Sanders v. John C. Green et al

Filing 145

ORDER granting, in part, and denying, in part, 129 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 128 Defendants Lim, Perry, Bridges, Meeks, Randle and Murphy's Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 144 Defendants' Motion f or Leave to File a Reply Memorandum; dismissing certain Defendants (with directions to Clerk); referring case to the Jacksonville Division Civil Pro Bono Appointment Program (with directions to Clerk); and staying and administratively closing case for 90 days. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 3/14/2018. (JW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER SANDERS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:14-cv-1493-J-34PDB

JOHN C. GREENE, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Christopher Sanders, an inmate of the Florida penal
system, initiated this action on December 15, 2014, by filing a
Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He
filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 28) on August 26, 2016, and a
Second Amended Complaint (SAC; Doc. 97) on August 9, 2017. In the
SAC, Sanders names the following individuals as Defendants: (1)
John C. Greene; (2) Charles P. Richter; (3) John A. Coates; (4)
Brandon Stratton; (5) Hope Gartman; (6) Christopher Landrum; (7)
Philip E. Davis;1 (8) Nancy Crawford; (9) Thomas Wainwright; (10)
Thomas North; (11) Jeffrey Beasley; (12) Michael Crews; (13) Brad
A.

Howard;

(14)

Cindy

Meeks;

(15)

Chase

Markham;

(16)

Chad

Robertson; (17) Markus Jackson; (18) Arthur Riegel III; (19) Walter
1

The Court dismissed Davis on August 17, 2017. See Order
(Doc. 100).

Mock; (20) Daniel Russell; (21) D.P. Capen; (22) C. Lim; (23) J.O.
Perry; (24) Angela Bridges; (25) Bryan Williamson; (26) Robert
Lamberson; (27) Jeremy Powe; (28) C. Murphy; and (29) V. Randle.
Sanders asserts that the Defendants violated his First, Fourth, and
Eighth Amendment rights when they retaliated against him for filing
grievances and reporting the injustices to his mother, maliciously
searched his cell, used excessive force against him, and denied him
proper medical treatment. As relief, Sanders requests compensatory
and punitive damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Beasley, Howard,
North, Crawford, Greene, Markham, Mock, Richter, Riegel, Robertson,
Russell, Wainwright, Powe, Lamberson, Jackson, Gartman, Crews,
Landrum,

Capen,

Coates,

Stratton

and

Williamson's

Motion

for

Summary Judgment (Motion; Doc. 129) and Defendants Lim, Perry,
Bridges, Meeks, Randle and Murphy's Motion for Summary Judgment
(Motion II; Doc. 128). They submitted exhibits in support of their
requests for summary judgment. See Def. Exs. A-QQ; Doc. 127-1.2 The
Court advised Sanders of the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, notified him that the granting of a motion to dismiss
or

a

motion

for

summary

judgment

would

represent

a

final

adjudication of this case which may foreclose subsequent litigation

2

With the Court's permission, see Order (Doc. 138), the
Defendants filed three digital video discs (videos) under seal, see
Defendants' Exhibits to Be Filed Under Seal (Doc. 140); Notice
(Doc. 139); Def. Exs. T; AA; BB.
2

on the matter, and gave him an opportunity to respond to the
motions. See Summary Judgment Notice (Doc. 133); Order Directing
Service of Process Upon Defendants; Notice to Plaintiff; Special
Appointment

(Doc.

Declaration

in

30)

at

Opposition

4-5,
to

¶

10.

Sanders

Defendants'

responded.

Motion

for

See

Summary

Judgment (Response; Doc. 137) with exhibits (P. Ex.); Declaration
in Opposition to Medical Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
(Response II; Doc. 141). Defendants' motions are ripe for judicial
review.
II. Plaintiff's Allegations3
In his verified SAC,4 Sanders asserts that he was housed in
the inpatient mental health transitional care unit in H dormitory
at Suwannee Correctional Institution (SCI). See SAC at 10, ¶ 1. He
states that, on February 16, 2014, he submitted a grievance and
asserted that Dr. Lim and the multi-disciplinary services team
refused "to give [him] a mental health level in hopes that [he]
would go off so they could jump on [him] with the cell extraction
team." Id. at ¶ 2. According to Sanders, after he filed the

3

The facts recited here are drawn from the verified SAC and
may differ from those that ultimately can be proved.
4

See Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 F. App'x 948, 950 (11th Cir.
2014) (citations omitted) ("The factual assertions that [Plaintiff]
made in his amended complaint should have been given the same
weight as an affidavit, because [Plaintiff] verified his complaint
with an unsworn written declaration, made under penalty of perjury,
and his complaint meets Rule 56's requirements for affidavits and
sworn declarations.").
3

grievance, Greene instructed him that he should stop writing
grievances

and

stop

having

his

mother

call

the

prison's

administration, and if he did not, Greene "had ways of making [him]
stop." Id. at 10-11, ¶ 3.
Sanders asserts that, on April 11, 2014, Richter told him that
he, Richter, would put Sanders on property restriction on the
following day because he "was putting as many blacks on strip
(property restriction) as he could." Id. at 11, ¶ 4. Sanders states
that Riegel gave him a telephone, so he called his mother and told
her about Richter's plan. See id. at ¶ 5. According to Sanders, on
April 12th, his mother called and informed the administration about
Richter's plan. See id. at ¶ 6. He avers that, on that same day,
Richter, Stratton, Coates and another officer came to his cell, and
Richter told Sanders that his mother could not "save" him by
contacting the administration. Id. at ¶ 7. Sanders asserts that,
after that, Stratton refused to feed him lunch and dinner and told
him that he was complying with Richter's directives. See id. at ¶
8. He declares that Stratton commented that if it was his decision,
he would summon "the five biggest Mother fu**ers and run in
[Sanders'] cell and beat [his] ass." Id. Sanders states that
Richter directed Riegel to place Sanders on property restriction
"to make up for Sgt. Riegel giving Sanders the phone and to make it
look like Sgt. Richter had nothing to do with it." Id. at ¶ 9.
Sanders maintains that Riegel wrote a false disciplinary report

4

(DR) against Sanders for misuse of state property, forced Sanders
to sleep on a steel bunk, and confiscated Sanders' clothing and
personal property to cover up his "maliciously placing Sanders on
property restriction." Id. at 13, ¶ 10.
According to Sanders, on April 15th, he submitted an emergency
grievance to Warden Landrum, who said he forwarded it to Inspector
Beasley; however, no one interviewed Sanders, and nothing was done
to remedy the misconduct. See id. at ¶ 11. Sanders asserts that, on
April 17th, he informed Dr. Lim about the April 12th abuse, but she
neither filed an incident report nor informed the administration.
See id. at ¶ 12. He states that after speaking with Dr. Lim,
Stratton escorted him back to his cell and told him that "it was
just a matter of time" before he and Richter "fu** his black ass
up." Id. at ¶ 13. Sanders maintains that he tried to inform
Assistant Warden Mock, but Mock told him he "better get off the
door before he has him put on property restriction." Id. at ¶ 14.
Sanders avers that he complained to his mother, who spoke with
Assistant Warden Gartman on April 18th; and Gartman directed
Lieutenant Woods to escort Sanders to the medical clinic for Nurse
Murphy to check him. See id. at ¶¶ 15, 16, 17.
Sanders asserts that, on April 18th, Crawford came to his cell
and told him they were going to "break" him of his "little habits"
(writing grievances). Id. at ¶ 18. According to Sanders, that same
day, Crawford directed Robertson and Capen to take Sanders out of

5

his cell, search his cell, and place him on property restriction;
they would have summoned the cell extraction team if Sanders had
not yelled at the handheld camera that he was not refusing to exit
his cell. See id. at 14, ¶¶ 19, 20. He states that Landrum reviewed
the camera footage, but "did not do anything to help Sanders." Id.
at ¶ 21. Sanders declares that, on April 20th, he told Gartman
about what had transpired on April 12th with Richter and Stratton
and with Crawford, Robertson and Capen on April 18th. See id. at ¶
22. According to Sanders, Gartman told him "they kick ass" at SCI,
and

that

Sanders

was

"lucky"

she

did

not

oversee

the

cell

extraction team when he initially refused to be seen by the medical
staff on April 18th. Id.
Sanders maintains that, on April 21st, Richter and Greene
placed a magnet over his window to try to get him to "go off" or
declare a mental health emergency so they could pull him out of his
cell and "jump on him in the blind spot in the hallway." Id. at ¶
23. According to Sanders, when he refused to "go off," Greene and
Richter acted like Sanders had his vent covered and told him that
the camera "sees me pointing at your vent and telling you to
uncover your vent[,] that's three more days on strip fu** boy." Id.
at 14-15, ¶ 24. Sanders states that Richter then wrote a false DR
against him to keep him on property restriction. See id. at 15, ¶
25.

6

According to Sanders, on April 24th, Greene and Crawford used
the cell extraction team to "jump on" him. Id. at ¶ 26. Sanders
asserts that an inmate yelled to him that Greene and Crawford "were
suiting up the cell extraction team," so he tied up his property in
a sheet and stored it under his bunk. Id. at ¶ 27. He states that,
when the cell extraction team arrived, he yelled to the camera that
he was not refusing to exit and that he wanted to submit to hand
restraints;

nevertheless,

the

cell

extraction

team

proceeded

anyway. See id. at ¶ 28. He avers that Greene refused to open the
food flap and permit him to submit to hand restraints and told the
camera that Sanders was refusing to "cuff up." Id. at ¶ 29. Sanders
describes what transpired when the cell extraction team (Powe,
Jackson, Russell, Williamson, and Lamberson) initially tried to
enter his cell.
[Sanders] squeezed his body past them and fell
on the floor outside of his cell because [he]
knew from watching Lt. Greene use the cell
extraction team on other inmates that if he
didn't get out [of] the cell they were going
to jump on him because the fixed wing camera
couldn't see what they were doing inside the
cell and the officer with the handheld camera
would point it at Lt. Greene's back so that
what they were doing wouldn't be caught on
camera.
Id. at ¶ 30. Sanders states that Williamson "pinned [him] down"
with a shield on the floor outside the cell. Id. at ¶ 31. He
recalls that he screamed to the handheld camera that he was outside
his cell and not resisting the officers. See id. He asserts that

7

Jackson and another officer grabbed his legs and pulled him back
into the cell, and then punched, kicked, and twisted his legs and
arms, while Lamberson, Powe, Williamson and Russell hit him in the
back, legs, ribs and arms. See id. at 15-16, ¶ 32. Sanders contends
that Jackson grabbed his left hand, dislocated Sanders’ left thumb,
and then popped it back into place; he screamed to the camera about
what Jackson had done. See id. at 16, ¶ 32. He maintains that,
although he was not resisting, Greene continued to yell "stop
resisting" to cover up the misconduct. Id. at ¶ 33. He alleges
that, after Greene "felt they had done enough damage," they placed
restraints on him and escorted him to the nurses station where he
complained to Nurse Perry about his swollen, bruised left thumb and
chest pains. Id. at ¶¶ 34, 35. Sanders states that Perry never
documented his injuries and told him that the corrections officers
should have broken his thumb. See id. at ¶ 35. Sanders notes that,
after Perry's examination, officers escorted him to cell 3112 in H
dormitory. See id. at ¶ 36. According to Sanders, from April 25th
through May 11th, Greene directed Coates to give Sanders an "air
diet" (empty food trays). Id. at ¶ 37.
Sanders asserts that, on April 28th, when he submitted a sick
call form, Nurse Bridges refused to have him pulled from his cell
in an effort to cover up the injuries he had suffered on April
24th.

See id. at ¶ 38. According to Sanders, from April 28th

through May 17th, when he submitted several sick call forms,

8

Bridges and Murphy refused to have officers escort him to the
medical clinic. See id. at ¶ 39. He states that when he gave
Bridges a sick call form on May 7th, she "ripped it up right in
front of [him]." Id. at ¶ 40. He recalls that he submitted a
grievance on May 9th, and was seen on May 17th; however, the
swelling of his thumb had lessened, and the bruise was almost
completely gone. See id. at ¶ 39. He states that, when he appealed
the grievance related to Bridges and Murphy, he never got a
response, only copies of the original grievance he filed. See id.
at ¶ 41.
Sanders complains that, on May 5th, he spoke with Assistant
Warden Gartman and told her about: Greene and Crawford using the
cell extraction team to "jump on" him; Richter, Stratton, and
Coates refusing to feed him; and Greene directing Coates to place
empty trays in his food box. Id. at 16-17, ¶ 42. He states that
Gartman told him that she did not care, and it would be in his best
interest to tell his mother to stop calling the administration. See
id. at 17, ¶ 43. According to Sanders, after Gartman left Sanders'
cell, Coates continued to put empty trays in his food box until
Sanders' mother called the office of the Florida Department of
Corrections (FDOC) Secretary Crews and filed a complaint. See id.
at ¶ 44. He asserts that Greene told him that Coates would continue
to give him empty food trays until he stopped writing grievances.
See id. at ¶ 45.

9

Sanders alleges that, on May 11th, Coates "crept" to his cell
when he thought Sanders was asleep, and called Richter on his radio
to tell him to meet him there. Id. at ¶ 46. Sanders states that he
jumped up when he heard Coates on the radio, and ran to his cell
door. See id. According to Sanders, Coates told him that he,
Coates, was going to enter the cell and "fight him one on one," but
Sanders "had to play like he was non-responsive," so Coates could
enter. Id. Sanders recalls that he told Coates he would neither
play non-responsive nor allow Coates or anyone else to enter his
cell. See id. Additionally, he states that Richter came to his cell
and asked if he was non-responsive. See id. at ¶ 47. Sanders
asserts that, when he told Richter he was "not non-responsive,"
Richter said that he "will be," told Coates to stay at Sanders'
cell, and then walked away. Id. Next, Sanders avers that when Nurse
Murphy came to his cell to check on his status and saw that he was
responsive, she told him "to stop playing like that." Id. at ¶ 48.
He recalls that he informed her that Richter and Coates were lying,
and that he "was not playing." Id. According to Sanders, Coates was
"mad" he could not "jump on" him, and therefore told Sanders that
he would feed him at lunch only if he "played non-responsive," so
Coates could enter his cell. Id. at 17-18, ¶ 49. Sanders maintains
that he again told Coates that he was "not playing non-responsive."
Id. at 18, ¶ 49.

