De La Cruz v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections et al
Filing
32
ORDER granting 27 motion to dismiss; dismissing with prejudice Defendant Corizon, LLC; instructions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 5/4/2017. (LDO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
ALFONSO A. DE LA CRUZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:15-cv-1314-J-39PDB
CORIZON, LLC,
Defendant.
ORDER
I. Status
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Corizon, LLC's
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Motion)
(Doc. 27). Plaintiff filed his Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss (Response) (Doc. 29).
See Order (Doc. 12).
Plaintiff is
proceeding on a Second Amended Complaint (Complaint) (Doc. 26).
II. Standard of Review
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the
factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In addition, all reasonable
inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Omar ex.
rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam).
Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal
pleading requirements.
1250,
1262-63
(11th
Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d
Cir.
2004)
(citations
omitted).
While
"[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]" the complaint should "'give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Further, the plaintiff must allege "enough
facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570.
"A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded
factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see Miljkovic v.
Shafritz & Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015)
(citation and footnote omitted).
A "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do[.]"
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations
omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that
"conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal
conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal")
(internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, "the tenet that
a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]" which simply
"are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth."
U.S. at 678, 680.
See Iqbal, 556
Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the
Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that
- 2 -
is plausible on its face[.]'" Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570).
III. Second Amended Complaint1
Plaintiff names Corizon, LLC (Corizon) as the only Defendant.
Complaint
at
3-4.2
Plaintiff
sues
Defendant
Corizon
in
its
individual capacity. Id. at 5. Plaintiff asserts that Corizon was
the medical provider for the Florida Department of Corrections
[FDOC] that acted with deliberate indifference to his serious
medical need, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.3
Id. at 5-6.
Plaintiff alleges that Corizon was deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff's serious medical needs in that Corizon failed to:
respond appropriately to his serious medical need, a prostate
problem.
Id. at 6.
He states that he has been suffering for the
1
In considering the Motion, the Court must accept all factual
allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 26) as true, consider the
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
accept all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such
allegations.
Miljkovic v. Shafritz and Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d
1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations and citations omitted). As
such, the recited facts are drawn from the Complaint and may differ
from those that ultimately can be proved.
2
The Court references the pagination assigned by the
electronic filing system.
3
Plaintiff mentions the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), but he does not raise an independent ADA claim. Complaint
at 5-6, at 8.
He imparts that he has difficulty reading and
writing and relies on the assistance of others under the ADA when
preparing his submissions. Id.
- 3 -
last four years and he has not been provided adequate treatment to
remedy his prostate problem. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, including an immediate
evaluation
recommended
by
by
a
urologist
the
followed
urologist.
Id.
by
prompt
at
9.
treatment
He
also
as
seeks
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and such other relief as to
which he may be entitled.
Id. at 10.
IV. Summary of the Arguments
In the Motion, Defendant Corizon seeks dismissal of the
Complaint as moot and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Motion
at 1. In doing so, Corizon asserts that: (1) Plaintiff's claim for
injunctive relief is moot because he is no longer incarcerated at
Franklin Correctional Institution (FCI) and Corizon is no longer
the contracted health care provider for the Florida Department of
Corrections (FDOC), see Motion at 4, and (2) Plaintiff fails to
state a claim against Corizon "when he does not identify an
official Corizon policy of deliberate indifference or an unofficial
Corizon custom or practice that was 'the moving force' behind the
alleged constitutional violation."
See Motion at 8.
In response to Corizon's Motion, Plaintiff asserts that he has
properly and sufficiently stated a claim of deliberate indifference
as to Defendant Corizon based on his contention that Corizon was
the medical agency contracted to provide medical treatment and in
- 4 -
direct control of the health care protocol of the FDOC.
Response at 1.
See
He states that Corizon is liable based on the
factual allegations raised showing "Corizon's act of omission to
provide adequate Medical care."
Id.
V. Law and Conclusions
A.
Failure to State a Claim
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured
under the United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such
deprivation occurred under color of state law.
Salvato v. Miley,
790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d
1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted);
Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (citations omitted).
To establish an Eighth Amendment
violation, there are particular requirements that must be met.
