Hall v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 27

OPINION AND ORDER affirming the Commissioner's decision. Signed by Magistrate Judge Monte C. Richardson on 11/14/2016. (MEH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
MARY J. HALL,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 3:15-cv-941-J-MCR

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
_______________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s appeal of an administrative
decision denying her application for a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits. Plaintiff alleges she became disabled on August 31, 2011. Plaintiff’s
application was denied initially and on reconsideration. A hearing was held
before the assigned Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on November 21, 2013, at
which Plaintiff was represented by an attorney. (Tr. 41-70.) The ALJ found
Plaintiff not disabled since August 31, 2011, the alleged onset date, through
December 18, 2013, the date of the decision. (Tr. 22-33.)
Plaintiff is appealing the Commissioner’s decision that she was not
disabled during the relevant time period. Plaintiff has exhausted her available
administrative remedies and the case is properly before the Court. The
undersigned has reviewed the record, the briefs, and the applicable law. For the
1

reasons stated herein, the undersigned determines that the Commissioner’s
decision is due to be AFFIRMED.
I.

Standard of Review
The scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the

Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841
F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether the Commissioner’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390
(1971). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir.
2004). Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence,
the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary
result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937
F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th
Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into
account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d
835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating the court must scrutinize the entire record to
determine the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s factual findings).

2

II.

Discussion
Plaintiff argues the following three general points on appeal: (a) that the

ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination is not supported by
substantial evidence; (b) that the ALJ failed to pose a proper hypothetical
question to the vocational expert (“VE”); and (c) that the ALJ’s credibility
determination is not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 25 at 2-3.)
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to include manipulative
limitations in the RFC determination despite affording great weight to the opinions
of examining physician Timothy McCormick, D.O., MPH. Plaintiff also argues that
because the ALJ failed to include Plaintiff’s manipulative limitations in the RFC
determination, the ALJ erred in failing to include such limitations in the
hypothetical question posed to the VE. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed
to articulate specific reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s credibility, which are
supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 25.)
Defendant responds that the ALJ sufficiently accounted for Plaintiff’s
limitations in the RFC determination. Further, Defendant contends that the ALJ’s
reliance on the VE’s testimony and the ALJ’s credibility determination was proper.
Defendant asserts that the ALJ properly concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled
and that substantial evidence confirms the ALJ’s conclusion. (Doc. 26.)
A.

The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had severe impairments, including
3

bladder prolapse, disorders of the spine, degenerative disc disease, anxiety,
affective disorder, headaches, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. (Tr.
24.) The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of
the listed impairments. (Tr. 24-26.)
Continuing on with the evaluation, the ALJ made the following RFC
determination:
the undersigned finds that the claimant has the [RFC] to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except
that the claimant needs to avoid ladders or unprotected
heights; the operation of heavy moving machinery; and
concentrated dust, fumes, or gases. The claimant needs a low
stress work environment with no production line. The claimant
can occasionally bend, crouch, kneel, and stoop. The
claimant needs to avoid squatting and crawling; the push pull
of arm controls; and the operation of foot controls. The
claimant needs a sit-stand option (i.e., to be able to either sit
or stand at her option).
(Tr. 26.) In making this finding, the ALJ assigned great weight to consulting
physician Dr. McCormick who opined that Plaintiff “is probably functioning in more
of a lighter activity level based on the health problems as described,” as such
opinion “is consistent with the medical evidence of record, including the doctor’s
own findings.” (Tr. 28.) Moreover, the ALJ afforded great weight to the opinions
of state agency medical consultant Charles Moore, M.D. “to the extent [the
opinions are] consistent with the assessed [RFC].” (Tr. 31.) However, the ALJ
rejected Dr. Moore’s opinions to the extent that they contain greater or additional
4

