Kendry v. Craft et al

Filing 88

ORDER denying 78 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 84 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk of the Court is directed to change the docket to reflect the correct initial of Defendant Kraft's first name, enter judgment in accordance with this Order, and close the case. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 1/31/2018. (JW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

SIMMIE KENDRY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 3:15-cv-248-J-34MCR

CO I KRAFT1, et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff, Simmie Kendry, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action
on January 6, 2015, pursuant to the mailbox rule, by filing a pro se “Civil Tort Complaint”
(Doc. 2) in the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in and for Columbia County,
Florida. On March 4, 2015, the Defendants removed the case from state court. See Notice
of Removal (Doc. 1). Thereafter, Kendry filed an Amended Civil Rights Complaint Form
(Amended Complaint; Doc. 36) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with exhibits (Pl. Exs.). In the
Amended Complaint, Kendry names the following individuals as Defendants: (1)
Corrections Officer Kraft; (2) Sergeant Roach; (3) Kathy Todd, Administrative Assistant
for Corizon Health Services at Columbia Correctional Institution (CCI); and (4) Warden M.
Barnes.

1

Defendant Kraft has requested the Court correct the caption to reflect his proper first initial as “E,” not “I.”
See Doc. 84 at 1 n.1.

Following this Court’s Order dismissing Defendants Todd and Barnes,2 two
Defendants remain: Roach and Kraft. Kendry asserts Defendants Roach and Kraft acted
with deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by
failing to protect him from an attack by two other inmates. Amended Complaint at 4. This
matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. In
Kendry’s Motion, filed on June 12, 2017, Kendry asserts he is entitled to judgment in his
favor because Roach and Kraft were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm.3
(Kendry Motion; Doc. 78). In support of his Motion, Kendry relies upon his sworn affidavit
(Kendry Affidavit; Doc. 78-1), his Amended Complaint (Docs. 36, 78-2), which is signed
under penalty of perjury, Defendants’ Answers to his Amended Complaint (Roach
Answer; Doc. 72; Kraft Answer; Doc. 61), and a request for discovery he sent to Roach
and Kraft.
Roach and Kraft filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on August 14, 2017
(Defense Motion; Doc. 84), asserting Kendry did not advise either of them prior to the
attack that he was in fear of his cellmate (one of the two inmates who attacked him) or
that he needed protection. Defense Motion at 2. They further assert Kendry is not entitled
to compensatory or punitive damages because he has not established more than a de
minimis injury. Id. at 8-9. In support of their Motion, Roach and Kraft submit their own
declarations, the declaration of Dr. Maier with supporting medical records, excerpts of

2

On August 25, 2016, the Court granted Defendant Todd’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment
and granted Defendant Barnes’ Motion to Dismiss. See Order (Doc. 56) at 32. The Court also dismissed
Kendry’s claim against Kraft for his missing property. See id.
3
Kendry also asserts Roach and Kraft are not entitled to qualified immunity. Roach and Kraft, however, do
not raise a qualified immunity defense in their Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court previously
dismissed Kendry’s claim against Kraft, in his official capacity, for monetary damages. See Order (Doc. 56)
at 32.

2

Kendry’s deposition testimony, and disciplinary reports for the inmates who attacked
Kendry (Def. Exs. B-F4). On October 26, 2017, Kendry responded to Roach and Kraft’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting the same arguments as those presented in his
Motion (Kendry Response; Doc. 87). Specifically, he re-asserts he “advised both
Defendant Roach and Defendant Kraft of issues he was having with an inmate, he was
in fear for his life, and request[ed] to be moved or placed in protective management.”
Kendry Response at 2. The Motions are ripe for the Court’s review.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), “[t]he court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a).
The record to be considered on a motion for summary judgment may include “depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials[.]” Rule 56(c)(1)(A).5 “An issue of fact is material if, under the
applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case . . . .[and] [a]n issue of