Significantly, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the requirements to
establish an Eighth Amendment claim concerning the deprivation of
medical care:
The
Eighth
Amendment's
prohibition
against "cruel and unusual punishments"
protects
a
prisoner
from
"deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs."
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct.
285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). To state a claim
of
unconstitutionally
inadequate
medical
treatment, a prisoner must establish "an
objectively
serious
[medical]
need,
an
objectively insufficient response to that
need, subjective awareness of facts signaling
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the need, and an actual inference of required
action from those facts."
Taylor v. Adams,
221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000).
Kuhne v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 745 F.3d 1091, 1094 (11th Cir. 2014).
"A serious medical need is 'one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that
even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor's attention.' In the alternative, a serious medical need is
determined by whether a delay in treating the need worsens the
condition."
Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d
1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994)).
To demonstrate that a prison official acted with deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy
both an objective and a subjective inquiry.
See Brown v. Johnson,
387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
not an easy task.
This is
First, he must satisfy the objective component
by showing that he had a serious medical need, Goebert v. Lee Cty.,
510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007), and then, he must satisfy the
subjective component, requiring the plaintiff to adequately present
an allegation "that the prison official, at a minimum, acted with
a
state
of
mind
that
constituted
Richardson, 598 F.3d at 737.
deliberate
indifference."
See McLeod v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of
Corr., No. 15-10851, 2017 WL 541398, at *2 (11th Cir. Feb. 10,
2017) (per curiam) (listing the three components of deliberate
- 6 -
indifference, including (1) the official's subjective knowledge of
a risk of serious harm; (2) the official's disregard of that risk;
and (3) conduct that is more than mere negligence); Melton v.
Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1223 n.2 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(rejecting an Eleventh Circuit panel decision stating a claim of
deliberate
indifference
requires
proof
of
more
than
gross
negligence).
For a period of time, Corizon, a private company, contracted
with the FDOC to provide medical services to inmates within the
state of Florida.
"[w]here
a
Corizon is not a governmental entity, but
function
which
is
traditionally
the
exclusive
prerogative of the state ... is performed by a private entity,
state action is present" for purposes of § 1983.
Ancata v. Prison
Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations
omitted).
Of note,
"when a private entity . . . contracts with a
county to provide medical services to inmates,
it performs a function traditionally within
the exclusive prerogative of the state" and
"becomes the functional equivalent of the
municipality" under section 1983. Buckner v.
Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997).
"[L]iability under § 1983 may not be based on
the doctrine of respondeat superior." Grech v.
Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th
Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Craig v. Floyd Cty., Ga., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011); see
Denham v. Corizon Health, Inc., Case No. 6:13-cv-1425-Orl-40KRS,
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2015 WL 3509294, at *3 n.1 (M.D. Fla. June 4, 2015) ("[W]hen a
government function is performed by a private entity like Corizon,
the private entity is treated as the functional equivalent of the
government for which it works.") (citation omitted).
private
corporation
like
Corizon
may
be
held
Thus, a
liable
for
constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Although Plaintiff may assert that Corizon is functionally
equivalent to a governmental entity, he cannot seek liability for
constitutional deprivations under § 1983 based on the theory of
respondeat superior.
Craig, 643 F.3d at 1310 (quoting Grech v.
Clayton Cty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc));
see Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cty., 218 F.3d 1267, 1276 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 958 (2000).
Acknowledging this
strict limitation on supervisory liability, the Court recognizes
that Corizon may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat
superior.
"Supervisory officials are not liable
under section 1983 on the basis of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability." Belcher v.
City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1396
(11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). "The standard by which
a supervisor is held liable in her individual
capacity for the actions of a subordinate is
extremely rigorous." Gonzalez,[4] 325 F.3d at
1234 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). "Supervisory liability occurs either
when the supervisor personally participates in
4
Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003).
- 8 -
the alleged constitutional violation or when
there is a causal connection between actions
of the supervising official and the alleged
constitutional
deprivation."
Brown
v.
Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990).
Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008) (overruled on
other grounds); see Braddy v. Fla. Dep't of Labor & Emp't Sec., 133
F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding supervisory liability
requires something more than stating a claim of liability under a
theory of respondeat superior).
