Great American Assurance Company v. Ride Solutions, Inc. et al
Filing
136
ORDER denying 94 motion to dismiss; denying 96 motion to dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 99 motion to dismiss; denying 110 motion to dismiss; denying as moot 119 Motion to Intervene; denying as moot 120 Motion for Leave to Add a Plaintiff; granting in part 135 Brown and Riding's Partially Unopposed Motion for Scheduling Conference or, in the Alternative, to Amend the Scheduling Order. Not later than 1/23/2019, Plaintiffs shall file a Third Amended Complaint in accordance with this Order. Not later than 2/8/2019, Defendants shall answer the Third Amended Complaint. Not later than 2/22/2019, the parties shall respond to any counterclaims or crossclaims. Not later than 2/8/2019, the parties shall file a jo int notice advising whether further mediation would be beneficial. Amended Deadlines: Plaintiffs' Disclosure of Expert Reports - 4/8/2019; Defendants' Disclosure of Expert Reports - 5/8/2019; Discovery Deadline - 7/1/2019; Dispositive and D aubert Motions Deadline - 8/1/2019; Responses to Dispositive and Daubert Motions - 8/22/2019; All other Motions including Motions in Limine - 1/13/2020; Filing of Pretrial Statement - 1/13/2020; Final Pretrial Conference - 1/23/2020; Trial Term Begins - 2/3/2020. See Order for additional details and deadlines. Signed by Judge Timothy J. Corrigan on 12/27/2018. (JJB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
GREAT AMERICAN ASSURANCE
COMPANY, a foreign corporation,
GREAT AMERICAN ALLIANCE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign
corporation,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 3:16-cv-372-J-32JBT
JUSTIN WILLIAMSON, RIDE
SOLUTION, INC., BROWN &
RIDING INSURANCE SERVICES,
INC., NON-PROFIT INSURANCE
SERVICES, INC., and BALLATOR
INSURANCE GROUP,
Defendants.
ORDER
This insurance coverage dispute is before the Court on three motions to
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, (Docs. 94, 96, 99), a motion to
intervene (Doc. 119), a motion for leave to amend to add a plaintiff, (Doc. 120),
and a motion to dismiss the cross-complaint, (Doc. 110).
I. BACKGROUND
On April 16, 2018, the Court ordered Great American Assurance
Company, the plaintiff in this action, to file a second amended complaint adding
Brown and Riding Insurance Services, Inc., Non-Profit Insurance Services, Inc.
(“NPIS”), Ballator Insurance Group, and Florida Insurance Trust (“FIT”) as
defendants. (Doc. 91). 1 On May 15, 2018, Assurance filed the Second Amended
Complaint, (Doc. 92), which added Great American Alliance Insurance
Company as a plaintiff, and alleged thirteen counts against Justin Williamson,
Ride Solution, Inc., Brown and Riding, NPIS, and Ballator. (Doc. 92). The
Second Amended Complaint did not list FIT as a defendant. Assurance and
Alliance allege in the Second Amended Complaint that Williamson’s injuries
are not covered under their respective policies (Counts I & IV), that
Williamson’s damages are precluded under the Assurance and Alliance policies
because he received workers’ compensation benefits (Counts II & V), that public
policy excludes the loss under the Assurance policy (Count III), that NPIS
should indemnify Assurance and Alliance under the Wrongful Acts Doctrine
(Count VI), that NPIS was negligent (Count VII), that Ballator was negligent
(Count VIII), that Ballator negligently supervised NPIS (Count IX), that
Ballator should indemnify Assurance (Count X), that Brown and Riding should
A more detailed description of the underlying facts and procedural
history are recounted in that order.
1
2
indemnify Assurance (Counts XI & XII), and that Brown and Riding was
negligent (Count XII).
Ride Solution, Brown and Riding, and NPIS and Ballator all moved to
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the basis that Assurance improperly
added Alliance as a Plaintiff and that FIT was not joined as a defendant as
required by the Court’s April 16, 2018 Order. (Docs. 94, 96, 99). Additionally,
NPIS and Ballator contend that Counts VI–X fail to state a claim. (Doc. 99).
