Workman v. Secretary, Department of Corrections et al
Filing
20
ORDER denying the Petition 1 , and dismissing the action with prejudice. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 10/23/2017. (BL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
OLIVER WORKMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 3:15-cv-306-J-34JBT
SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner Oliver Workman, a former inmate of the Florida
penal system, initiated this action on March 11, 2015, by filing a
pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition; Doc. 1) under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 and a Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition
(Doc. 2). In the Petition, Workman challenges a 2010 state court
(Putnam
County,
Florida)
judgment
of
conviction
for
Medicaid
provider fraud and grand theft. Respondents have submitted a
memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Response to Petition
(Response; Doc. 7) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). On September 11,
2015, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause and Notice to
Petitioner (Doc. 6), admonishing Workman regarding his obligations
and giving Workman a time frame in which to submit a reply. Workman
submitted a brief in reply. See Petitioner's Reply (Doc. 9);
Appendix (Pet. Ex.; Doc. 11). This case is ripe for review.
II. Procedural History
On July 7, 2009, the State of Florida charged Workman with
Medicaid provider fraud (count one) and grand theft over $100,000
(count two). See Resp. Ex. A at 20, Information. On July 7, 2010,
Workman entered a guilty plea. See Resp. Exs. C, Transcript of the
Plea Proceeding (Plea Tr.); A at 42, Pretrial Minutes. On August
18, 2010, the court sentenced Workman to a term of imprisonment of
five
years
for
Medicaid
provider
fraud,
and
to
a
term
of
imprisonment of seven years for grand theft, to run concurrently to
count one, followed by ten years of probation with restitution of
$485,909.07. Resp. Exs. A at 46, 47-51, 54-65; C, Transcript of the
Sentencing Proceeding. During the sentencing hearing, Workman filed
a written statement. See Resp. Ex. A at 52.
On direct appeal, Workman, with the benefit of counsel, filed
a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and
a motion to withdraw as counsel. See Resp. Ex. D at 1-12, 13-14.
The State filed a notice that it did not intend to file a brief.
See id. at 16-17. On May 3, 2011, the appellate court
affirmed
Workman's conviction and sentence per curiam, see Workman v. State,
60 So.3d 1075 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Resp. Ex. D at 18, and mandate
issued on May 25, 2011, see Resp. Ex. D at 20.
Workman filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief (Rule
3.850 motion) pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850
on April 29, 2011. See Resp. Ex. E at 1-27. In his Rule 3.850
2
motion, he asserted that counsel (Wade M. Rolle) was ineffective
because he failed to: protect his civil, constitutional and human
rights when the trial court erred (ground one); file a direct
appeal (ground two); conduct a pretrial investigation (additional
claim); present any evidence relating to the possibility that
Workman could have paid back the money in a brief amount of time
(additional claim); and make any statements or arguments after the
court
imposed
the
sentence
(additional
claim).
Additionally,
Workman states that counsel was ineffective because he: represented
him under a conflict of interest (ground three); made a false and
misleading promise that resulted in an involuntary plea (ground
four); denied him a probable cause hearing and a fair and impartial
hearing (ground five); overlooked a Brady1 violation (ground six);
and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment due to his
misrepresentation, conflict of interest, and misconduct (ground
seven). The State responded, see id. at 63-65, and Workman replied,
see id. at 82-116. On March 28, 2012, the post-conviction court
denied the Rule 3.850 motion as to
grounds one, two, three, five,
six, seven, and Workman's additional claims, and set an evidentiary
hearing on ground four. See id. at 117-21. The court held an
evidentiary hearing on March 14, 2012, see id. at 180; denied the
Rule 3.850 motion as to ground four, see id. at 135-38; and later
denied Workman's motion for rehearing, see id. at 158-62, 165. On
1
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
3
appeal, Workman filed an initial brief, see Resp. Ex. F at 1-18;
the State filed an answer brief, see id. at 19-30; and Workman
filed a reply brief, see id. at 31-48. On June 4, 2013, the
appellate court affirmed the court's denial of post-conviction
relief per curiam, see Workman v. State, 114 So.3d 955 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2013); Resp. Ex. F at 49, and the mandate issued on June 28,
2013, see Resp. Ex. F at 50.
