Williams v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections et al

Filing 37

ORDER granting Respondents' request to dismiss 19 the case as untimely, and dismissing the action with prejudice, with instructions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 5/16/2018. (BL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

FREDDIE LEE WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 3:15-cv-635-J-34JBT

SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner Freddie Lee Williams, an inmate of the Florida
penal system, initiated this action on May 18, 2015,1 by filing a
pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. He filed an Amended Petition (Doc. 5) on September 27,
2015. In the Amended Petition, Williams challenges a 2004 state
court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for burglary
of

a

dwelling.

Respondents

have

submitted

a

memorandum

in

opposition to the Amended Petition. See Respondents' Motion to
1

Giving Petitioner the benefit of the mailbox rule, this
Court finds that the Petition was filed on the date Petitioner
handed it to the prison authorities for mailing to this Court. See
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). The Court will also give
Petitioner the benefit of the mailbox rule with respect to his
inmate state court filings when calculating the one-year
limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Dismiss (Response; Doc. 19) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). On October
18, 2016, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause and Notice to
Petitioner

(Doc.

12),

admonishing

Williams

regarding

his

obligations and giving Williams a time frame in which to submit a
reply.

On

February

2,

2018,

Williams

replied.

See

Reply

to

Respondents' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 35). This case is ripe for
review.
II. One-Year Limitations Period
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on petitions for
writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation
shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest
of-(A) the date on which the judgment
became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of
the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment
to filing an application created by
State action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United
States is removed, if the applicant
was prevented from filing by such
State action;
(C)
the
date
on
which
the
constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme
Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and

2

made retroactively applicable
cases on collateral review; or

to

(D) the date on which the factual
predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered
through
the
exercise
of
due
diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other
collateral
review
with
respect
to
the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall
not be counted toward any period of limitation
under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
Respondents contend that Williams has not complied with the
one-year period of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
The following procedural history is relevant to the one-year
limitations issue. On November 17, 2003, the State of Florida
charged Williams with burglary of a dwelling. See Resp. Ex. 2 at 9,
Information. Williams proceeded to a jury trial in May 2004, see
Resp. Exs. 4, 5, Transcripts of the Jury Trial (Tr.), at the
conclusion of which, on May 19, 2004, the jury found him guilty, as
charged, see Resp. Ex. 2 at 117, Verdict; Tr. at 341-42. On June
17, 2004, the court sentenced Williams to a term of imprisonment of
eighteen years. See Resp. Ex. 2 at 142-47, Judgment. On June 6,
2005,

the

appellate

court

affirmed

Williams'

conviction

and

sentence per curiam, and the mandate issued on June 22, 2005. See
Resp. Ex. 9.

3

Williams' conviction became final on Sunday, September 4, 2005
(90 days from June 6, 2005). See Close v. United States, 336 F.3d
1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 2003) ("According to rules of the Supreme
Court, a petition for certiorari must be filed within 90 days of
the appellate court's entry of judgment on the appeal or, if a
motion for rehearing is timely filed, within 90 days of the
appellate court's denial of that motion."). Because Williams'
conviction was after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the
AEDPA, Williams had one year from the date his conviction became
final to file the federal petition (Tuesday, September 6, 2006).2
The Petition, filed on May 18, 2015, is due to be dismissed as
untimely unless Williams can avail himself of one of the statutory
provisions which extends or tolls the limitations period.3
With

the

one-year

limitations

period

having

expired

on

September 6, 2006, none of Williams' motions filed after September
6, 2006, could toll the limitations period because there was no

2

Williams had until September 6, 2006, because Monday,
September 5th, was a federal holiday (Labor Day).
3

To the extent Williams asserts that the one-year
limitations period should run from "the date on which the
impediment to filing an application created by State action in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is
removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State
action," 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), he has failed to carry his
burden of showing that the inability to file unconstitutionally
prevented him from exercising the fundamental right of access to
the courts in order to challenge his conviction, see Akins v.
United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1090 (11th Cir. 2000).
4

period remaining to be tolled.4 See Sibley v. Culliver, 377 F.3d
1196, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that, where a state prisoner
files post-conviction motions in state court after the AEDPA
limitations period has expired, those filings cannot toll the
limitations period because "once a deadline has expired, there is
nothing left to toll"). Given the record, Williams' May 18, 2015
Petition is untimely filed, and due to be dismissed unless Williams
can establish that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations
is warranted.
"When a prisoner files for habeas corpus relief outside the
one-year limitations period, a district court may still entertain
the petition if the petitioner establishes that he is entitled to
equitable tolling." Damren v. Florida, 776 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 830 (2017). The United States
Supreme Court has established a two-prong test for the application
of equitable tolling, stating that a petitioner must show "(1) that
he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
filing." Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quotations
and citation omitted); Cadet v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 853 F.3d 1216,
1221 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 1042 (2018). As an
extraordinary remedy, equitable tolling is "limited to rare and

4

See Resp. Exs. 1 at 3, Docket Entry 313; 10 at 1-118,
Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief, filed May 29, 2007.
5

exceptional circumstances and typically applied sparingly." Cadet,
853 F.3d at 1221 (quotations and citation omitted). The burden is
on Williams to make a showing of extraordinary circumstances that
"are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence,"
and this high hurdle will not be easily surmounted. Howell v.
Crosby, 415 F.3d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotations and
citation omitted); Wade v. Battle, 379 F.3d 1254, 1265 (11th Cir.
2004) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
Williams acknowledges that his Petition is untimely filed. See
Reply at 1. He simply has not met the burden of showing that
equitable tolling is warranted. Upon review, the Court finds that
Williams has not demonstrated that an extraordinary circumstance
prevented him from timely filing his federal Petition. Insofar as
Williams argues that he did not have access to his legal materials
and transcripts while in confinement and/or close management at
Jefferson Correctional Institution and Santa Rosa Institution, such
circumstances generally are not extraordinary, and are not such in
the instant case. See Miller v. Florida, 307 F. Appx. 366, 368
(11th Cir. 2009) (affirming a district court's dismissal of a
habeas petition as untimely; "restricted access to a law library,
lock-downs, and solitary confinement" as well as lack of education
and inability to

access legal assistance generally do not qualify

as circumstances warranting equitable tolling).

