Riley v. National Association of Marine Surveyors, Inc. et al
Filing
40
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT SOCIETY OF ACCREDITED MARINE SURVEYORS, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FILED MARCH 17, 2014; AND TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE M IDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA re 34 , 31 . Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 09/25/2014. (eps )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry [Transferred from hid on 9/26/2014.]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
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)
)
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MARINE SURVEYORS, INC.;
)
SOCIETY OF ACCREDITED MARINE )
SURVEYORS, INC.; JOHN DOES 1- )
)
50; JANE DOES 1-50; DOE
PARTNERSHIPS 1-50; DOE
)
)
CORPORATIONS 1-50; DOE
)
ENTITIES 1-50; AND DOE
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GOVERNMENTAL UNITES 1-50,
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )
DONALD J. “SKIP” RILEY, JR.,
CIVIL NO. 14-00135 LEK-RLP
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT SOCIETY
OF ACCREDITED MARINE SURVEYORS, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
COMPLAINT FILED MARCH 17, 2014; AND TRANSFERRING
THE CASE TO THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
On July 21, 2014, this Court issued its Order Granting
in Part and Denying in Part Defendant Society of Accredited
Marine Surveyors, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint Filed
March 17, 2014; and Transferring the Case to the Middle District
of Florida (“7/21/14 Order”).1
[Dkt. no. 31.2]
On August 1,
2014, Plaintiff Donald J. “Skip” Riley, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) filed a
motion for reconsideration of the 7/21/14 Order (“Motion for
1
Defendant Society of Accredited Marine Surveyors, Inc.
(“SAMS”) filed its Motion to Dismiss Complaint Filed March 17,
2014 (“Motion to Dismiss”) on April 25, 2014. [Dkt. no. 6.]
2
The 7/21/14 Order is also available at 2014 WL 3579651.
Reconsideration”).
[Dkt. no. 34.]
SAMS filed its memorandum in
opposition on August 15, 2014,3 and Plaintiff filed his reply on
September 2, 2014.
[Dkt. nos. 37, 39.]
The Court finds this
matter suitable for disposition without a hearing pursuant to
Rule LR7.2(e) of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States
District Court for the District of Hawai`i (“Local Rules”).
After careful consideration of the Motion for Reconsideration,
supporting and opposing memoranda, and the relevant legal
authority, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is HEREBY
DENIED for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
In the 7/21/14 Order, this Court, inter alia:
•concluded that Plaintiff had properly joined SAMS and NAMS in
the Complaint, filed March 17, 2014, and he stated a claim
for a conspiracy between SAMS and NAMS; [2014 WL 3579651, at
*2;]
•concluded that venue in this district is improper because SAMS
is not subject to specific or general jurisdiction in
Hawai`i and, thus, SAMS cannot be considered a resident,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); [id. at *3-6;] and
•transferred the case to the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida [id. at *6-7].
In the instant Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff
argues that the second ruling is erroneous and the third ruling
would “work a ‘manifest injustice.’”
3
[Mem. in Supp. of Motion
On August 18, 2014, Defendant National Association of
Marine Surveyors, Inc. (“NAMS”) filed its joinder to SAMS’s
memorandum in opposition. [Dkt. no. 38.]
2
for Reconsideration at 2.]
Plaintiff does not dispute the first
ruling.
STANDARD
In order to obtain reconsideration of the 7/21/14
Order, the Motion for Reconsideration “must accomplish two goals.
First, a motion for reconsideration must demonstrate reasons why
the court should reconsider its prior decision.
Second, a motion
for reconsideration must set forth facts or law of a strongly
convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior
decision.”
See Davis v. Abercrombie, Civil No. 11-00144 LEK-BMK,
2014 WL 2468348, at *2 (D. Hawai`i June 2, 2014) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
This district court
recognizes three circumstances where it is proper to grant
reconsideration of an order: “(1) when there has been an
intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence has come
to light; or (3) when necessary to correct a clear error or
prevent manifest injustice.”
Tierney v. Alo, Civ. No. 12-00059
SOM/KSC, 2013 WL 1858585, at *1 (D. Hawai`i May 1, 2013) (citing
School District No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th
Cir. 1993)).
“Mere disagreement with a previous order is an
insufficient basis for reconsideration.”
Davis, 2014 WL 2468348,
at *3 n.4 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
3
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff does not argue that there has been an
intervening change of controlling law, or that new evidence has
come to light.
See Tierney, 2013 WL 1858585, at *1.
Instead he
argues that: (1) he “presented cogent arguments and evidence” as
to why venue is proper and transfer would create manifest
injustice; and (2) he should not be penalized for his counsel’s
failure to provide persuasive legal authority.
Motion for Reconsideration at 2.]
[Mem. in Supp. of
The Court finds that neither
of these arguments warrant reconsideration of the 7/21/14 Order.
As SAMS argues, Plaintiff spends nearly the entire
memorandum in support of the Motion for Reconsideration rehashing
the same legal and factual arguments he made in his opposition to
the Motion to Dismiss and at the hearing, based on the same
evidence.