10

Sanders asserts that, later on the same day, Stratton told him
that he was "lucky" Nurse Murphy had visited his cell "being nosey"
because he, Richter, and Coates were going to enter his cell and
beat him until he was "unrecognizable." Id. at ¶ 50. He states that
Richter later came by his cell and told him that, if he exited his
cell, they would "do him" like they (North, Davis, Coates, and
Richter) had done with inmate King Davis (#L42132) a few days
earlier in the blind spot outside of H dormitory's wing three. Id.
at ¶ 51. Sanders alleges that North came to his cell and told him
"he was going to set it up" so they could "jump on" him. Id. at ¶
52. Sanders avers that, on the same day, he submitted an emergency
grievance to Warden Landrum and a grievance to FDOC Secretary
Crews, see id. at ¶ 53, and complained that his life was in danger
because Coates, Stratton, Greene, and Richter planned to assault
him in the blind spot outside of H dormitory's wing three, but
Landrum and Crews "did nothing to protect him," id. at 23, ¶ 85.
Sanders

maintains

that

he

received

an

FDOC

response

to

his

grievance only after Richter, Stratton, Coates, Markham, North,
Wainwright, and Greene had assaulted him on May 20, 2014. See id.
at 18, ¶ 53.
According

to

Sanders,

on

May

20th,

Coates

and

Stratton

informed him that he had to leave his cell for a tuberculosis shot.
See id. at 18, ¶ 54. Sanders asserts that when he refused, Stratton
advised him that Assistant Warden Gartman said he had to exit his

11

cell for a shot. See id. Sanders avers that he remembered that
Gartman had told him on May 5th that he must exit his cell for
call-outs, and if he refused to leave for a tuberculosis shot, they
could use the cell extraction team to remove him from the cell, and
therefore, he turned around and submitted to hand restraints. See
id. He avers that Stratton placed hand restraints on him, opened
the cell door, grabbed his arm, and "started squeezing it really
hard." Id. at 18-19, ¶ 55. Sanders recalls that he "could feel
Stratton shaking as he gripped [his] arm" while they waited for the
control booth officer to open the door. Id. at 19, ¶ 55. Sanders
describes what transpired when they entered the blind spot outside
of H dormitory. See id. at 19, ¶ 56.
Stratton tripped and slam[m]ed Sanders on the
floor really hard, then Sgt. Richter and Ofc.
Coates ran over and started punching, kicking
and hitting Sanders in the legs, arms and back
while Stratton squat[t]ed in front of Sanders
and started banging Sanders['] head against
the floor until he busted Sanders['] right eye
open and then started hitting him in the arms,
legs, and back while Lt. Greene stood by
watching Stratton, Coates, and Richter beating
Sanders.
Id.
He states that, after the beating, Richter told Coates: "you
know he's going to write us up for this," and Coates replied: "I
ain't worried [because] he has a house on the streets [and] I'll
kill his whole family if I get fired." Id. at ¶ 57. Sanders
maintains that, when an officer arrived on the scene with a camera,

12

he yelled into the camera what had happened. See id. at ¶ 58.
Sanders admits that he spat on Coates during an escort to the
nurses station, see id. at ¶ 59, and received a DR for battery, see
id. at 22, ¶ 84, but explains that he did so
when out of fear, anger, and mental and
emotional distress Sanders turned and spit at
Ofc.
Coates
because
he
was
squeezing
[Sanders'] injured arm.
Id. at 19, ¶ 59. Sanders recalls that Cortese and Coates also
slammed him on the floor. See id. at ¶ 60. He asserts that they
escorted him to the nurses station where Nurses Randle and Jane Doe
documented his injuries, called "the emergency area," and advised
Sanders that he needed stitches near his right eye and x-rays on
his shoulder. Id. Sanders avers that Greene placed him in a holding
cell where he had the camera "cut off" instead of escorting Sanders
directly to the emergency clinic. Id. at 19-20, ¶ 62. Sanders
states that Richter came to the holding cell and told him that "it
wasn't over yet and he was going to pay for spitting on Ofc.
Coates." Id. at 20, ¶ 63. He asserts that Richter, Wainwright,
Markham and Stratton, "but I'm not sure[,]" went into the office
across from the holding cells and "conspired" against him to decide
who would jump on him the next time. Id. at ¶ 64. Sanders alleges
that Nurse Randle exited the nurses station and said: "They [are]
going to kick your ass." Id. at ¶ 65. He maintains that he asked
Randle for help, but she replied that she had nothing to do with

13

it, went into the records room across from the nurses station, and
closed the door. See id. at ¶ 66.
Next, Sanders avers that Davis and Wainwright removed him from
the holding cell, escorted him outside, walked at a fast pace,
pulled him "to make it look like he was resisting," slammed him
down on the concrete sidewalk, and hit him while he was restrained.
Id. at ¶ 67. Sanders describes what transpired during the escort.
Due to the spit shield that was placed on
Sanders, he could not see who was doing what
but he knows it was Lt. North, Sgt. Richter,
Ofc. Davis, Ofc. Wainwright and Ofc. Markham
who [were] hitting him and Ofc. Markham was
twisting and bending Sanders['] fingers and
wrist while he was in restraints.
Markham continued to twist and bend Sanders[']
fingers and wrist as Markham and Ofc. Cortese
walked Sanders back into the H dorm and the
nurses station with a different use of force
camera watching Plaintiff Sanders.
Id. at ¶¶ 68, 69. Sanders states that, while in the nurses station,
he tried to tell Nurse Randle and Nurse Jane Doe about his
injuries, but North told Sanders to "shut the f**k up or he was
going to kick [Sanders'] teeth out," so "out of fear" he stopped
telling the nurses about his injuries. Id. at ¶ 70. Sanders alleges
that “a Captain Sanders” entered the nurses station, and advised
North "to do everything right because he wasn't trying to get
fired" due to "one of Greene's fu** ups." Id. at 21, ¶ 71. Sanders
avers that he was taken to "the emergency area" where Nurse
Sap-Edwards and an unknown doctor gave him two stitches in his

14

right eyebrow. Id. at ¶ 72. According to Sanders, upon return to
his cell in full restraints (shackles, handcuffs, black box, and
waist chains), North ended the use of force video. See id. at ¶ 73.
Sanders maintains that Greene, Richter, and Markham later arrived
at his cell and removed the restraints. See id.
According to Sanders, after "an undetermined amount of time,"
Greene, Richter, and Davis told him "to cuff up," so they could
escort him for x-rays on his shoulder. Id. at ¶ 74. He recalls that
when he told Greene it would hurt to move his arm behind his back,
Greene told him that he "didn't give a f**k and either [he] put his
arm behind his back or he was refusing the x-rays." Id. Sanders
states that he succumbed to handcuffing because "he really needed
the x-rays." Id. at ¶ 75. He asserts that, during the escort to G
dormitory for x-rays, Greene advised him that "if he stopped
writing

grievances[,]

it

was

all

over[,]

but

if

he

got

one

grievance about what had just taken place[,] it was going to start
all over again." Id. at ¶ 76. Sanders alleges that, when Greene
looked at the x-rays, he said "we broke that mother fu**er good."
Id. at ¶ 77. Sanders avers that when Richter escorted him to an
ambulance

that

ultimately

delivered

Sanders

to

Jacksonville

Memorial Hospital (JMH), Richter told him that he "was done for
now[,] but when Sanders got back from the hospital he [(Richter)]
was going to finish what he had started but next time Sanders was
going to be life flighted." Id. at 22, ¶ 78.

15

Sanders

asserts

that

JMH

medical

staff

performed

a

computerized axial tomography (CAT) scan and took additional x-rays
on his hands and right arm, and recommended that he have surgery
the next day. See id. at ¶ 79. Sanders declares that he stayed at
JMH from May 20th until May 23rd, and was discharged without having
the recommended surgery. See id. at ¶ 80. According to Sanders, the
FDOC housed him with a broken arm at the Reception and Medical
Center (RMC) from May 23rd until July 14th, and Dr. Robert J.
Kleinhans, M.D. recommended him for surgery on June 29th. See id.
at ¶ 81. He alleges that the bone in his right arm healed
improperly, and therefore, on July 14th, Dr. Kleinhans "had to
rebreak" his arm and place pins, screws, and a rod in the bone so
it would heal properly. Id.
Sanders declares that he submitted an emergency grievance to
FDOC Secretary Crews and informed him about what had occurred at
SCI. See id. at ¶ 82. The FDOC denied his grievance, and E. Stine
responded that the subject of the grievance was under review. See
id. Additionally, Sanders states that he submitted a grievance to
Inspector General Beasley on July 14th, and E. Stine responded that
when an incident is reported to the Inspector General, it is no
longer a grievance issue. See id. at ¶ 83.
According to Sanders, on December 8th, he saw "a portion" of
the May 20th use of force video depicting Nurse Jane Doe giving him
a shot after "the second use of force" that day. Id. at 23, ¶ 88.

16

Sanders contends that although the video also shows him being
escorted back to cell H3112 before being placed in the holding cell
across from the officers' office, he does not recall being escorted
back to cell H3112 before being placed in that holding cell. See
id. at ¶¶ 89, 90. As such, he maintains that Inspector Brad Howard
manipulated the use of force video to start when Sanders was
already on his feet after Richter, Coates, and Stratton had jumped
on him. See id. at ¶ 91.
III.

Summary Judgment Standard

The Eleventh Circuit set forth the summary judgment standard.
Summary judgment is proper when "there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The substantive
law controls which facts are material and
which are irrelevant. Raney v. Vinson Guard
Service, Inc., 120 F.3d 1192, 1196 (11th Cir.
1997). Typically, the nonmoving party may not
rest upon only the allegations of his
pleadings, but must set forth specific facts
showing there is a genuine issue for trial.
Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th
Cir. 1990). A pro se plaintiff's complaint,
however, if verified under 28 U.S.C. § 1746,
is equivalent to an affidavit, and thus may be
viewed as evidence. See Murrell v. Bennett,
615 F.2d 306, 310 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980).
Nevertheless, "[a]n affidavit or declaration
used to support or oppose a motion must be
made on personal knowledge." Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)(4). "[A]ffidavits based, in part, upon
information and belief, rather than personal
knowledge, are insufficient to withstand a
motion for summary judgment." Ellis v.
England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005).
As we've emphasized, "[w]hen the moving
party has carried its burden under Rule 56[],
17

its opponent must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts ... Where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party, there
is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d
538 (1986). "[T]he mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties
will
not
defeat
an
otherwise
properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue
of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Unsupported, conclusory
allegations that a plaintiff suffered a
constitutionally
cognizant
injury
are
insufficient to withstand a motion for summary
judgment. See Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d
1530, 1532–34 (11th Cir. 1990) (discounting
inmate's claim as a conclusory allegation of
serious injury that was unsupported by any
physical evidence, medical records, or the
corroborating
testimony
of
witnesses).
Moreover, "[w]hen opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court
should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary
judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380,
127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
Howard v. Memnon, 572 F. App'x 692, 694-95 (11th Cir. 2014) (per
curiam) (footnote omitted); Hinkle v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc.,
827 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2016).
At the summary judgment stage, the Court views all facts in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the non-moving party, and
draws all inferences in Plaintiff's favor. See McKinney v. Sheriff,
520 F. App'x 903, 905 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). "[T]he dispute

18

about a material fact is genuine . . . if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Hinkle,

827

F.3d

at

1300

(internal

quotations

and

citation

omitted). Summary judgment should be granted "against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate
only if, under Sanders' version of the facts, "there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Felio v. Hyatt, 639 F. App'x 604, 606
(11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
IV. Law and Conclusions
A. Eighth Amendment Excessive Use of Force
and Failure to Intervene
Sanders asserts that Defendants Greene and Crawford used the
cell

extraction

team

(Defendants

Powe,

Jackson,

Russell,

Williamson, and Lamberson) to forcibly remove him from his cell on
April 24, 2014. See SAC at 15-16, ¶¶ 30-32. Defendants contend that
the use of force that day "was necessary . . . to seek compliance
with

an

order,"

and

the

video

evidence

disputes

Sanders'

assertions. Motion at 21-22 (citing Def. Exs. F; N; O; P; Q; R; S;
T). Sanders also alleges that the Defendants assaulted him on May
20, 2014, during three related incidents involving (1) Defendants
19

Stratton, Richter, and Coates in the blind spot outside of H
dormitory, as Defendant Greene watched, see SAC at 19, ¶ 56; (2)
Defendant Coates after Sanders spat on him, see id. at ¶¶ 59, 60;
and (3) Defendants North, Richter, Wainwright, and Markham outside
of H dormitory, see id. at 20, ¶¶ 68, 69. Defendants state that
"the first use of force [on May 20th] occurred as a spontaneous use
of force which became necessary for Defendant Stratton to maintain
control of [Sanders] when [he] attempted to break his grasp."
Motion at 23 (citing Def. Exs. D; X). As to the second use of force
incident, Defendants contend that "[t]he video shows that [Coates]
use[d] no more force than necessary to hold [Sanders] until a spit
shield was obtained." Id. at 24 (citing Def. Exs. Z; AA). With
regard to the third incident, Defendants claim that Officer Davis,
with the assistance of Defendant Wainwright, took down and secured
Sanders who was "belligerent" during an escort, and Defendant
Markham thereafter assisted with the escort. Id. (citing Def. Exs.
CC; QQ).
With respect to the appropriate analysis in an excessive use
of force case, the Eleventh Circuit has explained.
[O]ur core inquiry is "whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore
discipline,
or
maliciously
and
sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117
L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). In determining whether
force
was
applied
maliciously
and
sadistically, we look to five factors: "(1)
the extent of injury; (2) the need for
application of force; (3) the relationship
20

between that need and the amount of force
used; (4) any efforts made to temper the
severity of a forceful response; and (5) the
extent of the threat to the safety of staff
and inmates[, as reasonably perceived by the
responsible officials on the basis of facts
known to them]..." Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d
1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotations
omitted).[5] However, "[t]he Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
necessarily
excludes
from
constitutional
recognition de minimis uses of physical force,
provided that the use of force is not of a
sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind."
Hudson,
112
S.Ct.
at
1000
(quotations
omitted).
McKinney v. Sheriff, 520 F. App'x 903, 905 (11th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam). "When considering these factors, [courts] 'give a wide
range

of

deference

to

prison

officials

acting

to

preserve

discipline and security, including when considering decisions made
at the scene of a disturbance.'" Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d
1212, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Cockrell v.
Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007)).
"The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de
minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is
not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Hudson v.
McMillian,

503

U.S.