restrictions than the assessed RFC because they “are not consistent with the
medical evidence of record or supported by the record as a whole.” (Id.) The
ALJ presented the following discussion with respect to Dr. Moore’s proposed
manipulative limitations:
For example, the undersigned finds that the claimant has no
limitation with overhead reaching, handling, or fingering. On
April 2012, the claimant had good grip strength bilaterally and
normal dexterity. The claimant had reduced range of motion in
the right shoulder; however, she had full strength in the upper
extremities (Exhibit 16F). Thereafter, in July 2013, the
claimant had no restriction in range of motion of the
extremities. Strength was normal and motor function was
intact (Exhibit 25F/2). In August 2013, the claimant denied
back pain, joint pain, and joint swelling. She moved all
extremities well (Exhibit 23F/6). On examination in September
2013, the claimant had good muscle tone and strength with no
swelling, tenderness, or limitation of motion of any joint. The
neurologic exam was within normal limits with no motor deficits
and normal sensation (Exhibit 23F/2).
(Id.)
The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms, but that Plaintiff’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her
symptoms were not entirely credible for the reasons explained in the decision.
(Tr. 28.) Later in the decision, the ALJ explained that “the record does not
support a resulting inability to work.” (Tr. 30.) The ALJ referenced medical
records contradicting Plaintiff’s ability to work. (Id.) Moreover, the ALJ noted
Plaintiff’s conservative medical treatment and her receipt of unemployment
5

compensation in 2011 and 2012. (Id.)
With the benefit of testimony from VE Donna Mancini, the ALJ determined
that there are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy
that Plaintiff can perform based on her age, education, work experience, and
RFC, such as cashier, ticket seller, and ticket taker. (Tr. 32-33.) As such, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 33.)
B.

The ALJ’s RFC Determination Was Proper

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform light work with certain
restrictions. (Tr. 26.) The ALJ did not include in the RFC manipulative
limitations, such as limitations with overhead reaching, handling, and/or fingering.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s failure to include such limitations in the RFC
determination was improper for two reasons. First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ
erred in affording great weight to the opinions of Dr. McCormick without including
manipulative limitations. Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in not
accepting the manipulative limitations set forth by state agency medical
consultant Dr. Moore. The undersigned disagrees with both of Plaintiff’s
contentions.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Dr. McCormick did not opine that Plaintiff
had manipulative limitations, or otherwise opine that Plaintiff had greater
restrictions than those found by the ALJ. Upon examination of Plaintiff on April
16, 2012, Dr. McCormick opined that despite Plaintiff’s symptoms of arthritis, she
6

has “normal dexterity” and that “she has good grip [strength] bilaterally.” (Tr. 28,
493.) Dr. McCormick noted that Plaintiff also had full range of motion, except for
her right shoulder, and had full strength and intact sensation in her upper
extremities. (Id.) Dr. McCormick opined that Plaintiff’s primary problems are
neck-related complaints and that she is “probably functioning in more of a lighter
activity level,” despite her symptoms. (Tr. 494.)
As support for her argument that Dr. McCormick included manipulative
limitations that the ALJ ignored, Plaintiff points to Dr. McCormick’s evaluation
report where he referenced Plaintiff’s swelling consistent with an arthritic process
in certain finger joints, Plaintiff’s report of tenderness in those joints, her
complaint of discomfort at the wrist during Tinel’s testing, and her report of right
middle finger problems and stenosing tenosynovitis in the right middle finger. (Tr.
493-94.) However, the mere presence of these impairments does not undermine
the ALJ’s RFC determination. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1213, n.6
(11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he mere existence of these impairments does not reveal the
extent to which they limit [his] ability to work or undermine the ALJ’s [RFC]
determination in that regard.”). Moreover, Plaintiff argues that Dr. McCormick’s
references to Plaintiff’s arthritis symptoms are consistent with x-rays taken in
June of 2013 and, therefore, manipulative limitations should have been included
in Plaintiff’s RFC determination. However, Plaintiff’s argument in this regard does
nothing more than invite the Court to improperly re-weigh evidence and invade
7

