Hall v. Merola et al
Filing
37
ORDER granting 36 Motion; granting 11 Motion to Dismiss to the extent the claims raised against Defendants Watson and Wright in the amended complaint are found to be Heck-barred; dismissing without prejudice the claims against Defendants Wa tson and Wright; dismissing without prejudice Defendants Watson and Wright; granting 11 Defendant Merola's Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiff's claims against him for compensatory and punitive damages, any claims for nominal damages against Merola remain; Defendant Merola shall respond to the amended complaint by June 10, 2016. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 5/17/2016. (LDO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
WENDALL HALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:15-cv-1054-J-39PDB
LIEUTENANT PETER MEROLA,
et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
I.
Status
Plaintiff, an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections,
is proceeding on a pro se Amended Civil Rights Complaint (Amended
Complaint) (Doc. 9).1
The Defendants are Lieutenant Peter Merola,
Sergeant Charles Watson, and Officer Wright.
They filed a Motion
to Dismiss (Motion to Dismiss) (Doc. 11), and Plaintiff filed his
Response (Response) (Doc. 13).
Defendants sought leave to file a
reply, and leave was granted. See Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's
Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 25).
Plaintiff recently filed a Motion for Ruling or Judgment on All
1
Plaintiff is a frequent filer in this and other federal
courts, and he is a three-strikes litigant; however, he has avoided
the three-strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in this instance
by first filing his civil rights case in the state court.
Defendants elected to remove the case to this Court, and their
Motion to Dismiss is pending.
Pending Motions and to Review Plaintiff's Reply [the Response (Doc.
13)] and Judicial Notices (Motion) (Doc. 36).
Along with his verified Amended Complaint,2 Plaintiff asks
this Court to consider his own Affidavit, Bobby Green's Affidavit,
copies of Inmate Sick-Call Requests, a Request for Administrative
Remedy or Appeal concerning the alleged actions of Defendant
Merola, and the appeal response.
See Response (Doc. 13).
He has
provided the Court with a number of judicial notices (Docs. 14, 16,
17, 19, 32, and 34) for the Court's consideration.
The Court has
reviewed all of the above and this case is ripe for review.
This is a civil rights action for compensatory and punitive
damages brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming
that he was subjected to the excessive use of force, chemical
spraying,
by
Defendants
Watson
and
Wright,
state
corrections
officers, in violation of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be
free from the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.
He also
alleges that Defendant Merola ordered that he not be fed for two
days in February 2014.
Under the Statement of Claim portion of the Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff states:
2
See Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 F. App'x 948, 950 (11th Cir.
2014) (per curiam) (citations omitted) ("The factual assertions
that [Plaintiff] made in his amended complaint should have been
given the same weight as an affidavit, because [Plaintiff] verified
his complaint with an unsworn written declaration, made under
penalty of perjury, and his complaint meets Rule 56's requirements
for affidavits and sworn declarations.").
- 2 -
(Count 1) Defendant Sergeant Charles Watson
violated the U.S. Constitution 8th Amendment
prohibiting cruel and usual punishment by
deliberately, maliciously, or wantonly gassing
Plaintiff
without
any
justification
or
sufficient reason to wantonly cause him pain
or injury or to retaliate against Plaintiff
for filing grievances, Lawsuits or for his
past disciplinary history or using excessive
force against Plaintiff.
(Count 2) Defendant Charles Watson violated
the United States Constitution 1st Amendment
right to redress grievances by unlawfully
gassing Plaintiff with chemical agents because
Plaintiff files grievances or Lawsuits against
correctional officers.
(Count 3) Defendant Officer Wright violated
the
U.S.
Constitution
8th
Amendment
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment by
deliberately, maliciously, or wantonly gassing
Plaintiff
without
any
justification
or
sufficient reasons to wantonly cause him pain
or injury or to retaliate against Plaintiff
for filing grievances Lawsuits or for his past
disciplinary reports or using excessive force
against Plaintiff.
(Count 4) Defendant Officer Wright violated
the U.S. Constitution 1st Amendment right to
redress grievances by unlawfully gassing
Plaintiff
with
chemical
agents
because
Plaintiff files lawsuits and grievances
against correctional officers.
(Count 5) Defendants Sergeant Charles Watson
and
Officer
Wright
violated
the
U.S.
Constitution 14th Amendment equal protection
of the law by allowing, approving or and
gassing Plaintiff with chemical agents because
of his black race.
(Count 6) Defendants Sergeant Charles Watson,
Officer Wright violated the U.S. Constitution
8th Amendment prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment by deliberately failing to protect
Plaintiff from a serious risk of harm or from
- 3 -
excessive force or from a risk of serious harm
to his health or safety.