After responding to the motions to dismiss, Assurance filed a Motion for Leave
to Amend to Add Great American Alliance as a Plaintiff, (Doc. 120), and
Alliance moved to intervene, (Doc. 119). Ballator, NPIS, Brown and Riding, and
Ride Solution oppose both motions. (Docs. 124, 125, 126).
Williamson answered the Second Amended Complaint and alleged a
counter-claim against Plaintiffs and cross-claims against NPIS, Ballator, and
Brown and Riding. (Doc. 95). Pertinent to this Order, Williamson asserted
claims for Negligence (Count VII) and Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count VIII)
against Brown and Riding, (Doc. 95 ¶¶ 101–12), which Brown and Riding moved
to dismiss, (Doc. 110). Plaintiffs, NPIS, and Ballator answered the counter and
cross-claims. (Docs. 103, 111, 112).
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Alliance as a plaintiff
Whether Alliance should be allowed to remain a plaintiff is the subject of
five separate pending motions. (Docs. 94, 96, 99, 119, 120). In response to adding
Alliance as a plaintiff, Brown and Riding, Ride Solution, and NPIS and Ballator
moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint because Assurance never
received consent or court approval to add Alliance. (Docs. 94, 96, 99). After
responding to the motions to dismiss, Assurance filed a Motion for Leave to
Amend to Add Great American Alliance as a Plaintiff, (Doc. 120), and Alliance
filed a Motion to Intervene, (Doc. 119).
Because more than twenty-one days elapsed since the filing of the original
Complaint, Assurance is only permitted to amend its pleading with consent of
the parties or with leave of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a)(2) states: “The court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.” Id. Here, the Court directed Assurance to amend its complaint, but
did not give it leave to add a plaintiff. (Doc. 91).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 governs intervention and provides for
mandatory and permissive intervention. A court must permit intervention if a
party timely files a motion and it “claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to
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protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Additionally, a court may permit intervention for a
party who timely files a motion and “has a claim or defense that shares with
the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B).
In determining permissive joinder, the court must consider the undue delay and
prejudice to the original parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).
Brown and Riding, Ride Solution, and NPIS and Ballator, claim that they
will be prejudiced if Alliance is added as a plaintiff at this stage of the litigation.
(Docs. 124, 125, 126). They assert that the motion to amend and the motion to
intervene are untimely because Alliance and Assurance have known since the
beginning of the litigation that Alliance should be a plaintiff. Additionally, they
claim that prior depositions continually refer to “Great American” without
further specificity and thus, each of those depositions will need to be redone to
clarify to which entity the deponent was referring.
Although Assurance represented to the Court that it wanted to remain
the sole plaintiff, (Doc. 90), and has known for a long time that Alliance should
be made a plaintiff, all parties, including those newly added, were on notice that
Alliance had pending claims in this case. (See Doc. 29 ¶¶ 47–60 (seeking
declaratory judgment that no coverage existed under Alliance’s policy)).
Throughout this litigation, Assurance has referred to itself as “Great American”
and has sought to litigate claims on behalf of Alliance. Ride Solution, in its
5
summary judgment motion, asserted that Assurance lacked standing to litigate
claims for Alliance. (Doc. 62 at 9). Thus, at the very latest, Assurance knew on
May 22, 2017 that Alliance should be added as a plaintiff. However, amendment
should be granted when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Despite the late
request, no party can claim surprise by adding Alliance at this stage of the
litigation. Additionally, the Court is skeptical that all depositions will need to
be redone because Alliance is now officially a plaintiff. At the time the
depositions were taken, the operative complaint sought declarations concerning
both Assurance’s and Alliance’s coverage. It makes sense that Alliance be a
named plaintiff so all claims can be adjudicated in this action.