On August 16, 2013, Workman filed a pro se motion to mitigate,
reduce, or modify sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.800(c) (Rule 3.800(c) motion). See Resp. Ex. G at 1-8. The court
denied the Rule 3.800(c) motion on September 6, 2013. See id. at
9.
On November 22, 2013, Workman filed a pro se motion to correct
illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a)
(1st Rule 3.800(a) motion). See id. at 10-16. In the 1st Rule
3.800(a) motion, Workman asserted that the trial court's imposition
of "dual sentences for the two offenses" was a violation of double
jeopardy. Id. at 13. The court denied the 1st Rule 3.800(a) motion
on December 17, 2013. See id. at 18. Workman filed a motion to
correct the court's order. See id. at 19-28. He asserted that the
court mistakenly stated he entered into a negotiated plea on
several counts when he had actually entered an open plea on two
counts, which entitled him to raise a double jeopardy claim. After
4
a hearing on April 14, 2014,2 the court entered an amended order
denying Workman's 1st Rule 3.800(a) motion, stating in pertinent
part:
THIS MATTER came before the Court on the
defendant's pro se Motion to Correct Sentence
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.800(a). The defendant asserts that he was
unlawfully subjected to double jeopardy. The
defendant entered into an open plea on two (2)
counts, including a first degree felony. On
the first degree felony, the defendant was
sentenced to 7 years of incarceration followed
by 10 years of probation. The remaining felony
involved a concurrent and lesser sentence.
There is simply no merit to the defendant's
claim.
Id. at 29 (emphasis deleted). Workman did not appeal the court's
denial of his 1st Rule 3.800(a) motion.
On December 5, 2013, Workman wrote a letter, dated December
2nd, to Judge Mendoza. In the letter, he asked for modification of
his sentence and referred to the court's denial of his first Rule
3.800(c) motion. See id. at 15-16. The court construed the letter
as a second Rule 3.800(c) motion, and denied it on December 17,
2013. See id. at 17.
On June 26, 2014, Workman filed a second motion to correct
illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
2
See Response to Motion to Supply Transcript of Evidentiary
Hearing (Doc. 14), at 1 (stating "it would appear that the trial
judge simply let Workman orally argue his double jeopardy claim"
because no witnesses were called, and no evidence was presented at
the April 14, 2014 hearing); see also Doc. 14 at 6, Motion Hearing
Minutes; Pet. Exs. B; C.
5
3.800(a) (2nd Rule 3.800(a) motion). See id. at 30-59. On August
20, 2014, the trial court denied the 2nd Rule 3.800(a) motion,
stating in pertinent part:
THIS MATTER came before the Court on the
Defendant's most recent pro se Motion to
Correct Sentence filed pursuant to Florida
Rule
of
Criminal
Procedure
3.800(a).
Specifically, the Defendant claims that he is
being illegally detained in the Florida
Department
of
Corrections
because
his
constitutional rights to not be charged twice
for the same offense ha[ve] been violated and
thus
the
Defendant
should
be
released
immediately from prison.
The Defendant has filed virtually the
same Motion twice and an evidentiary hearing
was held on the matter on April 14, 2014. The
Defendant's Motion was denied. (See Appendix
A).
The
Defendant's
successive.
latest
Motion
is
See id. at 60 (emphasis deleted). Workman filed a notice of appeal,
see id. at 63, and motion for rehearing, see id. at 65-68, on
September 3, 2014. The court denied his motion for rehearing on
September 15, 2014. See id. at 69. On appeal, Workman filed an
initial brief, see id. at 70-84, and the State notified the court
that it did not intend to file an answer brief, see id. at 85-86.
On November 10, 2014, the appellate court affirmed the court's
denial of post-conviction relief per curiam, see Workman v. State,
152 So.3d 594 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014); Resp. Ex. G at 87, and denied
his motion for rehearing on December 15, 2014, see Resp. Ex. G at
6
88-91, 92. The mandate issued on January 5, 2015. See Resp. Ex. G
at 93.
On January 2, 2015, Workman filed a pro se motion to correct
manifest injustice and miscarriage of justice pursuant to Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) (3rd Rule 3.800(a) motion). See
Resp. Ex. H at 1-7. In the 3rd Rule 3.800(a) motion, Workman
asserted that the court, in prior orders, never ruled on the merits
of his double jeopardy claim. The court denied the motion on
January 14, 2015. See id. at 8. Workman did not appeal the court's
denial of his motion.