4

Exhibit A in support of Roach and Kraft’s Motion for Summary Judgment is Kendry’s “face sheet.”
Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding summary-judgment
motions.” Rule 56 advisory committee’s note 2010 Amends.
5

The standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged. The language of
subdivision (a) continues to require that there be no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The amendments will not
affect continuing development of the decisional law construing and applying these phrases.
Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 F. App’x 874, 879 n.3 (11th Cir. 2013). “[A]lthough the interpretations in the
advisory committee[’s] notes are not binding, they are highly persuasive.” Id. Thus, case law construing the
former Rule 56 standard of review remains viable and applies here.

3

fact is genuine if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the nonmoving party.” Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to
the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that
should be decided at trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving
party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the
pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support
of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th
Cir. 2004).
Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over facts
that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude
the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court “must view all
evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary
judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros.
Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam)).
4

III. Facts
Because the Court is presented with cross-motions for summary judgment, it must
first ascertain whether the facts are in dispute. If the Court finds factual disputes regarding
issues of material fact, then it must deny both motions. Griffis v. Delta Family-Care
Disability, 723 F.2d 822, 824 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[B]efore the court can consider the legal
issues raised by the parties on cross-motions for summary judgment, it must have no
doubt as to the relevant facts that are beyond dispute.”) The parties disagree on two
points: (1) whether Kendry notified Roach and Kraft prior to the attack that he was in fear
for his life and requested protection; and (2) the nature and extent of Kendry’s injuries
resulting from the attack.
A. Failure to Protect Claim
Kendry asserts that two Latin Kings gang members named Bledsoe (Kendry’s
cellmate) and Rodriguez “brutally attacked” and stabbed him with a knife on September
29, 2014. Amended Complaint at 5. Kendry asserts that, four days prior to the attack, he
told Kraft “he was having problems with his roommate, inmate Bledsoe . . . and that he
needed a room change or protective custody . . . because inmate Bledsoe had stated: ‘I
don’t like you faggot ass n***er and they need to kill all you mother****ers.’” Id.; Kendry
Affidavit at 3. 6 According to Kendry, Kraft responded, “you need to learn to f**k or fight”
and ordered Kendry to return to his assigned dormitory. Kendry Affidavit at 3. Kendry
asserts that, later that afternoon, he informed Roach about Bledsoe’s “threat on his life”

6
Page numbers reflect the pagination assigned by the Court’s CM/ECF docketing system, which are found
at the top of each page.

5

and requested protection. Id. Kendry states that Roach responded, “I will look into this
later,” and directed Kendry to return to his cell. Id.
Roach and Kraft concede Kendry “was assaulted by Bledsoe and Rodriguez” on
September 29, 2014. Roach Answer at 2; Kraft Answer at 2. Indeed, a prison official’s
review of the fixed-wing camera footage from Kendry’s cell block confirmed the attack:
I observed inmates Bledsoe, Barry . . . and Rodriguez,
Christopher . . . striking inmate Kendry inside of cell G2-113.
Inmate Kendry then ran out of the cell and proceeded up the
stairwell. Inmates Bledsoe and Rodriguez then exited the cell
(G2-113) and followed inmate Kendry up the stairs. At
approximately 2115 hours inmate Kendry attempted to walk
past inmate Bledsoe to go back down the stairs and inmate
Bledsoe struck him in the facial area with a clinched fist.
Inmates Bledsoe and Rodriguez were placed in
Administrative Confinement. . . .
Def. Ex. D (Doc. 84-4) at 4. While Roach and Kraft agree that Bledsoe and Rodriguez
attacked Kendry, they assert, as an undisputed fact, that “[t]here is no evidence that
[Kendry] advised either Defendant Roach or Kraft of any issues he was having with any
inmate, he was in fear for his life, or [made] any requests to be moved or placed in
protective management.” Defense Motion at 2. Indeed, in their sworn declarations, each
attests he was “never made aware by Mr. Kendry of any issues he was having with any
inmate in September 2014.” Def. Exs. B, C (Docs. 84-2, 84-3). Roach and Kraft each
further state that, had Kendry informed him that he (Kendry) was having an issue with an
inmate, he (the officer) would have separated Kendry and that inmate, informed his
superiors, and created an incident report.7 Id.

