Knight v. Jones et al
Filing
17
ORDER denying 1 Petition and dismissing case with prejudice, with instructions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 12/3/2018. (ACT)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
JAMES HENRY KNIGHT,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 3:16-cv-389-J-34JBT
SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,
Respondents.
________________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner James Knight, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action
on March 30, 2016,1 by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(Petition; Doc. 1). In the Petition, Knight challenges a 2011 state court (Duval County,
Florida) judgment of conviction for two counts of trafficking in morphine, opium,
oxycodone, heroin, hydrocodone, or their derivatives, and one count of possession of
cocaine. Knight raises four grounds for relief. See Doc. 1 at 5-9.2 Respondents have
submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Respondent’s Answer in
Response to Order to Show Cause and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Resp.; Doc.
13) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). Knight submitted a brief in reply on May 30, 2017. See (Doc.
19; Reply). This case is ripe for review.
1
See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (mailbox rule).
For purposes of reference, the Court will cite the page number assigned by the
Court’s electronic docketing system.
2
II. Procedural History
On September 14, 2011, the State of Florida (State) charged Knight, by way of an
amended Information, with two counts of trafficking in morphine, opium, oxycodone,
heroin, hydrocodone, or their derivatives (counts one and two) and possession of cocaine
(count three). Resp. Ex. B. On October 12, 2011, Knight entered into a negotiated no
contest plea as to all three counts. Resp. Ex. C. That same day, pursuant to the plea
agreement, the circuit court sentenced Knight to a term of incarceration of eight years in
prison, with a three-year minimum mandatory sentence, as to counts one and two and
five years in prison as to count three with all terms to run concurrent with each other.
Resp. Ex. D. Knight did not appeal.
On March 9, 2012, Knight filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant
to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Resp. Ex. E at 1-16. Knight moved to
voluntarily dismiss this Rule 3.850 Motion on April 7, 2013, Id. at 17, and the circuit court
granted his motion on April 12, 2013. Id. at 19-20. Thereafter, Knight re-filed a pro se
Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 on July 8, 2013. Id. at 23-38.
Knight subsequently filed a pro se amended Rule 3.850 Motion (Amended Rule 3.850
Motion) on July 21, 2013. Id. at 39-57. In his Amended Rule 3.850 Motion, Knight alleged
that his trial counsel was ineffective for: failing to adequately investigate his case (ground
one); failing to file a motion to suppress (ground two); failing to investigate the arresting
officer’s allegedly false statements (ground three); and failing to advise Knight of any
defense strategies (ground four). Id. at 43-54. Knight also raised a fifth ground alleging
that the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors prejudiced him. Id. at 54-56. On June 16,
2015, Knight filed a supplement to his Amended Rule 3.850 Motion (Supplemental
2
Amended Rule 3.850 Motion), in which he added a sixth ground for relief: trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to adopt his pro se motion to suppress. Id. at 87-93. On July 7,
2015, the circuit court denied Knight’s Amended Rule 3.850 Motion and Supplemental
Amended Rule 3.850 Motion. Id. at 97-104. Florida’s First District Court of Appeal (First
DCA) per curiam affirmed the circuit court’s order without a written opinion on November
5, 2015, Resp. Ex. F, and issued its Mandate on December 1, 2015. Resp. Ex. G. Knight
filed a motion for rehearing on November 26, 2015, Resp. Ex. H, which the First DCA
denied on December 30, 2015. Resp. Ex. I.
III. One-Year Limitations Period
This action is timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d).
IV. Evidentiary Hearing
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the
need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d
1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a
federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove
the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal
habeas relief.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t
of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2245 (2017).
“It follows that if the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise
precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.”
Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record
before the Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [Knight’s] claim[s] without
3
further factual development,” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an
evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
V. Governing Legal Principles
A. Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a
state prisoner’s federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga.
Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 1432 (2017). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief
functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,
and not as a means of error correction.’” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38
(2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court
decisions is “‘greatly circumscribed’ and ‘highly deferential.’” Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey,
662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision,
if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue a written opinion
explaining its rationale in order for the state court’s decision to qualify as an adjudication
on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court’s
adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States
Supreme Court recently stated:
[T]he federal court should “look through” the unexplained
decision to the last related state-court decision that does
provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the
unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.
4
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted by
showing that the higher state court’s adjudication most likely relied on different grounds
than the lower state court’s reasoned decision, such as persuasive alternative grounds
that were briefed or argued to the higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at
1192, 1196.
