Truesdale v. CSX Corporation

Filing 27

ORDER granting 14 Motion for summary judgment; directing the Clerk to enter judgment against plaintiff and in favor of defendant and close the file. Signed by Judge Timothy J. Corrigan on 9/21/2017.(SRW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ECIA TRUESDALE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 3:15-cv-1373-J-32PDB

CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
Defendant.

ORDER
Plaintiff Ecia Truesdale, who is African-American, worked for defendant CSX
Transportation, Inc. (“CSXT”) as a customer service representative and coordinator
from June 2012 until August 2015 when CSXT terminated her employment.
Truesdale sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging CSXT harassed and discriminated
against her based on her race (Count I) and retaliated against her for making
complaints to the human resources department (Count II). CSXT has moved for
summary judgment (Doc. 14), Truesdale responded (Docs. 18 & 19), and CSXT
replied (Doc. 24). “Summary judgment is proper ‘if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.’” Trask v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179, 1184, n.1
(11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)).

I.

Undisputed Facts
In her job as a customer service representative, Truesdale worked with

customers to track and locate freight on CSXT’s rails and trucks. Doc. 14-5, Ex. 1;
Doc. 18-6, Ex. 80. At some point her title changed to customer service coordinator,
but her responsibilities remained the same. Doc. 18-6, Ex. 80. At her first year-end
review, Truesdale’s supervisor, Janel Williams (who is African-American), rated
Truesdale’s performance as unsatisfactory. Doc. 14-5, Ex. 5; Doc. 14-15 at ¶ 6.
Truesdale disagreed with the rating. Doc. 14-5, Ex. 9. Williams provided Truesdale
with detailed feedback as to why the rating was warranted. Doc. 14-5, Ex. 10.
Williams left CSXT in April 2013 and Debra Ghourley (who is white) then
supervised Truesdale until November 2013 when Ghourley became the Director of
Customer Service. Doc. 24-1. Ghourley completed Truesdale’s 2013 year-end
review and initially rated her performance as “fair.” Doc. 14-5, Ex. 15. Truesdale
disagreed with the rating and Ghourley, in consultation with her own supervisor (who
is white) and the human resources director (who is African-American), changed
Truesdale’s score to “satisfactory” which, unlike the “fair” rating, entitled Truesdale to
receive a raise. Doc. 14-2 at Tr.1 150; Doc. 14-5, Ex. 13, Ex. 17, Ex. 18. Ghourley
explained that because she had not supervised Truesdale for the entire year, she

1

“Tr.” references are to the transcript pages of depositions. Docs. 14-1, 14-2, 14-3
and 14-4 are Truesdale’s deposition (the transcript pages are sequential).
2

changed the rating to give Truesdale “the benefit of the doubt,” Doc. 14-16 at ¶ 6,
though Truesdale testified that Ghourley only grudgingly raised her rating, and
reminded Truesdale on many occasions that she disagreed with the higher rating.
Doc. 14-2 at Tr. 155-56.
Jennifer Perry (who is white) began supervising Truesdale in February 2014.
Doc. 24-1 at ¶ 4; Doc. 14-2 at Tr.158, Doc. 14-6, Ex. 19.2 In June 2014, Truesdale
was counseled after sending her biggest customer an email telling the customer that
her tone was “very disrespectful, rude and condescending,” and that she was making
Truesdale’s work “very difficult.” Doc. 14-6 at Ex. 22; Doc. 14-2 at Tr. 164. Perry
completed Truesdale’s 2014 year-end review, rating her as “sometimes achieves
expectations,” and noting that Perry was seeing improvement after “work[ing] through
several issues” with Truesdale to help her better address her customers’ needs. Doc.
14-6, Ex. 19. In February and March 2015 different coworkers complained to Perry
about interactions with Truesdale.