7
Roach and Kraft further rely on Kendry’s sworn deposition testimony in which Kendry conceded he did
not file a grievance prior to the attack. Def. Ex. E (Doc. 84-5) at 2-3.

6

In addition, Roach and Kraft note that Kendry did not accuse them of failing to act
until “several weeks” after the attack when, on October 20, 2014, Kendry submitted a
grievance, claiming that four days prior to the attack he had reported to Kraft that he was
having “problems” with his roommate. Defense Motion at 5; Pl. Ex. A at 13. Roach and
Kraft also rely on a grievance Kendry filed two days after the attack, on October 1, 2014,
in support of their assertion that Kendry did not immediately implicate them. Defense
Motion at 5. In that grievance, Kendry complained that:
[the] attack could have been prevented if the staff would not
have placed a know[n] Latin King in the cell with a black in the
[illegible] . . . . The Administration caused me to be beaten,
and stabbed in the back by the hate mongers. . . . I’ve been
here five years and I haven’t had any problems with my
roomates [sic] until they put these radical Latin Kings in my
cell. (I’m also receiving death threats while in confinement
from this gang.)
Pl. Ex. A (Doc. 36-1) at 5-6. Kendry does not reference Roach or Kraft in this grievance,8
nor does he suggest that he reported to anyone he was in fear of his life or feared a
particular inmate. See id. In Kendry’s Response to Roach and Kraft’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, he argues he did “implicate Kraft and Roach immediately after the incident
occurred.” Kendry Response at 5.

8

Five days after Kendry submitted this grievance, on October 6, 2014, Kendry submitted an inmate request
in which he sought the “name and rank of the housing official whom [sic] placed inmate Bledsoe” in his cell,
and he sought the name and rank of the officers on duty in his dorm on the day of the incident, and on
September 24, 2014, five days prior to the incident. See Pl. Ex. A (Doc. 36-1) at 12. Presumably, in this
request, Kendry was seeking the names of those officers to whom he claimed to have reported Bledsoe’s
threat. For reasons set forth in this Order, the date Kendry actually implicated Roach and Kraft is not
determinative.

7

B. Kendry’s Injuries
Kendry alleges suffering numerous physical injuries as a result of the attack:
“extensive brain damage that consistently causes him headaches, nosebleeds, . . .
deafness in both ears, visual impairment in both eyes, progressive memory loss,
equilibrium impairment that causes stroke like [symptoms], slurring of speech with mouth
twisting to the left and stagnant walking ability.” Amended Complaint at 5. In his Motion
for Summary Judgment, Kendry asserts he also suffers from numbness on the left side
of his body. Kendry Motion at 3; Kendry Affidavit at 3. During his deposition, taken on
January 4, 2017, Kendry testified to additional physical injuries that he attributes to the
attack: a broken finger, pinched nerve in his back, and facial damage (permanent
indentation). Def. Ex. E (Doc. 84-5) at 11-12. Kendry testified he told the nurse that his
finger hurt when he reported to medical on the day of the attack. Id. at 6, 11. Kendry said
he knew it was broken because of “the way it swelled,” but he conceded he has never
had his finger diagnosed as broken and did not seek follow-up treatment after the day of
the attack. Id. at 8-9.
Because in Roach and Kraft’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants assert
as an undisputed fact that “there is no evidence Kendry was stabbed,” see Defense
Motion at 3, Kendry notes that Bledsoe and Rodriguez were found guilty of stabbing him.
Kendry Response at 5. Kendry also contends that the dorm camera and his medical
reports from the day of the attack confirm Bledsoe and Rodriguez “beat and stabbed [him]
. . . with their fists and a knife in the area of [his] head, back, chest, abdomen and face.”9

9

Disciplinary reports for both Bledsoe and Rodriguez reflect they were found guilty of battery or attempted
battery, not stabbing, and a review of the fixed wing camera mentions no involvement of any weapons other
than “clinched fists.” Def. Ex. F (Doc. 84-6) at 1, 12.

