Hooper v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER affirming the Commissioner's final decision. Clerk to enter judgment accordingly and close the file. Signed by Magistrate Judge James R. Klindt on 9/18/2017. (BHC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
SIEBERT HOOPER, III,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 3:16-cv-910-J-JRK

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
_____________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER2
I. Status
Siebert Hooper, III (“Plaintiff”) is appealing the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration’s final decision denying his claims for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and
supplemental security income (“SSI”). Plaintiff’s alleged inability to work is a result of high
blood pressure, “[p]roblems with both hips,” “[p]roblems with both legs,” depression,
headaches, lower back pain, and “[s]leeping problems.” Transcript of Administrative
Proceedings (Doc. No. 11; “Tr.” or “administrative transcript”), filed September 20, 2016, at
94, 107, 118, 131, 247 (emphasis omitted). On June 25, 2012 Plaintiff filed applications for
DIB and SSI, alleging an onset disability date of November 30, 2007. Tr. at 94-104 (DIB),
107-17 (SSI). Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially, see Tr. at 94-104, 105, 146, 147-51
1

Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23,
2017. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy A. Berryhill should be
substituted for Carolyn W. Colvin as Defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to continue
this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
2

The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate
Judge. See Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge (Doc. No. 12), filed
September 20, 2016; Reference Order (Doc. No. 13), entered September 21, 2016.

(DIB); Tr. at 106, 107-17, 152-57, 158 (SSI), and were denied upon reconsideration, see Tr.
at 118-30, 144, 161, 162-66 (DIB); Tr. at 131-43, 145, 167 (SSI).
On August 18, 2014, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing, during
which the ALJ heard from Plaintiff, who was represented by a non-attorney representative,
and a vocational expert (“VE”). Tr. at 31-73. The ALJ issued a Decision on October 24, 2014,
finding Plaintiff not disabled through the date of the Decision. Tr. at 12-25.
The Appeals Council then received additional evidence in the form of a brief authored
by Plaintiff’s representative. Tr. at 5; see Tr. at 320-21 (brief). On June 21, 2016, the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, Tr. at 1-3, thereby making the ALJ’s Decision
the final decision of the Commissioner. On July 14, 2016, Plaintiff commenced this action
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) by timely filing a Complaint (Doc. No. 1), seeking
judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision.
On appeal, Plaintiff makes the following argument: “The ALJ erred by not
appropriately evaluating the medical evidence.” Memorandum in Support of Complaint (Doc.
No. 16; “Pl.’s Mem.”), filed October 4, 2016, at 8 (emphasis and some capitalization omitted).
Plaintiff apparently takes issue with the ALJ’s assessment of the opinions of Dr. Judella
Haddad-Lacle and Dr. Ghania Masri, two of Plaintiff’s treating physicians. See id. at 8-13.
On February 21, 2017, Defendant filed a Memorandum in Support of the Commissioner’s
Decision (Doc. No. 19; “Def.’s Mem.”) addressing Plaintiff’s arguments. After a thorough
review of the entire record and consideration of the parties’ respective memoranda, the
undersigned determines that the Commissioner’s final decision is due to be affirmed.

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II. The ALJ’s Decision
When determining whether an individual is disabled,3 an ALJ must follow the five-step
sequential inquiry set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations (“Regulations”), determining
as appropriate whether the claimant (1) is currently employed or engaging in substantial
gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals one listed in the Regulations; (4) can perform
past relevant work; and (5) retains the ability to perform any work in the national economy.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th
Cir. 2004). The claimant bears the burden of persuasion through step four and, at step five,
the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
Here, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential inquiry. See Tr. at 14-24. At step one,
the ALJ determined that “[Plaintiff] has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
November 30, 2007 the alleged onset date.” Tr. at 14 (emphasis and citations omitted). At
step two, the ALJ found that “[Plaintiff] has the following severe impairments: degenerative
disc disease of the lumbar spine, generalized arthritis of the lower extremities, status post
history of crushing injury, history of headaches[,] bipolar disorder[,] and anxiety.” Tr. at 14
(emphasis and citations omitted). At step three, the ALJ ascertained that “[Plaintiff] does not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the

