Powers v. Jones
Filing
3
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with directions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 5/19/2015. (BL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
BOBBY DEWAYNE POWERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:15-cv-595-J-34PDB
JULIE JONES,
Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Plaintiff Bobby Dewayne Powers, an inmate of the Florida penal
system, initiated this action on May 12, 2015, by filing a pro se
Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the
Complaint, Powers names Julie Jones, the Secretary of the Florida
Department of Corrections, as the only Defendant. He asserts that
his rights under the Eighth Amendment have been violated because
mentally ill inmates are confined with inmates who are not mentally
ill. He also complains that his assigned institution is "so
distant"
from
impossible"
family
for
them
compensatory damages.
and
to
friends
visit
that
him.
As
it
is
"difficult
relief,
he
or
requests
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires the Court to dismiss
this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I)-(iii).
Additionally, the Court must read Plaintiff's pro se allegations in
a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in
law or fact." Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.)
(citing Battle v. Central State Hospital, 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th
Cir. 1990)). A complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to
state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is not automatically
frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section
1915(e)(2)(B)(I) dismissals should only be ordered when the legal
theories are "indisputably meritless," id. at 327, or when the
claims rely on factual allegations which are "clearly baseless."
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). "Frivolous claims
include claims 'describing fantastic or delusional scenarios,
claims with which federal district judges are all too familiar.'"
Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears
that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Bilal v.
Driver, 251 F.3d at 1349.
2
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured under
the United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such
deprivation occurred under color of state law. Bingham v. Thomas,
654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation
omitted); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010)
(per curiam) (citations omitted). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit
"'requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the
official's
acts
or
omissions
and
the
alleged
constitutional
deprivation' in § 1983 cases." Rodriguez v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.,
508 F.3d 611, 625 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright,
802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986)). More than conclusory and vague
allegations are required to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See L.S.T., Inc., v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 684 (11th Cir.
1995) (per curiam); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th
Cir. 1984). In the absence of a federal constitutional deprivation
or violation of a federal right, Plaintiff cannot sustain a cause
of action against the Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
As to Powers' supervisory claim against Defendant Julie Jones,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has
stated:
"Supervisory officials are not liable under
section 1983 on the basis of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability." Belcher v.
City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th
Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). "The standard by which a
3
supervisor is held liable in her individual
capacity for the actions of a subordinate is
extremely rigorous." Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at
1234 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).[1]
"Supervisory liability occurs
either
when
the
supervisor
personally
participates in the alleged constitutional
violation or when there is a causal connection
between actions of the supervising official
and the alleged constitutional deprivation."
Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th
Cir. 1990).
"The necessary causal connection can be
established 'when a history of widespread
abuse puts the responsible supervisor on
notice of the need to correct the alleged
deprivation, and he fails to do so.'" Cottone,
326 F.3d at 1360 (citation omitted).[2] "The
deprivations that constitute widespread abuse
sufficient to notify the supervising official
must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of
continued duration, rather than isolated
occurrences." Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. A
plaintiff can also establish the necessary
causal connection by showing "facts which
support an inference that the supervisor
directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or
knew
that
the
subordinates
would
act
unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing
so," Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1235, or that a
supervisor's "custom or policy . . . resulted
in deliberate indifference to constitutional
rights," Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495
(11th Cir. 1991).
Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008). Further, the
Eleventh Circuit stated:
In a § 1983 suit, liability must be based on
something more than respondeat superior.
1
Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003).
2
Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2003).
4
Brown,[3] 906 F.2d at 671. Supervisory
liability can be found when the supervisor
personally
participates
in
the
alleged
constitutional violation, or when there is a
causal connection between the supervisory
actions and the alleged deprivation. Id. A
causal connection can be established through a
showing of a widespread history of the
violation. Id. at 672.
Reid v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 486 F. App'x 848, 852 (11th
Cir. 2012); Charriez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 596 F. App'x
890, 895 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Thus, any supervisory claim
against Defendant Jones fails because Plaintiff has failed to
allege any facts suggesting that Jones personally participated in
any violations of Powers' federal statutory or constitutional
rights.
To the extent that Powers asserts that the Defendant violated
his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment by housing him at a "psych camp," the Eleventh Circuit
has explained the requirements for an Eighth Amendment violation.
While the Constitution does not require
comfortable prisons, the Eighth Amendment's
proscription of cruel and unusual punishments
does mandate that prison officials "must
provide humane conditions of confinement"
ensuring inmates receive adequate food,
shelter, clothing, and medical care. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970,
1977, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Nevertheless,
the Eighth Amendment does not authorize
judicial reconsideration of every governmental
action affecting a prisoner's well-being, and
only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
3
Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667 (11th Cir. 1990).
5
pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct.
995, 998, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).
