HALL v STATE OF FLORIDA
Filing
25
ORDER granting Respondents' request to dismiss 15 the case as untimely, and dismissing the action with prejudice, with directions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 3/30/2018. (BL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
DOMINIQUE HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 3:15-cv-1000-J-34PDB
SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner Dominique Hall, an inmate of the Florida penal
system, initiated this action on July 30, 2015,1 by filing a pro se
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition; Doc. 1) under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida. The Northern District transferred the case to
this Court on August 11, 2015. In the Petition, Hall challenges
2010 state court (Clay County, Florida) judgments of conviction for
home invasion robbery and armed robbery. Respondents have submitted
a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Respondents' Motion
1
Giving Petitioner the benefit of the mailbox rule, this
Court finds that the Petition was filed on the date Petitioner
handed it to the prison authorities for mailing to this Court. See
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). The Court will also give
Petitioner the benefit of the mailbox rule with respect to his
inmate state court filings when calculating the one-year
limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
to Dismiss (Response; Doc. 15) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). On
December 11, 2015, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause and
Notice to Petitioner (Doc. 11), admonishing Hall regarding his
obligations and giving Hall a time frame in which to submit a
reply. On February 3, 2017, Hall replied. See Petitioner's Reply to
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss (Reply; Doc. 23); Exhibits, Docs.
23-1 through 23-39 (P. Ex.). This case is ripe for review.
II. One-Year Limitations Period
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on petitions for
writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation
shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest
of-(A) the date on which the judgment
became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of
the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment
to filing an application created by
State action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United
States is removed, if the applicant
was prevented from filing by such
State action;
(C)
the
date
on
which
the
constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme
Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and
2
made retroactively applicable
cases on collateral review; or
to
(D) the date on which the factual
predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered
through
the
exercise
of
due
diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other
collateral
review
with
respect
to
the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall
not be counted toward any period of limitation
under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
Respondents contend that Hall has not complied with the oneyear period of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The
following
procedural
history
is
relevant
to
the
one-year
limitations issue. In July 2009, the State of Florida charged Hall
with armed robbery in Case No. 2009-CF-1292, see Resp. Ex. G at 6,
and home invasion robbery in Case No. 2009-CF-1293, see Resp. Ex.
A at 8. Hall pled guilty to the charges in both cases on July 29,
2010. See Resp. Exs. A at 31-32; G at 37-38. On August 20, 2010,
the court sentenced Hall to a term of imprisonment of forty-five
years in Case No. 2009-CF-1292, and a term of imprisonment of
forty-five years in Case No. 2009-CF-1293, with both sentences to
run concurrently with each other. See Resp. Exs. A at 26-30; G at
31-36. In Case No. 2009-CF-1292, the appellate court affirmed
Hall's conviction and sentence per curiam on March 4, 2013, see
Resp. Ex. K, and the mandate issued on April 2, 2013, see Resp. Ex.
3
L. As to Case No. 2009-CF-1293, the appellate court affirmed Hall's
conviction and sentence per curiam on March 8, 2013, see Resp. Ex.
E, and the mandate issued on April 3, 2013, see Resp. Ex. F.
Hall's convictions became final on Monday, June 3, 2013 (90
days from March 4, 2013) in Case No. 2009-CF-1292, and on Thursday,
June 6, 2013 (90 days from March 8, 2013) in Case No. 2009-CF-1293.
See Close v. United States, 336 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 2003)
("According
to
rules
of
the
Supreme
Court,
a
petition
for
certiorari must be filed within 90 days of the appellate court's
entry of judgment on the appeal or, if a motion for rehearing is
timely filed, within 90 days of the appellate court's denial of
that motion."). Because Hall's convictions were after April 24,
1996, the effective date of the AEDPA, Hall had one year from the
dates his convictions became final to file the federal petition.
His Petition, filed on July 30, 2015, is due to be dismissed as
untimely unless he can avail himself of one of the statutory
provisions which extends or tolls the limitations period.
As to Case No. 2009-CF-1292, the one-year limitations period
began to run the next day, June 4, 2013, and ran for 260 days until
February 19, 2014, when Hall filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.850 (Rule 3.850 motion) as to both convictions. See Resp. Ex. M
at 1-7. In Case No. 2009-CF-1293, the one-year limitations period
began to run on June 7, 2013, and ran for 257 days until he filed
4
his Rule 3.850 motion. The circuit court denied the Rule 3.850
motion on August 6, 2014. See id. at 43-180. The appellate court
per curiam affirmed the circuit court's denial of his Rule 3.850
motion on November 14, 2014, see Resp. Ex. N, and the mandate
issued on December 12, 2014, see Resp. Ex. O.
The one-year limitations period began to run the next day,
December 13, 2014, and ran for 229 days until July 30, 2015, when
Hall filed a pro se federal Petition. Given the record, Hall's July
30, 2015 Petition is untimely filed,2 and due to be dismissed
unless Hall can establish that equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations is warranted.