3

“Disability” is defined in the Social Security Act as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A).
-3-

severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Tr. at
15 (emphasis and citations omitted).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following residual functional capacity
(“RFC”):
[Plaintiff can] perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR [§§] 404.1567(a)
and 416.967(a). Specifically, he can lift and carry, push and pull ten pounds
occasionally and five pounds frequently. [Plaintiff] is able to sit for four hours at
a time, for a total of eight hours during an eight-hour workday; and stand and/or
walk for [thirty] minutes at a time, for a total of two hours during an eight-hour
workday. [Plaintiff] cannot climb ropes ladders or scaffolds. He can occasionally
climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. [Plaintiff]
should avoid concentrated exposure to vibrations and work hazards including
unprotected heights and dangerous machinery. Mentally, [Plaintiff] cannot
perform complex tasks but he is fully capable of performing simple to detailed
tasks consistent with semi-skilled work with a[ Specific Vocational Preparation]
of three or four with concentration on those tasks for two-hour periods with
normal break and a lunch.
Tr. at 16-17 (emphasis omitted). At step four, the ALJ found that “[Plaintiff] is unable to
perform any past relevant work.”4 Tr. at 22 (emphasis and citations omitted). At step five,
after considering Plaintiff’s age (“42 years old . . . on the alleged disability onset date”),
education (“at least a high school education”), work experience, and RFC, the ALJ relied on
the testimony of the VE and found “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that [Plaintiff] can perform,” including “[c]harge [a]ccount [c]lerk,”
“[s]urveillance systems monitor,” and “[d]ocument preparer, microfilm.” Tr. at 23-24. The ALJ
concluded that “[Plaintiff] has not been under a disability . . . from November 30, 2007,
through the date of th[e D]ecision.” Tr. at 24 (emphasis and citations omitted).

4

Plaintiff has past work as a bagger, nurse assistant, and fast food worker. Tr. at 22-23.
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III. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision as to disability pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Although no deference is given to the ALJ’s conclusions
of law, findings of fact “are conclusive if . . . supported by ‘substantial evidence’ . . . .”
Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320,
1322 (11th Cir. 1998)). “Substantial evidence is something ‘more than a mere scintilla, but
less than a preponderance.’” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987)). The substantial evidence standard
is met when there is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Falge, 150 F.3d at 1322 (quoting Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It is not for this Court to reweigh the evidence; rather, the entire
record is reviewed to determine whether “the decision reached is reasonable and supported
by substantial evidence.” Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991)
(internal quotation and citations omitted); see also McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077,
1080 (11th Cir. 1988); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). The decision
reached by the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial
evidence–even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings. Crawford
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
IV. Discussion
The undersigned first sets out the applicable law. Then, the issue raised by Plaintiff
is addressed.

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A. General Law
The Regulations establish a “hierarchy” among medical opinions5 that provides a
framework for determining the weight afforded each medical opinion: “[g]enerally, the
opinions of examining physicians are given more weight than those of non-examining
physicians[;] treating physicians[’ opinions] are given more weight than [non-treating
physicians;] and the opinions of specialists are given more weight on issues within the area
of expertise than those of non-specialists.” McNamee v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 164 F. App’x 919,
923 (11th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), (2), (5)). The following
factors are relevant in determining the weight to be given to a physician’s opinion: (1) the
“[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination”; (2) the “[n]ature and
extent of [any] treatment relationship”; (3) “[s]upportability”; (4) “[c]onsistency” with other
medical evidence in the record; and (5) “[s]pecialization.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2)-(5),
416.927(d)(2)-(5); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(f).
With regard to a treating physician or psychiatrist,6 the Regulations instruct ALJs how
to properly weigh such a medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Because treating
physicians or psychiatrists “are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide
a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical impairment(s),” a treating physician’s

5

“Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable
medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s),
including [the claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite
impairment(s), and [the claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2); see also
20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a) (defining “[a]cceptable medical sources”).
6