1,

9-10

(1992)

(internal

quotations

and

citations omitted). Indeed, not "every malevolent touch by a prison
guard gives rise to a federal cause of action." Id. at 9 (citation

5

See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986).
21

omitted). "While a lack of serious injury is relevant to the
inquiry, '[i]njury and force . . . are only imperfectly correlated
and it is the latter that ultimately counts.'" Smith v. Sec'y,
Dep't of Corr., 524 F. App'x 511, 513 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010)). "A prisoner may
avoid summary judgment, 'only if the evidence viewed in the light
most

favorable

to

him

goes

beyond

a

mere

dispute

over

the

reasonableness of the force used and will support a reliable
inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.'" Stallworth v.
Tyson, 578 F. App'x 948, 953 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Brown v.
Smith, 813 F.2d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir. 1987)).
Moreover, "an officer can be liable for failing to intervene
when another officer uses excessive force." Priester v. City of
Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 924 (11th Cir. 2000); Ensley v.
Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1407–08 (11th Cir. 1998). This liability,
however, only arises when the officer is in a position to intervene
and fails to do so. See Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 764
(11th Cir. 2010); see also Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272,
1290 n.21 (11th Cir. 2011); Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d
724, 740 n.25 (11th Cir. 2010) ("Because the relevant events
happened so quickly, the record does not reflect any point at which
[the officer] could have intervened to prevent [another officer's]
use of excessive force . . . .").

22

1. April 24, 2014 Cell Extraction
Sanders asserts that Defendants Greene and Crawford summoned
the cell extraction team to forcibly remove him from his cell on
April 24th. See SAC at 15-16, ¶¶ 30-32. The Defendants submitted a
video under seal that shows the extraction team's removal of
Sanders from his cell. See Def. Ex. T. The video depicts the
extraction team's involvement over a period of less than ten
minutes, and the team's removal of Sanders from his cell in less
than three minutes. See id. As shown on the video, the following
events transpired.
On

April

24th,

at

11:07

a.m.,6

Defendant

Greene,

as

a

supervisor, introduced Officer Mario Coronado, the operator of the
handheld camera, who announced the same date and the time as 11:08
a.m. See id. Greene read the reasons for summoning the cell
extraction team for assistance: Sanders created a disturbance and
refused to submit to hand restraints for a cell movement; Housing
Sergeant Patten counseled Sanders and ordered him several times to
cease his disruptive actions and submit to hand restraints; Greene
also made several attempts to counsel Sanders and ordered him
numerous times to cease his unruly actions and submit to hand
restraints, to no avail; all reasonable efforts to control Sanders
were exhausted, and all efforts to counsel him failed; the need to

6

Throughout the video, Defendant Greene and Officer Coronado
use their wrist watches to announce the passage of time because the
camera does not have its own time display. See Def. Ex. T.
23

remove Sanders from the cell continued to exist; and Major Geiger
was contacted and authorized "an organized use of force cell
extraction" if necessary to overcome Sanders if he continued to
resist a lawful order. Id.
Additionally, Greene asked the team members to introduce
themselves and describe their responsibilities. See id. Defendant
Powe, the first team member, stated that he would enter the cell
first and use a shield and his body weight to immobilize Sanders by
pinning him to a wall, floor, or bed while protecting other team
members.

See

id.

Defendant

Jackson,

the

second

team

member,

explained that he would push the first team member into the cell,
control Sanders' upper extremities, and assist the third team
member with handcuffing. See id. Defendant Russell, the third team
member, announced that he would push the second team member into
the cell, control Sanders' upper extremities, place Sanders' arms
behind his back, apply handcuffs, and signal that Sanders' hands
were cuffed by announcing "cuffs on." Id. Defendant Williamson, the
fourth team member, explained that he would push the third team
member into the cell, control Sanders' lower extremities, and
assist the fifth team member in placing leg irons on Sanders. See
id. And, Defendant Lamberson, as the fifth man, declared that he
would push the fourth team member into the cell, control Sanders'
lower extremities, apply leg restraints to Sanders' ankles, and

24

then signal that his legs were cuffed by stating "leg irons on."
Id.
Next, Greene gave the extraction team detailed instructions:
"use extreme caution" because Sanders may have a weapon and use his
mattress to keep the team from entering the cell,7 and use only the
minimal amount of force necessary to overcome his resistance. Id.
With Greene leading, all five team members marched to Sanders' cell
as Sanders repeatedly yelled that he was willing to submit to
cuffing. See id. As they arrived at the cell front, Greene gave
Sanders a final opportunity to submit to cuffing and then announced
that Sanders refused his directive to "turn around" to submit to
handcuffing. Id. When the team began to enter the cell, Sanders
exited the cell and lay on the floor in the outer hallway. See id.
As Greene ordered Sanders to move back into the cell, the team
pushed Sanders back inside. See id. Greene signaled and directed
the cameraman to follow him, so the cameraman could film the entire
extraction without hindrances. See id. Sanders yelled that he was
ready to submit to cuffing, yet retreated underneath his bunk. See
id. Greene repeatedly directed Sanders to put his hands behind his
back, stop resisting the cell extraction team, get out from
underneath the bunk, and cease his disorderly conduct. See id. The
team pulled Sanders out from underneath his bunk; Defendant Powe

7

See Def. Ex. N, DR, Log No. 230-140703 ("I then observed
Inmate Sanders use his state issued mattress to block the door of
the cell."), dated April 24, 2014.
25

placed his knee on Sanders' back and used his body weight to pin
Sanders to the floor, as the other team members applied the hand
and leg restraints. See id.
In a use of force report narrative, Defendant Powe states:
[Sanders] failed to comply with [the] final
order to submit to hand restraints for the
purpose of a cell relocation. The cell
extraction team utilized force to bring inmate
Sanders into compliance with orders given.
Upon cell H2-211 being cycled [the] inmate
charged the cell extraction team and I then
redirected him to the floor in the doorway of
the cell utilizing the non-electric shield to
which [the] inmate continued to attempt to
pull himself out of the cell. I was instructed
to pull inmate Sanders back into the cell for
restraints to be applied. Once inmate Sanders
was back in the cell he broke my grasp and
pulled himself under the bunk. I then assisted
in pulling inmate Sanders from under his bunk
and placed my knee in his back and utilized my
body weight to pin him to the floor and
assisted placing his hands behind his back,
while restraints were being applied to him by
the other team members with the minimal amount
of force necessary.
Def. Exs. P; S, Declaration of Jeremy Powe (Powe Declaration). The
other team members provide similar accounts of what transpired
during the cell extraction, how Sanders charged the team, attempted
to pull himself out of the cell into the outer hallway, broke
Powe's grasp, and pulled himself under his bunk. See Def. Exs. R,
Declaration of Markus Jackson (Jackson Declaration); O, Declaration
of Daniel Russell (Russell Declaration); Amended Notice of Filing

26

Exhibit Q (Doc. 132), Def. Ex. Q, Declaration of Robert Lamberson
(Lamberson Declaration).8
Additionally, Defendants Greene and Powe provided detailed
accounts in the Incident Report. Powe stated, in pertinent part:
Inmate Sanders charged the cell door and
attempted to defeat the cell extraction team
by forcing his way out of the cell to which I
redirected him to the floor utilizing the nonelectronic
shield.
Inmate
Sanders
also
attempted to impede the forced cell extraction
by blocking the doorway of his cell with his
state issued bed mattress and personal
property. Due to Inmate Sanders being in the
doorway of the cell I was instructed to pull
him back into his cell. Subsequent to clearing
the doorway Inmate Sanders defeated my grasp
and climbed under the bunk. Once Inmate
Sanders was removed from under the bunk I
placed my knee in his back and pinned him to
the floor utilizing my body weight. I then
assisted Officers M. Jackson and D. Russell by
placing [the] Inmate's hands behind his back
while restraints were being applied, using
only the minimal amount of force necessary.
Inmate Sanders ceased all disruptive behavior
subsequent to the cell extraction team
applying hand and leg restraints, and all
force by me ceased at this time.
Def. Ex. P, Incident Report. As a supervisor, Greene provided the
following narrative:
Inmate Sanders did state that he would comply
with orders to submit to restraint[s] but
refused all orders to turn around and put his
hands behind his back and took a defensive
stance. Upon the cell door being opened Inmate
Sanders charged the cell extraction team and
attempted to exit his cell but was redirected
to the floor by Sergeant Powe. Inmate Sanders

8

Defendant Williamson did not provide a declaration.
27

continued to attempt to exit his cell by
pulling himself out of the cell. I then
instructed the cell extraction team to pull
Inmate Sanders back into his cell so that
restraints could be safely applied due to the
cell being on the upper floor. Subsequent to
clearing the doorway Inmate Sanders defeated
the cell extraction team's grasp and climbed
under the bunk. Inmate Sanders was removed
from under the bunk but refused all orders to
place both his hands behind his back and
continued to hold on to the bunk with his
right hand. Once restraints [were] applied
Inmate Sanders was escorted to the H-Dorm
treatment room . . . .
Id.;

see

Def.

Ex.

F,

Declaration

of

John

Greene

(Greene

Declaration). Notably, Defendant Crawford was not present at the
incident, see Def. Ex. T, and was not involved in counseling
Sanders or authorizing the cell extraction, see Def. Exs. P; see
also

Def.

Ex.

I,

Declaration

of

Nancy

Crawford

(Crawford

Declaration).
It is undisputed that the extraction team pinned Sanders down
with a shield on the floor outside the cell, and then pulled him
back into the cell. See SAC at 15, ¶¶ 31, 32; Greene, Russell,
Lamberson, Jackson, and Powe Declarations. The Defendants explain
that Sanders "was pulled back into the cell for restraints to be
applied."

Greene,

Russell,

Lamberson,

Jackson,

and

Powe

Declarations. Sanders asserts that he "squeezed his body" past the
extraction team and "fell on the floor outside of his cell" because
he wanted the fixed wing camera in the outer hallway to capture the
incident. SAC at 15, ¶ 30. According to Sanders, he believed the

28

officer holding the handheld camera would point it at Greene's
back, and therefore fail to film the forced extraction inside the
cell. See id. Contrary to Sanders' belief, Greene signaled to
Officer Coronado to follow him inside the cell, so Coronado could
film the extraction without obstruction. See Def. Ex. T. The video
shows that, while inside the cell, Greene stepped to the side,
looked back at Coronado to ensure the camera had an unobstructed
view, and never stepped in front of the camera to block its view.
See id.
The video evidence is reliable, and provides a chronology of
how the incident unfolded. The video does not show any extraction
team members or Greene hitting, kicking, or punching Sanders. See
id. Rather, it depicts that the five extraction team members pulled
Sanders out from underneath his bunk and secured his hands and legs
for restraints, with minimal force, as Greene closely watched and
supervised. See id. Following Greene's directives, the team carried
out "an organized use of force cell extraction" that was necessary
to secure Sanders since he continued to resist lawful orders to
submit to restraints. Id.
Given the evidence submitted by Defendants, the Court finds
they have met their initial burden of showing, by reference to
declarations and video evidence, that appropriate and minimal force
was used against Sanders. Thus, Sanders is required to present
evidence to show that there is a genuine issue for trial; he has

29

not done so. If this case were to proceed to trial, Sanders would
have only his testimony to support his claims. He has not presented
any evidence to refute the Defendants' evidence. All the exhibits
submitted by Defendants support their position that the cell
extraction of Sanders was necessary, and only minimal force was
used.
Notwithstanding the ease with which a prisoner can make an
excessive force claim, in many excessive force cases the competing
testimony of the prisoner and the correctional officers can be
enough to defeat summary judgment. However, both the Supreme Court
and the Eleventh Circuit have recognized that summary judgment is
appropriate in certain scenarios even if there are conflicting
versions of events.
[W]hen "opposing parties tell two different
stories,
one
of
which
is
blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it," a court
should not adopt the contradicted version for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380[9] . . . .
This is so because when the non-movant's
assertion is "so utterly discredited" by the
record, no "genuine" dispute of material fact
exists sufficient to prompt an inference on
behalf of the non-movant. Id.
Singletary v. Vargas, 804 F.3d 1174, 1183 (11th Cir. 2015); see
Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016) ("[W]hen
opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is

9

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
30

blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the
facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment."
(quotations and citation omitted)).
Here,

given

the

strong

and

consistent

testimony

of

the

corrections officers, see Greene, Russell, Lamberson, Jackson, and
Powe Declarations; Def. Exs. P; U, and the reliable video evidence,
see Def. Ex. T, showing that the extraction team, with Greene's
supervision, secured Sanders with minimal force, and the lack of
corroborating evidence to support Sanders' claim, this is the type
of case envisioned by the Supreme Court in Scott, 550 U.S. 372, in
which summary judgment is appropriate. In light of the evidence
presented

by

Defendants

and

Sanders'

failure

to

provide

any

evidence other than his own uncorroborated version, no reasonable
jury could find for Sanders under these circumstances surrounding
the cell extraction. See generally Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d
1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that "to defeat a motion
for summary judgment, [the plaintiff] must adduce specific evidence
from which a jury could reasonably find in his favor; [t]he mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of [his] position
will be insufficient" (quotations and citation omitted)). As such,
Defendants' Motion is due to be granted as to Sanders' Eighth
Amendment claims relating to the April 24th cell extraction against

31

Defendants Greene, Crawford, Powe, Jackson, Russell, Williamson,
and Lamberson.
2. The May 20, 2014 Incidents
As to the first incident on May 20th, Sanders states that
Coates and Stratton advised him that he had to leave his cell for
a tuberculosis shot. See SAC at 18, ¶ 54. He admits that he
initially refused their directive, but states that he then turned
around and submitted to hand restraints. See id. He avers that
Stratton placed hand restraints on him, opened the cell door, and
gripped his arm so "hard" that he could feel him "shaking" as they
waited for the control booth officer to open the door. Id. at 1819, ¶ 55. Sanders states that Stratton tripped and slammed him on
the floor "really hard," when they entered the blind spot outside
of H dormitory. Id. at 19, ¶ 56. According to Sanders, Richter and
Coates punched, kicked, and hit him in the arms, legs, and back,
while Stratton squatted in front of him, banged his head against
the floor until he busted Sanders' right eye, and hit him in the
arms, legs, and back. See id. He alleges that Greene watched as
Stratton, Coates, and Richter beat him. See id.
In the Incident Report (No. 14-6342), Defendant Stratton
provided the following narrative, in pertinent part:
On May 20, 2014 I was assigned as H-Dormitory
Housing Officer. At approximately 10:06 AM I
was escorting Inmate Sanders, Christopher DC
#R24565 solely housed in H3-112 to HDormitory's Medical Triage Room for the
purpose of Medical Call-Out. Upon entering the
32

