Statum v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 50

OPINION AND ORDER affirming the Commissioner's decision. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. Signed by Magistrate Judge Monte C. Richardson on 2/27/2017. (ADM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
KIMBERLY C. STATUM,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:14-cv-1297-J-MCR

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
________________________________/
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s appeal of an administrative
decision denying her applications for a Period of Disability, Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Plaintiff alleges she
became disabled on January 14, 2008. (Tr. 13, 34.) A hearing was held before
the assigned Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on November 15, 2012, at which
Plaintiff was represented by an attorney. (Tr. 27-53.) The ALJ found Plaintiff not
disabled from January 14, 2008 through December 12, 2012, the date of the
decision.2 (Tr. 10-21.)
In reaching the decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had “the following
severe impairments: degenerative joint disease, Hepatitis C, bipolar disorder,
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The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States
Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 40, 41.)
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Plaintiff had to establish disability on or before March 31, 2012, her date last
insured, in order to be entitled to a Period of Disability and DIB. (Tr. 13.)

gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), asthma, and alcohol abuse.” (Tr. 15.)
The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform a reduced range of light work, limiting Plaintiff, inter alia, “to simple
routine work tasks involving up to 3-step commands with only occasional
judgment and decision making and no more than occasional interaction with the
general public, coworkers, and supervisors.” (Tr. 18.)
Plaintiff is appealing the Commissioner’s decision that she was not
disabled from January 14, 2008 through December 12, 2012. Plaintiff has
exhausted her available administrative remedies and the case is properly before
the Court. The undersigned has reviewed the record, the briefs, and the
applicable law. For the reasons stated herein, the Commissioner’s decision is
AFFIRMED.
I.

Standard of Review

The scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841
F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether the Commissioner’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390
(1971). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir.
2004). Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence,
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the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary
result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937
F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th
Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into
account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d
835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating the court must scrutinize the entire record to
determine the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s factual findings).
II.

Discussion

Plaintiff argues that although the ALJ indicated he was giving “significant
weight” to the examining opinions of Lauren Lucas, Ph.D. and the non-examining
opinions of Theodore Weber M.Div., Psy.D. and Susan Shapiro, Ph.D., the ALJ
did not adopt these opinions and failed to explain why he was not adopting these
opinions in assessing the RFC. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did
not adopt these doctors’ opinions that Plaintiff would have difficulty getting along
with supervisors, and the opinions of Dr. Weber and Dr. Shapiro that Plaintiff
would have difficulty accepting criticism from supervisors. In other words, Plaintiff
argues that by limiting her to occasional interaction with supervisors, the ALJ did
not account for the limitations assessed by Drs. Lucas, Weber, and Shapiro,
because the amount of time she can interact with supervisors is wholly different
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from the ability to get along with supervisors or accept criticism from them.
Defendant responds, in relevant part:
Although Plaintiff maintains that the doctors’ opinions required
more significant limitations in social functioning than found by the
ALJ, the doctors merely stated that Plaintiff “would likely have
difficulty in sustaining appropriate relations among coworkers and
supervisors, particularly if she would feel slighted” (Tr. 394)
(emphasis added) and “[w]ould be able to cooperate and be socially
appropriate but would have difficulties accepting criticism from
supervisors” (Tr. 398, 455) (emphasis added). Thus, at most, these
doctors opined that Plaintiff would have “difficulties,” which the ALJ
acknowledged and incorporated into the RFC by limiting Plaintiff to
no more than occasional interaction with others (Tr. 17, 18, 19, 394,
398, 455). The doctors did not opine, as Plaintiff appears to
advocate, that she was precluded from social interactions, or that
she was significantly or markedly restricted from interacting with
others (Tr. 394, 398, 455). Instead, the doctors’ opinions speak for
themselves quite plainly, and they merely stated that Plaintiff would
have “difficulties” (Tr. 394, 398, 455). The ALJ consider[ed],
evaluated and weighed these opinions and incorporated them into
the RFC determination (Tr. 18).
(Doc. 47 at 9-10.)
The Court agrees with Defendant. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the
RFC to perform a reduced range of light work, limiting Plaintiff, inter alia, “to
simple routine work tasks involving up to 3-step commands with only occasional
judgment and decision making and no more than occasional interaction with the
general public, coworkers, and supervisors.” (Tr. 18.) In making this finding, the
ALJ gave “significant weight” to the opinions of Drs. Lucas, Weber, and Shapiro.
(Tr. 19.) The ALJ stated:
[O]n March 29, 2011, the State physician, Theodore Weber, M.Div.,
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Psy.D., concluded that the claimant may have difficulty accepting
criticism from supervisors but can otherwise engage in limited though
appropriate social interaction with others based on her moderate
social functioning limitations (Exhibits 7F-8F). Because this opinion
is consistent with the substantial evidence and considers the
claimant’s alleged social deficits, it is entitled to significant weight.
...
[O]n April 26, 2011, after interviewing the claimant and reviewing her
mental health, the psychiatric examiner, Lauren E. Lucas, Ph.D.,
opined that the claimant “appears psychologically competent to
perform routine repetitive task[s]” but would “likely have difficulty
sustaining appropriate relations among coworkers and supervisors,
particularly if she would feel slighted” (Exhibit 6F at page 5).
Similarly, the State agency psychological consultants, Theodore
Weber, M.Div., Psy.D. and Susan Shapiro, Ph.D. collectively opined
that the claimant can still complete simple tasks and would have
improved functioning if she abstained from using alcohol and illicit
substances (Exhibits 7F-8F, 12F). Because each of these opinions
is based on a thorough review of the claimant’s medical records and
consider the occupational impact of the claimant’s mental
impairments and alleged symptoms over time, the undersigned gives
them significant weight in the disability analysis.
(Tr. 17, 19.)
As shown above, the ALJ adequately considered the opinions of Drs.
Lucas, Weber, and Shapiro, and his decision is supported by substantial
evidence. On April 26, 2011, Dr. Lucas performed a mental consultative
examination, opining, inter alia, that Plaintiff “would likely have difficulty in
sustaining appropriate relations among coworkers and supervisors, particularly if
she would feel slighted.” (Tr. 394.) On April 29, 2011, Dr. Weber completed a
Mental RFC Assessment, assessing several moderate limitations, including a
moderate limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to accept instructions and respond