"When a prisoner files for habeas corpus relief outside the
one-year limitations period, a district court may still entertain
the petition if the petitioner establishes that he is entitled to
equitable tolling." Damren v. Florida, 776 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 830 (2017). The United States
Supreme Court has established a two-prong test for the application
of equitable tolling, stating that a petitioner must show "(1) that
he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
filing." Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quotations
2
With 105 days remaining, the one-year limitations period
expired on Monday, March 30, 2015, as to Case No. 2009-CF-1292.
With 108 days remaining as to Case No. 2009-CF-1293, the one-year
limitations period expired on Tuesday, March 31, 2015. Thus, the
federal Petition was filed approximately four months late.
5
and citation omitted); Cadet v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 853 F.3d 1216,
1221 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 2018 WL 942542, No. 17-6146,
(U.S. Feb. 20, 2018). As an extraordinary remedy, equitable tolling
is "limited to rare and exceptional circumstances and typically
applied
sparingly."
Cadet,
853
F.3d
at
1221
(quotations
and
citation omitted). The burden is on Hall to make a showing of
extraordinary circumstances that "are both beyond his control and
unavoidable even with diligence," and this high hurdle will not be
easily surmounted. Howell v. Crosby, 415 F.3d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir.
2005) (quotations and citation omitted); Wade v. Battle, 379 F.3d
1254, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
Hall acknowledges that his Petition is untimely filed. See
Reply. Nevertheless, he asserts that he is entitled to equitable
tolling because: (1) he has been a pro se litigant since March 14,
2012, see P. Ex. 1A, and was not aware of the federal one-year
limitations period, see Reply at 3; (2) he never had "constructive
knowledge" of the federal limitations period, id.; (3) he has been
diligent in pursuing his rights, see id.; (4) the Respondents would
not be prejudiced if the Court permits the untimely filing, see id.
at 2, 4; (5) he did not receive the state appellate court's
December 12, 2014 mandate until "between the dates of mid-December
and late February," see id. at 4; and (6) Respondents caused
"several extraordinary circumstances" after the filing of his
Petition that confused him and caused him "to remain ignorant," see
6
id. at 4-5; see also Docs. 11, 12 at 4, ¶ 3. He states that the
Court must consider the "reasonableness" of his "ignorance." Reply
at 5.
A habeas petitioner's lack of legal training and a general
ignorance or confusion regarding the law are not extraordinary
circumstances warranting equitable tolling. See Rivers v. United
States, 416 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005); Perez v. Florida, 519
F. App'x 995, 997 (11th Cir. 2013). Like other litigants, pro se
litigants
"are
deemed
to
know
of
the
one-year
statute
of
limitations." Outler v. United States, 485 F.3d 1273, 1282 n.4
(11th Cir. 2007). As to Hall's assertion that he did not receive
the
state
appellate
court's
December
12,
2014
mandate
until
"between the dates of mid-December and late February," he has
neither asserted that he contacted the appellate court to inquire
about the mandate nor provided the date that he ultimately received
his copy of the mandate. Hall should have known that the mandate
ultimately
would
issue
since
the
appellate
court
per
curiam
affirmed the circuit court's denial of his Rule 3.850 motion on
November 14, 2014, and denied his motion for additional time to
file a motion for rehearing on December 11, 2014.3 Even assuming
Hall is entitled to equitable tolling for the two-month period, his
3
See http://jweb.flcourts.org, Case No. 1D14-4089; see also
Fla. R. App. P. 9.340(a) ("Unless otherwise ordered by the court or
provided by these rules, the clerk shall issue such mandate or
process as may be directed by the court after expiration of 15 days
from the date of an order or decision.").
7
federal Petition is still untimely. Additionally, Hall's asserted
confusion after the filing of the federal Petition is of no import.
The Court's focus is on extraordinary circumstances that "stood in
[Hall's] way" and prevented him from timely filing the Petition.
Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Hall
has
not
demonstrated
that
an
extraordinary
circumstance
prevented him from timely filing his Petition.
He simply has not met the burden of showing that equitable
tolling is warranted. Hall has not shown a justifiable reason why
the dictates of the one-year limitations period should not be
imposed upon him. For this reason, this Court will dismiss this
case with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
III. Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)
If Hall seeks issuance of a certificate of appealability,
the undersigned opines that a certificate of appealability is not
warranted. This Court should issue a certificate of appealability
only if the petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make this
substantial showing, Hall "must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282
(2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or
that "the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve encouragement
8
to proceed further,'" Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36
(2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).
Where
a
constitutional
district
claims
court
on
has
the
rejected
merits,
the
a petitioner's
petitioner
must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. However, when the district court has
rejected a claim on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show
that "jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Id. Upon
consideration of the record as a whole, this Court will deny a
certificate of appealability.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.
Respondents' request to dismiss (Doc. 15) the case as
untimely is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2.
The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment dismissing
this case with prejudice.
3.
If Hall appeals the dismissal of the case, the Court
denies a certificate of appealability. Because this Court has
determined that a certificate of appealability is not warranted,
the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions report any
9
motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this
case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.
4.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and
terminate any pending motions.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 30th day of
March, 2018.
sc 3/26
c:
Dominique Hall, FDOC #J41187
Counsel of Record
10
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