Craig v. Florida Department of Corrections et al
Filing
24
ORDER granting 18 Motion to Dismiss to the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendant Fisher in his official capacity and to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief; Defendant Fisher shall respond to the Amended Complaint by September 15, 2017. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 8/15/2017. (LDO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
TAJI CRAIG,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:16-cv-1289-J-39MCR
DARIUS FISHER,
Defendants.
ORDER
I. Status
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss of
Defendant, Darius Fisher (Motion) (Doc. 18).
Response (Response) (Doc. 22).
Plaintiff filed a
He is proceeding on an Amended
Complaint (Complaint)1 (Doc. 7).
II. Standard of Review
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the
factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true.
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Ashcroft
In addition, all reasonable
inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Omar ex.
rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam).
1
Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal
The Court references the pagination assigned by the
electronic filing system.
pleading requirements.
1250,
1262-63
(11th
Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d
Cir.
2004)
(citations
omitted).
While
"[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]" the complaint should "'give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Further, the plaintiff must allege "enough
facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570.
"A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded
factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see Miljkovic v.
Shafritz & Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015)
(citation and footnote omitted).
A "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do[.]"
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations
omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that
"conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal
conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal")
(internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, "the tenet that
a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]" which simply
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"are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth."
U.S. at 678, 680.
See Iqbal, 556
Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the
Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face[.]'" Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570).
III. Amended Complaint2
Plaintiff, in his Statement of Claim, raises the following
claims against Defendant Fisher: (1) unnecessary use of force with
chemical
agents;
battery.
(2)
Complaint
sexual
at
harassment;
5.
As
and
relief,
he
(3)
assault
seeks
and
monetary
compensation, court-ordered mental health treatment, a transfer
from
Hamilton
Correctional
Institution
(HCI),
and
removal
of
Defendant Fisher from his duties as an employee of the Florida
Department of Corrections (FDOC).
Id. at 6-7.
In his Statement of Facts, Plaintiff alleges that on July 1,
2016, he was imprisoned at HCI and was being escorted by Defendant
Fisher
to
restraints.
confinement.
Id.
Id.
at
5.
Plaintiff
was
in
hand
Defendant Fisher made a sexually suggestive
2
In considering the Motion, the Court must accept all factual
allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 7) as true, consider the
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
accept all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such
allegations.
Miljkovic v. Shafritz and Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d
1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations and citations omitted). As
such, the recited facts are drawn from the Complaint and may differ
from those that ultimately can be proved.
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remark, licked Plaintiff's ear and smacked him on the buttocks.
Id. In response, Plaintiff yelled rape and sexual harassment. Id.
Defendant Fisher slammed Plaintiff to the ground head first; kneed
Plaintiff in the back; punched him four times in the head, face and
neck area; and then chemically sprayed Plaintiff.
Id. at 6.
Thereafter, Defendant Fisher pulled down Plaintiff's pants and
chemically sprayed him in his "private parts."
Id.
Plaintiff
maintains that he has scars on his neck and a rash from the
incident.
Id.
Defendant Fisher wrote Plaintiff a disciplinary report for
battery on a correctional officer.
Id.
Staff rejected the
disciplinary report due to false statements.
Id.
Plaintiff
asserts there was no penological justification for the use of
chemical agents on a restrained inmate, the use of physical force,
or the sexual harassment. Id. Plaintiff states he has injuries on
his body and he has suffered mentally.
Id.
IV. Summary of the Arguments
Defendant Fisher seeks dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Motion at 1.
In doing so, he contends:
(1) he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity to the extent he
is sued in his official capacity for monetary damages, see Motion
at 4-5; (2) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief can
be granted because he seeks some relief that the Court cannot
grant, id. at 5-6; and (3) the claim concerning the state torts of
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assault and battery is barred by statutory and Eleventh Amendment
immunity, id. at 6-8.
In response to Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff states he is
still suffering from mental disturbance as a result of the incident
alleged in the Complaint.
Response at 1.
As relief, Plaintiff
seeks the removal of Defendant Fisher from his job to prevent
additional assaults and sexual abuse of inmates; mental health
treatment; and $300,000.00.
Id.
V. Law and Conclusions
A.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendant Fisher raises the defense of sovereign immunity to
the extent Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages against him in his
official capacity.
Motion at 4-5.
In this regard, the Motion is
due to be granted. An official capacity claim for monetary damages
is barred by sovereign immunity.
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-102 (1984).
Thus, insofar as Plaintiff
seeks monetary damages from Defendant Fisher in his official
capacity, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit.
Zatler v. Wainwright,
802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
B.
Failure to State a Claim for Which Relief Can Be Granted
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured
under the United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such
deprivation occurred under color of state law.
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Salvato v. Miley,
790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d
1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted);
Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (citations omitted).
Here, Defendant Fisher asserts that Plaintiff is seeking
injunctive relief from the FDOC, an entity that is not a party to
this action.
Defendant Fisher is a correctional officer, and at
this time, a captain.
Plaintiff has not named a classification
officer with the authority to direct the transfer of an inmate as
a defendant.