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appropriately to criticism from supervisors. (Tr. 396-98.) In the Functional
Capacity Assessment portion of the Mental RFC, Dr. Weber opined that Plaintiff
“[w]ould be able to cooperate and be socially appropriate but would have
difficulties accepting criticism from supervisors.” (Tr. 398.) On July 24, 2011, Dr.
Shapiro affirmed Dr. Weber’s opinions “as they are written.” (Tr. 455.)
The ALJ incorporated these doctors’ opinions in the RFC assessment and
the hypothetical question to the VE by limiting Plaintiff to “no more than
occasional interaction with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors” (Tr.
18, 49-50). See Weaver v. Colvin, Case No. 3:13-cv-337, 2014 WL 4793947, *18
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2014) (“The ALJ appropriately accommodated for a moderate
limitation in ability to interact with co-workers and supervisors by limiting
[claimant] to only occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors.”) (citing
Brassfield v. Colvin, Case No. 4:11-cv-847, 2013 WL 1345644 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 2,
2013)); Whitfield v. Colvin, Case No. 1:13-cv-199-MP-CAS, *11 (N.D. Fla. June
27, 2014) (“Consistent with the evidence, the ALJ accounted for Plaintiff’s
moderate difficulties in social functioning and regarding his concentration,
persistence, or pace by including, among other factors, in his hypothetical
question to the vocational expert that Plaintiff ‘mentally would be limited to simple,
routine, repetitive tasks; concentrate and persist for two hour segments; would be
limited to occasional changes in the work setting, and occasional interactions with
the public, coworkers and supervisors . . . .’”); Vantuyl v. Colvin, 985 F. Supp. 2d
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880, 892 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (finding that the ALJ accounted for, inter alia,
moderate limitations in the ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately
to criticism from supervisors, by limiting claimant to no more than brief, superficial
(not intense, frequent, or constant) social interaction with co-workers,
supervisors, or the general public); see also Washington v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 503
F. App’x 881, 883 (11th Cir. Jan. 15, 2013) (per curiam) (“The ALJ took account
of Washington’s moderate limitations in social functioning by asking the VE a
hypothetical question that included the restriction that Washington was limited to
jobs that involved only occasional interaction with the general public and
coworkers, a limitation that evidence supported.”); Stokley v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 2013 WL 4049526, *13 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 2013) (“Dr. Wax concluded
Plaintiff would have difficulty working around most people, which the ALJ
accounted for in her decision by limiting Plaintiff to occasional interaction with the
public, her supervisor, and coworkers.”).
III.

Conclusion

The Court does not make independent factual determinations, re-weigh the
evidence, or substitute its decision for that of the ALJ. Thus, the question is not
whether the Court would have arrived at the same decision on de novo review;
rather, the Court’s review is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are
based on correct legal standards and supported by substantial evidence. Based
on this standard of review, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision that
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Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act for the
time period in question is due to be affirmed.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1.

The Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

2.

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment consistent with this Order,

terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, on February 27, 2017.

Copies to:
Counsel of Record

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