A treating physician or psychiatrist is a physician or psychiatrist who provides medical
treatment or evaluation to the claimant and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with
the claimant, as established by medical evidence showing that the claimant sees or has seen the
physician with a frequency consistent with accepted medical practice for the type of treatment and/or
evaluation required for the medical condition. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502.
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or psychiatrist’s medical opinion is to be afforded controlling weight if it is “well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent
with the other substantial evidence” in the record. Id. When a treating physician’s or
psychiatrist’s medical opinion is not due controlling weight, the ALJ must determine the
appropriate weight it should be given by considering the factors identified above (the length
of treatment, the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment
relationship, as well as the supportability of the opinion, its consistency with the other
evidence, and the specialization of the physician). Id.
If an ALJ concludes the medical opinion of a treating physician or psychiatrist should
be given less than substantial or considerable weight, he or she must clearly articulate
reasons showing “good cause” for discounting it. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440
(11th Cir. 1997). Good cause exists when (1) the opinion is not bolstered by the evidence;
(2) the evidence supports a contrary finding; or (3) the opinion is conclusory or inconsistent
with the treating physician’s or psychiatrist’s own medical records. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 124041; see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1991); Schnorr v. Bowen,
816 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that a treating physician’s medical opinion may
be discounted when it is not accompanied by objective medical evidence).
An ALJ is required to consider every medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d),
416.927(d) (stating that “[r]egardless of its source, we will evaluate every medical opinion
we receive”). While “the ALJ is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence
supports a contrary conclusion,” Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1981)
(citation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2), “the ALJ must state
with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor,”
-7-

Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Sharfarz v.
Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir.1987)); see also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208,
1212 (11th Cir. 2005). “In the absence of such a statement, it is impossible for a reviewing
court to determine whether the ultimate decision on the merits of the claim is rational and
supported by substantial evidence.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Cowart v.
Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981)).
B. ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Evidence
As noted above, Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ erred by not appropriately evaluating
the medical evidence.” Pl.’s Mem. at 8 (emphasis and some capitalization omitted). Plaintiff
asserts that “[Dr. Haddad-Lacle and Dr. Masri] render[ed] consistent opinions,” id. at 13, and
that “[o]bjective testing is not necessary for a treating physician to render an opinion about
the plaintiff’s ability to work,” id. at 11. Responding, Defendant contends that “the ALJ was
not obligated to accept the disability opinions of Plaintiff’s treating sources.” Def.’s Mem. at
5 (some capitalization omitted). According to Defendant, “Drs. Haddad[-Lacle] and Masri
recorded their disability opinions on pre-printed forms, which provided little to no narrative
or insight into the reasons behind their conclusions.” Id. at 6-7.
Dr. Haddad-Lacle, who practices family medicine, began treating Plaintiff on
November 29, 2011 mainly for pain in his lower back and lower extremities. See Tr. at 41422, 492-500 (duplicate), 489-91.The administrative transcript contains four treatment notes
from Dr. Haddad-Lacle. See Tr. at 414-22, 492-500 (duplicate), 489-91. The most recent
treatment note in the transcript is dated August 21, 2012. See Tr. 489-91. She diagnosed
Plaintiff, in relevant part, with: “Lower back pain,” Tr. at 415, 490; “[c]hronic pain syndrome,”
Tr. at 415, 418, 421, 490; and “[c]rush injury of the trunk,” Tr. at 415, 418. She completed
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four Medical Verification Forms in which she opined that Plaintiff is unable to work sitting
down or standing up. Tr. at 680 (dated May 8, 2013), Tr. at 683 (dated January 28, 2013),
Tr. at 684 (dated May 21, 2012), Tr. at 686 (dated February 27, 2012). She also stated that
Plaintiff is unable to lift more than ten pounds and cannot squat or bend.7 Tr. at 680, 683,
684, 686.
The ALJ gave “no weight” to Dr. Haddad-Lacle’s opinion that Plaintiff is unable to
work. Tr. at 21. In doing so, he noted that “the final responsibility for determining if a claimant
is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ is reserved for the Commissioner.” Tr. at 21. He gave “little
weight” to “Dr. Haddad[-Lacle’s] opinions as to the [Plaintiff’s] functional abilities” because
they “are not supported by the objective medical evidence or her own treatment notes.” Tr.
at 21. According to the ALJ, “[Plaintiff] has had very little treatment beyond medication
management for lower back pain, chronic pain syndrom due to fractures and crushing injury
as identified by Dr. Haddad[-Lacle].” Tr. at 21. Additionally, the ALJ noted that “[Dr. HaddadLacle’s] opinions are inconsistent with [Plaintiff’s] own testimony that he drives on a daily
basis and shops with his daughter and/or fiancé.” Tr. at 21.
Dr. Ghania Masri, who practices general medicine, treated Plaintiff for pain in his
lower back and legs. See Tr. at 640-45, 650-52, 661-64. There are four treatment notes from
Dr. Masri in the administrative transcript; the earliest one is dated September 18, 2013, Tr.
661-64, and the latest one is dated May 7, 2014, Tr. 640-42. She diagnosed Plaintiff, in
relevant part, with”[c]hronic pain,” Tr. at 645, 652, and “[c]rush injury of the trunk,” Tr. at 645,
652, 664. She completed two Medical Verification Forms: one on September 18, 2013, Tr.
7