Vestibule area in H-Dormitory, Inmate Sanders
attempted to escape my custodial grasp. I then
gave Inmate Sanders several verbal orders to
cease his actions to no avail. As a result of
Inmate Sander[s'] actions he was redirected to
the control room wall where he became verbally
and physically combative. Inmate Sanders was
then placed on the ground chest first using
only [a] minimal amount of force necessary to
bring him into compliance with all orders
given. Subsequent to physical force being
utilized I, Officer B. Stratton[,] was
relieved by Officers A. Cortese and J. Coates.
. . .
Def. Ex. X at 5, Incident Report; Notice of Filing (Doc. 142), Def.
Ex. D, Declaration of Brandon Stratton (Stratton Declaration).
Defendants Greene and Coates provide similar accounts and opine
that Stratton used only a minimal amount of force to bring Sanders
into compliance with Stratton's directives. See Greene Declaration;
Def. Ex. Z, Declaration of John Coates (Coates Declaration). Greene
declares that Sanders' assertion that he just stood by and watched
as Stratton, Richter, and Coates beat him is false. See Greene
Declaration. Defendant Richter avers that he was neither involved
in any uses of force with Sanders on May 20th nor watched other
officers beat Sanders. See Def. Ex. E, Declaration of Charles
Richter (Richter Declaration).
Upon review of the record, it appears that the Defendants'
Motion is due to be denied as to the first incident on May 20th.
Given the parties’ conflicting sworn descriptions of the incident,
genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Stratton,
Richter, and Coates used an excessive amount of force upon Sanders,
33

whether Greene watched them do so, and whether the Defendants had
previously threatened Sanders with violence. While Sanders and
Defendant Stratton agree that Stratton used force, the parties
present markedly different accounts regarding whether Stratton used
force in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
applied it maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Sanders
asserts that Defendants Stratton, Richter, and Coates' alleged
assaultive behavior was unnecessary, excessive, and retaliatory and
involved kicking, punching, and hitting. In contrast, Stratton
maintains that he used only necessary force to restore order, bring
Sanders into compliance with his verbal orders, and cease Sanders'
combative behavior. See Stratton Declaration.
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
extent of injury to a plaintiff is a factor that may provide some
evidence of the amount of force applied and whether the use of
force was necessary under the specified circumstances.
This is not to say that the "absence of
serious injury" is irrelevant to the Eighth
Amendment inquiry. Id. at 7, 112 S.Ct. 995.[10]
"[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate
is one factor that may suggest 'whether the
use of force could plausibly have been thought
necessary'
in
a
particular
situation."
Ibid.(quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106
S.Ct. 1078). The extent of injury may also
provide some indication of the amount of force
applied. . . .

10

Hudson, 503 U.S. 1.
34

Injury and force, however, are only
imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter
that ultimately counts. . . .
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37-38 (2010) (per curiam). However,
a court ultimately should decide an excessive force claim based on
the nature of the force used rather than the extent of the injury.
Id. at 38.
As previously stated, Sanders asserts that Stratton banged his
head against the floor until he busted Sanders' right eye. See SAC
at

19,

¶

56.

Notably,

the

video

evidence

submitted

by

the

Defendants starts at 10:08 a.m., and memorializes the second
incident involving Sanders spitting on Coates.11 See Def. Exs. AA;
X at 3 (stating the time on the handheld camera is 10:08 a.m.). As
Coates and Cortese escorted Sanders to the medical clinic after the
first use of force, Sanders turned his head towards Coates to spit.
See Def. Ex. AA. The video captures the right side of Sanders' face
as he turned towards Coates before they forced him to the ground,
and shows that Sanders had a bloody, swollen face just above his
right eye, apparently from the first use of force.12 See id.
Additionally, the video reflects that, when Cortese and Wainwright

11

See Def. Ex. FF, Videotaped Deposition of Christopher
Sanders (Sanders Deposition) at 71 (stating "they cut out
[Greene's] introduction to the use of force because it would have
showed me laying in a puddle of blood").
12

See Def. Ex. X at 12 (documenting a laceration/hematoma over
his right eye, a deformity to his right shoulder, and a busted
lip).
35

lifted Sanders from the floor after placing the spit shield over
his face, there was blood on the floor. See id. The parties offer
significantly different accounts of Stratton's use of force, the
motivation for Stratton's decision to force Sanders to the ground,
and the involvement and motivations of Greene, Richter, and Coates.
On this record, the Court finds that there remain genuine issues of
material fact with respect to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims
relating to the first May 20th incident against Defendants Greene,
Stratton, Richter, and Coates. As such, Defendants' Motion is due
to be denied.13
As to the second incident, Sanders asserts that Defendant
Coates

(along

with

Officer

Cortese

who

is

not

a

Defendant)

"slammed" him on the floor after Sanders turned and spat at Coates.
See SAC at 19, ¶¶ 59, 60. He states that he spat at Coates because
Coates squeezed his injured arm. See id. at ¶ 59. Coates declares,
in pertinent part:
Subsequent to physical force being utilized,
Defendant Stratton was relieved by Officers A.
Cortese and me. . . . Inmate Sanders was
assisted to his feet to continue to the
Medical Triage Room for a post use of force
physical.
While
in
route,
Plaintiff

13

"[B]ecause liability can be imposed upon prison guards who
are present at the scene and who are in a position to intervene but
fail to take reasonable steps to stop excessive force by other
guards," see Clark v. Argutto, 221 F. App'x 819, 826 (11th Cir.
2007), and since Sanders' Eighth Amendment failure to intervene
claim against Greene is closely intertwined with his excessive use
of force claim against Stratton, Richter, and Coates, the Motion
will be denied as to the failure to intervene claim.
36

expectorated on me, striking me in the face
and mouth. Inmate Sanders was then placed on
the ground by Officers A. Cortese and me,
chest first using only the minimal amount of
force necessary. While on the ground, Inmate
Sanders became highly combative and continued
expectorating in my direction, at which time
Officer Cortese and I used our body weight to
control Inmate Sanders. A spit shield was
placed on Inmate Sanders due to his continuing
to expectorate at me. Inmate Sanders was then
escorted to the H-Dorm treatment room and
evaluated by on duty staff, with noted
injuries.
Coates

Declaration.

Defendants

Greene

and

Wainwright

provide

similar accounts of what transpired. See Greene Declaration; Notice
of Filing of Exhibit (Doc. 143), Def. Ex. CC, Declaration of Thomas
Wainwright (Wainwright Declaration). Defendant Stratton provided,
in pertinent part, the following narrative in the use of force
report:
I witnessed Inmate Sanders expectorate in
Officer J. Coates['] direction striking him in
the face and mouth. I then witnessed Officers
Coates and Cortese redirect Inmate Sanders to
the ground chest first, utilizing their body
weight
to
prevent
Inmate
Sanders
from
continuing his assaultive actions. While on
the ground inmate Sanders became highly
combative and continued his assaultive actions
by continuing to expectorate in Officer
Coates' direction. I witnessed Officer T.
Wainwright relieve Officer J. Coates due to
Officer Coates being exposed to bodily fluids,
at which time all force ceased by Officer
Coates. Officer Wainwright placed a spit
shield on Inmate Sanders due to his continuous
assaultive behavior toward staff[.] [O]nce the
spit shield was in place[,] all force ceased
by Officer A. Cortese.

37

Def. Ex. X at 1; see Stratton Declaration. Additionally, Wainwright
provided similar details in an incident report, and stated that he
relieved Coates "due to [Coates'] exposure [to] bodily fluids from
Inmate Sanders expectorating on him and placed a spit shield on
Inmate Sanders due to his continuous assaultive actions on staff."
Def. Ex. X at 9.
Sanders admits, see SAC 19, ¶ 59, and the video evidence
confirms, that he spat at Coates, see Def. Ex. AA. Nevertheless, in
the video, Sanders denied their accusations that he spat. See id.
Additionally, the video evidence shows the following relevant
sequence of events that transpired in less than two minutes (10:08
a.m. until 10:10 a.m.): Sanders turned his head towards Coates and
spat at Coates; Coates and Cortese immediately forced Sanders to
the ground; they used their body weight to steady Sanders and keep
him on the ground; Greene verbally directed Sanders to cease his
disorderly actions, and keep his face turned away from Coates and
Cortese; Sanders stated, "I never spit, sir"; when Cortese had
control of Sanders on the ground, Coates walked away from the
scene; Greene summoned Wainwright to the scene and asked for a spit
shield; Cortese with his gloved hand held Sanders' face down on the
ground until Wainwright arrived with the spit shield; Greene
directed Wainwright to put the spit shield on Sanders; Sanders
repeatedly

said

that

he

had

a

broken

bone

in

his

shoulder;

Wainwright put the spit shield over Sanders' face; Cortese and

38

Wainwright followed Greene's directive to help Sanders to his feet,
leaving a splattering of blood from Sanders' face on the floor;
Greene followed as Cortese and Wainwright escorted Sanders directly
to the H dormitory treatment room; and the cameraman announced the
time as 10:10 a.m. Id.
That same day, Defendant Coates wrote a DR against Sanders for
violation of FDOC Rule 33-601.314, charge 1-11, aggravated assault
or attempted aggravated assault on a correctional officer. See Def.
Ex. DD, Log # 230-140896. Additionally, the State of Florida
criminally charged Sanders with battery for fluids on a corrections
officer, and he pled no contest. See Sanders Deposition at 74. The
state court sentenced Sanders to a term of imprisonment of fifteen
months. See id.; see also http://www.dc.state.fl.us/offenderSearch
(Sanders, Christopher, DC Number R24565).
Defendants assert, and this Court agrees, that there remain no
genuine issues of material fact with respect to the spitting
incident. Given the strong and consistent declarations of the
involved Defendants, as well as those who witnessed the incident,
the reliable video evidence that depicts how the spitting incident
unfolded with a minimal and necessary amount of force, and the lack
of corroborating evidence to support Sanders' claim, this is the
type of case envisioned by the Supreme Court in Scott, 550 U.S.
372, in which summary judgment is appropriate. In light of the
evidence presented by Defendants and Sanders' failure to provide

39

any evidence other than his own uncorroborated version which is
refuted by the video evidence, no reasonable jury could find for
Sanders as to this use of force incident. As such, Defendants'
Motion is due to be granted as to Sanders' Eighth Amendment claims
relating to the second incident against Defendants Greene, Coates,
and Wainwright.
Next, Sanders asserts that there was a third excessive use of
force that same day. He alleges that Defendants North, Richter,
Wainwright, and Markham beat him outside of H dormitory. See SAC at
20, ¶¶ 68, 69; Sanders Deposition at 60, 61. Defendants claim that
Officer Davis, with the assistance of Defendant Wainwright, took
down and secured Sanders who was "belligerent" during the escort,
and Defendant Markham thereafter assisted. Motion at 24. After the
incident, Officer Davis wrote a DR against Sanders for violation of
FDOC 33-601.314, Rules of Prohibited Conduct, 6-1, disobeying a
verbal order. See Def. Ex. EE. In the DR statement of facts, Davis
described what transpired and who was involved.
On May 20, 2014[,] I was assigned to HDormitory
as
a
Housing
Officer
[a]t
approximately 10:34 AM [w]hile escorting
Inmate Sanders, Christopher DC# R24565 from HDormitory to Suwannee Correctional Institution
Main Unit Medical Emergency Room for further
medical treatment after a prior use of force.
During the escort in front of H-Dorm Sanders
became belligerent and attempted to break my
custodial grasp. I gave several verbal orders
to cease his disruptive behavior to no avail.
At this time reactionary physical force was
necessitated to bring inmate Sanders into
compliance. I placed Inmate Sanders chest
40

first on the ground with the assistance of
Officer T. Wainwright utilizing only the
minimal amount of force necessary to bring
Inmate Sanders into compliance. At this time
all force ceased. . . .
Id.

Defendant

investigation,
Wainwright,

North
Officer

Stratton,

approved

the

Horne

listed

Greene,

DR.14
the

Coates,

See

id.

following

and

During

witnesses:

Richter.

Wainwright provides a similar account of what transpired.
While Inmate Sanders was being escorted from
H-Dormitory to the SWCI Main Unit Medical
Emergency Room after a prior (Use of force
14-6342), he became belligerent and attempted
to break his custodial grasp (Use of force
14-6344). Officer Davis gave several orders to
Inmate Sanders to cease his actions, but to no
avail. A reactionary use of force became
necessary to bring Inmate Sanders into
compliance. Officer Davis placed Inmate
Sanders chest first onto the ground, with my
assistance [with] [o]nly the minimal amount of
force necessary to bring Inmate Sanders into
compliance. This was captured on video.
Officers Cortese and Markham can be viewed on
the video maintaining a custodial hold on
Inmate Sanders while he was still on the
ground. Both Officers assisted Inmate Sanders
to his feet and escorted him back into
H-Dormitory and directly into the medical
treatment room. While being escorted back into
H-Dormitory,
Inmate
Sanders
shouted
allegations staff were attempting to break his
wrist. Inmate Sanders was assessed by medical
staff and then escorted from H-Dormitory to
the SWCI Main. Once Inmate Sanders was treated
by the Emergency Room, he was escorted back to
H-dormitory without further incident.

14

Defendant North did not submit a declaration.
41

the

See

id.