(Count 7) Defendant Lieutenant Peter Merola
violated the U.S. Constitution 8th Amendment
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment for
ordering his correctional officers not to feed
Plaintiff any food to retaliate against
Plaintiff for filing grievances.
(Count 8) Defendant Lieutenant Peter Merola
violated the U.S. Constitution 1st Amendment
right to redress grievances for ordering or
denying Plaintiff to eat any food because
Plaintiff files grievances in prison.
Amended Complaint at 9-11.3
In the Amended Complaint, under the Statement of Facts,
Plaintiff
states
that
he
is
suing
the
Defendants
in
their
individual capacities and he is seeking compensatory and punitive
damages. Id. at 12. Plaintiff submits that the events in question
occurred at the Reception and Medical Center.
Id. at 13.
He
alleges that on January 31, 2014, he was confined in K dormitory,
confinement cell K2112.
Id. at 14.
He states that Defendant
Watson approached his cell door window and announced the he and
Defendant Wright were going to gas Plaintiff because he is black,
using a racial epitaph; because Plaintiff has past disciplinary
reports for masturbation; because Plaintiff files lawsuits and
grievances against correctional officers; and because Plaintiff is
testifying against Officer Bennett.
3
Id.
In this opinion, the Court references the document and page
numbers designated by the electronic filing system.
- 4 -
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Watson and Wright came back,
opened Plaintiff's cell food flap, and sprayed his chest and face
with chemical agents, causing Plaintiff to suffer severe pain in
his face, chest, and eyes.
from
blurry
vision,
Id.
Plaintiff states that he suffered
difficulty
breathing,
severe
burning
itching of his skin, and bleeding out of his buttocks.
Id.
and
He
also complains that he suffered lasting mental pain and injury.
Id.
knew
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wright said that Plaintiff
it
was
coming
because
of
Plaintiff's
past
numerous
masturbation disciplinary reports and his being a writ writer who
files lawsuits and grievances against correctional officers.
Id.
Significantly, Plaintiff states: "Plaintiff was not tampering with
any safety device or water sprinkler safety device in his cell."
Id.
With regard to Defendant Merola, Plaintiff alleges that on
February 7, 2014, Merola told Plaintiff that he writes too many
grievances and that Merola was going to order his officers not to
feed Plaintiff any food to teach him a lesson.
Id. at 15.
Plaintiff states that on February 8, 2014 and February 9, 2014, K
dormitory confinement officers did not provide Plaintiff with food,
and they told him that they would not feed him because Merola
ordered them not to do so.
Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered
from severe physical pain, hunger pains, long-lasting mental pain,
and injury.
Id.
- 5 -
The record shows that on January 31, 2014, Defendant Watson
filed a disciplinary report against Plaintiff for tampering with a
safety
device.
Defendants'
Exhibit
A
(Doc.
11-1).
The
Disciplinary Report, Log # 209-140046, charges the following:
At approximately 9:15 A.M. on January 31,
2014, while assigned as K-dorm housing
supervisor, I was conducting a security check
on 2-wing, when I looked into cell K2112 which
solely
houses
inmate
Hall,
Wendall
DC#379682[,] I observed inmate Hall standing
on the toilet attempting to break the
sprinkler head. I ordered inmate Hall several
times to cease his actions to no avail.
Inmate Hall is in direct violation of FAC 33601.314, Rules of Prohibited Conduct, and is
being charged with 9-34, tampering with or
defeating any fire or other safety device.
Safety devices include: fire, smoke and carbon
dioxide detection devices; alarm systems; fire
suppression systems; safety and emergency
lighting; exit lights; evacuation route and
waning
[sic]
placards;
self-contained
breathing apparatuses; personal protective
equipment; first aid kits; eye wash stations;
and any other device utilized to ensure safety
of the institution, staff and inmates.
It
should be noted that this incident resulted in
a reactionary use of force. My shift OIC was
notified and instructed me to prepare this
report.
Defendants' Exhibit A at 1 (capitalization omitted) (Doc. 11-1).
The disciplinary team found Petitioner guilty.
Exhibit A at 2.
Defendants'
The basis given for the decision is:
Subject was found guilty of charge 9-34
"Tamper w/Safety Dev" based on the eyewitness
testimony of Officer C. Watson. As stated in
Section I: I was conducting a security check
on 2-wing, when I looked into cell K-2112
which solely houses inmate Hall, Wendall
#379682, I observed inmate Hall standing on
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the toilet attempting to break the sprinkler
head.