On the May 2013 Medical Verification Form, Dr. Haddad-Lacle also represented that
“[Plaintiff’s] most recent office visit” was on April 15, 2013. Tr. at 680. The administrative transcript,
however, does not contain a treatment note with this date. See generally administrative transcript.
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at 677, and one on February 26, 2014, Tr. at 676. On the September 2013 form, she opined
Plaintiff could work sitting down, but could not work standing or do any heavy lifting. Tr. at
677. On the February 2014 form, however, she stated Plaintiff is not able to work sitting
down or standing up, and cannot lift more than ten pounds. Tr. at 676.
The ALJ gave Dr. Masri’s opinion “little weight” for the following reasons:
Dr. Masri's initial opinion in September 2013 as to [Plaintiff’s] functional abilities
is not wholly inconsistent with the [RFC determination]. However, there is
nothing in Dr. Masri's treatment notes to support that [Plaintiff] could not work
sitting down on a full-time basis. Moreover, Dr. Masri's opinion in February
2014 is completely inconsistent with the treatment records and the other
objective medical evidence of record and contains no explanation for the
change in findings concerning [Plaintiff’s] limitations. For example, Dr. Masri's
physical examination of [Plaintiff] in February 2014 showed that he had low
back pain with spasm and decreased sensation on both quads and his lower
extremities had no clubbing, cyanosis or edema; Dr. Masri noted [Plaintiff] has
muscle atrophy without indicating to which muscles she was referring. Dr.
Masri said [Plaintiff] was ambulating using a rolling walker at home; [Plaintiff]
reported feeling like his legs were giving up on him[.] [H]owever[,] treatment
notes do not support that a walker is medically necessary. Further, the record
does not contain evidence that [Plaintiff] has had any recent imagining studies
to determine the extent of his reported injuries.
Tr. at 21 (citation omitted).
Upon review, the undersigned finds that the ALJ did not err in assessing the opinions
of Dr. Haddad-Lacle and Dr. Masri. The ALJ summarized the treatment notes of both
physicians and determined that the limitations they assigned were inconsistent with their own
treatment notes and other medical evidence. See Tr. at 18, 20-21. In noting this
inconsistency, the ALJ provided adequate reasons for discounting their opinions. Those
reasons are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
First, the opinions are conclusory and unsupported by objective medical evidence.
See Edwards, 937 F.3d at 583. Dr. Haddad-Lacle and Dr. Masri concluded that Plaintiff was

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unable to work and had significant functional limitations, but they did not provide any support
for those opinions.8 See Provenza v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:15-CV-432-FTM-CM, 2016
WL 3475641, at *6 (M.D. Fla. June 27, 2016) (stating that “[f]orm questionnaires or so-called
‘checklist’

opinions

generally

are

disfavored”),

Hammersley

v.

Astrue,

No.