B. FIT as a defendant
When the Court held a hearing on October 27, 2017, the parties to the
case were Justin Williamson, Assurance, and Ride Solution. At the hearing, it
became apparent that NPIS and Brown and Riding were necessary parties,
(Doc. 76), and the Court ordered briefing on how the parties should be aligned,
(Doc. 79). In the briefing on this issue, several parties also recommended that
FIT and Ballator be added. (See generally Docs. 86, 87, 88). The Court then
ordered that Assurance would remain the plaintiff and would add NPIS, Brown
and Riding, FIT, and Ballator as defendants. (Doc. 91). However, Assurance did
not add FIT as a defendant in its Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 92). Brown
and Riding, Ride Solution, and NPIS and Ballator have moved to dismiss the
6
complaint on the basis that Assurance failed to abide by this Court’s order.
(Docs. 94, 96, 99).
Assurance states that it did not add FIT as a defendant because pursuant
to Rule 11, it did not have a good faith basis to do so. (Docs. 104, 105, 106). This
argument is unpersuasive. First, the Court would not order a party to do
something and then sanction that party for its compliance. Second, Assurance,
and now Alliance, seek declarations that Williamson is not covered under the
Alliance policy—a policy in which FIT is the named insured, (Doc. 92 ¶ 17, 91–
98; see also Doc. 29-1 at 1). Thus, although it is unclear whether the named
insured is required to be a defendant in an action seeking declarations of noncoverage, it certainly is not sanctionable to include it. See Sparta Ins. Co. v.
Poore, No. 1:13-CV-1692-VEH, 2013 WL 6243707, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 3, 2013)
(stating that “courts have held in a variety of circumstances that not all
insureds must be joined in a declaratory judgment action.” (quoting Great W.
Cas. Co. v. Firstfleet, Inc., CA 2:12–00623–KD–N, 2013 WL 4165715 (S.D. Ala.
July 18, 2013)); S.-Owners Ins. Co. v. Search Auto. Techs., LLC, No. 9:12-CIV80205-DLB, 2012 WL 13024102, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2012) (holding that the
named insured must be joined even though they were not a defendant in the
underlying action).
“When the court decides under Rule 19(a) that a person should be joined
the court should direct the plaintiff to amend his complaint to add the person.
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Failure to comply with such an order may result in dismissal of the plaintiff’s
action under Rule 41(b) FRCP for failure of a party to comply with an order of
court.” English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 465 F.2d 43, 47–48 (5th Cir. 1972)
(footnotes omitted). However, dismissal is not appropriate in this circumstance,
and FIT shall be added as a defendant.
C. Plaintiffs’ claims against NPIS and Ballator
NPIS and Ballator seek dismissal of all claims against them for failing to
state claims upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 99 at 3–4). Count VI alleges
that Assurance and Alliance are entitled to Indemnification by NPIS under the
Wrongful Acts Doctrine. (Doc. 92 ¶¶ 99–103). Count VII alleges negligence
against NPIS, Count VIII alleges negligence by Ballator, Count IX alleges
negligent supervision by Ballator, and Count X alleges that Assurance is
entitled to common law indemnification from Ballator. (Doc. 92 ¶¶ 99–131).
1. The indemnification counts should be dismissed.
NPIS and Ballator assert that Counts VI and X should be dismissed
because Plaintiffs failed to allege the basic elements of an indemnification claim
and the claims have not accrued. (Doc. 99 at 8–9). However, only Count X is at
issue because Plaintiffs concede that the Wrongful Acts Doctrine does not
provide a separate cause of action. (Doc. 120 at 3).
In order to properly plead a cause of action for common law
indemnity, the party seeking indemnity must allege in his
complaint 1) that he is wholly without fault; 2) that the party from
8
whom he is seeking indemnity is at fault; and 3) that he is liable
to the injured party only because he is vicariously, constructively,
derivatively, or technically liable for the wrongful acts of the party
from whom he is seeking indemnity.
Fla. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 763 So. 2d 429, 435 (Fla.
5th DCA 2000).
Assurance alleges that it is without fault, (Doc. 92 ¶ 130), and that any
liability it has will be because of the negligence of NPIS, Ballator, or Brown and
Riding. (Doc. 92 ¶¶ 29, 109, 119). Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that any
liability they face is proximately caused by NPIS and Ballator’s negligence.