If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation
of the claim unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited
scope of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:
First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for claims of
state courts’ erroneous legal conclusions. As explained by the
Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct.
1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two
distinct clauses: a “contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable
application” clause. The “contrary to” clause allows for relief
only “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that
reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the
state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme]
Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at
413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (plurality opinion). The “unreasonable
application” clause allows for relief only “if the state court
identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the
Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.
Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for claims of
state courts’ erroneous factual determinations. Section
2254(d)(2) allows federal courts to grant relief only if the state
court’s denial of the petitioner’s claim “was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
5
§ 2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined §
2254(d)(2)’s “precise relationship” to § 2254(e)(1), which
imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the state court’s
factual findings “by clear and convincing evidence.” See Burt
v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348
(2013); accord Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 135 S. Ct.
2269, 2282, 192 L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that “precise
relationship” may be, “‘a state-court factual determination is
not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court
would have reached a different conclusion in the first
instance.’”[3] Titlow, 571 U.S. at ---, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (quoting
Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175
L.Ed.2d 738 (2010)).
Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2298
(2017). Also, deferential review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was
before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1)’s “requires an examination
of the state-court decision at the time it was made”).
Thus, “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners
whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16
(2013). “Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a state court blundered in a
manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in existing law’ and ‘was so lacking in
justification’ that ‘there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree.’” Tharpe, 834
F.3d at 1338 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102-03). This standard is “meant to be” a
“difficult” one to meet. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Thus, to the extent that a petitioner’s
claims were adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, they must be evaluated under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
3
The Eleventh Circuit has described the interaction between § 2254(d)(2) and §
2254(e)(1) as “somewhat murky.” Clark v. Att’y Gen., Fla., 821 F.3d 1270, 1286 n.3 (11th
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1103 (2017).
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B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the effective assistance of
counsel. That right is denied when a defense attorney’s performance falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness and thereby prejudices the defense.” Yarborough
v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521
(2003), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a
conviction must show that “counsel’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.” [Strickland,] 466
U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052. A court considering a claim of
ineffective assistance must apply a “strong presumption” that
counsel’s representation was within the “wide range” of
reasonable professional assistance. Id., at 689, 104 S. Ct.
2052. The challenger’s burden is to show “that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”
Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
With respect to prejudice, a challenger must demonstrate “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id., at 694, 104 S. Ct.
2052. It is not enough “to show that the errors had some
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id., at
693, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Counsel’s errors must be “so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.” Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized “the absence of any ironclad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test before the other.”
Ward, 592 F.3d at 1163. Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be
satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a court need not address the performance
prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing
Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: “If it is
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easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,
which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
697.
A state court’s adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is accorded great
deference.
“[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation is a most
deferential one.” Richter, - U.S. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 788. But
“[e]stablishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was
unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The
standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly
deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is
doubly so.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). “The
question is not whether a federal court believes the state
court’s determination under the Strickland standard was
incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable a substantially higher threshold.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556
U.S. 111, 123, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009)
(quotation marks omitted). If there is “any reasonable
argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential
standard,” then a federal court may not disturb a state-court
decision denying the claim. Richter, - U.S. at -, 131 S. Ct. at
788.
Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014); Knowles v. Mirzayance,
556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). “In addition to the deference to counsel’s performance
mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds another layer of deference--this one to a state
court’s decision--when we are considering whether to grant federal habeas relief from a
state court’s decision.” Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004). As
such, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
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VI. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Grounds One, Two, Three, and Four
In each of Knight’s four grounds raised in his Petition he alleges counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress and for failing to conduct any investigation
into his case as it relates to the suppression of evidence. Doc. 1 at 5-7, 8-9.
Knight raised a similar claim in his Amended Rule 3.850 Motion. Resp. Ex. E at
45-50. In denying this claim, the circuit court stated:
Initially, the Court notes the record reflects that, during
most of the pre-trial proceedings in the instant case,
Defendant represented himself pro se after he decided to
discharge his public defender; but, on occasion upon his
wishes, counsel functioned as stand-by-counsel. This Court
finds Defendant, while he represented himself, had “the entire
responsibility for his own defense, even if he has standby
counsel. Such a defendant cannot thereafter complain that
the quality of his defense was a denial of ‘effective assistance
of counsel.’” Barnes v. State, 124 So. 3d 904, 917 (Fla. 2013)
(citations omitted). Further, the law did not permit Defendant’s
stand-by counsel to function as Defendant’s attorney of record
because Defendant, while he represented himself, was not
also entitled to an attorney’s assistance. See Johnson v.
State, 974 So. 2d 363, 364-65 (Fla. 2008) (citing Logan v.
