Aviles v. Crawford et al
Filing
48
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 42 Motion for summary judgment, granting with respect to Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief and dismissing the claim for injunctive relief as moot; denying 42 Motion for summary judgment in all other respects. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 5/16/2016. (LDO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
LUIS AVILES,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:14-cv-1485-J-39JBT
OFFICER CRAWFORD, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Luis Aviles, an inmate of the Florida penal system,
is proceeding in this action on a pro se Amended Civil Rights
Complaint (Amended Complaint) (Doc. 5) filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
The Defendants are Officers Crawford and Wright.
Court will construe the pro se Amended Complaint liberally.
The
In
doing so, the Court finds that Plaintiff raises the following
claims.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Crawford and Wright
violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment when they used unnecessary and excessive force
on March 8, 2014 at the Reception and Medical Center (RMC).
As
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and
injunctive relief.
This cause is before the Court on Defendants' Partial Motion
for Summary Judgment (Defendants' Motion) (Doc. 42).1
Plaintiff
was advised of the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56, notified that the granting of a motion to dismiss or a motion
for summary judgment would represent a final adjudication of this
case which may foreclose subsequent litigation on the matter, and
given an opportunity to respond. See Summary Judgment Notice (Doc.
43) & Order (Doc. 7).
Plaintiff responded.
See Plaintiff's Reply
to Defendants' Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Response) (Doc.
46).
II. Plaintiff's Allegations in the Amended Complaint
In his verified Amended Complaint,2 Plaintiff alleges that
before breakfast at RMC,
on March 8, 2014, Defendants Wright and
Crawford spoke to him in an abusive and profane manner and then
slammed him against the laundry room door. Amended Complaint at 5.
When Plaintiff requested to speak to the captain on duty, Defendant
Crawford told Defendant Wright to open the laundry room door.
Id.
Defendant Crawford pulled Plaintiff into the laundry room and
1
The Court will refer to the exhibits appended to Defendants'
Motion as "Ex."
2
See Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 F. App'x 948, 950 (11th Cir.
2014) (per curiam) (citations omitted) ("The factual assertions
that [Plaintiff] made in his amended complaint should have been
given the same weight as an affidavit, because [Plaintiff] verified
his complaint with an unsworn written declaration, made under
penalty of perjury, and his complaint meets Rule 56's requirements
for affidavits and sworn declarations.").
2
flipped him to the ground.
Id.
kicked
was
Plaintiff
while
he
Defendants Crawford and Wright
on
the
ground.
Id.
at
5-6.
Plaintiff got up and asked them if it took both of them to assault
him, and in response, Defendant Crawford slapped Plaintiff in the
face and said, "I'll get five more guys and kill you."
Id. at 6.
During the morning, Plaintiff called his family and told them
about the incident, and they, in turn, called the institution. Id.
No one came to see Plaintiff and no investigation was done.
Id.
On March 10, 2014, Plaintiff declared a mental health emergency so
he
could
see
his
mental
health
counselor,
Mrs.
Davis.
Id.
Plaintiff told Mrs. Davis about the incident, and she notified her
supervisor. Id. Plaintiff was taken for a pre-confinement medical
examination, and the medical staff observed bruises on Plaintiff's
hand, torso, and left knee.
Id.
He was sent for x-rays.
Plaintiff was placed in confinement under investigation.
provided a written statement.
Id.
Id.
Id.
He
On March 18, 2014, Plaintiff
was transferred back to Jefferson Correctional Institution (JCI).
III. Summary Judgment Standard
The Eleventh Circuit set forth the summary judgment standard.
Summary judgment is proper when "there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The
substantive law controls which facts are
material and which are irrelevant. Raney v.
Vinson Guard Service, Inc., 120 F.3d 1192,
1196 (11th Cir. 1997).
Typically, the
nonmoving party may not rest upon only the
allegations of his pleadings, but must set
3
forth specific facts showing there is a
genuine issue for trial. Eberhardt v. Waters,
901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990). A pro
se plaintiff's complaint, however, if verified
under 28 U.S.C. § 1746, is equivalent to an
affidavit, and thus may be viewed as evidence.
