19903 was missing. It
was later discovered that inmate Eggleston had
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ran [sic] from the City Yard and collapsed
approximately 3 blocks down the road. Inmate
Eggleston received medical attention due to
his condition and was later returned to the
institution and placed in administrative
confinement pending the charge of 4-1 escape
or escape attempt of the Rules of Prohibited
Conduct.
The shift OIC was notified and
instructed me to submit this report.
Id.
Petitioner, on August 17, 2012, provided a statement that
during his lunch break at the Public Works, he smoked K-2 and lost
reality.
realized
R. Ex. D (Doc. 11-1 at 14).
what
attention.
Id.
he
had
done
(run),
he
He said that when he
was
receiving
medical
He submitted an additional statement contending
that he was not in a confined or enclosed area, so the offense
should not be considered to be an escape or attempted escape.
at 15.
He had no witnesses or evidence to present.
Id.
R. Ex. E (Doc.
11-1 at 16); R. Ex. F (Doc. 11-1 at 17).
Petitioner pled not guilty and declined the offer of staff
assistance.
R. Ex. G (Doc. 11-1 at 19).
The team provided the
basis of its decision:
The team decision is based on information
obtained from the investigation, the hearing
and Officer J. Wallace's statement in section
one of the DR, where it is reported that
Officer Wallace conducted a[n] informal count
while working inmate in Public Works and
discovered that inmate Eggleston was missing
and had ran [sic] 3 blocks away.
Inmate
Eggleston was allowed to make a statement and
he stated he don't [sic] remember what
happened, he just woke up in an ambulance.
Inmate Eggleston's witness statements were
read during the hearing, Inmate Eggleston
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stated that he smoked K-2 and lost reality.
Inmate Eggleston refused to call any witnesses
and signed the DC6-112B denoting such.
No
other evidence was presented.
AC time was
considered but not applied.
Id.
As punishment, Petitioner lost 180 days of gain time and
received 60 days of disciplinary confinement.
Id.
Petitioner
submitted a Request for Administrative Remedy or Appeal to the
Warden.
R. Ex. H (Doc. 11-1 at 20).
The Response, in pertinent
part, said:
An inmate is lawfully incarcerated while
working outside the institution. Being in an
unauthorized area or unauthorized absence from
you[r] squad or assignment constitutes as
[sic] an escape.
You were aware of this
information[.] [It] is on the "Rules for
inmates assigned to community work squads"
which you have been given several times and
the copies are in your inmate file. In your
own statement during the investigation you
wrote "during my lunch break of public works I
smoked K-2 and lost reality. When I realized
what I had done (running) was real I was
receiving medical attention."
R. Ex. I (Doc. 11-1 at 21).
Petitioner appealed to the Secretary through a Request for
Administrative Remedy or Appeal.
R. Ex. J (Doc. 11-1 at 22-26).
The appeal was rejected as not being in compliance with the rules.
R. Ex. K (Doc. 11-1 at 27).
Petitioner submitted another Request
for Administrative Remedy or Appeal to the Secretary.
(Doc. 11-1 at 28-30).
R. Ex. L
The Secretary denied the appeal for the
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reasons stated in the institutional response.
R. Ex. M (Doc. 11-1
at 31).
On December 10, 2012 Petitioner provided a Petition for Writ
of Mandamus to the prison officials for mailing to the circuit
court.
R. Ex. N (Doc. 11-1 at 32); Exhibit 1 (Doc. 13-1 at 1-5).
The circuit court, on January 23, 2013, entered an Order to Show
Cause.
Exhibit 2 (Doc. 13-2 at 1-2).
On June 14, 2013, the
circuit court entered an Order Dismissing Petition. R. Ex. 2 (Doc.
11-2 at 1-2).
days
from
the
The court found the petition was filed more than 30
exhaustion
of
administrative
remedies,
it
was
untimely, and should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Id.
On March 19, 2014, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed per
curiam.
2014.
R. Ex. 3 (Doc. 11-3 at 2).
The mandate issued June 2,
Id. (Doc. 11-3 at 1).
Petitioner is no longer confined in the Department.
released on March 1, 2015.5
Pennsylvania.
He was
He now resides in Philadelphia,
(Doc. 16).
IV.
CONCLUSION
When Petitioner filed this case with the Clerk on August 1,
2014, he was in the custody of the Department.
Therefore, he
satisfied the "in custody' requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989).
5
Petitioner filed his
See http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ImateReleases/detail.
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Reply with the Clerk on December 29, 2014, and was released from
the Department 62 days later, on March 1, 2015.
Neither
party
submitted
a
challenge
to
this
Court's
jurisdiction based on mootness, however, "a federal court at any
stage of the proceedings must, on its own, dismiss a case as moot
when it cannot give the petitioner any effective relief."
A.M. v.
Butler, 360 F.3d 787, 790 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Spencer v. Kemna,
523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998), Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996)).
"[A] habeas petitioner who has been released from imprisonment
subsequent to his filing a § 2254 petition must establish that his
petition still presents a case or controversy under Article III, §
2, of the United States Constitution, and therefore is not moot."
Mattern v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 494 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th
Cir.
2007)
(per
curiam)
(citing
Spencer,
523
U.S.
at
7).
Petitioner has not alleged any collateral consequences, and the
case or controversy requirement of Article III of the United States
Constitution continues through all stages of federal judicial
proceedings.
Williams v. Carter, 253 F. App'x 914, 915 (11th Cir.
2007) (per curiam) (refusing to extend presumption of collateral
consequences to revocation of good-time credits).