I ordered inmate Hall to cease his
actions to no avail. Incident resulted in a
reactionary use of force.
All attachments
were read and considered by the team.
Id. (capitalization omitted).
The
recorded
disciplinary
action
is
thirty
days
of
disciplinary confinement and a loss of twenty days of gain time.
Id.
The disciplinary report has not been overturned.
Defendants'
Exhibit B (Doc. 11-2).
II.
Motion to Dismiss Standard
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'"
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable
inference
that
the
defendant
is
liable
for
the
misconduct alleged."
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
"[T]he
court
tenet
that
a
must
accept
as
true
all
of
the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
- 7 -
III.
A.
Law and Conclusions
Heck-bar Defense
Defendants assert that a Heck-bar defense is properly raised
in a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P.4
Motion to Dismiss at 1 n.1.
See Palmer v. Laux, No. 2:10-cv-438-
FtM-29DNF, 2011 WL 4029085, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2011) (Not
Reported in F.Supp.2d) (finding the plaintiff steered his case into
Heck territory by raising claims directly contrary to the facts
upon which the disciplinary charges were based). Defendants Watson
and Wright contend that successful prosecution of Plaintiff's
claims in this case would necessarily imply the invalidity of the
institutional order imposing disciplinary punishment and that such
a claim cannot be maintained under § 1983 unless and until the
disciplinary
order
available remedies.
has
been
set
aside
as
a
result
of
other
See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997);
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006).
The Supreme Court, in Heck,
emphasized that it was not imposing an exhaustion requirement upon
42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, but, "'rather den[ied] the existence of
a cause of action' altogether."
Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289,
1294 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489)).
The Eleventh Circuit explained that the Heck-bar has been
extended to prison disciplinary determinations if the civil rights
claim would necessarily affect the fact or duration of confinement:
4
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
- 8 -
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that if a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff on his §
1983
claim
for
money
damages
"would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence," the district court
must dismiss the complaint, unless the
conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated. 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. at
2372. The Court later extended this bar to
prison disciplinary judgments that result in
the deprivation of good-time credits. See
Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646–48, 117 S.Ct. at
1588–89. However, Heck only applies to prison
disciplinary determinations if a prisoner's §
1983 claim would necessarily affect the fact
or duration of his confinement. See Wilkinson
v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79, 81–82, 125 S.Ct.
1242, 1246–48, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005);
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754, 124
S.Ct. 1303, 1306, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004).
Thus, as we have made clear, the same facts
underlying a conviction, or in this case, a
disciplinary judgment, can also give rise to a
§ 1983 claim without implicating Heck. Dyer v.
Lee, 488 F.3d 876, 879–80 (11th Cir. 2007)
("[A]s long as it is possible that a § 1983
suit
would
not
negate
the
underlying
conviction,
then
the
suit
is
not
Heck-barred.").
Davis v. Hodges, 481 F. App'x 553, 554 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (per
curiam).
As such, it is clearly established law that an action under §
1983 simply will not lie and should be dismissed if the remedy or
remedies
sought
in
the
action
would
"necessarily
imply
the
invalidity of the punishment imposed" in a prison disciplinary
proceeding.
Additionally, under Bryant v. Rich, the Court may
accept evidence and act as a fact-finder to resolve the threshold
issues
to resolve all matters in abatement.
- 9 -
Bryant v. Rich, 530
F.3d 1368, 1376 (11th Cir.) ("it is proper for a judge to consider
facts outside of the pleadings and to resolve factual disputes so
long as the factual disputes do not decide the merits"), cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 1074 (2008).
Plaintiff, in his Response, states that he is not seeking
injunctive relief to overturn, expunge or reverse the disciplinary
report or to restore his gain time.
Response at 3.
Instead, he
argues that he is entitled to monetary damages for an Eighth
Amendment
violation
(excessive
force/deprivation
of
food);
a
Fourteenth Amendment violation (racial discrimination), and a First
and Eighth Amendment violation (retaliation by chemically spraying
Plaintiff for filing grievances).
Id.
He attempts to distinguish
his case by asserting that his disciplinary conviction "is merely
'incidental' or slight to his further claims of excessive force
against Watson and Wright[.]"
Id. at 9.
He further contends that
his inclusion in the statement of facts of his Amended Complaint
that he did not tamper with the safety device in his cell does not,
standing alone, constitute a challenge to the finding of guilt to
the disciplinary report, but is "'circumstances of confinement
facts' of his excessive force claims and retaliatory claims against
defendants Watson and Wright[.]"
Id. at 10.
Plaintiff's "argument that Heck is inapplicable because he is
not seeking to expunge his disciplinary actions misses the mark."