A plaintiff may successfully state a section 1983 claim and
show liability of a government entity "only where the [government
entity] itself causes the constitutional violation at issue." Cook
ex. rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cty., Fla., 402
F.3d 1092, 1116 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
The key to
establishing that an official policy or custom of the government
entity causes the constitutional violation is to show it was the
"moving force" behind the alleged constitutional deprivation.
See
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978). Thus,
in order for a plaintiff to successfully raise a section 1983 claim
against a municipality or corporate entity acting under color of
state law, he must allege that his constitutional rights were
violated, that the municipality or corporate entity had a custom or
policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that particular
constitutional
right,
and
the
policy
- 9 -
or
custom
caused
the
constitutional violation.
McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289
(11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that local governments can
be
held
policies.
liable
for
constitutional
torts
caused
by
official
It is important to note that such liability is limited
to "acts which the [government entity] has officially sanctioned or
ordered." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986).
Under the directives of Monell, a plaintiff also must allege that
the constitutional deprivation was the result of "an official
government policy, the actions of an official fairly deemed to
represent government policy, or a custom or practice so pervasive
and well-settled that it assumes the force of law."
Denno, 218
F.3d at 1276 (citations omitted); see Hoefling v. City of Miami,
811 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating Monell "is meant to
limit
§
1983
liability
to
'acts
which
the
municipality
has
officially sanctioned or ordered'"; adding that "[t]here are,
however, several different ways of establishing municipal liability
under § 1983").
"A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the
[government entity], or created by an official of such rank that he
or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the [government
entity]." Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th
Cir. 1997) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 (1998).
The policy requirement is designed to "'distinguish acts of the
- 10 -
[government entity] from acts of employees of the [government
entity], and thereby make clear that [governmental] liability is
limited to action for which the [government entity] is actually
responsible.'" Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329 n.5 (quotation and citation
omitted). As such, governmental liability arises under § 1983 only
where "'a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made
from among various alternatives'" by governmental policymakers."
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (quoting
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84).
Of course, a government entity rarely makes official the
adoption of a policy that permits a particular constitutional
violation.
As a consequence, in order to state a cause of action
for damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must ordinarily demonstrate
that the government entity has a custom or practice of permitting
the violation. See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330; McDowell v. Brown, 392
F.3d at 1289.
A custom is an act "that has not been formally approved by an
appropriate decisionmaker," but that is "so widespread as to have
the force of law."
Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (citation omitted).
The Eleventh
Circuit defines "custom" as "a practice that is so settled and
permanent that it takes on the force of law" or a "persistent and
wide-spread practice."
Sewell, 117 F.3d at 489.
It is also a
requirement that, "[t]o hold the [government entity] liable, there
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must be 'a direct causal link between [its] policy or custom and
the alleged constitutional deprivation.'"
Snow ex rel. Snow v.
City of Citronelle, 420 F.3d 1262, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation
omitted). Here, Corizon's liability under § 1983 would be based on
its functional equivalence to the government entity responsible for
providing medical care and services to FDOC inmates; therefore,
Plaintiff must plead that Corizon had an official custom or policy
of deliberate indifference or an unofficial custom or practice that
constituted the moving force behind the alleged constitutional
violation.
The Court finds that Corizon's argument that Plaintiff fails
to adequately allege that Corizon had a policy or custom that
constituted deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical
needs is well-taken. Unlike Fields v. Corizon Health, Inc., 490 F.
App'x 174, 182 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), Plaintiff fails to
point to any policy or custom of Corizon that contributed to the
constitutional violation. In Fields, the Plaintiff alleged Corizon
had a custom or policy of not sending inmates with paralysis to the
hospital, unless near death.
Id. at 180.
The evidence at trial
showed that Corizon's definition of "'emergency' meant only a lifeor-death situation."
Id. at 183.
Based on the showing of
Corizon's narrow definition of emergency, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the jury could reasonably conclude that Corizon "had
a policy that improperly delayed treatment of serious medical
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needs,
like
paralysis,
where
such
exacerbate an inmate's condition."
delay
would
detrimentally
Id. at 184.
Here, Plaintiff fails to identify an official Corizon custom
or policy of deliberate indifference or an unofficial custom or
practice that constituted the moving force behind the alleged
constitutional violation.