Of great import, the Court cannot grant Petitioner relief. He
is no longer confined in the Department.
Also of note, Petitioner
is not challenging the constitutionality of his original conviction
and sentence. Moreover, Petitioner was not criminally convicted of
escape.
Thus, there is no escape conviction to be used to enhance
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any future sentence. Any argument that an internal, administrative
disciplinary report concerning escape or attempted escape will
enhance a subsequent sentence is too speculative to create a case
or controversy.
Courts are not "in the business of pronouncing
that past actions which have no demonstrable continuing effect were
right or wrong."
Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18.
This Court cannot give
Petitioner any effective relief, and no further relief can be
obtained from the Respondents on the Petition. As such, Petitioner
does not have Article III standing and this case is due to be
dismissed as moot.
Alternatively, the Petition should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
Fundamentally, Petitioner is asking this Court to
reverse the state court's decision that his mandamus petition was
untimely filed and it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the petition.
Respondents assert that Petitioner is seeking relief outside of
this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker -Feldman doctrine.
Response at 5.
As such, they ask the Court to dismiss the Petition
for lack of jurisdiction.
Id. at 6-7.
Upon review, Petitioner is claiming that the circuit court
improperly dismissed his mandamus petition as untimely filed, and
that the First District Court of Appeal unjustly affirmed this
decision.
In brief, Petitioner is asking this Court to overturn
injurious state court rulings.
This Court has no power to review
the decisions made by the Florida state courts.
Kolb v. Santurri,
No. 3:09cv2-WS, 2009 WL 2602625, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2009)
- 10 -
(not reported in F.Supp.2d) (recognizing that a federal district
court is without jurisdiction to "sit in review of state-court
judges' decisions").
See Response at 6-7.
Indeed, Petitioner's request for reversal of state court
decisions is plainly prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine:
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44
S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District
of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206
(1983). The doctrine is a jurisdictional rule
that precludes the lower federal courts from
reviewing state court judgments. Nicholson v.
Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009).
This is because "[28 U.S.C.] § 1257, as long
interpreted, vests authority to review a state
court judgment solely in th[e Supreme] Court."
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 292, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d
454 (2005). The Supreme Court recently has
cautioned that "[t]he Rooker- Feldman doctrine
... is confined to cases of the kind from
which the doctrine acquired its name: cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review
and rejection of those judgments." Id. at 284,
125 S.Ct. 1517; see also Lance v. Dennis, 546
U.S. 459, 464, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d
1059
(2006)
(per
curiam)
(noting
the
"narrowness" of the Rooker- Feldman rule). We
have since explained that the Rooker- Feldman
doctrine operates as a bar to federal court
jurisdiction where the issue before the
federal court was "inextricably intertwined"
with the state court judgment so that (1) the
success
of
the
federal
claim
would
"effectively
nullify"
the
state
court
judgment, or that (2) the federal claim would
succeed "only to the extent that the state
court wrongly decided the issues." Casale v.
Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009)
- 11 -
(per
curiam)
omitted).
(internal
quotation
marks
Alvarez v. Attorney General for Fla., 679 F.3d 1257, 1262-63 (11th
Cir. 2012) (footnote omitted).
Finally, and alternatively, Petitioner's assertion that his
disciplinary infraction did not amount to escape or attempted
escape, but merely constituted an unauthorized absence pursuant to
the Florida Administrative Code (Fla. Admin. Code 33-601.314 (4-2)
(unauthorized absence from assigned area, including housing, job or
any other assigned or designated area)), is not cognizable in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding.
See Memorandum at 10-11.
This
claim involves statutory interpretation of a state law found in the
Florida Administrative Code (Fla. Admin. Code 33-601.314 (4-1)
(escape or escape attempt)).
The writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 "was not enacted to enforce State-created rights."
Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing
Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988)), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1170 (2001).
The Eleventh Circuit allows that only in cases of federal
constitutional error will a federal writ of habeas corpus be
available.
See Jones v. Goodwin, 982 F.2d 464, 471 (11th Cir.
1993); Krasnow v. Navarro, 909 F.2d 451, 452 (11th Cir. 1990).
Petitioner attempts to bring his claim within the purview of this
Court's jurisdiction by labeling his claim a due process claim.
However, "[t]his limitation on federal habeas review is of equal
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force when a petition, which actually involves state law issues, is
'couched in terms of equal protection and due process.'" Branan v.
Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Willeford v.
Estelle, 538 F.2d 1194, 1198 (5th Cir. 1976)).
It is not within
the province of a this Court to make the type of examination
Petitioner requests.
Since ground one presents an issue that is not cognizable in
this habeas proceeding, this ground cannot provide a basis for
federal habeas corpus relief.
Reviewing this ground, there is no
breach of a federal constitution mandate.
Therefore, the claim
raised in ground one is due to be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.
The
Petition
(Doc.
1)
is
DISMISSED
WITH
PREJUDICE.
2.
The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing the case with
prejudice.
3.
The Clerk shall close this case.
4.
If Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his Petition, the
Court denies a certificate of appealability.6
6
Because this Court
This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only
if a petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right."
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
To make this
substantial showing, Petitioner "must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district court's assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v. Dretke, 542
U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000)), or that "the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further,'" Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
- 13 -
has
determined
that
a
certificate
of
appealability
is
not
warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions
report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be
filed in this case.
Such termination shall serve as a denial of
the motion.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 30th day of
January, 2017.
sa 1/27
c:
Myrick Eggleston
Counsel of Record
322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893
n.4 (1983)).
Upon due consideration, this Court will deny a
certificate of appealability.
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