Eiras v. State of Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation Division of Alcoholic Beverage and Tobacco et al

Filing 34

ORDER granting 20 Defendant State of Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation's Second Motion to Dismiss Count V of Plaintiff's Complaint; denying 21 Defendant Eugene R. Baker, Jr.'s Second Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint. Count V of the Complaint is dismissed. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 10/13/2017. (JW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER J. EIRAS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:16-cv-231-J-34PDB

v.
STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES
AND TOBACCO, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/

ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on (1) Defendant State of Florida Department of
Business & Professional Regulation’s Second Motion to Dismiss Count V of Plaintiff’s
Complaint (Doc. No. 20; DB&PR’s Second Motion), filed on March 8, 2017, and (2)
Defendant Eugene R. Baker, Jr.’s Second Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s
Complaint (Doc. No. 21; Baker’s Second Motion), filed on March 14, 2017 (collectively, the
Second Motions). On March 22, 2017, Plaintiff Christopher J. Eiras (Plaintiff or Eiras) filed
Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant DBPR’s Second Motion to Dismiss Count V (Doc. 20)
and Defendant Baker’s Second Motion to Dismiss Count I (Doc. 21) [sic] (Doc. No. 24;
Second Response). Accordingly, the Second Motions are ripe for review.

1

The factual allegations in the Complaint (Doc. No. 2) are fully set forth in the Court’s
Order (Doc. No. 19; Order) entered on March 7, 2017. Consequently, the Court will not
repeat that background here. However, the Court will lay out the relevant procedural
history of this case.
On February 4, 2016, Eiras filed his five count Complaint in the Circuit Court of the
Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida. See Complaint. The Department
of Business & Professional Regulation Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco
(DB&PR) removed the action to this Court on March 10, 2016. See DB&PR’s Notice of
Removal (Doc. No. 1; Notice). Following the filing of motions to dismiss by both DB&PR
and Baker, see Doc. No. 4 and Doc. No. 6, the Court dismissed Count II and Count III of
the Complaint, leaving Counts I, IV, and V pending before the Court, see Order at 21-22.
Only Count I and Count V are relevant to the Second Motions.
In Count I of the Complaint, Eiras alleges that Baker violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Section 1983) by executing a false arrest and thereby depriving Eiras of his rights under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Complaint ¶ 29. In Count
V, Eiras alleges that DB&PR violated Section 1983 by maliciously prosecuting him in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id.
at ¶¶ 45-48. In its Second Motion, DB&PR seeks to dismiss Count V on the basis of
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and because the state is not a
“person” for purposes of Section 1983. See DB&PR’s Second Motion at 2-3. In his Second
Response, Eiras states that he “does not contest DB&PR’s Second Motion to Dismiss
Count V.” See Second Response at 2. As such, the Court will grant DB&PR’s Second
Motion, and will dismiss Count V.

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In Baker’s Second Motion, Baker argues that the Court should dismiss Count I of
the Complaint because Eiras has sued him based on his official acts, and therefore he is
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Baker’s Second Motion at 2-3.
This position is not well taken. Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected an almost identical
argument in Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991). There, “Hafer s[ought] to overcome the
distinction between official-and personal-capacity suits by arguing that § 1983 liability
turn[ed] not on the capacity in which state officials [we]re sued, but on the capacity in which
they acted when injuring the plaintiff.”

Id. at 27.

Hafer argued that a state official

performing an official duty was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at
27-31. The Court rejected the contention stating that the Eleventh Amendment does not
bar suits against state officials in their individual capacities, and that state officers are not
“absolutely immune from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the ‘official’
nature of their acts.” Id. at 31; see also Hobbs v. Roberts, 999 F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir.
1993) (“The Eleventh Amendment protects no personal assets in ‘individual’ or ‘personal’
capacity suits in federal court.”); Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs.,
779 F.2d 1509, 1512-13 (11th Cir. 1986) (“As opposed to suits in which the defendant is
the state, one of the state’s agencies, or a responsible state officer sued in an official
capacity, the Eleventh Amendment provides no bar to federal court adjudication of suits
against state officers individually.”). Rather, state officers sued in their individual capacities
may be entitled to qualified immunity, but not absolute immunity. See Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 733 (11th Cir.
2010).

Thus, Baker is protected, if at all, under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Accordingly, although this lawsuit arises out of conduct that Baker committed while “acting

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under the authority of the State of Florida,” see Complaint ¶ 29, the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar Eiras from suing Baker in his individual capacity. Hafer also forecloses
Baker’s contention that he is not a “person” for purposes of Section 1983. Indeed the
Court specifically concluded that “state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are
‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30. Here Eiras has sued Baker
in his individual capacity. See Complaint at 2, ¶ 5. Therefore, Baker’s Second Motion is
due to be denied.1
In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED:
1. Defendant State of Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation’s
Second Motion to Dismiss Count V of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. No. 20) is
GRANTED.
2. Count V of the Complaint is DISMISSED.
3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate Defendant State of Florida
Department of Business & Professional Regulation Division of Alcoholic
Beverages and Tobacco from the docket.
4. Defendant Eugene R. Baker, Jr.’s Second Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s
Complaint (Doc. No. 21) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, this 13th day of October, 2017.

1
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), when an attorney presents a
written motion to the Court, the attorney “certifies that to the best of [his] knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Baker’s Second Motion is so lacking in merit that the
Court reserves jurisdiction to consider whether its filing warrants the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11.

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Copies to:
Counsel of Record

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