8

Kendry Affidavit at 2; Amended Complaint at 5. The nurse who treated Kendry noted he
suffered edema on the inside of his lip, with no open areas, and a small scratch on his
left shoulder area. Def. Ex. D (Doc. 84-4) at 6. The nurse cleaned the scratch and applied
a Band-aid. The discharge instructions directed Kendry to sign up for a sick call if needed.
Id. at 7. Additionally, a shift supervisor who visited Kendry in the medical unit following
the attack determined that no outside medical treatment was warranted for his injuries,
which were noted to be a “small laceration to his bottom lip and small scratch mark to his
left shoulder area.” Id. at 3.
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Roach and Kraft submitted the
declaration of Albert Carl Maier, M.D., J.D., who concluded Kendry’s claimed injuries are
unsupported by the medical records. According to Dr. Maier, the “only injuries noted were
a swollen lip and a scratch on his shoulder.” Id. at 1. Dr. Maier stated that a review of
Kendry’s medical file from 2013 through October 2015 revealed no evidence of Kendry
seeking additional treatment for injuries related to the September 29, 2014 attack. Id. With
respect to Kendry’s alleged vision problems resulting from the attack, Dr. Maier refers to
a pre-attack inmate request (dated August 8, 2014) in which Kendry complained about
his eyesight. In that request, Kendry wrote that his “eyesight [was] getting worse and it
seems like [he’s] going blind . . . and [his] vision is constantly blurred for long periods of
time.” Id. at 9. Dr. Maier also disputed Kendry’s claims about his memory and speech
based upon two post-attack mental health records (dated January 2 and January 30,

9

2015) in which the doctor noted normal speech, memory, and thought process.10 Id. at
10-11.
IV. Law and Conclusions
The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take reasonable measures to
guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
However, prison officials are not constitutionally liable for every inmate-on-inmate attack.
Id. Instead, it is “[a] prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of harm
to an inmate [that] violates the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 828. The deliberate indifference
standard requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the prison official subjectively was
aware of a risk of harm: mere negligence is not sufficient. Id. at 828, 835-36.
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment “when a
substantial risk of serious harm, of which the official is
subjectively aware, exists and the official does not respond
reasonably to the risk.” Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346,
1349 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted and
alterations adopted) (emphasis added). ...
Moreover, this must be shown by “conduct that is more than
gross negligence.” Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d
1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2010). “[T]he deliberate indifference
standard—and the subjective awareness required by it—is far
more onerous than normal tort-based standards of conduct
sounding in negligence: ‘Merely negligent failure to protect an
inmate from attack does not justify liability under [§] 1983.’”
Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1332 (quoting Brown v. Hughes, 894
F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Losey v. Thompson, 596 F. App’x 783, 788-89 (11th Cir. 2015).
A prison official subjectively knows of a risk of harm to an inmate when he
“disregards an excessive risk to [the] inmate’s health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

10
According to those records, Kendry was treating with a mental health professional for depression,
seemingly unrelated to the attack.