Richards v. Dickens, 411 F. App'x 276, 278 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
- 10 -
curiam).
"[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether a prisoner
explicitly seeks to reinstate his good-time credits, but instead
whether the § 1983 claims call into question the validity of the
deprivation of those credits."
Id.
Also, dismissal pursuant to
"the principles announced in Heck may be appropriate regardless of
the kind of relief sought."
Esensoy v. McMillan, No. 06-12580,
2007 WL 257342, at *1 n.6 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1097 (2008).
Although this is a close case, upon careful consideration of
the Amended Complaint, the documents, and exhibits submitted to the
Court, the Court is convinced that the claims raised against
Defendants Watson and Wright are Heck-barred.
Plaintiff contends
that he was subjected to chemical gassing for reasons other than he
was tampering with a safety device and refusing to obey verbal
orders to cease his actions - a claim that would necessarily imply
the invalidity of the punishment imposed.
Indeed, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants Watson and Wright, without justification,
or more accurately with improper motive to retaliate against him
for filing grievances and lawsuits, for his past disciplinary
history, and due to his race, applied chemical agents.5
5
Thus, he
This is not a case in which Plaintiff admitted that yes, he
tampered with the security device and disobeyed verbal orders to
stop tampering with the device, he was properly disciplined for
that infraction, but the officers used excessive force in subduing
him. Instead, Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he was not
tampering with a safety device in his cell and Defendants Watson
and Wright chemically gassed him for various retaliatory or
discriminatory reasons.
- 11 -
is contending that he was subjected to an unprovoked attack by
chemical spraying, for the improper reason of retaliation and
discrimination, and the disciplinary report is wholly false.
In his Affidavit at 2 (Doc. 13-1), Plaintiff states: "I did
not tamper with any fire sprinkler and I did not try to break the
head of fire sprinkler or safety device in my cell at any time and
I did not resist any order or command or verbal order from any
officer."
Of import, the disciplinary report otherwise describes
the elements of the infraction; therefore, this Court finds that
Plaintiff's allegations would necessarily invalidate the revocation
of his gain-time credits.
Of note, the report specifically states
that Plaintiff was standing on his toilet attempting to break the
sprinkler
head.
Defendants'
Exhibit
A
at
1
(Doc.
11-1).
Additionally, it states that the correctional officer gave repeated
orders to Plaintiff to cease his actions, "to no avail."
Id.
It
further states that a "reactionary use of force" was employed by
the officers as a result of Plaintiff's actions.
Id.
The finding
of guilt is based on the charge and the eyewitness testimony of
Officer C. Watson, referencing the Plaintiff's attempt to break the
sprinkler head, his refusal to head the officer's order to cease
his
destructive
actions,
reactionary use of force.
and
the
incident
resulting
in
a
Id. at 2.
A judgment in Plaintiff's favor would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his disciplinary report and his loss of gain time.
- 12 -
Plaintiff is not alleging the officers use of force in response to
his tampering with the sprinkler head and refusal to obey orders
was excessive; instead, he is alleging that the chemical spraying
was an unprovoked attacked, in retaliation for his being a writ
writer, for his past disciplinary history, and due to his race.
See LaFlower v. Kinard, No. 2:10-cv-82-FtM-29SPC, 2011 WL 2183555,
at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2011) (Not Reported in F.Supp.2d) (finding
the case Heck-barred when the plaintiff alleged an unprovoked,
retaliatory attack for past lawsuits, not a claim concerning the
magnitude of the force used in response to his failure to comply
with orders).
Plaintiff has not alleged the reversal of the
disciplinary report or presented documents showing that he has
caused
the
disciplinary
proceeding
to
be
set
aside
through
administrative, state or federal remedies available to him. Unless
and until the disciplinary report has been overturned, Plaintiff
has no claim for money damages.
Of import, at this juncture, the
record shows that the disciplinary report has not been overturned.6
Therefore, based on the above, Defendants Watson and Wright's
Motion to Dismiss based on the Heck-bar defense is due to be
granted.
The claims against them will be dismissed without
prejudice to Plaintiff's right to refile his claims in a new civil
rights case against Defendants Watson and Wright under 42 U.S.C. §
6
To the extent Plaintiff seeks reversal of the disciplinary
report and restoration of his gain time, the proper method for
seeking such relief in this Court is by filing a petition for writ
of habeas corpus after exhausting state court remedies.
- 13 -
1983 when he can demonstrate that the disciplinary report has been
overturned.
Again, a petition for writ of habeas corpus would be
the proper method to challenge the disciplinary proceeding and its
results.
B.
Physical Injury
The remaining claims are raised against Defendant Merola.