Doc. 14-7, Ex. 51, Ex. 53. In March 2015

2

Truesdale testified that Perry supervised her in 2014, which is borne out by the
mid- and year-end review documents. Doc. 14-2 at Tr. 158, Doc. 14-6, Ex. 19.
However, Ghourley and Perry (who both apparently testified without reference to
records) testified that Perry began supervising Truesdale in 2015. Doc. 14-10 at Tr.
12; Doc. 14-13 at Tr. 6-8. Truesdale’s later affidavit also says that Perry began
supervising her in 2015. Doc. 18-6, Ex. 80 Ghourley consulted CSXT personnel
records and completed a subsequent declaration, clarifying that Perry supervised
Truesdale beginning in 2014 (as Truesdale originally testified). Doc. 24-1 at ¶¶ 3-4.
The Court does not find this to be a “genuine dispute” as to a “material fact” but
provides this explanation to clarify the confusion in the record.
3

Truesdale was counseled for directing a customer to submit inquiries in a manner that
created more work for the customer and made it appear that Truesdale was handling
a high volume of inquiries. Doc. 14-7, Ex. 54, Ex. 55.
Then on May 26, 2015, accompanied by two human resources directors,
LaTisha Thompson and Kelly Toaston (both African-American), Perry met with
Truesdale and issued her a formal Performance Warning. Doc. 14-6, Ex. 25. Perry
advised Truesdale that if she did not sustain acceptable performance over the next
sixty days, she would be subject to further disciplinary action, up to and including
termination. Id. Several days later, Truesdale sent a lengthy email to Toaston
explaining that she felt she was being retaliated against and treated unfairly for having
contacted human resources to dispute her performance reviews; she felt threatened
and intimidated by Perry and Ghourley (who was now Perry’s supervisor); and
management was sabotaging her by not timely sharing performance information with
her. Doc. 14-6, Ex. 27. Truesdale’s email does not once mention race. Truesdale
closed her letter by seeking Toaston’s assistance in finding another position within
CSX. Id. Truesdale applied for other open positions at CSX but was not selected.
Doc. 14-6, Ex. 32, Ex. 33.
Meanwhile, Perry and Toaston met with Truesdale every two weeks for
coaching sessions meant to improve her performance. Doc. 14-6, Ex. 31, Ex. 35;
Doc. 14-7, Ex. 39, Ex. 40. However, Perry did not rate Truesdale’s performance as
4

meeting expectations on a regular basis and at the end of the sixty days, Perry
recommended to Ghourley that Truesdale be terminated. Doc. 14-10 at Tr. 35.
Ghourley, Perry and Toaston met with Truesdale, and Ghourley terminated Truesdale
on August 10, 2015.
Discussion3

II.

In her two count complaint, Truesdale alleges she was harassed and
terminated because she is African-American and retaliated against for reporting
3

The Court rejects Truesdale’s efforts to cure her often evasive deposition
testimony by the submission of an after-the-fact conclusory affidavit full of buzzwords
seemingly designed to defeat summary judgment. (Doc.18-6, Ex. 80). The Court
strikes paragraphs 6, 11, 29, 30 from that affidavit to the extent they are wholly
conclusory and/or contradict her deposition testimony without any explanation as to
why she testified under oath as she did. Truesdale testified that Ghourley did not like
her, that Ghourley and Perry treated Truesdale’s co-workers better than her, that
Ghourley and Perry nitpicked her work. But she was unable to articulate any basis
for a jury to believe this attitude had anything to do with her race as opposed to her
performance (which the supervisor before Ghourley (who was African-American) also
found to be deficient, rating her even worse than Ghourley did). While Truesdale’s
affidavit refers to different treatment accorded her “white” co-workers, her deposition
testimony refers to different treatment accorded her “co-workers,” who were white,
African-American, and Hispanic. Moreover, when pressed as to the content of her
conversations with human resources personnel wherein she advised them of her
complaints, Truesdale could not confirm whether she ever actually told anyone at the
time that she felt her race was the reason she was being mistreated. Rather,
Truesdale explained that she felt she had “implied” to HR that race was a factor. Doc.
14-1 at 65-67, 74-85; Doc. 14-2 at Tr. 95, 96, 100-13, 118-21, 146-47; Doc. 24-1 at
¶¶ 10, 11. See Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1270 n. 28 (11th Cir. 2008)
(explaining rule that “a party [who] has given clear answers to unambiguous questions
which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . cannot thereafter
create such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation,
previously given clear testimony”) (quoting Van T. Junkins and Assoc., Inc. v. U.S.
Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir. 1984)).
5

unlawful employment practices, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Doc. 1. Race
discrimination and retaliation claims brought under § 1981 are analyzed in the same
manner as claims brought under Title VII.4 Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 232
F.3d 836, 843 n.11 (11th Cir. 2000) (analyzing § 1981 claim of wrongful termination
under Title VII framework); Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281,1296 n.20 (11th Cir. 2009)
(stating that elements of a § 1981 claim of hostile work environment are same as
those under Title VII); Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277
(11th Cir. 2008) (analyzing § 1981 and Title VII retaliation claims under the same
standard).
A.