See Murrell v. Bennett, 615 F.2d 306, 310 n.5
(5th
Cir.
1980).
Nevertheless,
"[a]n
affidavit or declaration used to support or
oppose a motion must be made on personal
knowledge."
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
56(c)(4).
"[A]ffidavits based, in part, upon information
and belief, rather than personal knowledge,
are insufficient to withstand a motion for
summary judgment." Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d
1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005).
As we've emphasized, "[w]hen the moving
party has carried its burden under Rule 56[],
its opponent must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts . . .
Where the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'"
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348,
89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "[T]he mere existence
of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue
of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Unsupported, conclusory
allegations that a plaintiff suffered a
constitutionally
cognizant
injury
are
insufficient to withstand a motion for summary
judgment.
See Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d
1530, 1532–34 (11th Cir. 1990) (discounting
inmate's claim as a conclusory allegation of
serious injury that was unsupported by any
physical evidence, medical records, or the
corroborating
testimony
of
witnesses).
Moreover, "[w]hen opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court
4
should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary
judgment."
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
Howard v. Memnon, 572 F. App'x 692, 694-95 (11th Cir. 2014) (per
curiam) (footnote omitted).
In an action involving the alleged
violation of a plaintiff's federal constitutional rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, "assuming all facts in the light most favorable to
[plaintiff, as the non-moving party]," summary judgment is properly
entered in favor of a defendant where "no genuine issue of material
fact exist[s] as to whether [plaintiff]'s constitutional rights
were violated."
McKinney v. Sheriff, 520 F. App'x 903, 905 (11th
Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
IV. Defendants' Motion
Defendants contend that they are entitled to partial summary
judgment because: (1) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for
injunctive
relief,
and
(2)
Plaintiff
is
compensatory, punitive, or emotional damages.
at 1.
not
entitled
to
Defendants' Motion
Exhibits are appended to Defendants' Motion, including the
Inmate Movement/Transfer History for Plaintiff; the Incident Report
written by Mrs. Davis concerning the March 8, 2014 incident; the
Declaration of Albert Carl Maier, M.D., Senior Physician for the
Florida Department of Corrections (DOC), and Plaintiff's relevant
DOC medical records; and excerpts of the Deposition of Luis Aviles.
The Incident Report, written by Ta-Tanisha Davis, states that
Plaintiff reported that on March 8, 2014, between six and seven in
5
the morning, he was brought into the laundry room by Officer
Crawford, pushed against the wall, and then, when on the ground,
was
kicked
by
Officer
Crawford
in
the
torso
area.
Ex.
B.
Plaintiff also reported that when he got up off of the floor,
Defendant Crawford threatened to get other officers and kill
Plaintiff.
Id.
Plaintiff said that Officer Wright stood by and
watched this incident.
Id.
The Supervisor's Comment in the Report states the following:
"Inmate Aviles, Luis, DC# L23877 was escorted to Urgent Care by
Lieutenant S. Crawford and given a Medical Assessment by LPN K.
Bracewell with the following injuries noted, Swollen area to right
side 4th and 5th Metacarpal, Left Knee Swollen, and right ribcage
and midsternum swollen and misshapen." Id. The Major referred the
matter to the Inspector's Office for further disposition.
Id.
The Declaration of Dr. Maier is also appended to Defendants'
Motion.
Ex. C.
Dr. Maier attests that once Plaintiff complained
of abuse, Dr. Marie Garcon thoroughly assessed Plaintiff condition
on March 10, 2014, and noted Plaintiff's complaint of right hand
pain, left knee pain, and right rib pain.
Id. at 1.
Dr. Maier
attests that Dr. Garcon documented that Plaintiff's right hand and
left
knee
were
swollen
and
his
chest
area
was
swollen
and
misshapen. Id. Dr. Maier further notes that Dr. Garcon ordered xrays of Plaintiff's right hand, left knee, and chest.
No other treatment was given.
Id.
6
Id. at 2.
Dr. Maier states that all of
the x-rays were negative for acute injury.
Id.
Dr. Maier also
noted that Plaintiff had knee pain prior to the alleged abuse. Id.
Dr. Maier points out that Plaintiff made no other complaints of
injury.
Id.