(Doc. 92 ¶¶ 22–29). However, Plaintiffs’ indemnification claims fail. Assurance
is only seeking indemnification in the event Williamson is able to recover under
the insurance policy. (Doc. 92 ¶ 131). However, if the Court determines that
coverage was in place, it would be irrespective of NPIS and Ballator’s
negligence. NPIS and Ballator are not Assurance’s agents, thus, their alleged
misrepresentations cannot bind Assurance into coverage. See Kolodziej v.
Mason, 774 F.3d 736, 741 (11th Cir. 2014). Therefore, if Assurance is required
to pay Williamson under the insurance contract, such contractual liability
would result from something other than NPIS or Ballator’s negligence—making
indemnification inappropriate. See Seitlin & Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 650 So. 2d
624, 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
9
2. Whether Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged negligence against NPIS
and Ballator.
NPIS and Ballator argue that Counts VII and VIII fail to sufficiently
allege legal duties and proximate causation. (Doc. 99 at 9). The Second
Amended Complaint states that NPIS had an “obligation to complete [its] work
in a professional manner.” (Doc. 92 ¶ 105). NPIS and Ballator assert that a
special relationship is needed for such a duty to be imposed upon them. (Doc.
99 at 12). Plaintiffs contend that a reasonable person in NPIS or Ballator’s
position would or should have known that their actions created a foreseeable
zone of risk posing a threat to someone in Plaintiffs’ position. (Doc. 105 at 14).
To sustain a claim of negligence, Plaintiffs must allege: (1) a duty; (2)
breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages. Virgilio v. Ryland Grp., Inc.,
680 F.3d 1329, 1339 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, L.L.C.,
39 So. 3d 1216, 1227 (Fla. 2010)). “Establishing the existence of a duty under
Florida’s negligence law is a minimum threshold legal requirement that opens
the courthouse doors, and is ultimately a question of law for the court rather
than
a
jury.”
Id.
(alterations
adopted)
(quotation
marks
omitted)
(quoting Williams v. Davis, 974 So. 2d 1052, 1057 n. 2 (Fla. 2007)).
“Florida, like other jurisdictions, recognizes that a legal duty will arise
whenever a human endeavor creates a generalized and foreseeable risk of
harming others.” McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 503 (Fla. 1992).
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The statute books and case law, in other words, are not required
to catalog and expressly proscribe every conceivable risk in order
for it to give rise to a duty of care. Rather, each defendant who
creates a risk is required to exercise prudent foresight whenever
others may be injured as a result. This requirement of reasonable,
general foresight is the core of the duty element.
Id. However, the foreseeable zone of risk standard is more likely to impose a
duty when the plaintiff has suffered personal or property damage. Virgilio, 680
F.3d at 1339. “Where the plaintiff seeks only the recovery of an economic loss,
the duty element of negligence law serves as an important barrier to overextension of liability.” Id.
Although the duty element can limit liability in situations where a
plaintiff only seeks economic damages, the unique facts of this case warrant
imposing a duty here. Although Plaintiffs allege that NPIS had a duty to
“complete their work in a professional manner,” (Doc. 92 ¶ 105), this is not a
professional negligence case. However, NPIS’s conduct, based on the facts
alleged, is wrong. The law cannot allow a party to lie about whether an
insurance company, with which it has no relationship, agreed to provide
coverage and then claim that they had no duty to that insurance company.
Thus, by allegedly falsely informing Ride Solution that Alliance had renewed
coverage for a year, NPIS, and by extension Ballator, created a zone of risk that
reasonably and foreseeably could result in harm to the insurers. See id.;
McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503.