Termination Claim (Count I)

Because Truesdale relies on circumstantial evidence to attempt to prove her
race discrimination claim, the Court first addresses her claim under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. Smith v. Lockheed-Martin, Corp., 644 F.3d 1321,
1325 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 80205 (1973)). Barring success there, the Court may consider whether Truesdale has
painted “a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence” from which a jury could infer
intentional discrimination. Id. at 1328-29 (quotation and citation omitted).5

4

The Court is dismayed to note that some of the cases cited by CSXT for this basic
proposition are not accurately reported in its motion for summary judgment.
5

Here too, CSXT ignores this aspect of the law in suggesting in its reply brief that
plaintiff can only prevail via the McDonnell Douglas framework. Doc. 24 at 7. Binding
6

Starting first with the McDonnell Douglas analysis, Truesdale must establish a
prima facie case of discrimination by showing “(1) that [she] is a member of a
protected class (here, [African-American]); (2) that [she] was qualified for the position
[she] held; (3) that [she] was discharged from that position; and (4) that in terminating
[her] employment, [CSXT] treated [her] less favorably than a similarly-situated
individual outside [her] protected class.” Smith, 644 F.3d at 1325 (citing Maynard v.
Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003)). If Truesdale can establish a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to CSXT to rebut the presumption that its decision
to terminate Truesdale was motivated by race, which it may do by articulating a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for her termination. See Id. at 1325. If CSXT
meets its burden of production, “the presumption of discrimination is rebutted” and
“the inquiry ‘proceeds to a new level of specificity,’ whereby [Truesdale] must show
[CSXT’s] proffered reason to be a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id. at 1325-26
(quoting EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002)).
The Court finds Truesdale cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination
because she cannot demonstrate that in terminating her employment, CSXT treated
her less favorably than similarly-situated co-workers who were not African-American.

precedent holds otherwise. See Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328 (“[E]stablishing the
elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework is not, and never was intended to be,
the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary judgment motion in an
employment discrimination case.”); Flowers v. Troup Cty, Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d
1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Smith for same proposition).
7

Truesdale testified that one white co-worker (Roxanne McElroy) received a “bad
review” in 2013 but was not terminated, and two other white co-workers (Janeene
Bartley and Patti Cole) performed as poorly as Truesdale but were not disciplined.6
But Truesdale also testified that she had never seen Bartley or Cole’s personnel files,
Doc. 14-3 at Tr. 213; doesn’t know if they were ever disciplined or how they scored
on their performance reviews, id.; didn’t know how many mistakes Bartley made, Doc.
14-1 at Tr. 90; hadn’t seen any of McElroy’s subsequent reviews, Doc. 14-2 at Tr. 9293; was “making a guess” that McElroy had as many performance deficiencies as
Truesdale, id. at Tr. 92; had never observed Cole’s work, Doc. 14-3 at Tr. 213; and
admitted that her source of information about Cole was “rumors in the grapevine.”
Doc. 14-2 at Tr. 92. In fact, neither McElroy, Bartley or Cole ever received an
unsatisfactory performance review (as did Truesdale in 2012) and, other than
McElroy’s “fair” review in 2013 (the year Truesdale’s initial “fair” review was
subsequently changed to “satisfactory” at her request), all three of them performed