Upon review, Defendants provided a March 5, 2014 Back Pain
Protocol attached to the Affidavit that mentions a swollen knee
joint, but it does not state whether it is Plaintiff's right or
left knee that was swollen on that date.
Id. at 4.
In addition,
Defendants present the Emergency Room Record for Plaintiff dated
March 10, 2014.
Id. at 11-12.
It is a record of alleged staff
abuse examination after a physical altercation.
Id. at 11.
The
nurse, K. Bracewell, LPN, is the signed Health Care Provider on the
Emergency
Room
Record
form.
Id.
She
noted
that
Plaintiff
complained of pain in the right hand, left knee, and right ribcage.
Id.
Her examination summary noted the swollen right hand and
swollen left knee.
Id.
She further documented that the right
ribcage and midsternum were swollen and misshapen.
She also
Id.
checked the form that Dr. Garcon was notified.
Id.
Nurse
Bracewell checked the form that treatment was provided, and she
described the treatment as x-rays to right hand, left knee, and
chest.
Id.
She also completed a Diagram of Injury, documenting
and describing Plaintiff's injuries.
Id. at 12.
The staff
signature on the Diagram of Injury is again Nurse Bracewell.
7
Id.
The
x-ray
effusion."
of
the
Id. at 16.
left
knee
showed
"a
large
knee
joint
The chest x-ray showed no evidence of acute
injury, and the right hand x-ray also showed no evidence of acute
injury.
Id. at 17-18.
In the excerpt from Plaintiff's Deposition, he testified that
the nurse checked his hand, and it was swollen.
Ex. D at 9-10.
He
reported that the nurse checked his torso and noticed bruises and
swelling.
Id. at 10.
knee was swollen.
Id.
He also said the nurse noted Plaintiff's
He attested that the nurse told the doctor,
and the doctor ordered x-rays.
Id.
Plaintiff said that after the
x-rays were taken, he was placed in administrative confinement.
Id.
He noted that he did not seek further treatment and was
transferred to JCI the following week.
Id.
Plaintiff stated that
he had swelling and bruises as a result of the use of force, and he
indicated that he was in pain for a couple of days and took
Ibuprofen.
Id. at 11-12.
V.
Plaintiff
provides
He also said he was sore.
Id.
Plaintiff's Response
exhibits
showing
that
he
filed
both
informal and formal grievances and administrative appeals with
regard to the incident.3
Plaintiff's Exhibit A.
He also provides
additional relevant documents, including the Emergency Room Record,
3
The Court will refer to the exhibits attached to the
Response as "Plaintiff's Exhibit."
8
Diagram of Injury, and Radiology Reports.
Plaintiff's Exhibits D
& E.
VI. Law and Conclusions
A.
Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff is no longer confined at RMC.
for injunctive relief is moot.
Therefore, his claim
See Defendants' Motion at 8-9.
Thus, Defendants' Motion is due to be granted in this regard.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)
"The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
In considering an
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, [the Court] must consider
both
a
subjective
and
objective
component:
(1)
whether
the
'officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind,' and
(2) 'if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to
establish a constitutional violation.'" Tate v. Rockford, 497 F.
App'x 921, 923 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1822
(2013).
In both Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment
excessive force claims, whether the use of
force violates an inmate's constitutional
rights "ultimately turns on 'whether force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore
discipline
or
maliciously
and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm.'" Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 32021, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251
(1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) (establishing the
standard for an Eighth Amendment excessive
9
force claim); see Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d
1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying the
Whitley test in a Fourteenth Amendment
excessive force case).
If force is used
"maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm," then it necessarily
shocks the conscience.
See Brown v. Smith,
813 F.2d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments give
equivalent
protections
against
excessive
force). If not, then it does not.
Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam).
"Although the extent of the injury is a relevant factor in
determining
the
amount
of
force
applied,
it
is
not
solely
determinative of an Eighth Amendment claim." Muhammad v. Sapp, 494
F. App'x 953, 957 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Wilkins v.
Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010)).
When
prison
officials
maliciously
and
sadistically
use
force
to
cause
harm,
contemporary standards of decency always are
violated.