Wainwright Declaration. Defendant Richter declares that he was
neither involved in any uses of force with Sanders that day nor
watched any other officers beat Sanders nor threatened Sanders with
any future violence. See Richter Declaration.
The record before the Court reflects a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Defendants North, Richter, Wainwright,
and Markham used excessive force upon Sanders. While Sanders and
the Defendants agree that Officer Davis with the assistance of
Defendant Wainwright used force, the parties present markedly
different accounts regarding whether the force was used in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or was applied
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Sanders asserts that
Defendants

North,

Richter,

Wainwright,

and

Markham's

alleged

assaultive behavior was unnecessary, excessive, and retaliatory and
involved hitting Sanders while he was restrained and still on the
ground. See SAC at 20, ¶¶ 67, 68, 69; Sanders Deposition at 60
(stating that "all of them [were] trying to get their free little
licks in."). In contrast, Defendants Wainwright and Markham state
that Davis and Wainwright used only necessary force to restore
order, bring Sanders into compliance with Davis' verbal orders, and
cease Sanders' combative behavior. See Def. Ex. QQ, Declaration of
Chase Markham (Markham Declaration); Wainwright Declaration. On
this record, the Court finds that there remain genuine issues of
material fact with respect to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims

42

relating to the third use of force incident against Defendants
North, Richter, Wainwright, and Markham. As such, Defendants'
Motion is due to be denied as to Sanders' Eighth Amendment claims
relating to the third incident on May 20th against Defendants
North, Richter, Wainwright, and Markham.
B. Conspiracy
Sanders asserts that, after the spitting incident, Defendants
Richter, Wainwright, Markham, and Stratton, along with Officers
Cortese and Davis, entered an office across from the holding cells
and "conspired" to determine who would be the next officer to jump
on him. SAC at 20, ¶ 64. Defendants state that "[a] review of
Exhibit BB shows that no such meeting occurred." Motion at 25. The
Eleventh Circuit stated:
Conspiring to violate another person's
constitutional rights violates section 1983.
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 101 S.Ct.
183, 186 (1980); Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d
421, 425 (11th Cir. 1988), overruled in part
on other grounds by Whiting v. Traylor, 85
F.3d 581, 584 n.4 (11th Cir. 1996). To
establish a prima facie case of section 1983
conspiracy, a plaintiff must show, among other
things, that the defendants "reached an
understanding to violate [his] rights."
Strength, 854 F.2d at 425 (quotation omitted).
The plaintiff does not have to produce a
"smoking gun" to establish the "understanding"
or "willful participation" required to show a
conspiracy, Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d
463, 469 (11th Cir. 1990), but must show some
evidence of agreement between the defendants.
Bailey v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Alachua
County, 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th Cir. 1992)
("The linchpin for conspiracy is agreement,
which presupposes communication."). For a
43

conspiracy claim to survive a motion for
summary judgment "[a] mere 'scintilla' of
evidence . . . will not suffice; there must be
enough of a showing that the jury could
reasonably find for that party." Walker v.
Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990).
Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283-84 (11th Cir.
2002).
The fixed wing video evidence referenced by Defendants, see
Def. Ex. BB, depicts the escort of Sanders to cell H-3112 after the
spitting

incident,

and

shows

Defendant

Greene

as

he

read

a

statement relating to the "reactionary use of force," see id.; see
also Def. Ex. AA. The fixed wing video concludes at 10:20 a.m. See
Def. Ex. BB. In his deposition, Sanders stated that he did not
recall how long he was left in the cell before the Defendants
returned to pull him out for another escort. See Sanders Deposition
at 59. The third use of force incident began at 10:34 a.m. See Def.
Ex. EE. The fixed wing video evidence does not resolve the issue as
to whether the Defendants met before the third incident, and if so,
whether their meeting was administrative in nature to select the
officers who would escort Sanders without incident or to conspire
about using unnecessary force against Sanders during the next
escort.
In his declaration in response to Defendants' Motion, Sanders
states that Defendants Richter, Wainwright, Markham, and Stratton
went into an office "to figure out who was going to jump on [him]
next." Response at 7, ¶ 58. In his deposition, Sanders stated that
44

he could hear the officers talking about "[w]ho was going to escort
[him] up there to medical and what they wanted them to do." Sanders
Deposition at 59. Also, in response to a question asking what the
Defendants "[said] they wanted to do," Sanders answered
I don't remember specifically. It was
something to the extent of, like, it really
wasn't anything specific, it was something,
like, you already know what time it is. Who is
escorting him.
Id. at 60 (emphasis added). Defendants deny Sanders' assertion that
they conspired after the spitting incident to use unnecessary force
against Sanders. See Richter, Wainwright, Markham, and Stratton
Declarations. Notably, for Sanders' conspiracy claim to survive
Defendants' request for summary judgment, a mere scintilla of
evidence will not be sufficient. Instead, "there must be enough of
a showing that the jury could reasonably find for [Sanders]." See
Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1284 (citation omitted). Sanders has neither
shown that Defendants Richter, Wainwright, Markham, and Stratton
reached an agreement to use unnecessary force against him nor
provided some evidence that a jury could reasonably find for him at
trial. As such, Defendants' Motion is due to be granted as to
Sanders' conspiracy claim against Defendants Richter, Wainwright,
Markham, and Stratton.
C. First Amendment Retaliation
Sanders

states

that

the

Defendants

violated

his

First

Amendment right when they retaliated against him for complaining to

45

his mother and filing grievances about staff abuse and conditions
of confinement. He asserts the following retaliatory acts: (1)
Riegel wrote a false DR on April 12th; (2) Richter and Riegel
unlawfully placed him on property restriction, and forced him to
sleep on a steel bunk without a mattress on April 12th; (3) Capen
wrote two false DRs on April 18th; (4) Capen and Robertson, under
Crawford's direction, unlawfully placed him on property restriction
on April 18th; (5) Robertson used excessive force against him;15 (6)
Richter, Stratton, Greene, and Coates deprived him of several
meals, threatened him with physical violence, and used excessive
force against him; and (7) Gartman and Mock threatened him with
physical violence. See SAC at 10, 25-38. Defendants assert that
Sanders was found guilty of the disciplinary charges based on
sufficient evidence after a hearing on each DR, for which he was
afforded procedural due process of law. As a result, they contend
that Sanders cannot establish a retaliation claim when he violated
FDOC rules, and the disciplinary team found him guilty of the
disciplinary charges due to misconduct, not as a result of his
submission

of

earlier

grievances

and

complaints

about

his

conditions of confinement. See Motion at 13-16.
"The First Amendment forbids prison officials from retaliating
against prisoners for exercising the right of free speech." Farrow
v.

West,

15

320

F.3d

1235,

1248

See SAC at 14, ¶ 20.
46

(11th

Cir.

2003).

"It

is

an

established principle of constitutional law that an inmate is
considered to be exercising his First Amendment right of freedom of
speech when he complains to the prison's administrators about the
conditions of his confinement." Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270,
1276 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1248). An inmate
may maintain a cause of action for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 by showing that a prison official's actions were "the result
of

[the

conditions

prisoner]
of

his

having

filed

imprisonment."

a

grievance

Farrow,

320

concerning
F.3d

at

the
1248

(quotation marks omitted).
As relevant to this action, the Eleventh Circuit set forth the
standard applicable to a First Amendment retaliation case.
To prove First Amendment retaliation, an
inmate must show that: (1) his speech or act
was
constitutionally
protected,
(2)
he
suffered an adverse action from prison
officials that would deter a person of
ordinary firmness from engaging in the speech
or act, and (3) the protected speech or act
and adverse action were causally connected.
Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th
Cir. 2008); see Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d
1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2011) ("An inmate must
establish ... 'his speech or act was
constitutionally
protected....'").
We've
routinely held that a prisoner's complaints
about prison conditions, via administrative
grievances, lawsuits, and the like are
protected under the First Amendment. Smith,
532 F.3d at 1276 (addressing grievances about
the conditions of imprisonment); Al–Amin v.
Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1333–34 (11th Cir. 2008)
(addressing a prison's opening of mail from
attorneys outside the inmate's presence).

47

Hollins v. Samuals, 540 F. App'x 937, 938-39 (11th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam).
Notably, there must be a causal relationship between the
retaliatory action (disciplinary punishment) and the protected
speech (filing grievances). The Eleventh Circuit has addressed an
inmate's claim for retaliation against prison officials in the
disciplinary context.
If a prisoner is found guilty of an actual
disciplinary infraction after being afforded
due process and there was evidence to support
the disciplinary panel's fact finding,[16] the
prisoner cannot later state a retaliation
claim against the prison employee who reported
the infraction in a disciplinary report.
Whether an inmate actually committed the
charged infraction or whether the disciplinary
report
falsely
accuses
the
inmate
are
questions of fact that are decided by the
disciplinary
panel.
In
the
particular
circumstances here, [the plaintiff] has
suffered adverse action (here 30 days'
disciplinary confinement) because he actually
violated the prison rules and not because of
his earlier grievances. To find otherwise
would render the prison disciplinary system
impotent by inviting prisoners to petition the
courts for a full retrial each time they are
found guilty of an actual disciplinary
infraction after having filed a grievance.
Because he was guilty of the disciplinary
charges resulting in the disciplinary harm at
issue, [plaintiff]'s retaliation claim fails.
O'Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (footnote omitted). Thus, an inmate cannot state a claim of

16

See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Superintendent
v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985).
48

retaliation for a disciplinary charge involving a prison rule
infraction when the inmate was found guilty of the actual behavior
underlying that charge after being afforded adequate due process.
See id. at 1215. In other words, there is no causal connection
between a DR and a prisoner's freedom of speech if the disciplinary
action would have been taken regardless of the prisoner's protected
speech. Id. at 1217 (citing Smith, 532 F.3d at 1278, n.22). "Any
possible causal connection between the protected activity (the
grievances) and the harm (the disciplinary charges and sanctions)
is severed since the harm is not in reaction to any protected
activity, but directly due to an improper activity." Id.

at

1219–20.
Sanders asserts that the Defendants retaliated against him for
filing earlier grievances when they fabricated facts underlying
several DRs. He states that Defendant Riegel wrote a DR for misuse
of state property on April 12th.17 He also states that, on that same
day,

Richter

and

Riegel

unlawfully

placed

him

on

property

restriction, and forced him to sleep on a steel bunk without a
mattress. Defendant Riegel provides a declaration in support of his
request for summary judgment, and describes the circumstances that

17

Sanders states that, during "all times relevant to this
case," he was housed in the inpatient mental health transitional
care unit in H dormitory at SCI. SAC at 10, ¶ 1. Undoubtedly,
Sanders "has an extensive history of mental health disorders" that
mental health professionals have evaluated and treated over several
years. See Def. Ex. MM at 2, ¶ 8.
49

led to issuance of the DR and property restriction on April 12th.
On April 12, 2014, at approximately 7:45 pm, I
was assigned as the H-Dormitory Housing
Sergeant. I was conducting showers and cell
searches on Quad #2 of H-Dormitory. I searched
Inmate Sanders cell, H2-211, and found a
fishing line, which appeared to be made from
the thread of a state issued white sheet. I
noticed Inmate Sanders personal property, to
include his personal letters, in complete
disarray under his assigned bunk. I issued
Inmate Sanders a disciplinary report for
violation of Fla. Admin. Code 33-601.314 (7-4)
misuse of state property or property and
failure to maintain his cell.
As a result, [Sanders] was placed on 72-hour
property restriction.
Def. Ex. A, Declaration of Arthur Riegel (Riegel Declaration). As
a result of Sanders' failure to comply with a prison rule, Riegel
wrote a DR for misuse of state property. See Def. Ex. B, DR, Log #
230-140618. The DR statement of facts provides, in pertinent part:
Inmate Sanders will be placed on 72 hour
property restriction to prevent any further
issues. [He] will remain on his current status
pending the disposition of a disciplinary
report hearing.
Id. The DR, worksheet, and memorandum to mental health,18 see id.,
establish that the prison officials complied with the requirements
of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and Superintendent v.
Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985). Sanders received written notice of the

18

Defendant Meeks affirmed: "It does not appear [Sanders']
mental condition substantially contributed to the alleged offense
or significantly hinders [his] participation in the disciplinary
process." See Def. Ex. B, Disciplinary Team Mental Health
Consultation, dated April 12, 2014.
50

charges against him. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563 (requiring advance
written notice of charges). He had the opportunity to present
evidence and witnesses. See id. at 566 (stating that prisoners
should be allowed to call witnesses and present evidence as long as
it does not interfere with institutional safety or legitimate
correctional goals). He also received written statements of the
findings

against

him

and

the

evidence

relied

upon

by

the

disciplinary team. See id. at 563 (requiring that a factfinder give
the prisoner written notice of evidence relied on and reasons for
disciplinary action). Riegel's statement and the photograph of the
"fishing line" constituted evidence before the disciplinary team
that supported the team's decision. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 456
(finding that the prison disciplinary panel complied with due
process requirements when convicting the inmate based on oral
testimony and a written report by the prison guard).
Additionally, Sanders asserts that Defendant Capen wrote two
false DRs on April 18th. He also states that Defendants Capen and
Robertson, under Defendant Crawford's direction, unlawfully placed
him

on

property

restriction.

Defendant

Robertson

submitted

declaration, stating in pertinent part:
I have also reviewed the two attached
disciplinary reports issued to inmate Sanders
based on incidents that occurred on April 18,
2014 at Suwannee Correctional Institution. I
was not involved in either of the two
incidents that lead to the issuing of these
disciplinary
reports.
My
name
is
Chad
Robertson and the person involved in the
51

a

incidents
was
Sgt.
J.
Robertson,
See
Disciplinary Report No. 230-140673 and Log
#230-140674.[19]
Def. Ex. J, Declaration of Chad Robertson (Robertson Declaration)
(emphasis added). Notably, Sanders names Chad Robertson as a
Defendant. See SAC at 1, 7. In response to Defendants' Motion,
Sanders admits that Defendant Chad Robertson was not involved. See
Response at 3, ¶ 14; see also Def. Exs. H; L (showing that Sergeant
J. Robertson witnessed both instances of Sanders' misconduct). As
such, Defendants' Motion is due to be granted as to Sanders'
retaliation claims against Defendant Chad Robertson since Sanders
acknowledges that he mistakenly named him as a Defendant.
Defendant Capen also provides a declaration and describes the
factual circumstances underlying the issuance of the April 18th DRs
at issue.
Inmate Sanders alleges that on April 18, 2014,
Lt. Crawford had Defendant Robertson and I
pulled [sic] him from his cell and place him
on property restriction for no reason and
under the pretense that Plaintiff was being
removed for a cell search, and that his cell
was the only one searched. Inmate Sanders also
alleges that once he was placed back into his
cell, Defendant Robertson and I refused to
take off his cuffs and tried to enter his cell
and pretend he was trying to keep the cuffs.
Inmate
Sanders
alleges
that
Defendant
Robertson called Defendant Kelly and reported
that he was refusing to give up his cuffs and
had he not yelled into the camera that he was
not refusing to come out, Defendants Kelly,
Robertson, and I would have used the cell

19

See Def. Exs. H; L.
52

extraction team to jump
allegations are untrue.

on

him.

These

On April 18, 2014 at approximately 11:00 p.m.,
while assigned to H-dormitory, a random search
of cell H2-211 on Quad 2 was conducted. The
cell solely houses inmate Sanders, Christopher
DC# R24565. Inmate Sanders stated, "you
fu**ing crackers ain't taking my shit to Lt.
Crawford". He was issued a disciplinary report
for a violation of Fla. Admin. Code R.
33-601.314 (1-4). Disrespect to Officials.[20]
On April 18, 2014 at approximately 11:00 p.m.,
I was conducting a random cell search on quad
2 of cell H2-211. I observed a food service
cup and spork, and Inmate Sanders' personal
papers covering the cell vent. Inmate Sanders
was issued a disciplinary report for a
violation of Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-601.314
(7-4) misuse of state property. Plaintiff was
placed on property restriction.[21]
Def. Ex. K, Declaration of Demetri Capen (Capen Declaration);
Crawford Declaration. The DRs, see Def. Exs. H, No. 230-140673; L,
No. 230-140674, establish that the prison officials complied with
the requirements of Wolff, 418 U.S. 539, and Hill, 472 U.S. 445.
The disciplinary team found him guilty of violating FDOC rules
based

on

Capen's

statements

and

observations

along

with

a

photograph of the food service cup and spork.
The record reflects that the Defendants wrote the DRs and
placed Sanders on property restriction because he violated the FDOC
rules, and the disciplinary team ultimately found him guilty based

20

See Def. Ex. H.