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NPIS and Ballator next contend that Plaintiffs’ negligence claims fail
because they cannot prove that any alleged negligence caused Plaintiffs’
damages. (Doc. 99 at 13–14). NPIS and Ballator argue that if Williamson is
entitled to coverage from either Alliance or Assurance, such coverage would be
the result of their contractual obligations. Id. Additionally, NPIS and Ballator
assert that Plaintiffs cannot claim attorneys’ fees because they initiated the
action and are not defending against wrongful claims on account of NPIS and
Ballator’s alleged negligence. Id. In response, Plaintiffs state that they incurred
costs as a result of NPIS and Ballator’s negligence prior to the initiation of the
lawsuit. (Doc. 105 at 16–17). Although
NPIS
and
Ballator
cannot
be
responsible for costs related to contractual liability, at this stage of the
proceedings Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that they incurred costs related to
Williamson filing a claim because of NPIS and Ballator’s negligence. (Doc. 92
¶ 110–11, 119–20).
3. Whether Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a claim for negligent
supervision against Ballator. 2
“Negligent supervision occurs when during the course of employment, the
employer becomes aware or should have become aware of problems with an
employee that indicated his unfitness, and the employer fails to take further
2
Ballator is alleged to be NPIS’ parent.
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actions . . . .” Acts Ret.-Life Communities Inc. v. Estate of Zimmer, 206 So. 3d
112, 114 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot. v. Hardy, 907 So.2d 655, 660 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)). The employee’s
underlying wrong must be a tort and it must be committed outside the scope of
his employment. Id. see also Thomas v. City of Jacksonville, No. 3:13-CV-737J-32MCR, 2017 WL 3316478, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2017), aff’d, 731 F. App’x
877 (11th Cir. 2018); Santillana v. Fla. State Court Sys., No. 609CV-2095-ORL19KRS, 2010 WL 271433, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2010).
Here, Plaintiffs failed to allege that Peter Herron-Brown, the NPIS
employee who made the alleged misrepresentations to Ride Solution, acted
outside the scope of his employment. See Santillana v, 2010 WL 271433, at *11;
Estate of Zimmer, 206 So. 3d at 114. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ negligent
supervision claim must be dismissed. 3
Even if such allegation was made, the Court is skeptical that Plaintiffs could
allege a duty. “In the context of a claim of negligent supervision, ‘an employer has a
legal duty arising out of the relationship between the employment in question and the
plaintiff . . . if he or she is in the zone of foreseeable risks created by the employment.’”
Santillana v, 2010 WL 271433, at *11 (quoting Storm v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 866 So.2d
713, 717 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)). Thus, the issue is whether Assurance and Alliance were
in the zone of foreseeable risks created by NPIS’ “employment” with Ballator. Id.
Assuming that NPIS was Ballator’s employee, Plaintiffs cannot show that the
employment relationship created the foreseeable zone of risk—it was the alleged
misrepresentations that created the zone of risk.
3
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D. Williamson’s cross-claims against Brown and Riding
Williamson filed cross-claims against Brown and Riding for Negligence
(Count VII) and Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count VIII). (Doc. 95 ¶¶ 101–12).
Brown and Riding moved to dismiss Williamson’s cross-claims on the basis that
FIT exceeded its statutory authority and therefore Brown and Riding was not
obligated to provide insurance, and that Williamson failed to allege a duty for
its breach of fiduciary duty and negligence claims. (Doc. 110).
Brown and Riding makes several arguments relating to Ride Solution’s
ability to procure its own insurance independent from FIT. (Doc. 110). However,
Brown and Riding’s arguments rely on facts that are either not in the complaint
or lack citations to the record. As such, these arguments can be raised on
summary judgment, but will not be relied upon here.
Additionally, Brown and Riding asserts it owed no duty to Williamson or
Ride Solution and therefore it cannot be liable for negligence or breach of
fiduciary duty. (Doc. 110 at 14–16). However, an injured third-party, such as
Williamson, can recover against an insurance agent for negligently failing to
provide insurance. See Mudano v. Frenkel & Co., 489 So. 2d 1184, 1184 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1986); see also JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. P.I.E. Mortg., Inc., No. 0961261-CIV, 2010 WL 11505258, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 2010) (stating that
privity is not required to state a breach of fiduciary duty claim), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 09-61261-CIV, 2010 WL 11506062 (S.D. Fla.
14
June 7, 2010). The cross-claim sufficiently states claims for negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty against Brown and Riding. (Doc. 95 ¶¶ 101–08); see
Virgilio, 680 F.3d at 1339 (stating the elements of negligence); P.I.E. Mortg.,
2010 WL 11505258, at *5 (listing the elements for a breach of fiduciary duty
claim).