the province of the ALJ, who has the ultimate duty to make the RFC
determination based on the evidence presented. See, e.g., Martin v. Sullivan,
894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Even if the evidence preponderates
against the Secretary’s factual findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is
supported by substantial evidence.”) (citations omitted); Graham v. Bowen, 790
F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1986) (“The weighing of evidence is a function of the
[ALJ], not of the district court.”); Powers v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1151, 1152 (11th
Cir. 1984) (stating that when there is conflicting evidence on an issue, “it is the
Secretary, acting through the ALJ, and not the court, who is charged with the duty
to weigh the evidence and to determine the case accordingly”) (citing Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 389-403 (1971)).
Nevertheless, the ALJ considered whether to include manipulative
limitations in his discussion of Dr. Moore’s opinions, but rejected such limitations
as “not consistent with the medical evidence of record or supported by the record
as a whole.” (Tr. 31.) As an initial matter, it is important to note that although Dr.
Moore did include manipulative limitations in his evaluation, the ALJ is not
required to “match” the opinions of a medical source in the ALJ’s RFC
determination. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2), 404.1545(a)(3), 404.1546(c);
see also Kopke v. Astrue, Case No.: 8:11-cv-1197-T-30TGW, 2012 WL 4903470
at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2012) (“If the plaintiff is arguing that the [ALJ’s]
determination of the plaintiff’s [RFC] must ‘match’ the opinions of a medical
8

source, that contention is unpersuasive, as the responsibility for assessing the
plaintiff’s [RFC] rests with the [ALJ].”), report and recommendation adopted in
2012 WL 4867423. The ALJ considered Dr. Moore’s manipulative limitations,
rejected them, and articulated reasons supported by substantial evidence for
doing so.
The ALJ referenced Dr. McCormick’s April 2012 examination revealing that
Plaintiff had good grip strength bilaterally, normal dexterity, and full strength in the
upper extremities. (Tr. 31, 493, 496.) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s strength
was normal, her motor function was intact, and she had no restriction in range of
motion of the extremities in July 2013. (Tr. 730.) In August 2013, Plaintiff denied
back pain, joint pain, and joint swelling, and moved all extremities well. (Tr. 631.)
In September 2013, Plaintiff showed good muscle tone and strength, with no
swelling, tenderness, or limitation of any joint. (Tr. 627.) Plaintiff’s digits showed
no cyanosis or clubbing. (Id.) Plaintiff’s neurologic exam was within normal
limits, showing normal reflexes and sensation with no motor deficits. (Id.)
Plaintiff contends that the evidence referenced by the ALJ in rejecting Dr.
Moore’s proposed limitations does not constitute substantial evidence because
the ALJ referenced: (1) the examination of Dr. McCormick without referencing the
negative symptoms described by Dr. McCormick, (2) a July 2013 examination of
Plaintiff unrelated to her hand problems, and (3) two examinations that “appear to
be a review of systems with nothing to do with the actual physical examination of
9

[Plaintiff].” (Doc. 25 at 13-14.) The undersigned disagrees. Again, the ALJ
properly evaluated the opinions of Dr. McCormick so there was no error by the
ALJ in referencing his opinions. Further, Plaintiff failed to provide the Court with
any persuasive support for precluding the ALJ from considering and referencing
the July, August, and September 2013 medical reports. Cf. Phillips v. Barnhart,
357 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004) (“In determining whether Phillips can return
to her past relevant work, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC using all
relevant medical and other evidence in the case.”) (citation omitted); 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529 (allowing an ALJ to consider a claimant’s statements about her
symptoms when assessing RFC). The ALJ here weighed the evidence and
determined Plaintiff’s RFC, which is supported by substantial evidence. The
Court will not undertake the task of re-weighing the evidence on appeal.
Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to weigh the opinions of
Plaintiff’s “treating facilities” is unpersuasive. While the ALJ must address
medical opinions explicitly, the ALJ is not required to address every piece of
evidence in the record. See, Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir.
2005) (stating that “there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to
every piece of evidence in the record”); see also Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d
731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981) (noting that the ALJ should sufficiently explain the
weight given to “obviously probative” evidence). Notably, Plaintiff does not cite to
any “obviously probative” opinions that the ALJ failed to consider, but rather
10

vaguely asserts that the ALJ failed to assign weight to the treating physicians. It
is clear that the ALJ in this case considered and assigned weight to the probative
opinion evidence. (Tr. 30-31.) As discussed above, the ALJ’s RFC determination
is supported by substantial evidence.
C.