See Morgan v. Tucker, No. 3:13-cv-81-J-
34PDB, 2016 WL 1089994, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2016).
Of
further import, Plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting a claim
of
Corizon's
direct
"personal
[Plaintiff's] medical care."
involvement
in
the
denial
of
Palmer v. Corizon Medical Co., No.
8:14-cv-385-T-23TBM, 2014 WL 5488808, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 30,
2014).
Instead, Plaintiff suggests that Corizon, the employer,
should be liable based on the actions of an employee doctor or
medical
staff
member
in
failing
to
respond
appropriately
to
Plaintiff's medical needs by refusing to refer him to a urologist
and/or
depriving
Complaint at 7.
him
of
appropriate
"prostate
treatment."
It is important to note that Corizon cannot be
held liable based on any alleged conduct of or decisions by its
employees simply because they were working under contract for
Corizon to provide medical care to inmates incarcerated in the
FDOC.
At most, Plaintiff has presented a claim against Corizon
under the principle of respondeat superior, which is inadequate to
- 13 -
state a claim of a deprivation of constitutional rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
In
his
Complaint,
unconstitutional
custom
Plaintiff
or
makes
policy.
no
He
allegations
does
not
of
even
boilerplate and conclusory allegations of a custom or policy.
an
use
In
sum, Plaintiff has failed to show a policy or custom of Corizon
contributed to an Eighth Amendment violation in order to hold the
corporation liable.
Again, Plaintiff has neither identified an official Corizon
policy of deliberate indifference nor an unofficial Corizon custom
or practice that was "the moving force" behind the deprivation of
adequate medical care and was in deliberate indifference to his
constitutional right to such care.
Because Plaintiff has not
provided sufficient allegations to state an Eighth Amendment claim
against Corizon plausible on its face, Plaintiff's section 1983
claim against Corizon is due to be dismissed.
B.
Moot
"The general rule in our circuit is that a transfer or a
release of a prisoner from prison will moot that prisoner's claims
for injunctive and declaratory relief."
Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d
1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (abrogated on other
grounds).
Plaintiff is no longer confined at FCI, Santa Rosa
Correctional Institution, the Reception and Medical Center, or the
North West Florida Reception Center Annex, the institutions where
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he sought injunctive relief or grieved his medical issues.
Spears
v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (a
claim
for
injunctive
controversy
once
the
relief
no
longer
presents
inmate
is
transferred
to
facility), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1046 (1989).
a
a
case
or
different
See Rowan v.
Harris, 316 F. App'x 836, 838 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) (recognizing
that
claims
concerning
prison
conditions
become
moot
when
a
prisoner is transferred to another facility), cert. denied, 555
U.S. 1000 (2008).
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Florida
State Prison.
Also of import, Corizon is no longer the contracted health
care provider for the FDOC. As such, Corizon can no longer provide
the requested injunctive relief to Plaintiff.
Thus, Plaintiff's
claim for injunctive relief is moot:
"Article III of the Constitution requires that
there be a live case or controversy at the
time that a federal court decides the case; it
is not enough that there may have been a live
case or controversy when the case was filed."
(citation
and
internal
quotations
Id.
omitted). "The doctrine of mootness provides
that the requisite personal interest that must
exist at the commencement of the litigation
(standing) must continue throughout its
existence (mootness)."
Id. (citations,
alterations, and internal quotations omitted).
KH Outdoor, L.L.C. v. Clay County, Fla., 482 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th
Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, it is now
- 15 -
ORDERED:
1.
Defendant Corizon, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 27) is GRANTED.
2.
Defendant Corizon, LLC, is DISMISSED from this action
with prejudice.
3.
The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.
The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions and close
this case.
4.
Due to Plaintiff's allegation that he has not received
treatment for his prostate problem, the Court directs the Clerk to
provide Julie Jones, the Secretary of the FDOC, and Thomas Reimers,
the Health Services Director of the FDOC, with a copy of the Second
Amended Complaint (Doc. 26) and this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 4th day of
May, 2017.
sa 5/3
c:
Alfonso A. De La Cruz
Counsel of Record
Julie Jones, Secretary, FDOC
Thomas Reimers, Health Services Director, FDOC
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