III. One-Year Limitations Period
The Petition appears to be timely filed within the one-year
limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
IV. Evidentiary Hearing
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner
to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez
v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir.
2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a
federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an
applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if
true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief."
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y,
Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S.Ct. 2245 (2017). "It follows that if the record
7
refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes
habeas
relief,
a
district
court
is
not
required
to
hold
an
evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts
of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court.
Because this Court can "adequately assess [Workman's] claim[s]
without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d
1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be
conducted.
V. Governing Legal Principles
A. Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas
corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification
Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct.
1432 (2017). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal
habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in
the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error
correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)
(quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final
state court decisions is "'greatly circumscribed' and 'highly
deferential.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343
(11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the
last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on
8
the merits. See Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 834 F.3d
1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct.
1203 (2017); Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277,
1285 (11th Cir. 2016). Regardless of whether the last state court
provided a reasoned opinion, "it may be presumed that the state
court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any
indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary."
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011) (citation omitted);
see also Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, --, 133 S.Ct. 1088,
1096 (2013).3 Thus, the state court need not issue an opinion
explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to
qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Richter, 562 U.S. at
100.
If the claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court,
§ 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's
decision
(1)
"was
contrary
to,
or
involved
an
unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
3
The presumption is rebuttable and "may be overcome when
there is reason to think some other explanation for the state
court's decision is more likely." Richter, 562 U.S. at 99-100; see
also Johnson, 133 S.Ct. at 1096-97. However, "the Richter
presumption is a strong one that may be rebutted only in unusual
circumstances . . . ." Johnson, 133 S.Ct. at 1096.
9
presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);
Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:
First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal
review for claims of state courts' erroneous
legal conclusions. As explained by the Supreme
Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120
S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), §
2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a
"contrary to" clause and an "unreasonable
application" clause. The "contrary to" clause
allows for relief only "if the state court
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that
reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question
of law or if the state court decides a case
differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a
set of materially indistinguishable facts."
Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (plurality
opinion).
The
"unreasonable
application"
clause allows for relief only "if the state
court identifies the correct governing legal
principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions
but unreasonably applies that principle to the
facts of the prisoner's case." Id.
Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal
review for claims of state courts' erroneous
factual determinations. Section 2254(d)(2)
allows federal courts to grant relief only if
the state court's denial of the petitioner's
claim
"was
based
on
an
unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the
evidence
presented
in
the
State
court
proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The
Supreme
Court
has
not
yet
defined
§
2254(d)(2)'s "precise relationship" to §
2254(e)(1), which imposes a burden on the
petitioner to rebut the state court's factual
findings "by clear and convincing evidence."
See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S.
Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accord
Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 135 S.
Ct. 2269, 2282, 192 L.Ed.2d 356 (2015).
Whatever that "precise relationship" may be,
"'a state-court factual determination is not
unreasonable merely because the federal habeas
court
would
have
reached
a
different
10
conclusion in the first instance.'"[4] Titlow,
571 U.S. at ---, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (quoting
Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S. Ct.
841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010)).
Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S.Ct. 2298 (2017); see also Daniel v. Comm'r, Ala.
Dep't of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2016). Also,
deferential review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the
record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim
on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011)
(stating the language in § 2254(d)(1)'s "requires an examination of
the state-court decision at the time it was made"); Landers v.
Warden, Att'y Gen. of Ala., 776 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015)
(regarding § 2254(d)(2)).
Where
the
state
court's
adjudication
on
the
merits
is
"'unaccompanied by an explanation,' a petitioner's burden under
section 2254(d) is to 'show[] there was no reasonable basis for the
state court to deny relief.'" Wilson, 834 F.3d at 1235 (quoting
Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). Thus, "a habeas court must determine what
arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have supported,
the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is
possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or
theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of
4
The Eleventh Circuit has described the interaction between
§ 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1) as "somewhat murky." Clark v. Att'y
Gen., Fla., 821 F.3d 1270, 1286 n.3 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
137 S.Ct. 1103 (2017).
11
[the] Court." Richter, 562 U.S. at 102; see also Wilson, 834 F.3d
at 1235. To determine which theories could have supported the state
appellate court's decision, the federal habeas court may look to a
state trial court's previous opinion as one example of a reasonable
application of law or determination of fact. Wilson, 834 F.3d at
1239; see Butts v. GDCP Warden, 850 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir.