The ALJ’s Determination at Step Five Was Proper

Plaintiff next argues that the determination at step five was not supported
by substantial evidence. Namely, Plaintiff asserts that this determination was
improper because of the ALJ’s failure to include manipulative limitations in the
RFC determination. However, as already discussed above, the undersigned
finds that the ALJ did not err in making the RFC determination. In the
hypothetical to the VE, the ALJ included all limitations made in his RFC
determination. (Tr. 63-65.) From that hypothetical, the VE recited three
occupations that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 64-65.) The ALJ was not required to
incorporate unsupported allegations or unsupported opinions within his
hypothetical to the VE. See, e.g., Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161; Graham v. Bowen,
790 F.2d 1572,1576 (11th Cir. 1986).
D.

The ALJ Properly Discredited Plaintiff’s Testimony

The ALJ must consider all of a claimant’s statements about his or her
symptoms, including pain, and determine the extent to which the symptoms can
reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1528. In doing so, the ALJ must apply the Eleventh Circuit’s three11

part standard which requires: (1) evidence of an underlying physical or mental
condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of
the alleged symptoms arising from that condition or (3) that the objectively
determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably
expected to give rise to the alleged symptoms. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1559 (quoting
Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in discounting Plaintiff’s testimony.
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to articulate reasons for
discounting the testimony, but rather recited “boiler plate type language” for
discounting her testimony. (Doc. 25 at 21.) Plaintiff points to the following
statement by the ALJ:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned
finds that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms;
however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
entirely credible for reasons explained in this decision.
(Tr. 28.) The undersigned agrees with Plaintiff that this statement constitutes the
boiler plate type language that, without more, may not withstand scrutiny on
appeal. However, the ALJ did not end his analysis with that statement alone.
Rather, the ALJ articulated specific reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s credibility.
(Tr. 30.) The ALJ noted that the objective evidence did not support Plaintiff’s
allegations. (Id. (“Turning to the credibility analysis, although the record confirms

12

the existence of the claimant’s impairment, the record does not support a
resulting inability to work.”).) The ALJ referenced normal evaluations of Plaintiff’s
extremities and lungs, Plaintiff’s denial of back and joint pain and joint swelling,
and Plaintiff’s full range of motion in her neck, which is supported by the record.
(Id.; Tr. 618 (noting Plaintiff’s lungs were clear to auscultation, extremities were
within normal limits “with no clubbing, cyanosis, or edema. Gait and station
normal.”); Tr. 627 (“Normal gait and station, spine without deformity, good muscle
tone and strength, no swelling, tenderness, or limitation of motion of any joint . . .
no motor deficits.”); Tr. 631 (“Denies back pain, joint pain, joint swelling . . .
Moves all extremities well, no clubbing or edema.”); Tr. 705 (“Negative for back
pain.”); Tr. 729 (“Denies low back pain, joint pain.”); Tr. 730 (“RESPIRATORY:
clear to auscultation, bilaterally . . . the upper and lower extremities have normal
muscle, joint, and bone structure. No tenderness, effusion or edema is noted.
No restriction in range of motion is noted. Strength is normal and symmetrical for
the upper and lower extremities . . . normal gait is noted. Patient ambulates
without assistance. There is normal muscle tone. Motor function is intact.”).)
Further, the ALJ referenced Plaintiff’s conservative treatment. The ALJ
noted that Plaintiff has not received treatment from a mental health professional.
(Tr. 30.) Plaintiff also testified that she was not receiving treatment for her
alleged pain. (Tr. 30, 52-53.) Finally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff received
unemployment benefits after her alleged onset date of August 31, 2011 through
13

the end of 2012, although there was a question as to whether Plaintiff’s
unemployment benefits were due to a medical impairment as opposed to inability
to secure work. (Tr. 44-46, 184.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, the ALJ
articulated reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony and those reasons are
supported by substantial evidence.
III.

Conclusion
The Court does not make independent factual determinations, re-weigh the

evidence, or substitute its decision for that of the ALJ. Thus, the question is not
whether the Court would have arrived at the same decision on de novo review;
rather, the Court’s review is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are
based on correct legal standards and supported by substantial evidence. Based
on this standard of review, the undersigned affirms the ALJ’s decision that
Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act for the
time period in question.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
1.

The Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

2.

The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment accordingly and

close the file.
DONE AND ENTERED at Jacksonville, Florida, on November 14, 2016.

14

Copies to:
Counsel of Record

15