21

See Def. Ex. L.
53

on witness statements and other evidence. On this record, the
protected

speech

(disciplinary

(filing

punishment

grievances)

and

property

and

adverse

restriction)

actions
were

not

causally connected. As such, Defendants' Motion is due to be
granted

as

to

Sanders'

retaliation

claims

against

Defendants

Richter, Riegel, Crawford, Robertson and Capen. Moreover, to the
extent Sanders asserts that the Defendants retaliated against him
for filing grievances when they either wrote other DRs during the
relevant time period or were involved in the incidents underlying
the basis for the those DRs,22 Defendants' Motion is due to be
granted.
Additionally, Sanders asserts that Defendants Greene, Coates,
Richter, and Stratton retaliated against him when they sporadically
deprived

him

of

several

meals,

threatened

him

with

physical

violence, and used excessive force against him. He states that
Richter and Stratton denied him lunch and dinner on April 12th. See
SAC at 11, ¶ 8. He also alleges that Greene and Coates deprived him
of several meals from April 25th through May 11th. See id. at 16,

22

See Def. Exs. G (involving Defendant Riegel); M (concerning
the April 21st misuse of state property, and Defendants Richter and
Greene); N (regarding the April 24th misuse of state property, the
cell extraction, and Defendants Russell and Greene); Y-1, Y-2
(relating to Defendant Richter placing a magnet over his window on
April 21st due to his lewd and lascivious behavior in front of
Defendant Bridges on April 17th); DD (pertaining to the May 20th
spitting incident and Defendant Coates); EE (relating to the May
20th incident, and Defendants North, Richter, Wainwright, Stratton,
Greene, and Coates).
54

¶ 37. Defendants address Sanders' assertions as an Eighth Amendment
claim instead of one arising under the First Amendment. See Motion
at 32-34. They flatly deny that they refused to feed Sanders. See
Greene, Coates, Richter, and Stratton Declarations. In response to
the Motion, Sanders asserts that there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Defendants Greene, Coates, Richter, and
Stratton refused to feed him several meals from April 12, 2014,
until May 11, 2014. See Response at 2, ¶ 15. This Court agrees.
Sanders swears in his verified SAC that the Defendants denied him
meals. Additionally, in his deposition, Sanders testified that they
refused him meals "every time their shift was working." Sanders
Deposition at 5. In light of the conflicting evidence, Defendants'
Motion is due to be denied as to Sanders' retaliation claims
relating to food deprivation against Defendants Greene, Coates,
Richter, and Stratton.
Next, Sanders alleges that Defendant Mock, as an Assistant
Warden, retaliated against him for filing grievances when he
threatened to place Sanders on property restriction. See SAC at 3233, ¶ 32. According to Sanders, when he tried to inform Mock about
staff abuse on April 17th, Mock "told Sanders he'd better get off
the door before he has him put on property restriction." Id. at 13,
¶ 14. Sanders also asserts that Defendant Gartman, as an Assistant
Warden, retaliated against him for filing grievances when she
threatened him with physical violence. See id. at 28, ¶ 14. Neither

55

Gartman nor Mock submitted a declaration in support of their
request for summary judgment. At this stage of the proceedings, to
the extent the facts are disputed, the Court must accept Sanders'
statements as the facts. Thus, accepting Sanders' sworn allegations
as true, Defendants' Motion is due to be denied as to Sanders'
retaliation claims against Defendants Gartman and Mock.
D. Property Deprivation and Cell Search
Sanders asserts that Richter, Crawford, Riegel, Robertson, and
Capen deprived him of his property. See SAC at 33-35, ¶¶ 36-42.
Defendants

contend

that

"[a]

state

employee's

unauthorized

intentional deprivation of an inmate's property does not violate
due

process

under

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

if

a

meaningful

postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available." Motion at 18
(citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)). Insofar as
Sanders asserts that the Defendants deprived him of due process by
taking his property, it is well-settled that the Due Process Clause
is not offended when a state employee intentionally deprives a
prisoner of his property as long as the State provides him with a
meaningful post-deprivation remedy. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533;
Jackson v. Hill, 569 F. App'x 697, 698 (11th Cir. 2014); Taylor v.
McSwain,

335

deprivation

F.
of

App'x

32,

property,

34
a

(11th
state

Cir.

2009)

employee's

("Regarding
unauthorized

intentional deprivation of an inmate's property does not violate
due

process

under

the

Fourteenth

56

Amendment

if

a

meaningful

postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available."). Sanders has an
available, adequate post-deprivation remedy under state law. "Under
Florida law, [a plaintiff] can sue the officers for the conversion
of his personal property." Jackson, 569 F. App'x at 698 (citing
Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009)). Moreover,
any assertion that the Defendants were negligent when they failed
to ensure that his property was replaced or returned does not rise
to the level of a Fourteenth Amendment violation. See Maddox v.
Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1119 (11th Cir. 2013) (stating mere
negligence does not rise to the level of a substantive due process
violation).
Additionally, Sanders asserts that Defendants Robertson and
Capen violated his Fourth Amendment right when they randomly
searched his cell on April 18th. See SAC at 35-36, ¶¶ 43, 44.
Imprisonment necessarily curtails the enjoyment of some significant
constitutional rights as institutional security needs must be
balanced with retained rights. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
545–46

(1979);

Sandin

v.

Conner,

515

U.S.

472,

485

(1995)

("[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by
the considerations underlying our penal system.") (quoting Price v.
Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) (overruled on other grounds by
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991)). Nevertheless, inmates
retain those rights that are "not inconsistent with [their] status

57

as . . . prisoner[s] or with the legitimate penological objectives
of the corrections system." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822
(1974) (quoted in Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523).
In Hudson, the Court stated, in pertinent part:
[W]e hold that society is not prepared to
recognize
as
legitimate
any
subjective
expectation of privacy that a prisoner might
have in his prison cell and that, accordingly,
the Fourth Amendment proscription against
unreasonable searches does not apply within
the confines of the prison cell. The
recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in
their individual cells simply cannot be
reconciled with the concept of incarceration
and the needs and objectives of penal
institutions.
468 U.S. at 525-26. In so holding, the Court recognized that the
"administration of a prison . . . is 'at best an extraordinarily
difficult undertaking.'" Id. at 527 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at
566). Thus, the Court balanced two competing interests: "the
interest of society in the security of its penal institutions and
the interest of the prisoner in privacy within his cell." Id. The
Court concluded: "We are satisfied that society would insist that
the prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to what must be
considered the paramount interest in institutional security." Id.
at 528. Notably, the Court stated that "wholly random searches are
essential to the effective security of penal institutions." Id. at
529. Consistent with this authority, Defendants' Motion is due to
be granted as to Sanders' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims

58

relating to property deprivation and the April 18th cell search
against Defendants Richter, Crawford, Riegel, Robertson, and Capen.
E. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
To the extent Defendants assert that they are entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity, this Court agrees.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that
"[t]he Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI.
It is well established that, in the absence of
consent, "a suit in which the State or one of
its agencies or departments is named as the
defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,
276, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)
(quotation omitted). The Eleventh Amendment
also prohibits suits against state officials
where the state is the real party in interest,
such that a plaintiff could not sue to have a
state officer pay funds directly from the
state treasury for the wrongful acts of the
state. Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180
F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999). . . .
Hayes v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, 563 F. App'x
701, 703 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
In Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1986)
(per curium), the Eleventh Circuit noted:
It is clear that Congress did not intend
to abrogate a state's eleventh amendment
immunity in section 1983 damage suits. Quern
v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-45, 99 S.Ct.
1139,
1144-45,
59
L.Ed.2d
358
(1979).
Furthermore,
after
reviewing
specific
provisions of the Florida statutes, we
recently concluded that Florida's limited
59

waiver of sovereign immunity was not intended
to encompass section 1983 suits for damages.
See Gamble,[23] 779 F.2d at 1513-20.
Accordingly, in Zatler, the court found that the FDOC Secretary was
immune from suit in his official capacity. Id. Insofar as Sanders
may be seeking monetary damages from the Defendants in their
official capacities, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit. Therefore,
Defendants' Motion is due to be granted as to Sanders' claims for
monetary damages from them in their official capacities.
F. Evidence Tampering
Sanders asserts that Defendant Howard, as an FDOC Inspector,
violated his First Amendment right because he tampered with the use
of force video, and therefore, "blocked" Sanders from being able to
show how Defendant Richter assaulted him. SAC at 40, ¶ 7. He states
that Howard "manipulated" the video "to start when [Sanders] was
already on his feet" after Defendants Richter, Coates, and Stratton
had

"jumped"

him.

Id.

at

23,

¶

91.

In

Defendant

Howard's

declaration, he avers that Sanders' assertions "are not true." See
Def. Ex. II, Declaration of Brad Howard.
As previously discussed in Section IV. A. 2., the video
evidence

memorializes

the

second

incident

involving

Sanders

spitting on Coates. See Def. Exs. AA. Nevertheless, the video still
captures the right side of Sanders' face as he turned towards

23

Gamble v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Serv., 779 F.2d 1509
(11th Cir. 1986).
60

Coates before Cortese and Coates forced him to the ground. See id.
It reflects that Sanders suffered a bloody, swollen face just above
his right eye, apparently from the first use of force involving
Richter, Coates, and Stratton. See id. Additionally, the video
shows that, when Cortese and Wainwright lifted Sanders from the
floor after placing the spit shield over his face, there was blood
on the floor.
Notably, Sanders acknowledges that an officer arrived with a
handheld camera after Richter, Coates, and Stratton's use of force
upon him, and before the second incident involving Coates and
Cortese. See SAC at 19, ¶¶ 56, 57, 58; see also Sanders' Deposition
at 71. On this record, there are no genuine issues of material fact
in that the parties agree that the cameraman started to film
Coates' escort of Sanders after the first incident. Any assertion
that Defendant Howard "blocked" Sanders' ability to prove the first
use of force is unfounded. Howard has not infringed upon Sanders'
First Amendment right in that Sanders was neither denied access to
the

courts

to

present

his

claim

nor

the

prison's

grievance

procedure to address his assertions that the Defendants used an
excessive amount of force. As such, Defendants' Motion is due to be
granted as to Sanders' First Amendment claim that Defendant Howard
tampered with the evidence.

61

G. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect
Sanders asserts that Defendants Gartman, Mock, Landrum, Crews,
and Beasley failed to protect him from physical harm when he
notified them that his life and well being were in danger. See SAC
at 39, ¶ 2. Defendants assert they were unaware of a substantial
danger of physical harm from SCI staff because Sanders neither
spoke with them about verbal threats from staff nor "placed anyone
on notice that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and most
importantly, that the inference was drawn." See Motion at 28, 2628. In response to the Motion, Sanders suggests that there remain
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Defendants'
subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of harm could be
inferred from the facts: he filed multiple grievances informing
them that he was threatened with physical harm and retaliated
against for filing grievances. See Response, Doc. 137-1, at 2, ¶¶
20, 21.
The

Eighth

Amendment

requires

prison

officials

to

"take

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). It is "[a] prison official's
'deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to
an inmate [that] violates the Eighth Amendment." Id.

at 828

(citations omitted). The deliberate indifference standard requires
the

plaintiff

to

demonstrate

that

62

the

prison

official

"was

subjectively aware" of a risk of harm; mere negligence is not
sufficient. Id. at 829, 835-36.
A
prison
official
violates
the
Eighth
Amendment "when a substantial risk of serious
harm, of which the official is subjectively
aware, exists and the official does not
respond reasonably to the risk." Carter v.
Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003)
(quotation marks omitted and alterations
adopted) (emphasis added). To survive summary
judgment on a failure-to-protect claim under
the Eighth Amendment, "a plaintiff must
produce
sufficient
evidence
of
(1)
a
substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the
defendants' deliberate indifference to that
risk; and (3) causation." Goodman, 718 F.3d at
1331 (quotation marks omitted).[24]
"The second element—that [a prison official]
evidenced a deliberate indifference to a
serious risk that [a prisoner] would be
injured—forms the crux of the matter at hand."
Id. The prison official must "actually
(subjectively) know[] that an inmate is facing
a substantial risk of serious harm, yet
disregard[] that known risk by failing to
respond to it in an (objectively) reasonable
manner." Rodriguez v. Sec'y for Dep't of
Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007).
With regard to the subjective component of the
defendant's actual knowledge, the defendant
"must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837,
114 S.Ct. at 1979.
Moreover, this must be shown by "conduct that
is more than gross negligence." Townsend v.
Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th
Cir. 2010). "[T]he deliberate indifference
standard—and the subjective awareness required
by it—is far more onerous than normal

24

Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2013).
63

tort-based standards of conduct sounding in
negligence: 'Merely negligent failure to
protect an inmate from attack does not justify
liability under [§] 1983.'" Goodman, 718 F.3d
at 1332 (quoting Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d
1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Losey v. Thompson, 596 F. App'x 783, 788-89 (11th Cir. 2015).
Thus, to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate
must show that a prison official "actually (subjectively) knows
that an inmate is facing a substantial risk of serious harm, yet
disregards that known risk by failing to respond to it in an
(objectively) reasonable manner." Rodriguez v. Sec'y for Dep't of
Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 837, 844) (footnote omitted). "The known risk of injury must be
a 'strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility' before a
guard's failure to act can constitute deliberate indifference."
Brown v. Hughes, 894 F. 2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990).
Prison officials may avoid Eighth Amendment liability in one
of three ways: (1) showing that they were not aware "of the
underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and
that they were therefore unaware of a danger"; (2) admitting
awareness of "the underlying facts" of a substantial danger, but
believing the danger was "insubstantial or nonexistent"; or (3)
showing they responded reasonably to a known substantial danger.
Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 617-18 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844)
(internal quotations omitted).