2017), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-512 (Sept. 29, 2017).5
However, in Wilson, the en banc Eleventh Circuit stated that the
federal habeas court is not limited to assessing the reasoning of
the lower court. 834 F.3d at 1239. As such,
even when the opinion of a lower state court
contains flawed reasoning, [AEDPA] requires
that [the federal court] give the last state
court to adjudicate the prisoner's claim on
the merits "the benefit of the doubt,"
Renico,[6] 559 U.S. at 773, 130 S.Ct. 1855
(quoting Visciotti,[7] 537 U.S. at 24, 123
S.Ct. 357), and presume that it "follow[ed]
the law," Donald,[8] 135 S.Ct. at 1376 (quoting
Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 24, 123 S.Ct. 357).
Id. at 1238.
Thus, "AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas
relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state
5
Although the United States Supreme Court has granted
Wilson's petition for certiorari, the "en banc decision in Wilson
remains the law of the [Eleventh Circuit] unless and until the
Supreme Court overrules it." Butts, 850 F.3d at 1205 n.2.
6
Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766 (2010).
7
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002).
8
Woods v. Donald, 135 U.S. 1372 (2015).
12
court." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16 (2013). "Federal courts
may grant habeas relief only when a state court blundered in a
manner so 'well understood and comprehended in existing law' and
'was so lacking in justification' that 'there is no possibility
fairminded jurists could disagree.'" Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338
(quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102-03). "This standard is 'meant to
be' a difficult one to meet." Rimmer v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.,
864 F.3d 1261, 1274 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at
102). Thus, to the extent that Workman's claims were adjudicated on
the merits in the state courts, they must be evaluated under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d).
B. Exhaustion/Procedural Default
There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before
bringing a § 2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must
exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging
his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust
state remedies, the petitioner must "fairly present[]" every issue
raised in his federal petition to the state's highest court, either
on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489
U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust
a claim, "state prisoners must give the state courts one full
opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one
complete
round
of
the
State's
established
appellate
review
process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
13
In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court
explained:
Before seeking a federal writ of habeas
corpus,
a
state
prisoner
must
exhaust
available
state
remedies,
28
U.S.C.
§
2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the
"'"opportunity to pass upon and correct"
alleged violations of its prisoners' federal
rights.'" Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365,
115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (per
curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.
270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438
(1971)). To provide the State with the
necessary "opportunity," the prisoner must
"fairly present" his claim in each appropriate
state court (including a state supreme court
with powers of discretionary review), thereby
alerting that court to the federal nature of
the claim. Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115
S.Ct. 887; O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.
838, 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1
(1999).
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A state prisoner's failure to properly exhaust available state
remedies results in a procedural default which raises a potential
bar to federal habeas review. The United States Supreme Court has
explained the doctrine of procedural default as follows:
Federal habeas courts reviewing the
constitutionality of a state prisoner's
conviction and sentence are guided by rules
designed to ensure that state-court judgments
are
accorded
the
finality
and
respect
necessary to preserve the integrity of legal
proceedings within our system of federalism.
These rules include the doctrine of procedural
default, under which a federal court will not
review the merits of claims, including
constitutional claims, that a state court
declined to hear because the prisoner failed
to abide by a state procedural rule. See,
14
e.g., Coleman,[9] supra, at 747–748, 111 S.Ct.
2546; Sykes,[10] supra, at 84–85, 97 S.Ct.
2497.
A state court's invocation of a
procedural rule to deny a prisoner's claims
precludes federal review of the claims if,
among other requisites, the state procedural
rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to
support the judgment and the rule is firmly
established and consistently followed. See,
e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. --, --, 131
S.Ct. 1120, 1127–1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011);
Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. --, --, 130 S.Ct.
612, 617–618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). The
doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims
from being heard is not without exceptions. A
prisoner may obtain federal review of a
defaulted claim by showing cause for the
default and prejudice from a violation of
federal law. See Coleman, 501 U.S., at 750,
111 S.Ct. 2546.
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012). Thus, procedural
defaults
may
be
excused
under
certain
circumstances.
Notwithstanding that a claim has been procedurally defaulted, a
federal court may still consider the claim if a state habeas
petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from
the default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward v.
Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010); In Re Davis, 565 F.3d
810, 821 (11th Cir. 2009). In order for a petitioner to establish
cause,
the procedural default "must result from some
objective factor external to the defense that
prevented [him] from raising the claim and
which cannot be fairly attributable to his own
9
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
10
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
15
conduct." McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252,
1258 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Carrier, 477
U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639).[11] Under the
prejudice prong, [a petitioner] must show that
"the
errors
at
trial
actually
and
substantially disadvantaged his defense so
that he was denied fundamental fairness." Id.
at 1261 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494, 106
S.Ct. 2639).
Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).
In
the
petitioner
absence
may
of
receive
a
showing
of
consideration
cause
on
and
the
prejudice,
merits
of
a
a
procedurally defaulted claim if he can establish that a fundamental
miscarriage of justice, the continued incarceration of one who is
actually innocent, otherwise would result. The Eleventh Circuit has
explained:
[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and
prejudice, there remains yet another avenue
for him to receive consideration on the merits
of his procedurally defaulted claim. "[I]n an
extraordinary case, where a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a
federal habeas court may grant the writ even
in the absence of a showing of cause for the
procedural default." Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496,
106 S.Ct. at 2649. "This exception is
exceedingly narrow in scope," however, and
requires proof of actual innocence, not just
legal innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d
1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001).
Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. "To meet this standard, a petitioner must
'show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have convicted him' of the underlying offense." Johnson v.
11
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
16
Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Schlup v.
Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally, "'[t]o be credible,'
a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not
presented at trial." Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)
(quoting
Schlup,
513
U.S.
at
324).
With
the
rarity
of
such
evidence, in most cases, allegations of actual innocence are
ultimately summarily rejected. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.
C. Double Jeopardy Clause
The Eleventh Circuit has stated:
"The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment provides that no person shall be
'subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb.'" Jones v.
Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 380, 109 S.Ct. 2522,
2525, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (1989) (quoting U.S.
Const., amend. V). In addition to protecting
against multiple prosecutions for the same
offense, the Clause also prohibits "multiple
punishments for the same offense imposed in a
single proceeding." Id. at 381, 109 S.Ct. at
2525 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the context of multiple punishments,
the purpose of double jeopardy is simply to
"ensur[e] that the total punishment did not
exceed that authorized by the legislature."
Id. (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435, 450, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1903, 104 L.Ed.2d
487 (1989)); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,
366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983)
("[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does no more
than prevent the sentencing court from
prescribing greater punishment than the
legislature
intended.").
Therefore,
in
enforcing
the
federal
double-jeopardy
guarantee, we "must examine the various
offenses for which a person is being punished
to determine whether, as defined by the
legislature, any two or more of them are the
17
same offense." United States v. Dixon, 509
U.S. 688, 745, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2881, 125
L.Ed.2d 556 (1993). In effect, we ask whether
the offenses are "sufficiently distinguishable
to permit the imposition of cumulative
punishment." Id. at 745, 113 S.Ct. at 2881–82
(quotation marks omitted). Where no clear
legislative intent has been expressed, we
apply the "same-elements test" of Blockburger,
which provides that two statutes are not the
"same offense" for purposes of double jeopardy
if "each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not." Blockburger, 284
U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182.[12]
Stoddard v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 600 F. App'x 696, 703-04 (11th
Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct.
114 (2015).
VI. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
A. Ground One
As ground one, Workman asserts that the state trial court
never ruled on the merits of his double jeopardy claim, which
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. See Petition at 5. He states:
[Rule] 3.800(a) post-conviction motion was
never adjudicated on the merits. There were
substantive rights for the 3.800(a) motion
after the trial court corrected the wrong
information submitted by them. The trial court
denied the motion based on wrong information
submitted by them. All denied motions (2) were
... with no authority citation. The second
[Rule] 3.800(a) [motion] was indicated as
successive when there was no legal restriction
indicated as to what made it successive[.] The
trial court initially denied the [Rule]
3.800(a) [motion] based on wrong information
that the petitioner had entered a negotiated
12
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
18
plea when it was not. It was, when corrected
by the trial court, an open plea to the mercy
of the court which made it with substantive
rights to be challenged as [a] violation of
double jeopardy rights. No refute from the
record[.]