6

Additionally,

Williams

asserts

that

he

was

diligent

in

pursuing his claims in federal court because he submitted a letter
on June 11, 2009, explaining the delay. See Case No. 3:09-cv-545-J25HTS. He therefore states that "the actual delay" in presenting
his federal claims is approximately three years. See Reply at 2. In
the letter, Williams asserted that he was "confused" about the
federal limitations period because inmate law clerks and his
appellate attorney had given him inadequate advice, and the federal
limitations period had expired by the time he exhausted his state
court remedies. See Case No. 3:09-cv-545-J-25HTS, Letter (Doc. 1).5
A

habeas

petitioner's

lack

of

legal

training

and

a

general

ignorance or confusion regarding the law are not extraordinary
circumstances warranting equitable tolling. See Rivers v. United
States, 416 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005); Perez v. Florida, 519
F. App'x 995, 997 (11th Cir. 2013). Indeed, like other litigants,
pro se litigants "are deemed to know of the one-year statute of
limitations." Outler v. United States, 485 F.3d 1273, 1282 n.4
(11th Cir. 2007). Moreover, insofar as Williams asserts that the
prison's law library lacked legal materials relating to the proper
filing of a federal petition, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that
record evidence was insufficient to support a causal connection

5

The Court dismissed the case on June 29, 2009, without
prejudice to give Williams an opportunity to properly prepare and
refile his habeas claims after he exhausted his state court
remedies. See Case No. 3:09-cv-545-J-25HTS, Order of Dismissal
Without Prejudice (Doc. 4), filed June 29, 2009.
7

between a petitioner's untimely filing and any alleged inadequacies
in the prison library. See Helton v. Sec'y for the Dept. of Corr.,
259 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001). Similarly, Williams has
neither shown that his confinement status nor inadequacies in the
library or inmate law clerk program affected his ability to timely
file his federal petition.6
To the extent Williams claims he is actually innocent, this
Court

finds

that

he

has

not

made

the

requisite

showing.

In

McQuiggin v. Perkins, the United States Supreme Court held that a
claim

of

actual

innocence,

if

proven,

provides

an

equitable

exception to the one-year statute of limitations. 569 U.S. 383, 386
(2013).
We hold that actual innocence, if proved,
serves as a gateway through which a petitioner
may pass whether the impediment is a
procedural bar, as it was in Schlup[7] and
House,[8] or, as in this case, expiration of
the statute of limitations. We caution,
however, that tenable actual-innocence gateway
pleas are rare: "[A] petitioner does not meet
the threshold requirement unless he persuades
the district court that, in light of the new
evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would
have voted to find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt." Schlup, 513 U.S., at 329,
6

Notably, Williams was able to file a pro se motion for
clarification in the First District Court of Appeal on September
22, 2005, see http://onlinedocketsdca.flcourts.org, Case No. 1D043073, when he was allegedly in a confinement status at Jefferson
Correctional Institution awaiting a transfer to close management at
Santa Rosa Correctional Institution, see Reply at 2-3.
7

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).

8

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006).
8

115 S.Ct. 851; see House, 547 U.S. at 538, 126
S.Ct. 2064 (emphasizing that the Schlup
standard is "demanding" and seldom met). And
in making an assessment of the kind Schlup
envisioned, "the timing of the [petition]" is
a factor bearing on the "reliability of th[e]
evidence" purporting to show actual innocence.
Schlup, 513 U.S., at 332, 115 S.Ct. 851.
Id. at 386-87.
Thus, to make a showing of actual innocence, Williams must
show "that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). Here, Williams has not
offered any new reliable evidence that was not available at the
time of his trial. He has not produced exculpatory scientific
evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical
evidence that was not available at the time of his trial. As such,
he has not met the high bar of providing new evidence that supports
factual innocence. Indeed, Williams has failed to point to any
evidence to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that no
juror, acting reasonably, would have found him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt in light of new evidence. He has presented no new
evidence establishing that he is actually innocent of the crime.
This is not an "extraordinary" case under the Schlup standard.
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006).
Williams has not shown a justifiable reason why the dictates
of the one-year limitations period should not be imposed upon him.

9

For this reason, this Court will dismiss this case with prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
III. Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)
If Williams seeks issuance of a certificate of appealability,
the undersigned opines that a certificate of appealability is not
warranted. This Court should issue a certificate of appealability
only if the petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make this
substantial showing, Williams "must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists

would

find

the

district

court's

assessment

of

the

constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v. Dretke, 542
U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000)), or that "the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further,'" Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893
n.4 (1983)).
Where

a

constitutional

district
claims

court
on

the

has

rejected

merits,

the

a petitioner's
petitioner

must

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. However, when the district court has
rejected a claim on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show
that "jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
10

right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Id. Upon
consideration of the record as a whole, this Court will deny a
certificate of appealability.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.

Respondents' request to dismiss (Doc. 19) the case as

untimely is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2.

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment dismissing

this case with prejudice.
3.

If Williams appeals the dismissal of the case, the Court

denies a certificate of appealability. Because this Court has
determined that a certificate of appealability is not warranted,
the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions report any
motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this
case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.

11

4.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and

terminate any pending motions.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 16th day of
May, 2018.

sc 5/16
c:
Freddie Lee Williams, FDOC #095064
Counsel of Record

12