10

Thus, to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate must show a prison official
“actually (subjectively) knows that an inmate is facing a substantial risk of serious harm,
yet disregards that known risk by failing to respond to it in an (objectively) reasonable
manner.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 844). “The known risk of injury must be a ‘strong likelihood,
rather than a mere possibility’ before a guard’s failure to act can constitute deliberate
indifference.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F. 2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990).
Prison officials may avoid Eighth Amendment liability in one of three ways: (1)
showing that they were not aware “of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently
substantial danger”; (2) admitting awareness of “the underlying facts” of a substantial
danger, but believing the danger was nonexistent; or (3) claiming to have responded
reasonably to a known substantial danger. Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 617-18 (citing Farmer,
511 U.S. at 844). In this case, Roach and Kraft rely on the first method: they assert they
were unaware of a substantial danger because Kendry never reported a threat. Defense
Motion at 2, 4-5. Thus, the subjective knowledge requirement is at issue.
To satisfy the subjective knowledge requirement, a plaintiff must show that a prison
official is “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Whether a prison official “had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question
of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from the
circumstantial evidence.” Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 617 (emphasis in original). However,
the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “‘threats between inmates are common and do
not, under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a substantial risk of
11

harm’.” Woodyard v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 700 F. App’x 927, 932 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 1996)).
Notably, where a plaintiff presents evidence that he reported only a vague,
generalized fear or problems with other inmates rather than a specific and particularized
threat of harm, courts have not hesitated to grant summary judgment in favor of the prison
officials. See, e.g., Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003); McBride v.
Rivers, 170 F. App'x 648, 655 (11th Cir. 2006). For example, in Carter, the plaintiff
submitted evidence that prison officials knew the inmate who later attacked him was a
“problem inmate” and was roaming the cell he shared with plaintiff like a “caged animal.”
352 F.3d at 1348. He further presented evidence that he told prison officials that the
inmate was acting crazy, that the inmate intended to fake a hanging, and that the inmate
told the plaintiff that he (the plaintiff) would help fake the hanging “one way or another.”
Id. The Carter court found these circumstances to be insufficient to create a genuine issue
of fact on the question of whether the defendant prison officials were actually, subjectively
aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. Id. at 1349. In doing so, the
court noted that there was no evidence that the plaintiff explicitly told the prison officials
that he feared his cellmate or that his cellmate had clearly threatened him. Id. The court
also found that the cellmate’s statement that the plaintiff would help him fake a hanging
required an inappropriate “inferential leap” in order for the prison officials to interpret the
statement as a threat to the plaintiff. Id. at 1349. Last, the court noted that the plaintiff
never told prison officials that he considered the inmate’s statements to be a threat. Id. at
1350. At most, the court said, the prison officials were negligent by failing to separate the
inmates, but such was insufficient to justify liability under § 1983. Id. See also Estate of
12

Owens v. GEO Grp., Inc., 660 F. App'x 763, 770 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding no evidence
that the prison official “had any belief, suspicion, knowledge, or inclination that [the
inmate] would attack when he did” or that the inmate posed any particularized threat to
the plaintiff). But see Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1101 (11th Cir.
2014) (holding the district court erred in granting summary judgment where the plaintiff
presented evidence that the defendants knew of the inmate’s violent past, and, the day
before the alleged incident, the inmate set fire in the cell he shared with the plaintiff, yet
defendants placed them both back in the cell together despite plaintiff’s complaints of
fear).
In McBride, the court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of prison
officials, despite the fact that the plaintiff presented evidence that he specifically asked
not to be placed in a cell with the inmate who later attacked him. 170 F. App'x at 655.
According to the record, the plaintiff reported telling a prison guard, “me and that dude
had problems. I'm in fear for my life. Don't put me in the cell with him.” Id. The court found
this evidence to be insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the prison
officials were subjectively aware of a serious risk of harm. In reaching its conclusion, the
court noted that the plaintiff did not identify a “specific prior incident, from which the
defendant could infer that a substantial risk existed.” Id.
In contrast, where a plaintiff presents evidence of a more particularized threat, a
jury question will exist. Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 620-21. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Rodriguez is instructive here because it involved somewhat similar circumstances and
provides an example of a threat report sufficiently specific to create a jury question. Id. In
Rodriguez, the court, recounting the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
13