64

In this case, Defendants Gartman, Mock, Landrum, Crews, and
Beasley rely on the first method: they assert they were unaware of
a substantial danger of physical harm from SCI staff because
Sanders neither spoke with them about the verbal threats from staff
nor "placed anyone on notice that a substantial risk of serious
harm exits and most importantly, that the inference was drawn." See
Motion at 28, 26-28. Thus, the subjective knowledge requirement is
at issue. To satisfy the subjective knowledge requirement, a
plaintiff must show that a prison official is "aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference." Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837. Whether a prison official "had the requisite
knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to
demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from the
circumstantial evidence." Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 617 (emphasis in
original).
As to Defendant Gartman, Sanders asserts that she failed to
protect him from "the illegal actions" committed by Defendants
Coates, Greene, Richter, Crawford, Russell, Williamson, Lamberson,
Powe, North, Jackson, Robertson, Capen, Riegel, and Stratton. SAC
at 28, ¶ 13; 31, ¶ 26. Sanders states that he and his mother
informed Gartman about the alleged abuse leading up to the physical
assaults. According to Sanders, he informed his mother by written
correspondence about the events that had transpired in early April

65

2014, see id. at 13, ¶ 15; his mother spoke with Gartman on April
18th, and informed Gartman about the abuse, see id.; and Gartman
had Lieutenant Woods pull Sanders out of his cell, and had Nurse
Murphy check Sanders, see id. at ¶¶ 16, 17. Sanders further asserts
that, on April 20th, he spoke with Gartman and informed her that
Richter and Stratton said they were going to jump on him. See id.
at 14, ¶22. Sanders states that Gartman told him that "he was
lucky" she did not run the cell extraction team and that he was at
SCI where "they kick ass." Id.

According to Sanders, he again

spoke with Gartman on May 5th about how Richter, Stratton, and
Coates refused to feed him, and how Green directed Coates to put
empty trays in his food box; however, she told him she did not
care. See id. at 16-17, ¶¶ 42, 43.
Next, Sanders asserts that Defendant Mock failed to protect
him from Defendants Stratton and Richter who had threatened to harm
him. He states that, on April 17th, he "tried to [verbally] inform"
Mock about "what was going on," but Mock told him he "better get
off the door" or he would have him placed on property restriction.
SAC at 13, ¶ 14. According to Sanders, he informed Mock about the
specific threats by Defendants Stratton, Richter, and Coates. See
P. Ex., Doc. 137-8 at 14 (May 11, 2014 grievance), 13 (Acting
Warden Mock referring the issue to the Office of the Inspector
General on May 14th).

66

Neither Gartman nor Mock submitted a declaration in support of
the request for summary judgment. The question before the Court at
summary judgment is not whether Sanders in fact reported the
alleged

threats

to

Gartman

and

Mock

that

ultimately

led

to

Defendants Stratton, Richter, and Coates' alleged excessive use of
force (1st May 20th incident), and Defendants North, Richter,
Wainwright, and Markham's alleged excessive use of force (3rd May
20th incident). Sanders has sworn that he did inform Gartman and
Mock about the specific threats and has also sworn to the substance
of the information he provided to them. At this stage of the
proceedings, the Court must accept Sanders' statements as the
facts. On this record, drawing all inferences in favor of Sanders,
as the Court must, Sanders' reported threats to Gartman and Mock
were sufficient to impute to them knowledge of a substantial risk
of

serious

harm

to

Sanders.

Thus,

accepting

Sanders'

sworn

allegations as true, Defendants' Motion is due to be denied as to
Sanders' failure to protect claims against Defendants Gartman and
Mock.25
Additionally,

Sanders

maintains

that

Defendants

Landrum,

Crews, and Beasley failed to protect him from the Defendants'

25

Sanders' assertions as to Gartman and Mock are interwoven
with Sanders' claims of excessive use of force (the first and third
uses of force on May 20th) against Defendants Stratton, Richter,
Coates, North, Wainwright, and Markham, and retaliation claims
against Defendants Greene, Coates, Richter, and Stratton for the
alleged denial of meal trays.
67

abuse, see SAC at 31-32, ¶¶ 27, 28, 30, when they were fully aware
about the specific threats through Sanders' submission of multiple
grievances, see Sanders Deposition at 52, 68. As to Landrum,
Sanders states that, on April 15th, he submitted a grievance of an
emergency nature to Landrum, see P. Ex., Doc. 137-7 at 3-4, and
Landrum responded that he had forwarded it to Inspector Beasley;
however, Sanders was never interviewed, and nothing was done to
remedy the injustices, see SAC at 13, ¶ 11. According to Sanders,
he yelled to a handheld camera on April 18th about staff threats,
but after reviewing the use of force camera, Landrum never helped
him. See id. at 14, ¶ 21. Additionally, he states that, on May
11th, he wrote an emergency grievance to Landrum, see P. Ex., Doc.
137-8 at 14, but he did not get a response until after Richter,
Stratton, Coates, Markham, North, Wainwright, and Greene assaulted
him on May 20th, see SAC at 18, ¶ 53; 23, ¶ 85. Landrum avers, in
pertinent part:
I was never made aware of any abuse of inmate
Sanders, nor was I aware of any discussions
with inmate Sanders' mother by staff at
Suwannee
Correctional
Institution.
Any
grievances by inmate Sanders would have been
addressed by staff at Suwannee Cl.
I did sign off on a grievance that was being
referred
to
the
Inspector
General
for
investigation,
Grievance
Log
number
1404-230-184, wherein Inmate Sanders says he
was physically and mentally abused.[26] The
grievance was referred to the Inspector

26

See P. Ex., Doc. 137-7 at 8, 9.
68

General's Office and contained an allegation
of physical abuse but no factual basis to
support the allegation.[27] As the Warden, it
was my duty to review videos associated with
uses of force, however it was not routine for
me to review fixed wing videos, absent a use
of force.
Def.

Ex.

PP,

Declaration

of

Christopher

Landrum

(Landrum

Declaration). Sanders maintains that he never spoke to Landrum
about the abuse, but notified him about the ongoing misconduct
through the submission of grievances. See Sanders Deposition at 52.
In response to Defendants' Motion, Sanders submitted grievances
that he addressed to Landrum concerning retaliatory conduct and
specific threats by Riegel, Richter, Greene, Coates, and Stratton.
See P. Ex., Doc. 137-7 at 3-5, 6-7, 8-9; 137-8 at 13-14.
As to Defendant Crews, Sanders asserts that when Coates
continued to put empty trays in his food box, Sanders' mother
called the FDOC Secretary's office and filed a complaint. See SAC
at 17, ¶ 44. He also states that he submitted an emergency
grievance to Crews on May 11th about threats by Richter, Coates,
and Stratton.28 See id. at 18, ¶ 53; 23, ¶ 85; see also P. Ex., Doc.
137-8 at 5, 6, 23, 24; Sanders Deposition at 52. Defendant Crews
states, in pertinent part:

27

See P. Ex., Doc. 137-7 at 8.

28

Sanders asserts that he submitted a grievance to Defendant
Crews on May 28th, and informed him about the May 20th uses of
force. See SAC at 22, ¶ 82; see also P. Ex., Doc. 137-8 at 23.
69

I was never aware of any abuse of inmate
Sanders, nor was I aware of any discussions
with inmate Sanders' mother by staff at
Suwannee Correctional Institution.
Additionally,
I
am
not
aware
of
any
conversation that I had with inmate Sanders'
mother. In the event that someone was
contacted
about
inmate
abuse
at
an
institution, this is what would occur. This
information would be forwarded to the housing
institution and the Office of the Inspector
General for follow-up and determination as to
whether additional action was required.
Additionally, I did not personal[ly] review
grievances.
They
were
reviewed
by
the
Department of Corrections, Office of Grievance
Appeals.[29]
Def. Ex. HH, Declaration of Michael Crews (Crews Declaration).
According to Sanders, he never spoke with Crews, see Sanders
Deposition at 52; his mother called the FDOC Secretary's Office,
but Sanders has "no idea" whom she spoke to about the staff abuse,
id. at 68. He states: "I don't know if she ever spoke with [Crews]
personally. I know she also emailed them a copy of the letter I
sent her. . . ." Id. at 69.
Next, Sanders asserts that Defendant Beasley failed to protect
him when he knew about "the illegal actions" of Defendants Greene,
Crawford,

Gartman,

Robertson,

Perry,

Landrum,
Capen,

North,
Lim,

Coates,

Meeks,

Richter,

Russell,

Riegel,

Williamson,

Lamberson, Powe, and Jackson, and failed to correct the misconduct
when the grievances were forwarded to him for an investigation and

29

See P. Ex., Doc. 137-8 at 5, 24.
70

appropriate action. See SAC at 32, ¶¶ 30, 31; 13, ¶ 11. Defendant
Beasley states, in pertinent part, that he neither personally
investigated any complaint, grievance, or allegation, nor directly
supervised any investigation regarding any complaint, grievance, or
allegation made in Sanders' case. See Def. Ex. JJ, Declaration of
Jeffery T. Beasley (Beasley Declaration).
The fact that Defendants Landrum, Crews, and Beasley flatly
deny that Sanders reported threats of fear (or suggest his sworn
statement lacks credibility) to them, see Motion at 26-28; see also
Landrum, Crews, and Beasley Declarations, provides insufficient
grounds on which to grant summary judgment in their favor. In
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court cannot engage in
impermissible credibility determinations. See

Furcron v. Mail

Centers Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2016); see also
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998) (stating that, in
a motion for summary judgment, it is improper to simply attack the
opposing party's credibility); Hall v. Bennett, 447 F. App'x 921,
924 (11th Cir. 2011) (reversing the district court's grant of
summary

judgment

because

the

court

improperly

"weighed

the

witnesses' credibility by favoring" the officer's account over the
prisoner-plaintiff's). As such, Defendants' Motion is due to be
denied as to Sanders' failure to protect claims against Defendants
Landrum, Crews, and Beasley.

71

H. Supervisory Liability
Sanders asserts that Defendants Landrum, Gartman, Mock, and
Crews

failed

to

properly

supervise

Greene,

Coates,

Stratton,

Richter, Crawford, Jackson, North, Robertson, Russell, and Riegel
when they knew about the ongoing misconduct, and failed to correct
it. See SAC at 28, ¶ 13 (Gartman); 31, ¶ 25 (Landrum); 32, ¶ 29
(Crews); 33, ¶ 33 (Mock); 38, ¶ 60. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has stated:
"Supervisory officials are not liable under
section 1983 on the basis of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability." Belcher v.
City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th
Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). "The standard by which a
supervisor is held liable in her individual
capacity for the actions of a subordinate is
extremely rigorous." Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at
1234 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).[30] "Supervisory liability occurs
either
when
the
supervisor
personally
participates in the alleged constitutional
violation or when there is a causal connection
between actions of the supervising official
and the alleged constitutional deprivation."
Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th
Cir. 1990).
"The necessary causal connection can be
established 'when a history of widespread
abuse puts the responsible supervisor on
notice of the need to correct the alleged
deprivation, and he fails to do so.'" Cottone,
326 F.3d at 1360 (citation omitted).[31] "The
deprivations that constitute widespread abuse
sufficient to notify the supervising official

30

Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003).

31

Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2003).
72

must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of
continued duration, rather than isolated
occurrences." Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. A
plaintiff can also establish the necessary
causal connection by showing "facts which
support an inference that the supervisor
directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or
knew
that
the
subordinates
would
act
unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing
so," Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1235, or that a
supervisor's "custom or policy . . . resulted
in deliberate indifference to constitutional
rights," Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495
(11th Cir. 1991).
Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008) (overruled
on other grounds as recognized by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,
709 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the application of a heightened
pleading standard for § 1983 cases involving qualified immunity));
see Keith v. DeKalb Cty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047-48 (11th Cir.
2014). In sum,
To state a claim against a supervisory
defendant, the plaintiff must allege (1) the
supervisor's personal involvement in the
violation of his constitutional rights,[32] (2)
the existence of a custom or policy that
resulted in deliberate indifference to the
plaintiff's constitutional rights,[33] (3)
facts supporting an inference that the
supervisor directed the unlawful action or

32

See Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir.
2007) ("Causation, of course, can be shown by personal
participation in the constitutional violation.") (citation
omitted).
33

See Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1332 ("Our decisions establish that
supervisory liability for deliberate indifference based on the
implementation of a facially constitutional policy requires the
plaintiff to show that the defendant had actual or constructive
notice of a flagrant, persistent pattern of violations.").
73

knowingly failed to prevent it,[34] or (4) a
history of widespread abuse that put the
supervisor on notice of an alleged deprivation
that he then failed to correct. See id. at
1328–29 (listing factors in context of summary
judgment).[35] A supervisor cannot be held
liable under § 1983 for mere negligence in the
training or supervision of his employees.
Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836–37 (11th
Cir. 1990).
Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App'x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Sanders has alleged sworn facts suggesting that Defendants Landrum,
Gartman, Mock, and Crews were personally involved in, or otherwise
causally connected to, the alleged violations of his federal
statutory or constitutional rights. On this record, there remains
a genuine issue of material fact as to the extent of their
involvement and whether the alleged violations could have been
prevented. As such, Defendants' Motion is due to be denied as to
Sanders' claims of supervisory liability (limited to the remaining
Eighth Amendment failure to protect and First Amendment retaliation
claims) against Defendants Landrum, Gartman, Mock, and Crews.