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.
Defendants NPIS and Ballator’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
Second Amended Complaint, (Doc. 99), is GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part.
a. Counts VI (Indemnification by NPIS under the Wrongful Acts
Doctrine), IX (Negligent Supervision by Ballator), and X (Common
Law Indemnification by Ballator) of the Second Amended
Complaint are DISMISSED with prejudice.
b. Alliance shall remain a plaintiff.
c. FIT shall be added as a defendant.
2.
Ride Solution’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint,
(Doc. 94), is DENIED.
3.
Brown and Riding’s Motion to Dismiss Great American’s Second
Amended Complaint, (Doc. 96), is DENIED.
4.
Alliance’s Motion to Intervene, (Doc. 119), is DENIED as moot.
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5.
Assurance’s Motion For Leave to Amend to Add Great American
Alliance as a Plaintiff, (Doc. 120), is DENIED as moot.
6.
Brown and Riding’s Motion to Dismiss Williamson’s Cross-
Complaint (Doc. 110) is DENIED.
7.
Not later than January 23, 2019, Plaintiffs shall file a Third
Amended Complaint that adds Florida Insurance Trust as a Defendant and
does not allege Indemnification under the Wrongful Acts Doctrine (currently
Count VI), Negligent Supervision by Ballator (currently Count IX), and
Indemnification from Ballator (currently Count X). Additionally, the attached
exhibits shall not be filed in parts, and shall be filed in the correct order with
all pages oriented in the same direction. 4 In all other respects, the Third
Amended Complaint shall remain identical to the Second Amended Complaint.
8.
After filing the Third Amended Complaint, Assurance and Alliance
shall promptly serve it on FIT along with a copy of this Order.
9.
Not later than February 8, 2019, Williamson, Ride Solution,
Brown and Riding, NPIS, and Ballator shall answer the Third Amended
Complaint. 5
For example, Exhibit B to the Second Amended Complaint is in three parts
and contains pages that are upside down. For the Third Amended Complaint, that
exhibit shall be filed as a single attachment with all pages in order and in the same
direction—like it was for the Amended Complaint. (See Doc. 29-1). Counsel shall
contact the clerk if they have questions.
4
5
Because the Third Amended Complaint is, for all practical purposes, going to
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10.
Not later than February 22, 2019, those same parties, and
Plaintiffs, shall respond to any counterclaims or crossclaims.
11.
Brown and Riding’s Partially Unopposed Motion for Scheduling
Conference or, in the Alternative, to Amend the Scheduling Order (Doc. 135) is
GRANTED in part. The Case Management Scheduling Order, (Doc. 113), is
modified as follows:
a. Plaintiffs’ Disclosure of Expert Reports – April 8, 2019
b. Defendants’ Disclosure of Expert Reports – May 8, 2019
c. Discovery Deadline – July 1, 2019
d. Dispositive and Daubert Motions Deadline – August 1, 2019
e. Responses to Dispositive and Daubert Motions – August 22, 2019
f. All other Motions including Motions in Limine – January 13, 2020
g. Filing of Pretrial Statement – January 13, 2020
h. Final Pretrial Conference – January 23, 2020 at 10:00 a.m.
i. Trial Term Begins – February 3, 2020 at 9:00 a.m.
j. In all other respects, the parties shall continue to be governed by
the terms of the Court’s July 25, 2016 Case Management
Scheduling Order (Doc. 26), as amended in by the Court’s July 17,
2018 Scheduling Order, (Doc. 113).
remain identical to the Second Amended Complaint, further motions to dismiss from
the current parties are unnecessary.
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12.
Now that the underlying case has been resolved, and a damages
amount determined, the parties may find mediation more fruitful. Thus, not
later than February 8, 2019, the parties shall provide a joint notice to the
Court advising whether further mediation would be beneficial.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 27th day of
December, 2018.
TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN
United States District Judge
jb
Copies to:
Counsel of record
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