summarized that the plaintiff reported to two prison guards on at least two occasions that
he wanted to be transferred because Latin Kings gang members “wanted to kill [him]”
after he renounced his affiliation with the gang. Id. at 614-16. The plaintiff was stabbed
only hours after he was released back to the general population, a decision made at a
classification review meeting in which the defendants participated and after the plaintiff
had again requested to be transferred. Id. at 615-16. With regard to the subjective
knowledge inquiry, one defendant, in a motion for summary judgment, denied any
knowledge of the reports. Id. at 619. The other defendant, however, in a motion for
directed verdict at trial, acknowledged the plaintiff reported a threat, but, relying on Carter,
argued the threat was too vague. Id. at 621. The court rejected that defendant’s reliance
on Carter, finding that the plaintiff’s reported threat was more specific than that of the
Carter plaintiff’s. Id. at 621-22. In doing so, the court determined that a jury could find that
the plaintiff reported the following:
(1) that he was a former Latin King who decided to renounce
his membership; (2) that members of the Latin Kings had
threatened to kill him when he returned to the compound in
retaliation for his renunciation; (3) that the compound at [the
correctional facility] was heavily populated with Latin Kings;
and (4) that, in order to prevent an attempt on his life, he
needed either to be transferred to another institution or to be
placed in protective custody. These are things that the inmate
in Carter did not do.
Id. at 621.
Here, Kendry’s alleged reported threat, like that in Carter, fails to reach the
specificity required to impute actual knowledge to Roach and Kraft of a substantial risk of
serious harm to Kendry. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Defendants frame
the argument incorrectly. The question before the Court at summary judgment is not
14

whether Kendry in fact reported the alleged threat at all. He has sworn that he did and
sworn to the substance of his statements to Kraft and Roach. At this stage of the
proceedings, the Court must accept his statements as the facts. Thus, the proper question
before the Court is whether Kendry’s reported threat was sufficiently specific to impute to
Roach and Kraft knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.11
Even accepting Kendry’s allegations as true, Kendry’s reports to Roach and Kraft
amount to no more than vague references to “problems” with his cellmate or statements
of generalized fear. See Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349. According to Kendry, he told Kraft “he
was having problems with his roommate, inmate Bledsoe . . . and that he needed a room
change or protective custody . . . because inmate Bledsoe had stated: ‘I don’t like you
faggot ass n***er and they need to kill all you mother****ers.’” Kendry Affidavit at 3
(emphasis added). Kendry asserts that, later that afternoon, he informed Roach about
Bledsoe’s “threat on his life” and requested protection but never suggests he made any
statement beyond, or more specific than, what he reported to Kraft. Id. In other words,
what Kendry reported was that he and Bledsoe were having problems, he wanted
protection, Bledsoe did not like Kendry, and Bledsoe believed that all gay African
American inmates should be killed. This generalized statement is much less specific than
the one reported by the plaintiff in Rodriguez. See 508 F.3d at 621-22. The Rodriguez
plaintiff articulated a particularized threat of harm to himself, rather than a generalized

11

The fact that Roach and Kraft flatly deny that Kendry reported a threat of fear (or suggest his sworn
statement lacks credibility), see Defense Motion at 6, provides insufficient grounds on which to grant
summary judgment in their favor. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court cannot engage in
impermissible credibility determinations. See Furcron v. Mail Centers Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th
Cir. 2016); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998) (stating that, in a motion for summary
judgment, it is improper to simply attack the opposing party’s credibility); Hall v. Bennett, 447 F. App’x 921,
924 (11th Cir. 2011) (reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment because the court improperly
“weighed the witnesses’ credibility by favoring” the officer’s account over the prisoner-plaintiff’s).