6

At one point in her deposition, Truesdale said that only Bartley and Cole
performed as poorly as her without being terminated, Doc. 14-2 at Tr. 93, so it is not
clear that she considers McElroy to be a comparator. Her summary judgment
response does not mention McElroy or Cole at all. While it does mention Bartley, it
is only to say that Truesdale covered her customers while Bartley was on leave, that
Bartley took a lot of leave, and that Bartley complained to Perry about Truesdale’s
handling of Bartley’s customers and that Perry took Bartley’s side without consulting
Truesdale. See Doc. 19 at 4-5. However, to give Truesdale every benefit of the
doubt, the Court considers Bartley, Cole and McElroy to be possible comparators.
8

better than Truesdale all four years they were evaluated. See Doc. 14-16 at ¶ 9.7
Truesdale also complains that she suffered mistreatment others did not,
including receiving emails in all capital letters, being talked about, having an
increased workload, being nitpicked and scrutinized, and not being selected to
transfer to another position in the company. But these incidents are not adverse
employment actions within the meaning of the law, whether viewed separately or
cumulatively.8 See Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239, 1242, 1244,

7

Truesdale offered only conclusory statements in her affidavit that white co-workers
were treated differently than she was in that their mistakes were not escalated to
management, they were not subject to discipline despite poor performances, and they
were allowed to transfer to other positions. Doc. 18-6, Ex. 80 at ¶ 32. Like her
deposition testimony, this is insufficient to create a genuine dispute as to any material
fact. See Valderrama v. Rousseau, 780 F.3d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining
that in opposing summary judgment, “[c]onclusory allegations and speculation are
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.”); Fed. R. Civ. P 56(c) and (e)
(party opposing summary judgment must properly support assertions of fact).
To the extent Truesdale argues that being put on the performance improvement
plan (“PIP”) (which preceded her termination) was itself the adverse employment
action, she has not demonstrated a prima facie case as to this either, having failed to
show that CSXT treated her less favorably. And, in any event, it is not clear that such
placement would be deemed an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Hall v.
Siemens VDO Auto., 481 F. App’x 499, 505 (11th Cir. June 21, 2012) (holding
placement on a PIP is not an adverse action for a retaliation claim); Carroll v. Ceridian
Benefits Servs., No. 8:11-cv-1063-T-24TGW, 2012 WL 5431007, *8 (M.D. Fla. Nov.
7, 2012) (holding placement on a PIP is not an adverse employment action in a race
discrimination case).
8

The sampling of monthly workload documents Truesdale supplied do not show
that Truesdale had a higher workload than her co-workers. See Doc. 14-7 at Ex. 47,
Ex. 48. (Truesdale did not know what year the documents reflected, Doc. 14-3 at Tr.
214.) Ghourley’s second declaration states that CSXT’s records for 2014 and
January - July, 2015 (summarized in her declaration) reveal that Truesdale was
9

1245 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that conduct is only actionable under Title VII’s antidiscrimination clause if it effects “a serious and material change in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment” “as viewed by a reasonable person in the
circumstances” and that unfair work assignments, negative evaluations, criticism, loss
of self-esteem, and loss of prestige, while unpleasant, are not actionable except in
rare circumstances).
Furthermore, even if the Court found Truesdale was able to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, CSXT has put forward a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason to terminate Truesdale, as evidenced by the well-documented long-standing
history of her poor performance on nearly every criteria CSXT measures. While
Truesdale points to a few stray remarks that she contends support her theory of racial
animus,9 she has entirely failed to rebut CSXT’s evidence that she was a poor

assigned less work than many of her co-workers. Doc. 24-1 at ¶ 9. Additionally, while
Truesdale testified that two people were allowed to transfer out of Ghourley’s
supervision whereas she was not, one of the two was African-American, belying
Truesdale’s claim that a failure to let her transfer out was race-based discrimination.
See Doc. 14-1 at Tr. 90; Doc. 14-2 at Tr. 91. (Truesdale also testified that a
Caucasian employee transferred into her department but she did not know the
circumstances, Doc. 14-2 at Tr. 91; thus, its relevance, if any, is insufficient to create
a genuine dispute as to any material fact.)
9