[Mem. in Opp. at 7, 9.]
In essence, Plaintiff simply
disagrees with the Court’s analysis and conclusions, which does
not provide a valid basis for reconsideration.4
See Davis, 2014
WL 2468348, at *3 n.4.
Plaintiff does present a new document, titled
4
Further, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument made in
his reply that “Plaintiff’s Motion [for Reconsideration] is
substantively unopposed, and should be granted.” [Reply at 2-3
(some citations omitted) (citing Local Rule 56.1(g)).] The Court
already rejected these arguments so SAMS’s failure to address
each detailed point that Plaintiff makes in this second go-round
is of no moment.
4
“Certificate of Appreciation for Service,” purportedly given to
him by SAMS for his service as Southern California Sub-Region
Director.
[Reply, Decl. of Donald J. “Skip” Riley, Jr., Exh. A.]
He argues that this shows that Plaintiff has “reliable knowledge
regarding SAMS’s business practices,” and therefore Plaintiff’s
declaration in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss should have
been given due weight.
[Reply at 7-8.]
The Court, however,
considered Plaintiff’s declaration and gave it due weight.
Based
on it, the Court found that there was “a genuine dispute as to
whether SAMS had a mentorship program in Hawai`i, held a meeting
in Hawai`i, and distributed its directory of members in Hawai`i.”
7/21/14 Order, 2014 WL 3579651, at *5.
The Court concluded that,
“[e]ven if these facts were true, . . . they are insufficient to
support a finding that SAMS purposefully availed itself of
Hawai`i for Plaintiff’s contract claims.”
Id.
More generally, Plaintiff appears to argue (without
legal citation), see Mem. in Supp. of Motion for Reconsideration
at 4 n.1, that the Court applied the wrong standard in weighing
the evidence.
The Court rejects this argument.
It weighed the
evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, and concluded that there was no
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over SAMS in Hawai`i.
See, e.g., 7/21/14 Order, 2014 WL 3579651, at *5 (“the Court
finds that Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine dispute that SAMS
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
5
business in Hawai`i”), *6 (“Since there is no dispute of material
fact as to whether the Court has general or specific jurisdiction
over SAMS, the Court FINDS that SAMS is not a Hawai`i resident
for venue purposes.”).
Plaintiff’s attempt to reiterate the same
arguments based on the same purported contacts does not change
the fact that he has not made “a prima facie showing of
jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.”
Mavrix
Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir.
2011) (citation omitted).
Regarding Plaintiff’s newly presented cases, the Court
finds that they do not support the claim made at the hearing that
he has a property interest in his SAMS membership sufficient to
create venue in this district.
In Caruth v. International
Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59 F.3d 126, 127 (9th Cir. 1995), the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Contrary to
Plaintiff’s position, Caruth does not recognize a property right
in Caruth’s membership in the International Psychoanalytic
Association (“IPA”).
Rather, the Ninth Circuit based its
decision on its conclusion that the IPA had purposefully availed
itself of California, in part by expressly aiming at California
in making “site visits in California[.]”
Id. at 128.
The
opinion does not support the point made at the hearing regarding
a property interest, or provide a basis for the Court to
6
reconsider its conclusion that a “‘substantial part of property
that is the subject of the action is situated’ in Hawai`i.”5
7/21/14 Order, 2014 WL 3579651, at *6 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(2)).
Similarly, the Court finds that the New Jersey and
Rhode Island state cases – which found that association expulsion
decisions may warrant judicial review in certain cases since
memberships “may create a property interest,” Cipriani Builders,
Inc. v. Madden, 912 A.2d 152, 158 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2006), or “a contract in the nature of a property right,” King v.
Grand Chapter of Rhode Island Order of E. Star, 919 A.2d 991, 996
(R.I. 2007) – do not support Plaintiff’s request for
reconsideration of the 7/21/14 Order.
Since Plaintiff does not demonstrate compelling
“reasons why the court should reconsider its prior decision” or
“set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature,” see
Davis, 2014 WL 2468348, at *2, the Court DENIES the Motion for
Reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration of Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
5
Plaintiff now appears to argue that Caruth, and the two
others, see infra, support one of the factors in the
reasonableness analysis instead. [Mem. in Supp. of Motion for
Reconsideration at 12.] For similar reasons, the Court also
finds they provide little support for that argument.
7
Defendant Society of Accredited Marine Surveyors, Inc.’s Motion
to Dismiss Complaint Filed March 17, 2014; and Transferring the
Case to the Middle District of Florida, filed August 1, 2014, is
HEREBY DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, September 25, 2014.
/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge
DONALD J. “SKIP” RILEY, JR. VS. SOCIETY OF ACCREDITED MARINE
SURVEYORS, INC.; CIVIL 14-00135 LEK-RLP; ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT SOCIETY OF ACCREDITED MARINE
SURVEYORS, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FILED MARCH 17,
2014; AND TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
8
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