Plaintiff
alleges
that
Merola
ordered
officers
to
not
feed
Plaintiff during the period of February 8, 2014 through February 9,
2014, in retaliation for Plaintiff filing grievances.
Plaintiff
asserts that he suffered severe physical pains [sic], hunger pains,
and long-lasting mental pain and injury due to the lack of food for
two days. Amended Complaint at 15. Defendant Merola contends that
Plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages
because he cannot demonstrate the requisite physical injury under
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
Plaintiff has not described any physical malady resulting from
the deprivation of food for two days. Indeed, he does not describe
any other "physical manifestation of hunger pain, such as weight
loss[.]" Agrawal v. Briley, No. 02 C 6807, 2006 WL 3523750, at *14
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2006) (Not Reported in F.Supp.2d). See Williams
v. Lackawanna Co. Prison, No. 4:07-1137, 2010 WL 1508542, at *3
(M.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2010) (in reviewing claim of suffering from
hunger pain, finding no demonstration of physical injury due to
lack of nutrition or some other deleterious impact of a prolonged
- 14 -
deficient diet), report and recommendation adopted by Williams v.
Lackawanna Co. Prison, 2010 WL 1491132 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2010).
At most, Plaintiff has described hunger pain for two days and
lingering mental anguish as a result of being deprived of meals for
two days.
In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged that he has been
deprived of meals over a long period of time or been subjected to
a diet deficient in adequate nutrition.
Instead, he alleges a
brief, two-day period of not being provided meals by correctional
officers.
As discussed in Agrawal,
In any event, the court doubts that "pain of
hunger," standing alone, overcomes the PLRA's
bar to recovering compensatory damages for
non-physical injury. Cf. Martin v. Gold, No.
1:05-CV-28, 2005 WL 1862116, at *9 (D.Vt. Aug.
4, 2005) (noting that "headaches and hunger
pains may not satisfy the PLRA requirement,"
but finding that requirement met where
plaintiff's
teeth
were
pulled,
prison
officials did not provide dentures for
thirteen months thereafter, and plaintiff
experienced constant pain from attempting to
chew prison food without teeth); see also
Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 508 (5th Cir.
1999) (finding inmate plaintiff's Eighth
Amendment § 1983 claim frivolous where
plaintiff alleged hunger pain from prison
guard's denial of access to dining hall on
several occasions, but failed to claim weight
loss or any other "adverse physical effects").
Accordingly, the court concludes that to the
extent Plaintiff has suffered non-physical
injury, compensatory damages for his RLUIPA
claim are barred by the PLRA.
Agrawal v. Briley, 2006 WL 3523750, at *14.
- 15 -
Thus, Plaintiff is seeking compensatory and punitive damages
for mental or emotional injury.
Therefore, his claims are barred
by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) as long as he remains incarcerated.
See
Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531-32 (11th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1112 (2004).
However, section 1997e(e) does not
preclude the award of nominal damages if Plaintiff prevails on his
retaliation
claims
against
Defendant
Merola.
Accordingly,
Defendant Merola's Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted with
respect to Plaintiff's claims against him for compensatory and
punitive damages.
C.
Defendants
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
contend
that
they
are
entitled
to
Eleventh
Amendment immunity to the extent Plaintiff is suing them in their
official capacities. Motion to Dismiss at 13. Plaintiff states in
his Amended Complaint that he is suing the Defendants in their
individual capacities for monetary relief.
12.
See Response at 19.
Amended Complaint at
Therefore, he is not suing the Defendants
in their official capacities, and there is no Eleventh Amendment
immunity issue to be considered under these circumstances.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff's Motion for Ruling or Judgment on All Pending
Motions and to Review Plaintiff's Reply [the Response (Doc. 13)]
and Judicial Notices (Doc. 36) is GRANTED.
- 16 -
2.
Defendants Watson and Wright's Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
11) is GRANTED to the extent the claims raised against them in the
Amended Complaint are found to be Heck-barred.
3.
The claims against Defendants Watson and Wright are
DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff's right to refile his
claims against Watson and Wright under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when
Plaintiff can demonstrate that the disciplinary report has been
overturned.
4.
Defendants Watson and Wright are DISMISSED from this
action without prejudice.
5.
Defendant Merola's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is GRANTED
with respect to Plaintiff's claims against him for compensatory and
punitive damages. Any claims for nominal damages against Defendant
Merola remain.
6.
Defendant Merola shall respond to the Amended Complaint
by June 10, 2016.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 17th day of
May, 2016.
sa 5/5
c:
Wendall Hall
Counsel of Record
- 17 -
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