Truesdale’s theory that racial animus was the cause of her demise at CSXT is
based on Debra Ghourley having once complained about traffic and the loud and
distracting noise caused by the Martin Luther King Day parade (whose route passes
by CSXT and its parking area); a remark Ghourley made that the women are “trashy”
on the television program “The Real Housewives of Atlanta” (Truesdale says the
program features African-American women who Truesdale agreed wore revealing
10

performer and was rated as such by three different supervisors over three different
years, including by an African-American supervisor. See Crawford v. City of Fairburn,
482 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that under McDonnell Douglas
burden shifting analysis, “plaintiff must meet the reason proffered head on and rebut
it”) (citations omitted). Truesdale’s claim that she suffered an adverse employment
action based on race discrimination does not survive the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
Nor does the Court find Truesdale has presented “a convincing mosaic of
circumstantial evidence” from which a jury could infer intentional discrimination as the
basis for CSXT taking adverse employment action against her. Smith, 644 F.3d at
1328-29. Truesdale’s evidence includes the remarks Ghourley said (or maybe said)
that offended Truesdale (recounted in fn. 9); that a three person panel (of which
Ghourley and African-American Human Resources Director LaTisha Thompson were
members) did not select another African-American person for a promotion (Truesdale
did not apply for that position) (see Doc. 14-2 at Tr. 147); the hearsay that Sherita
Jacobs, an African-American co-worker who transferred out of Ghourley’s

clothing, used foul language, and hit each other); and a remark Truesdale “thought”
she overheard Ghourley make that the Trayvon Martin shooting was justified (the
Trayvon Martin shooting was a highly publicized case in which a 17 year old unarmed
African-American high school student was shot and killed by a neighborhood watch
coordinator who a jury acquitted (see State v. Zimmerman, No. 2012-CF001083-A,
available at http://flcourts18.org/?page_id=969)). None of these comments were
directed to Truesdale but she overheard them. See Doc. 14-1 at Tr. 49-57; Doc. 14-2
at Tr. 134-35.
11

supervision, told Truesdale that she thought Ghourley was discriminating against her
(Jacobs) based on her race (see Doc. 14-3 at Tr. 232-33); and Truesdale’s own view
that the treatment she received was because she is African-American (see Doc. 14-2
at Tr. 111-12, Doc. 14-3 at Tr. 178). No jury could infer intentional discrimination on
this thin record. See, e.g., Connelly v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Trans. Auth., 764 F.3d
1358, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014) (contrasting plaintiff’s weak evidence with “compelling
evidence” of discrimination presented in Smith).
B.

Harassment Claim (Count I)

Truesdale also asserts a race-based hostile work environment claim. To prove
this claim, Truesdale must show that “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.” Trask v.
Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179, 1195 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299, 1311 (11th Cir. 2012) (alteration omitted)). To
establish a prima facie case Truesdale must show (1) she “belong[s] to a protected
group,” (2) “she was subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment was
based on a protected characteristic, (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of . . . her employment and create an
abusive working environment, and (5) a basis exists for holding [CSXT] liable.” Id.
(citing Gupta v. Fla. Board of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 582 (11th Cir. 2000)). “[O]nly
12

conduct that is based on a protected category may be considered in a hostile work
environment analysis.” Id. (citation and alteration omitted).
Truesdale claims she satisfies her prima facie case because, unlike her white
co-workers, supervisors spoke to Truesdale and sent emails to her using a hostile
tone, had conversations about her with other co-workers or within their earshot, and
did not defend her when customers were abusive.10 Truesdale cannot show that the
treatment she received was based on her race as opposed to her undisputedly poor
performance.11 Even crediting Truesdale’s best case, the treatment she received was
not nearly severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and conditions of her
employment, whether the incidents are considered singly or in combination. See id.
Truesdale cannot establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment, nor can
she piece together a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence upon which a jury
could find she was harassed based on her race.

10

The sweeping exaggerated statements Truesdale uses in her written response
to describe these incidents are simply not supported by any admissible evidence in
the record.
11

The few isolated comments Truesdale overheard Ghourley make to others that
could possibly be construed as “racial” (described above), were not sufficiently severe
or pervasive as to create a hostile work environment. Additionally, Truesdale testified
that she never heard Perry make any racially insensitive comments (Doc. 14-1 at Tr.
73) and she did not testify that any co-workers did either. See Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (explaining that Title VII is violated “[w]hen the workplace
is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult”) (quotation and
citation omitted).
13

C.