15

threat or derogatory statements about a particular class of people. He reported that gang
members “wanted to kill [him],” and he referenced a specific, articulable event that caused
his fear—renouncing his affiliation with the gang and a specific gang population. Id.
Kendry’s after-the-fact allegation that his attack was at the hands of Latin Kings gang
members does not save his claim. Importantly, Kendry does not assert in his sworn
affidavit or his Amended Complaint that he informed either Roach or Kraft, when he
allegedly reported the threat, that it came from a known gang member. See Kendry
Affidavit. Instead, Kendry reported a threat from his “cellmate” or another “inmate.” See
id. at 3.
Moreover, this Court does not read the Rodriguez opinion to suggest that all inmate
reports of gang-related threats result in a heightened duty for prison officials to act in the
absence of a specific threat report based on an articulable incident. See 508 F.3d at 62122. Rather, the Rodriguez court’s discussion of gang involvement related to the specific
facts the plaintiff had reported in that case. Indeed, the Rodriguez court observed that,
“[i]n the context of this case, we conclude that the gang-related threats made on
[plaintiff’s] life, which were explicitly reported to prison officials, present a substantial
enough risk of harm to trigger a prison official’s Eighth Amendment duty to act.” Id. at 617
n.12 (emphasis added). As such, what the Rodriguez court held was that the plaintiff’s
reports of gang involvement, in that case, provided the necessary specificity required to
create an issue of fact for a jury’s determination. See id. at 620-21. Here, Kendry did not
even suggest gang involvement. He neither explicitly reported to Roach or Kraft a specific
threat of physical harm or death made against him, nor did he indicate that, if a threat
were made against him, there was a particular reason that defendants should have
16

understood it as creating a substantial risk of harm. His statements are simply insufficient
to create an issue of fact on the question of whether Defendant Roach or Kraft had actual
knowledge of a substantial threat of harm to Kendry.
Even if Kendry himself interpreted Bledsoe’s statement as a direct threat against
his life that is not enough. Imputing to Roach and Kraft actual knowledge of a
particularized threat of harm based on Kendry’s vague report of generalized fear would
require an impermissible “inferential leap.” See Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349 (“Defendants
would have had to read imaginatively all derogatory and argumentative statements made
between prisoners to determine whether substantial risks of serious harm exist.”). At
most, Kendry’s report of Bledsoe’s threat can be interpreted as a general expression of
hatred toward homosexuals or African Americans. Bledsoe did not tell Kendry that he
(Bledsoe) planned to, or even wanted to, physically harm Kendry. If Kendry had reported
to Roach and Kraft that Bledsoe stated, “I hate you because you are homosexual, and I
am going to kill you,” that would be different. Bledsoe, however, merely expressed that
some unnamed actors (“they”) should kill a class of inmates that included Kendry. Roach
and Kraft’s failure to act on this complaint amounts, at most, to mere negligence and not
deliberate indifference. See id.; see also Bowen v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison, 826
F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[I]t is only a heightened degree of culpability that will
satisfy the subjective knowledge component of the deliberate indifference standard, a
requirement that is ‘far more onerous than normal tort-based standards of conduct
sounding in negligence.’”).
Upon review of the record, the Court concludes that, viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to Kendry and drawing reasonable inferences in his favor, there are
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insufficient facts from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Roach and Kraft acted
with deliberate indifference to a known, substantial risk of serious harm to Kendry. As
such, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted and Kendry’s
Motion is due to be denied.12
Therefore, it is now ORDERED:
1.

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to change the docket to reflect the

correct initial of Defendant Kraft’s first name as “E.” See Defense Motion (Doc. 84) at 1
n.1.
2.

Kendry’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 78) is DENIED.

3.

Roach and Kraft’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 84) is GRANTED.

4.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants Roach and Kraft as

well as Defendants Todd and Barnes pursuant to the Court’s August 25, 2016 Order (Doc.
56).13
5.

The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions and close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 31st day of January, 2018.

Jax-6 1/30
c:
Simmie Kendry, FDOC #102106
Counsel of Record

12

In light of the Court’s ruling, it is unnecessary to address whether Kendry suffered more than a de minimis
physical injury.
13
Defendants Todd and Barnes were previously dismissed from this action, but the Court withheld judgment
in their favor pending adjudication of this action as a whole.

18