34

See Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008)
("Douglas's complaint alleges that his family informed Yates [(an
Assistant Warden)] of ongoing misconduct by Yates's subordinates
and Yates failed to stop the misconduct. These allegations allow a
reasonable inference that Yates knew that the subordinates would
continue to engage in unconstitutional misconduct but failed to
stop them from doing so.").
35

West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2007).
74

I. Qualified Immunity
Defendants Beasley, Howard, North, Crawford, Greene, Markham,
Mock,

Richter,

Lamberson,

Riegel,

Jackson,

Robertson,

Gartman,

Russell,

Crews,

Wainwright,

Landrum,

Capen,

Powe,

Coates,

Stratton, and Williamson assert that they are entitled to qualified
immunity. See Motion at 36-37. As to qualified immunity, the
Eleventh Circuit stated:
The qualified-immunity defense reflects
an effort to balance "the need to hold public
officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials
from harassment, distraction, and liability
when they perform their duties reasonably."
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129
S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). The
doctrine resolves this balance by protecting
government officials engaged in discretionary
functions and sued in their individual
capacities unless they violate "clearly
established
federal
statutory
or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known." Keating v. City of
Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quotation marks and brackets omitted).
As a result, qualified immunity shields
from
liability
"all
but
the
plainly
incompetent or one who is knowingly violating
the federal law." Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d
1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). But the
doctrine's protections do not extend to one
who "knew or reasonably should have known that
the action he took within his sphere of
official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the [plaintiff]."
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815, 102
S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted).
To invoke qualified immunity, a public
official must first demonstrate that he was
75

acting within the scope of his or her
discretionary authority. Maddox v. Stephens,
727 F.3d 1109, 1120 (11th Cir. 2013). As we
have
explained
the
term
"discretionary
authority," it "include[s] all actions of a
governmental official that (1) were undertaken
pursuant to the performance of his duties, and
(2) were within the scope of his authority."
Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir.
1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, it is clear that Defendant Officers
satisfied this requirement, as they engaged in
all of the challenged actions while on duty as
police officers conducting investigative and
seizure functions.
Because
Defendant
Officers
have
established that they were acting within the
scope of their discretionary authority, the
burden
shifts
to
[the
plaintiff]
to
demonstrate
that
qualified
immunity
is
inappropriate. See id. To do that, [the
plaintiff] must show that, when viewed in the
light most favorable to him, the facts
demonstrate that Defendant Officers violated
[Plaintiff's] constitutional right and that
that right was "clearly established ... in
light of the specific context of the case, not
as a broad general proposition[,]" at the time
of Defendant officers' actions. Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled in part on other
grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct.
808. We may decide these issues in either
order, but, to survive a qualified-immunity
defense, [the plaintiff] must satisfy both
showings.
Maddox,
727
F.3d
at
1120–21
(citation omitted).
Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 850-51 (11th Cir. 2017).
Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity
because they did not commit any federal statutory or constitutional
violation. See Motion at 36. Under the doctrine of qualified
immunity, Defendants may claim they are entitled to qualified
76

immunity from monetary damages in their individual capacities. It
is

undisputed

that

Defendants

were

engaged

in

discretionary

functions during the events at issue. To defeat qualified immunity
with respect to these Defendants, Sanders must show both that a
constitutional violation occurred, and that the constitutional
right violated was clearly established.
Because the Court has determined that Sanders failed to
establish the existence of an issue of fact as to Sanders' claim of
a constitutional violation, Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity from monetary damages in their individual capacities as to
Sanders': (1) Eighth Amendment claims relating to the April 24,
2014 cell extraction against Defendants Greene, Crawford, Powe,
Jackson, Russell, Williamson, and Lamberson; (2) Eighth Amendment
claims relating to the second May 20, 2014 use of force incident
against Defendants Greene, Coates, and Wainwright; (3) conspiracy
claim

against

Defendants

Richter,

Wainwright,

Markham,

and

Stratton; (4) First Amendment retaliation claims relating to the
DRs against Defendants Richter, Riegel, Crawford, Robertson, Capen,
Greene, Russell, Coates, North, Wainwright, and Stratton; (5)
Fourth

and

Fourteenth

Amendment

claims

relating

to

property

deprivation and the April 18, 2014 cell search against Defendants
Richter, Crawford, Riegel, Robertson, and Capen; and (6) First
Amendment claim relating to evidence tampering against Defendant

77

Howard. Their claims of qualified immunity as to Sanders' remaining
counts are due to be denied.
J. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
Sanders asserts that Defendants Lim, Perry, Bridges, Meeks,
Randle, and Murphy36 violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment when: (1) Perry, Bridges, and
Murphy failed to document and/or treat the injuries he sustained in
the alleged April 24th use of force incident, see SAC at 39, ¶ 3;
(2) Lim, Meeks, and Randle failed to report Sanders' assertions of
staff abuse, see id. at ¶ 4; and (3) Randle acknowledged that
officers were going to harm Sanders, but failed to take corrective
action to stop the abuse, see id. at 39, ¶ 4; 40, ¶ 6. According to
Sanders, he informed Lim on April 17th that officers had abused him
on April 12th, see id. at 13, ¶ 12; Lim neither filed an incident
report nor informed the administration about Sanders' assertions,
see id.; after the cell extraction team's alleged April 24th use of
force, officers escorted Sanders to the nurses station where
Sanders informed Perry that Jackson had dislocated his thumb and
popped it back into place, see id. at 16, ¶¶ 34, 35; Perry never
documented Sanders' injuries and told Sanders that the officers
should have broken his thumb, see id. at ¶ 35; Bridges and Murphy
refused to see Sanders for sick call from April 28th through May

36

The Court will refer to the Defendants, collectively, as
"Medical Defendants."
78

17th, see id. at ¶¶ 38-40; medical personnel saw Sanders in sick
call on May 17th, "but by then the swelling had [gone] down and the
bruise was gone almost completely," see id. at ¶ 39; after the
alleged May 20th use of force, Randle documented Sanders' injuries,
see id. at 19, ¶ 60, and told Sanders: "They [are] going to kick
your ass," see id. at 20, ¶ 65; and when Sanders asked Randle for
help, Randle said she had nothing to do with it, and left the
holding cell area, see id. at ¶ 66.
The Medical Defendants maintain that the record does not
support Sanders' claims, and therefore, they are entitled to
summary judgment. See Motion II at 2. They state that "[t]he
medical records tell a different story," id. at 3, from Sanders'
account, and they submitted portions of Sanders' medical records in
support of their request for summary judgment, see Doc. 127-1.37
They

assert

that:

(1)

after

the

April

24th

incident,

Perry

documented Sanders' injuries when Sanders complained about knee
pain from a previous injury and pain over his right eye; see id. at
3, 9; (2) Perry "found no new injuries" and "[n]othing in this
record indicates Sanders ever complained of a thumb injury," id. at
9; (3) Murphy, Bridges, and Randle were not involved in Sanders'
post use of force care on April 24th and May 20th, see id.; and (4)

37

The Medical Defendants did not submit any declarations in
support of the request for summary judgment.
79

"nothing in the record shows [that] Lim and Meeks failed to respond
to a known danger to Sanders[,]" id. at 12.
Sanders opposes Motion II. According to Sanders, Perry knew
about his injured thumb and checked his left hand after the April
24th cell extraction, but failed to document the injury; Defendants
Lim, Randle, and Meeks knew about the staff abuse and neither
notified the officers in charge nor reported the abuse; Perry,
Bridges, and Murphy refused to provide medical treatment after the
April 24th use of force incident; and Randle knew Sanders was in
danger of being assaulted and refused to take corrective action.
See Response II at 1-4. The Medical Defendants filed a Motion for
Leave to File a Reply Memorandum (Request; Doc. 144). In the
Request, they seek permission to file a reply memorandum to clarify
the issues. See Request at 2. The Request is due to be denied.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured under
the United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such
deprivation occurred under color of state law. Salvato v. Miley,
790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d
1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted);
Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam)

(citations

omitted).

Moreover,

the

Eleventh

Circuit

"'requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the
official's

acts

or

omissions

and

80

the

alleged

constitutional

deprivation' in § 1983 cases." Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 625 (quoting
Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986)). In the
absence of a federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a
federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against
the defendants.
The Eleventh Circuit has explained the requirements for an
Eighth Amendment violation.38
"The Constitution does not mandate
comfortable prisons, but neither does it
permit inhumane ones . . . ." Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 832, 114 S.Ct. at 1976 (internal quotation
and citation omitted).[39] Thus, in its
prohibition
of
"cruel
and
unusual
punishments," the Eighth Amendment requires
that
prison
officials
provide
humane
conditions of confinement. Id. However, as
noted above, only those conditions which
objectively amount to an "extreme deprivation"
violating contemporary standards of decency
are subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8-9, 112 S.Ct. at 1000.[40]
Furthermore, it is only a prison official's
subjective deliberate indifference to the
substantial risk of serious harm caused by
such conditions that gives rise to an Eighth
Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828,
114 S.Ct. at 1974 (quotation and citation
omitted); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303, 111 S.Ct.
at 2327.[41]

38

The Medical Defendants mistakenly assert that Sanders was
a pretrial detainee, and therefore, his rights arise under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Motion II at 7.
39

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).

40

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).

41

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
81

Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2010). "To show
that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective
and a subjective inquiry." Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351
(11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th
Cir. 2003)). First, the plaintiff must satisfy the objective
component by showing that he had a serious medical need.

Goebert

v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).
"A serious medical need is considered
'one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious
that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor's attention.'" Id.
(citing Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr.,
40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994)). In
either case, "the medical need must be one
that,
if
left
unattended,
pos[es]
a
substantial risk of serious harm." Id.
(citation and internal quotations marks
omitted).
Brown, 387 F.3d at 1351.
Next, the plaintiff must satisfy the subjective component,
which requires the plaintiff to "allege that the prison official,
at

a

minimum,

acted

with

a

state

of

mind

that

constituted

deliberate indifference." Richardson, 598 F.3d at 737 (describing
the three components of deliberate indifference as "(1) subjective
knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk;
(3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.") (citing Farrow,
320 F.3d at 1245); Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir.

82

2016) (setting forth the three components) (citing Farrow, 320 F.3d
at 1245).
In
Estelle[42],
the
Supreme
Court
established that "deliberate indifference"
entails more than mere negligence. Estelle,
429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285; Farmer, 511
U.S. at 835, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The Supreme Court
clarified
the
"deliberate
indifference"
standard in Farmer by holding that a prison
official
cannot
be
found
deliberately
indifferent under the Eighth Amendment "unless
the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511
U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (emphasis added).
In interpreting Farmer and Estelle, this Court
explained in McElligott[43] that "deliberate
indifference
has
three
components:
(1)
subjective knowledge of a risk of serious
harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by
conduct that is more than mere negligence."
McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255; Taylor,[44] 221
F.3d at 1258 (stating that defendant must have
subjective awareness of an "objectively
serious need" and that his response must
constitute
"an
objectively
insufficient
response to that need").
Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245-46.
On

this

record,

considering

the

statements

in

Sanders’

verified SAC, his deposition testimony, the medical records, and
the use of force video (Def. Ex. T), this Court finds that genuine

42

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).

43

McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 1999).

44

Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2000).
83

issues of material fact (as to whether the Medical Defendants
participated in alleged violations of Sanders' Eighth Amendment
right when they neither documented nor treated his injuries nor
took corrective action to remedy the alleged unlawful acts of which
they were aware) preclude entry of summary judgment in their favor.
As such, Motion II is due to be denied.
K. Appointment of Counsel
A plaintiff in a civil case has no constitutional right to
counsel.45 A court may, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),
appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff only in exceptional
circumstances. See Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir.
1999). Such exceptional circumstances exist "where the facts and
legal issues are so novel or complex as to require the assistance
of a trained practitioner." Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096
(11th Cir. 1990). In determining whether to appoint counsel, a
court may consider the type and complexity of the case and whether
the plaintiff can adequately present his case. See

Ulmer v.

Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Fla. Dep't
of Corr., 713 F.3d 1059, 1065 n.11 (11th Cir. 2013)).
Given

the

number

of

remaining

Defendants

and

claims,

appointment of counsel is likely warranted at this stage of the

45

During the early stage of litigation, Sanders filed a
request for the appointment of counsel. See Motion for Appointment
of Counsel (Doc. 7), filed March 4, 2015. The Court denied the
request on August 31, 2015. See Order (Doc. 9).
84

litigation.

Therefore,

this

case

will

be

referred

to

the

Jacksonville Division Civil Pro Bono Appointment Program so that
the designated deputy clerk of this Court may seek counsel to
represent Sanders. Due to the limited resources of the program and
the economy's impact upon those resources, the process of finding
counsel may take some time. Therefore, the Court will stay and
administratively close the case for ninety (90) days to try to find
counsel. Sanders must await this Court's notification to him as to
when counsel has been found to represent him. The Court cautions
Sanders that it may be difficult to find pro bono counsel due to
the number of remaining Defendants and claims.
In consideration of the foregoing, it is now
ORDERED:
1.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 129) is

GRANTED as to Sanders': (1) Eighth Amendment claims relating to the
April 24, 2014 cell extraction against Defendants Greene, Crawford,
Powe, Jackson, Russell, Williamson, and Lamberson; (2) Eighth
Amendment claims relating to the second May 20, 2014 use of force
incident against Defendants Greene, Coates, and Wainwright; (3)
conspiracy claim against Defendants Richter, Wainwright, Markham,
and Stratton; (4) First Amendment retaliation claims relating to
the DRs against Defendants Richter, Riegel, Crawford, Robertson,
Capen, Greene, Russell, Coates, North, Wainwright, and Stratton;
(5) Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims relating to property

85

deprivation and the April 18, 2014 cell search against Defendants
Richter, Crawford, Riegel, Robertson, and Capen; and (6) First
Amendment claim relating to evidence tampering against Defendant
Howard.

Judgment

in

their

favor

will

be

withheld

pending

adjudication of the action as a whole. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54.
2.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 129) is

GRANTED on the basis of qualified immunity only to the extent
provided in the Order.
3.
GRANTED

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 129) is
as

to

Sanders'

claim

for

monetary

damages

from

the

Defendants in their official capacities.
4.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 129) is

DENIED as to Sanders': (1) Eighth Amendment claims relating to the
first May 20, 2014 use of force incident against Defendants Greene,
Stratton, Richter, and Coates; (2) Eighth Amendment claims relating
to the third May 20, 2014 use of force incident against Defendants
North,

Richter,

Wainwright,

and

Markham;

(3)

First

Amendment

retaliation claims relating to food deprivation against Defendants
Greene,

Coates,

Richter,

and

Stratton;

(4)

First

Amendment

retaliation claims against Defendants Gartman and Mock; (5) Eighth
Amendment failure to protect claims against Defendants Gartman,
Mock, Landrum, Crews, and Beasley; and (6) supervisory liability
claims (limited to the remaining Eighth Amendment failure to
protect and First Amendment retaliation claims) against Defendants

86

Landrum, Gartman, Mock, and Crews. Any remaining portions of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment are DENIED.
5.

Defendants

Lim,

Perry,

Bridges,

Meeks,

Randle

and

Murphy's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 128) is DENIED.
6.

Defendants

Lim,

Perry,

Bridges,

Meeks,

Randle,

and

Murphy's Motion for Leave to File a Reply Memorandum (Doc. 144) is
DENIED.
7.

The following Defendants are DISMISSED from the action:

(1) Nancy Crawford; (2) Brad A. Howard; (3) Chad Robertson; (4)
Markus Jackson; (5) Arthur Riegel III; (6) Daniel Russell; (7) D.P.
Capen; (8) Bryan Williamson; (9) Robert Lamberson; and (10) Jeremy
Powe. The Clerk shall terminate them as Defendants.
8.

This case is referred to the Jacksonville Division Civil

Pro Bono Appointment Program so that the designated deputy clerk of
this Court may seek counsel to represent Sanders. This case is
STAYED

for

ninety

(90)

days,

and

administratively close the case.

87

the

Clerk

is

directed

to

9.

The Clerk must provide a copy of this Order to the

designated deputy clerk for the Jacksonville Division Civil Pro
Bono Appointment Program.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 14th day of
March, 2018.

sc 3/13
c:
Christopher Sanders, FDOC #R24565
Counsel of Record

88