Id. Workman raised the claim in his 3rd Rule 3.800(a) motion. See
Resp. Ex. H at 1-7. The state court denied the motion, stating in
pertinent part:
THIS MATTER came before the Court on the
Defendant's pro se Motion to Correct Manifest
Injustice and Miscarriage of Justice . . .
filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(a). The Defendant again claims
a double jeopardy violation and claims that
the prior Order claiming the Defendant's
identical claim in past Motions was successive
was a miscarriage of justice because a prior
Order that resulted in a denial . . . was not
based on the merits.
Attached as Collective Appendix A, are
the past Orders from the Court denying the
Defendant's claim on the merits and the
Defendant's Appeal along with a copy of a
Mandate affirming the lower Court's decision.
Id. at 8 (emphasis deleted). Workman did not appeal the court's
denial of the 3rd Rule 3.800(a) motion. Respondents contend that
the claim is procedurally barred since Workman failed to appeal the
court's denial. See Response at 5-9. On this record, the Court
agrees that the claim has not been exhausted, and is therefore
procedurally barred since Workman failed to raise the claim in a
procedurally correct manner. Workman has not shown either cause
excusing the default or actual prejudice resulting from the bar.
19
Moreover, he has failed to identify any fact warranting the
application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception.13
Even assuming that Workman's claim is not procedurally barred,
he is not entitled to relief. To the extent that the state court
adjudicated his claim of manifest injustice on the merits, the
Court will address the claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications.
After a review of the record and the applicable law, the Court
concludes that the state court's adjudication of this claim was not
contrary to clearly established federal law and did not involve an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Nor
was
the
state
court's
adjudication
based
on
an
unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the state court proceedings. Accordingly, Workman is not entitled
to relief on the basis of this claim.
Moreover, assuming that the state court's adjudication of this
claim
is
not
entitled
to
deference,
Workman's
claim
is,
nevertheless, without merit. Respondents contend, see Response at
10, and this Court agrees, that the claim presents an issue purely
of state law not cognizable on federal habeas review. In essence,
he challenges the state trial judge's rulings on his Rule 3.800(a)
motions. The purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to review
13
Workman entered a plea of guilty, see Plea Tr. at 26; Resp.
Ex. A at 42, and confessed to his unlawful behavior in a written
statement at sentencing, see Resp. Ex. A at 52.
20
the lawfulness of Workman's custody to determine whether that
custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.14 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
Workman's conviction and sentence do not violate the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States. Thus, Workman is not
entitled to federal habeas relief on ground one.
B. Ground Two
As ground two, Workman asserts that the State of Florida
charged him twice for the same criminal conduct in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Petition at 7.
He states:
The charges of Medicaid Provider Fraud and
Grand
Theft
resulted
from
the
same
conduct/act. No separate act/conduct was done
to create the two charges as occurring
separately. In order for the Grant Theft to
be, Medicaid Provider Fraud had to occur. When
Medicaid Provider Fraud was committed so was
the Grand Theft. The Grand Theft was the
necessarily lesser charge. [The] Grand Theft
conviction cannot stand, as it did not involve
a separate and distinct criminal episode from
Medicaid Provider Fraud. The Grand Theft
charge should be vacated and the Medicaid
Fraud should be affirmed by the court.
Id. Workman raised the claim in his 1st Rule 3.800(a) motion, and
the state court denied the motion on the merits; he did not appeal
14
Section 2254(a) of Title 28 provides that "a district court
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court" upon a showing that his custody is in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States.
21
the court's denial. He raised the claim again in his 2nd Rule
3.800(a) motion; the state court denied the motion as successive;
and the appellate court affirmed the court's denial per curiam.
Respondents contend that the claim is procedurally barred. See
Response at 7 ("[D]ue to his failure to appeal from the denial of
the first motion and the affirmance of the ruling as to the second
motion[,] Workman has procedurally defaulted . . . ."). On this
record, the Court agrees that the claim has not been exhausted, and
is therefore procedurally barred since Workman failed to raise the
claim in a procedurally correct manner. Workman has not shown
either cause excusing the default or actual prejudice resulting
from
the
bar.
warranting
the
Moreover,
he
application
has
of
failed
the
to
identify
fundamental
any
fact
miscarriage
of
justice exception.
Even assuming that Workman's claim is not procedurally barred,
he is not entitled to relief. To the extent that the state court
adjudicated his claim on the merits when it denied his 1st Rule
3.800(a) motion, the Court will address the claim in accordance
with the deferential standard for federal court review of state
court
adjudications.
applicable
law,
the
After
a
review
Court
concludes
of
the
that
record
the
state
and
the
court's
adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established
federal law and did not involve an unreasonable application of
clearly
established
federal
law.