Plaintiff has not named a medical professional with
the authority to direct mental health treatment as a defendant.
Finally, Defendant Fisher, a correctional officer, is not in a
position to terminate employees of the FDOC.
Also of import, the
Court does not have the authority to direct the termination of
FDOC's employees.
Defendant's Motion is due to be granted with respect to
Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief.
However, Plaintiff's
claim for monetary compensation remains.
C.
State Tort Claim of Assault and Battery
Defendant Fisher asserts that the claim against him for the
state law torts of assault and battery is barred by both the
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution and Florida
Statute 768.28.
Defendant Fisher further contends that Plaintiff
cannot sue Fisher in a state tort negligence action, Plaintiff may
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only sue the entity by which he is employed, and Plaintiff cannot
sue the entity in federal court.
In support of his assertion, Defendant Fisher quotes a portion
of the relevant Florida Statute:
...(n)o officer, employee, or agent of the
state or any of its subdivisions shall be held
personally liable in tort or named as a party
defendant in any action for injury or damage
suffered as a result of any act, event or
omission of action in the scope of her or his
employment or function . . . . The exclusive
remedy for injury or damage suffered as a
result of an act, event or omission of an
officer, employee, or agent of the state or
any of its subdivisions or constitutional
officers shall be by action against the
governmental entity . . . of which the
officer, employee or agent is an employee.
Motion at 7 (quoting, in part, Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a)).
At first blush, Defendant Fisher's contention seems somewhat
persuasive; however, upon a more in-depth analysis of the issue, he
presents an unsound position based on crafty editorialization of
the statute at issue.
Upon consideration of the unedited version
of the statute, Defendant Fisher's mendacious argument does not
hold water:
No officer, employee, or agent of the
state or of any of its subdivisions shall be
held personally liable in tort or named as a
party defendant in any action for any injury
or damage suffered as a result of any act,
event, or omission of action in the scope of
her or his employment or function, unless such
officer, employee, or agent acted in bad faith
or with malicious purpose or in a manner
exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of
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human rights, safety, or property. However,
such officer, employee, or agent shall be
considered an adverse witness in a tort action
for any injury or damage suffered as a result
of any act, event, or omission of action in
the scope of her or his employment or
function. The exclusive remedy for injury or
damage suffered as a result of an act, event,
or omission of an officer, employee, or agent
of the state or any of its subdivisions or
constitutional officers shall be by action
against the governmental entity, or the head
of such entity in her or his official
capacity, or the constitutional officer of
which the officer, employee, or agent is an
employee, unless such act or omission was
committed in bad faith or with malicious
purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and
willful disregard of human rights, safety, or
property. The state or its subdivisions shall
not be liable in tort for the acts or
omissions of an officer, employee, or agent
committed while acting outside the course and
scope of her or his employment or committed in
bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a
manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard
of human rights, safety, or property.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.28 (emphasis added).
Relevant case law reveals that "[t]he crux of a state-law
assault and battery claim against [an officer] is 'whether a
reasonable officer would believe that this level of force is
necessary in the situation at hand.'" Christie ex rel. estate of
Christie v. Scott, 923 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1328-29 (M.D. Fla. 2013)
(quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002)).
Indeed, a defendant may be liable under Florida law for assault and
battery if the force used was clearly excessive and unreasonable
under the circumstances.
Id. (citation omitted).
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It
is
also
significant
that
this
Court
may
exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim of assault and
battery, see Logan v. Smith, No. 3:07-cv-1156-J-JBT, 2014 WL
2109889,
at
*8
(M.D.
Fla.
May
20,
2014)
(Not
Reported
in
F.Supp.3d);3 Logan v. Johnson, No. 3:13-cv-532-J-39MCR, 2014 WL
5473561,
at
*8
(M.D.
Fla.
Oct.
28,
2014)
(Not
Reported
in
F.Supp.3d); Connell v. Tate, No. 3:10-cv-221-J-20JRK, 2012 WL
252817, at * 13 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2012) (Not Reported in
F.Supp.2d), and this is particularly so when "the state law claim
of assault and battery arises from the same nucleus of operative
facts as the Eighth Amendment claims[.]" Negron v. Bryant, No.
3:08-cv-1118-J-34MCR, 2010 WL 746727, at *18 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 3,
2010) (Not Reported in F.Supp.2d).
Therefore, based on the above, the Motion will be denied to
the extent that Defendant Fisher seeks dismissal of the claim for
damages from him for the torts of assault and battery.
Therefore, it is now
ORDERED:
1.
The Motion to Dismiss of Defendant, Darius Fisher (Doc.
18) is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages
3
This Court instructed the jury on the intentional torts of
assault and battery under Florida law. See Logan v. Smith, No.
3:07-cv-1156-J-JBT, Court's Jury Instructions (Doc. 292 at 14-15).
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from Defendant Fisher in his official capacity and to the extent
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief.
2.
Defendant Fisher shall respond to the Amended Complaint
(Doc. 7) by September 15, 2017.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 15th day of
August, 2017.
sa 8/14
c:
Counsel of Record
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