State, 846 So. 2d 472, 473 (Fla. 2003)) (stating “criminal
defendants have no right under the Sixth Amendment or
under the Florida Constitution to engage in ‘hybrid
representation’ – that is, to simultaneously represent
themselves and be represented by counsel.”). Accordingly,
Defendant’s allegations against counsel are unfounded and
without merit.
Assuming arguendo counsel had represented
Defendant throughout the entire pendency of the instant case,
this Court finds all six of Defendant’s instant allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel are refuted by the record or
are procedurally barred. See Stano, 520 So. 2d at 280;[4] Clift,
43 So. 3d at 779.[5] Defendant testified under oath he was
4
5
Stano v. State, 520 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1988).
Clift v. State, 43 So. 3d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
9
satisfied with counsel’s representation of him, and she had
answered all of his questions. Similarly, Defendant’s plea
form, which he acknowledged in open court that he read,
understood, and signed, contains the following provisions:
“We have fully discussed all aspects of this case, including all
possible defense to all charges, including self-defense and
any defense based upon any disability, disease, insanity, or
intoxication.” Defendant’s signed plea form also contains the
following affirmation: “My attorney has taken all actions
requested by me, or has explained to my satisfaction and
agreement why such actions should not be taken, and I
concur with my attorney’s decisions in that regard.” Since
Defendant testified he was satisfied with counsel’s
representation of him and provided written testimony
indicating the same, he may not go behind his previous sworn
testimony and now argue counsel rendered deficient
performance. See Stano, 520 So. 2d at 280; Bir, 493 So. 2d
at 56;[6] Dean, 580 So. 2d at 810;[7] see also Iacono, 930 So.
2d at 831.[8]
As to Defendant’s specific allegation that counsel failed
to file a motion to suppress, the record indicates he affirmed
under oath during his plea hearing that the trial court had
heard the merits of a motion to suppress. Defendant may not
now allege otherwise. See Id. Indeed, as Defendant now
acknowledges in his Supplement Amended Motion, he filed a
Motion to Suppress while he represented himself pro se. In
his previous pro se Motion to Suppress, Defendant
challenged the validity of the traffic stop, search, and seizure.
The trial court held a full hearing on Defendant’s Motion, and,
after considering its merits, ultimately denied Defendant’s
request. That is, the trial court previously considered the
merits of the same exact claim seeking suppression and
denied the motion. Therefore, Defendant cannot establish
that, had counsel re-filed a motion seeking suppression on the
same exact grounds as those which were previously
adjudicated, or if counsel had so objected as Defendant now
alleges, such a motion would have been granted. See Branch
v. State, 952 So. 2d 470, 476 (Fla. 2006) (holding counsel
cannot be ineffective for failing to file a motion which would
have been properly denied). . . .
6
Bir v. State, 493 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Dean v. State, 580 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
8 Iacono v. State, 930 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
7
10
To the extent Defendant seeks to argue his plea was
involuntarily-entered due to counsel’s performance, the
record reflects otherwise. Defendant testified he understood
the terms of his plea agreement contemplated [sic] and the
negotiated sentence he faced and would receive. Defendant
further testified no one had threatened him, coerced or
intimidated him, or promised him anything to get him to enter
his plea of guilty, and that he was not under the influence of
drugs or alcohol when he entered his plea. Defendant
affirmed counsel reviewed his plea form with him and, before
entering his guilty plea, he did not need any additional time to
speak with counsel about his decision to enter his plea.
Therefore, the record reflects Defendant entered his plea
freely, voluntarily, and knowingly.
Id. at 100-03 (record citations omitted and emphasis in original). The First DCA per curiam
affirmed the circuit court’s denial without a written opinion. Resp. Exs. F; G.
To the extent that the First DCA decided these claims on the merits,9 the Court will
address the claims in accordance with the deferential standard for federal court review of
state court adjudications. After a review of the record and the applicable law, the Court
concludes that the state court’s adjudication of these claims was not contrary to clearly
established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Thus, Knight is not entitled to relief
on the basis of any of his claims.
Nevertheless, even if the state appellate court’s adjudication of these claims is not
entitled to deference, Knight’s claims in Grounds One, Two, Three, and Four are without
merit. A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, but once
In looking through the appellate court’s per curiam affirmance to the circuit court’s
“relevant rationale,” the Court presumes that the appellate court “adopted the same
reasoning.” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1194.