22
Nor
was
the
state
court's
adjudication based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.
Accordingly, Workman is not entitled to relief on the basis of this
claim.
Moreover, assuming that the state court's adjudication of this
claim
is
not
entitled
to
deference,
Workman's
claim
is,
nevertheless, without merit. The State of Florida charged Workman
with two criminal offenses: Medicaid provider fraud and grand
theft. See Resp. Ex. A at 20. The Information states:
R.J. LARIZZA, State Attorney for the Seventh
Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida and
as such prosecuting attorney for this Court,
in the name of and by the authority of the
State of Florida charges that:
COUNT I: IN THAT OLIVER WORKMAN[,] on or about
January 3, 2003, in the County of PUTNAM and
State of Florida, did knowingly make, cause to
be made or aid and abet in the making of any
false statement or false representation of a
material fact, by commission or omission, in
any claim submitted to the agency or its
fiscal agent for payment contrary to Florida
Statute 409.920(2)a. (3 DEG FEL)[15]
15
Florida Statutes section 409.920(2)(a) provides:
A person may not:
1. Knowingly make, cause to be made, or aid
and abet in the making of any false statement
or false representation of a material fact, by
commission or omission, in any claim submitted
to the agency or its fiscal agent or a managed
care plan for payment.
23
COUNT II: IN THAT OLIVER WORKMAN, on or about
January 3, 2003, in the County of PUTNAM and
State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use,
or endeavor to obtain or use US Currency of a
value of $100,000.00 or more, which was the
property of, or any other person not the
defendant(s) of the property or benefit
therefrom or to appropriate the property to
the use of OLIVER WORKMAN or to the use of any
person not entitled thereto, contrary to
Florida Statute 812.014(1)(2)(a)1. (1 DEG
FEL)[16]
Id. Notably, the State of Florida charged each criminal offense
under a separate statute. Medicaid provider fraud and grand theft
each require proof of an element that the other does not. Medicaid
provider fraud requires the making of a false statement or false
representation of a material fact; grand theft does not. Grand
theft requires a taking of another's property; Medicaid provider
fraud does not. Moreover, neither Medicaid provider fraud nor grand
theft is a lesser-included offense of the other offense. The
16
Florida Statutes section 812.014(1) provides:
A person commits theft if he or she knowingly
obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to
use, the property of another with intent to,
either temporarily or permanently:
(a) Deprive the other person of a right to the
property or a benefit from the property.
(b) Appropriate the property to his or her own
use or to the use of any person not entitled
to the use of the property.
Florida Statutes section 812.014(2)(a)1. states: "If the property
stolen is valued at $100,000 or more . . . ."
24
criminal acts are of a separate character and type requiring
different elements of proof, and are codified in separate statutes.
As such, punishment for these distinct criminal acts does not
violate double jeopardy. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299 (1932); McKinney v. State, 66 So.3d 852 (Fla. 2011); Fla. Stat.
§ 775.021(4)(a) (Florida's codification of the Blockburger test).
Therefore, Workman is not entitled to federal habeas relief as to
ground two.
VII. Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)
If Workman seeks issuance of a certificate of appealability,
the undersigned opines that a certificate of appealability is not
warranted. This Court should issue a certificate of appealability
only if the petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make this
substantial showing, Workman "must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists
would
find
the
district
court's
assessment
of
the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v. Dretke, 542
U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000)), or that "the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further,'" Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893
n.4 (1983)).
Where
a
constitutional
district
claims
court
on
the
25
has
rejected
merits,
the
a petitioner's
petitioner
must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. However, when the district court has
rejected a claim on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show
that "jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Id. Upon
consideration of the record as a whole, this Court will deny a
certificate of appealability.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.
The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this action is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2.
The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment denying the
Petition and dismissing this case with prejudice.
3.
If Workman appeals the denial of the Petition, the Court
denies a certificate of appealability. Because this Court has
determined that a certificate of appealability is not warranted,
the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions report any
motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this
case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.
26
4.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and
terminate any pending motions.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 23rd day of
October, 2017.
sc 10/20
c:
Oliver Workman
Counsel of Record
27
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