Eighth Amendment challenges to conditions
of confinement are subject to a two-part
analysis. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278,
1289 (11th Cir. 2004). First is the "objective
component," requiring a prisoner to prove the
condition
they
[sic]
complain
of
is
"sufficiently serious" to violate the Eighth
Amendment, meaning that, at the very least, it
presents an unreasonable risk of serious
damage to his or her future health or safety.
Id. The risk must be "so grave that it
violates contemporary standards of decency to
expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk."
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 113
S.Ct. 2475, 2481, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993).
Second, the "subjective component" of the
analysis requires the prisoner to show that
the defendant prison officials acted with a
culpable state of mind, judged under a
"deliberate indifference" standard. Chandler,
379 F.3d at 1289. To prove deliberate
indifference, a prisoner must show that the
defendants had subjective knowledge of a risk
of serious harm, and disregarded that risk
through conduct constituting more than gross
negligence. Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d
1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2013).
Redding v. Georgia, 557 F. App'x 840, 843-44 (11th Cir. 2014) (per
curiam); Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2010).
In the instant action, Powers has not alleged sufficient facts
to satisfy the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment standard. He
does
not
allege
that
his
housing
assignment
results
in
any
deprivation, let alone an extreme deprivation. See Chandler v.
Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004) (highlighting that
"extreme
deprivations"
are
required
6
to
establish
an
Eighth
Amendment conditions of confinement claim) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In the absence of any extreme deprivation, no
federal
constitutional
right
is
infringed
by
simply
housing
mentally healthy inmates with mentally ill inmates. See Ochoa v.
Ammons, No. 1:08-cv-00120-WLSRLH, 2009 WL 891900, at *4 (M.D. Ga.
Mar.
30,
2009)
(dismissing
the
plaintiff's
claim
that
his
institution had "no proper policy or enforcement to separate" the
mentally healthy inmates from the mentally ill inmates, where the
plaintiff did "not allege that he personally suffered any injury as
a result of this failure to separate"); Nolley v. Cnty. of Erie,
776 F.Supp. 715, 739-40 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that segregation
of an inmate with human immuno-deficiency virus in a ward housing
suicidal and psychologically unstable inmates did not violate the
Eighth Amendment, as the overall conditions in the ward, while
severe, were not sufficiently traumatic). Here, Powers fails to
assert that he personally suffered any injury as a result of the
Department's decision to house him at a "psych camp." See Hernandez
v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 281 F. App'x 862, 866 (11th Cir. 2008)
(stating plaintiff "did not allege a deprivation that posed an
unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health").
Powers also complains that the institution is located too far
from family and friends, and therefore they are unable to visit
him. His assertion regarding visitation is due to be dismissed.
The Supreme Court has held that an inmate
does not have a liberty interest in or right
7
to "unfettered visitation" and thus denial of
visitation is not protected by the Due Process
Clause. See Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460-61, 109 S.Ct.
1904,
1908–09,
104
L.Ed.2d
506
(1989)
(concluding that "[t]he denial of prison
access to a particular visitor . . . is not
independently protected by the Due Process
Clause"); see also Caraballo–Sandoval v.
Honsted, 35 F.3d 521, 525 (11th Cir. 1994)
(holding that "inmates do not have an absolute
right to visitation, such privileges being
subject to the prison authorities' discretion
provided that the visitation policies meet
legitimate penological objectives").
Charriez, 596 F. App'x at 893-94. Moreover, "an inmate has no
justifiable
expectation
that
he
will
be
incarcerated
in
any
particular prison within a State[.]" Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S.
238, 245 (1983) (footnote omitted); see also Barfield v. Brierton,
883 F.2d 923, 936 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S.
215
(1976))
(stating
"inmates
usually
possess
no
constitutional right to be housed at one prison over another").
In light of the foregoing, this case will be dismissed,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), without prejudice to Powers'
right to refile his claims against the proper defendants and with
sufficient factual allegations to support a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, if he elects to do so.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.
This
Plaintiff's
case
right
is
to
hereby
refile
DISMISSED
his
8
claims
without
against
prejudice
the
to
proper
defendants and with sufficient factual allegations to support a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if he elects to do so.
2.
The Clerk shall send a civil rights complaint form and an
Affidavit of Indigency to Plaintiff. If he elects to refile his
claims, he may complete and submit the proper forms. Plaintiff
should not place this case number on the forms. The Clerk will
assign a separate case number if Plaintiff elects to refile his
claims. In initiating such a case, Plaintiff should either file a
fully completed Affidavit of Indigency (if he desires to proceed as
a pauper) or pay the $400.00 filing fee (if he does not desire to
proceed as a pauper).
3.
case
The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this
without
prejudice,
terminating
any
pending
motions,
and
closing the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 19th day of
May, 2015.
sc 5/18
c:
Bobby Dewayne Powers
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