See Whitley, supra, 475 U.S., at
327, 106 S.Ct., at 1088. This is true whether
or
not
significant
injury
is
evident.
Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit
any physical punishment, no matter how
diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some
arbitrary quantity of injury. Such a result
would have been as unacceptable to the
drafters of the Eighth Amendment as it is
today.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
The standard in an excessive use of force case is as follows:
[O]ur core inquiry is "whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore
discipline,
or
maliciously
and
sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v.
10
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117
L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). In determining whether
force
was
applied
maliciously
and
sadistically, we look to five factors: "(1)
the extent of injury; (2) the need for
application of force; (3) the relationship
between that need and the amount of force
used; (4) any efforts made to temper the
severity of a forceful response; and (5) the
extent of the threat to the safety of staff
and inmates[, as reasonably perceived by the
responsible officials on the basis of facts
known to them]..." Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d
1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotations
omitted).[4] However, "[t]he Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
necessarily
excludes
from
constitutional
recognition de minimis uses of physical force,
provided that the use of force is not of a
sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind."
Hudson,
112
S.Ct.
at
1000
(quotations
omitted).
McKinney v. Sheriff, 520 F. App'x 903, 905 (11th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam).
In their Motion, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not
suffered an injury sufficient to withstand 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)
with respect to Plaintiff's claim for compensatory, punitive, or
emotional damages.
Defendants' Motion at 9-14.
The Eleventh
Circuit, in Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531-32 (11th Cir.
2002),
cert.
denied,
540
U.S.
1112
(2004),
addressed
requirements of 1997e(e):
Subsection (e) of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e
states that "[n]o Federal civil action may be
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for
4
See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986).
11
the
mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical
injury." This statute is intended to reduce
the number of frivolous cases filed by
imprisoned plaintiffs, who have little to lose
and excessive amounts of free time with which
to pursue their complaints.
See Harris v.
Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 976-79 (11th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (surveying the legislative history
of the PLRA). An action barred by § 1997e(e)
is barred only during the imprisonment of the
plaintiff; therefore, such action should be
dismissed without prejudice by the district
court, allowing the prisoner to bring his
claim once released and, presumably, once the
litigation cost-benefit balance is restored to
normal. Id. at 980.
Tracking the language of the statute, §
1997e(e) applies only to lawsuits involving
(1) Federal civil actions (2) brought by a
prisoner (3) for mental or emotional injury
(4) suffered while in custody. In Harris, we
decided that the phrase "Federal civil action"
means
all
federal
claims,
including
constitutional claims. 216 F.3d at 984-85.
After Plaintiff reported that he had been abused by staff, he
was sent to the DOC Emergency Room. Once there, Plaintiff reported
to the nurse that he was in pain.
The record shows that upon
examination, Plaintiff had visible injuries.
The examining nurse
noted that Plaintiff had a swollen right hand and swollen left
knee.5
The nurse also recorded that Plaintiff's right ribcage and
5
Plaintiff had a pre-existing knee problem, but Plaintiff
claims the left knee swelling was caused or aggravated by the use
of force. Also, based on the medical record provided to the Court,
it is not entirely clear which knee had previously caused Plaintiff
pain. See Ex. C at 4. Also of import, the Radiology Report of the
left knee references large joint effusion, an increased amount of
fluid that may be caused by trauma.
Ex. C at 16; Plaintiff's
12
midsternum were swollen and misshapen.
The nurse recorded that
the treatment provided was x-rays to the right hand, left knee, and
the chest.
Upon being contacted about Plaintiff's injuries, the
doctor ordered x-rays.
Plaintiff stated he suffered pain, took
Ibuprofen, and was sore.
Under these circumstances, the Court is
not inclined to bar Plaintiff's claim for compensatory, punitive
and emotional damages or limit his recovery to nominal damages with
regard to his claim of excessive force.
Defendants' Motion is due
to be denied in this regard.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED:
Defendants' Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 42) is
GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief
against
Defendants
Crawford
and
Wright,
injunctive relief is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
and
the
claim
for
In all other respects,
Defendants' Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 42) is
DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 16th day of
May, 2016.
Exhibit E.
13
sa 5/16
c:
Luis Aviles
Counsel of Record
14
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