Retaliation Claim (Count II)

Truesdale has not put forward any direct evidence of retaliation so here too the
Court looks to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which requires
Truesdale to show “(1) [she] engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) [she]
suffered an adverse employment decision,12 and (3) the decision was causally related
to the protected activity.” Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Delaware, LLC, 854
F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation and citation omitted). If Truesdale can
establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts back to CSXT to “articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for her termination. Id. (quotation and citation
omitted). If CSXT does so, then Truesdale “must show that the supposedly legitimate
reason was in fact a pretext designed to mask illegal discrimination.” Id. (citation
omitted).
While not entirely clear, it seems Truesdale is arguing that the retaliation she
suffered (her termination) stems from two incidents: an anonymous complaint to a
CSXT ethics hotline in February 2014 about race discrimination in a hiring decision;
12

The Court assumes the only “adverse employment decision” at issue in this claim
is Truesdale’s termination. To the extent Truesdale might be arguing the retaliation
she suffered included additional adversity (other than being terminated), none of the
claimed incidents rise to the level of being an adverse employment decision within the
meaning of a retaliation claim. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry Co. v. White,
548 U.S. 53, 57, 65-67 (2006) (explaining that, while an adverse employment action
for purposes of a retaliation claim is construed more broadly than in a discrimination
claim, “the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination”).
14

and her complaint to Human Resources about her 2013 year-end review (which
complaint resulted in her scores being raised).13 As to the first incident, while there
was an anonymous complaint to CSXT’s ethics hotline that a hiring panel (on which
Ghourley was one of three members) engaged in race discrimination by selecting a
white candidate instead of an African-American for a vacancy in February 2014
(which complaint the Court assumes to be statutorily protected activity),14 Truesdale
testified that although she had made other complaints to the ethics hotline, she was
not sure that she was the person who complained about the February 2014 vacancy.
Doc. 14-2 at Tr. 142-47. Furthermore, while Ghourley testified that she suspected it
might have been Truesdale who made the anonymous complaint, Truesdale is unable
to causally connect her termination eighteen months later to the anonymous ethics
hotline complaint. Without other evidentiary support, the temporal proximity of a
February 2014 complaint is too far removed from Truesdale’s August 2015

13

Although Truesdale’s summary judgment response references “multiple
complaints” she allegedly made to human resources and management about race
discrimination (Doc. 19 at 6), in her deposition Truesdale could not recall telling any
supervisor that race played a role in any action anyone took against her or anyone
else until the day she was terminated when she says she told Toaston as Toaston
escorted Truesdale from the building that Ghourley had a history of mistreating black
women. Doc. 14-2 at Tr. 109-11. Thus, none of these other actions can form the
basis for a retaliation claim under § 1981.
14

The documentation of the ethics hotline complaint and investigation are of record.
Doc. 14-5, Ex. 12.
The African-American candidate who was not selected was not Truesdale; she did
not apply for that position.
15

termination to demonstrate causation. Jones, 854 F.3d at 1271-72 (explaining that
a three to four month period between statutorily protected conduct and adverse
employment action is too long to establish causation without other evidence).
Truesdale also claims that Ghourley resented Truesdale for complaining to HR
about her 2013 year-end performance review (which resulted in Ghourley raising
Truesdale’s rating so that Truesdale received a raise) and that this action caused
Ghourley to retaliate against Truesdale by pressuring Perry to put Truesdale on a PIP
over a year later and ultimately to terminate her. Truesdale does not explain how her
complaint about her review (which she does not claim had anything to do with her
race) was “statutorily protected activity.” See Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956,
961 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment on retaliation claim under § 1981
where plaintiff’s complaint was not about an unlawful employment practice). Even
assuming that Truesdale’s complaint about her year-end review was a complaint
about an unlawful employment practice, it is only Truesdale’s conjecture that supports
her attenuated theory of subsequent retaliation by Ghourley through Perry over a year
later.
Moreover, even if Truesdale could establish a prima facie case of retaliation
based on either the anonymous call or the year-end review complaint, CSXT points
to Truesdale’s poor performance as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
terminating her and Truesdale has not marshaled any admissible evidence to show
16

this reason is a pretext for unlawful retaliation. As a matter of law, Truesdale cannot
prove her retaliation claim.
III.

Conclusion
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
Defendant CSXT’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 14) is GRANTED.

The Clerk shall enter judgment against plaintiff Ecia Truesdale and in favor of
defendant CSX Transportation, Inc., and shall thereafter close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida this 21st day of September,
2017.

s.
Copies:
counsel of record

17