508-CV-245-OC-10GRJ, 2009 WL 3053707, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2009) (noting that
“courts have found that check-off forms . . . have limited probative value because they are
conclusory and provide little narrative or insight into the reasons behind the conclusions).
Moreover, the doctors’ opinions were “not accompanied by objective medical evidence.”
Edwards, 937 F.3d at 583. Notably, the ALJ observed that “the record does not contain
evidence that [Plaintiff] has had any recent imaging studies to determine the extent of his
reported injuries.” Tr. at 21.
Second, the ALJ correctly noted that the opinions expressed in the Medical
Verification Forms are unsupported by the medical record as a whole, including Dr. HaddadLacle’s and Dr. Masri’s own treatment notes. See Tr. at 21. The doctors’ treatment notes are
brief, consist mostly of statements regarding Plaintiff’s subjective complaints,9 and do not
contain any functional limitations or objective medical findings supporting the limitations

8

In addition, as the ALJ correctly observed, Dr. Masri’s conclusions in the February 2014
Medical Verification Form regarding Plaintiff’s ability to work are inconsistent with those in the September
2013 form, See Tr. at 21, 676-77 (forms), but the form does not offer an explanation for the difference
in conclusions.
9

Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s credibility determination. See generally Pl.’s Mem.
The undersigned finds the ALJ “articulate[d] explicit and adequate reasons” for finding Plaintiff not
credible. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). Specifically, the ALJ found that
“[Plaintiff’s] activities of daily living are not as restricted as he has alleged,” and that he has been
inconsistent in reporting his symptoms. Tr. at 20-21.
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assigned by the doctors in the Medical Verification Forms. See Tr. at 414-22, 492-500
(duplicate), 489-91, 640-45, 650-52, 661-64.
In addition, the medical record as a whole, including both doctors’ treatment notes,
reflects that Plaintiff’s treatment has been conservative in nature, consisting mostly of pain
medication and no significant treatment with a specialist or physical therapist. Notably,
according to Dr. Masri’s treatment notes from May 7, 2014, “[Plaintiff] restarted . . .
pharmacotherapy recently, but he was [discharged] from their clinic because of
non[compliance] with the pain agreement contract.” Tr. at 640. Dr. Masri also indicated that
“[Plaintiff] was [discharged] from [physical therapy] because he missed [three] consecutive
[appointments].” Tr. at 640.
A few days later, on May 12, 2014, Kimberly Bravo, ARNP referred Plaintiff to
Northside Brooks Rehabilitation (“Brooks Rehabilitation”), a physical therapy center. Tr. at
530. On June 25, 2014, however, Brooks Rehabilitation sent Ms. Bravo a letter stating
Plaintiff had not been evaluated yet because “[their] numerous attempts to contact [him] for
scheduling have not been successful.” Tr. at 529. It does not appear Plaintiff received
physical therapy thereafter, as the administrative transcript does not contain any treatment
notes from Brooks Rehabilitation or any other physical therapy facility.10 See
generally administrative transcript. Further, the administrative transcript contains only one
treatment note, dated July 16, 2014, from a pain management specialist. See Tr. at 574-76.
Thus, the medical record as a whole, including Plaintiff’s conservative treatment, is
inconsistent with the doctors’ opined severity of Plaintiff’s condition.
10

At the hearing, which was about three months after Ms. Bravo’s referral, Plaintiff stated:
“I[ have] done physical therapy and it has[ not] done any good. . . . They tried it now twice.” Tr. at 52. He
reported that his last physical therapy appointment was “nine months [before the hearing].” Tr. at 52.
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The undersigned finds the ALJ did not err in finding that the medical record as a
whole, including Dr. Haddad-Lacle’s and Dr. Masri’s treatment notes, does not support the
significant limitations assigned by the doctors in the Medical Verification Forms. Thus, the
ALJ’s discounting of Haddad-Lacle’s and Dr. Masri’s opinions is supported by substantial
evidence.
V. Conclusion
After a thorough review of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the ALJ’s
Decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1.

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment pursuant to sentence four of

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and pursuant to § 1383(c)(3), AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s final
decision.
2.

The Clerk is further directed to close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida on September 18, 2017.

bhc
Copies to:
Counsel of record

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