9
11
proceeding pro se “a defendant . . . cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own
defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel,’” even if a trial court
appoints standby counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975); see also
United States v. Windsor, 981 F.2d 943, 947 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting “[t]his court knows of
no constitutional right to effective assistance of standby counsel.”); Behr v. Bell, 665 So.
2d 1055, 1056-57 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46) (holding “a
defendant who represents himself has the entire responsibility for his own defense, even
if he has standby counsel. Such a defendant cannot thereafter complain that the quality
of his defense was a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.’”). Under Florida law, a
defendant waives any right to have his or her counsel investigate or put forward a defense
when he or she enters a guilty plea. Smith v. State, 41 So. 3d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA
2010) (citing Davis v. State, 938 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)). Also, “[w]here a
defendant enters a plea and swears that he is satisfied with his counsel's advice, he may
not later attack counsel's effectiveness for failure to investigate or defend the charge.” Id.
Similarly, where a defendant concedes he was aware of his attorney’s alleged
deficiencies prior to entry of his or her plea, a defendant cannot assert the plea was
involuntarily entered. Davis, 938 So. 2d at 557.
The record reflects that the circuit court appointed the public defender on July 14,
2011, immediately after law enforcement arrested Knight. Resp. Ex. E at 116.
Approximately a month later, on August 19, 2011, the circuit court permitted Knight to
proceed pro se and appointed his former public defender as standby counsel. Id. at 117.
The circuit court reappointed the public defender as Knight’s counsel on September 15,
2011. Id. at 118. On October 10, 2011, the circuit court again allowed Knight to proceed
12
pro se, with the public defender as standby counsel, Id. at 119, at which time Knight filed
a pro se motion to suppress. Id. at 136-42. In his pro se motion to suppress, Knight argued
that the traffic stop leading to his arrest was illegal and that he did not otherwise consent
to a search. Id. Two days later, on October 12, 2011, the circuit court denied the motion
to suppress following a hearing. Id. at 120, 143. Thereafter, on the same day, Knight
requested the circuit court to reappoint counsel and entered into the negotiated plea
agreement. Id. at 120, 125.
Based on this record, Knight cannot claim he was deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel during the periods in which he represented himself. See Faretta,
422 U.S. at 834 n.46; Windsor, 981 F.2d at 947; Behr, 665 So. 2d at 1056-57. To the
extent Knight was represented during the pre-plea process, Knight cannot demonstrate
prejudice because the circuit court considered his pro se motion to suppress on the merits
and denied it. Resp. Ex. E at 120, 136-42, 143. As such, even had counsel filed a motion
to suppress on the same grounds, the record demonstrates that the circuit court would
not have granted it. See Id. at 143. Therefore, Knight cannot demonstrate prejudice.
Additionally, during the plea colloquy, Knight made the following representations
to the circuit court: (1) he had adequate time with his attorney to discuss the plea and his
case; (2) no one coerced or promised him anything to enter the plea; (3) he read,
understood, and signed the plea form; (4) he understood the circuit court had heard and
ruled on his motion to suppress; (5) he was satisfied with his attorney; and (6) he
understood he was giving up his right to a jury trial and all associated rights. Id. at 12731. Based on these sworn representations to the circuit court, Knight waived his right to
have counsel investigate and file a motion to suppress. See Smith, 41 So. 3d at 1040.
13
Likewise, the entry of his negotiated plea waives any claim that his counsel was deficient
for failing to investigate or file a motion to suppress. See id. Moreover, Knight knew or
should have known that his counsel did not file a motion to suppress prior to the entry of
his plea. Therefore, he cannot claim his plea was involuntary where he was or should
have been aware of this fact before he entered the plea. See Davis, 938 So. 2d at 557.
For the above stated reasons, the relief Knight seeks in Grounds One, Two, Three, and
Four are due to be denied.
VII. Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)
If Knight seeks issuance of a certificate of appealability, the undersigned opines
that a certificate of appealability is not warranted. The Court should issue a certificate of
appealability only if the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Knight
“must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of
the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282
(2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues
presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,’” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4
(1983)).
Where a district court has rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits,
the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
However, when the district court has rejected a claim on procedural grounds, the
petitioner must show that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
14
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. Upon
consideration of the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate of appealability.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.
The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
2.
The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment denying the Petition and
dismissing this case with prejudice.
3.
If Knight appeals the denial of the Petition, the Court denies a certificate of
appealability. Because the Court has determined that a certificate of appealability is not
warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions report any motion to
proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this case. Such termination shall serve
as a denial of the motion.
4.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and terminate any
pending motions.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 3rd day of December, 2018.
Jax-8
C:
James Henry Knight, #303976
Kathryn Lane, Esq.
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