Wallace v. Jones et al
Filing
56
ORDER granting 46 Defendants Grainger, Barnett, and Thornton's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 50 Defendants Jones, Andrews, and Rossiter's amended motion to dismiss; dismissing the case with prejudice; directing the Clerk to enter judgment dismissing the case with prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file. Signed by Judge Timothy J. Corrigan on 8/30/2018. (KLC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
TIMOTHY WALLACE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:17-cv-214-J-32JBT
JULIE JONES, et al.,
Defendants.
_______________________________
ORDER
Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights case on February
23, 2017 (Doc. 1). He is currently proceeding on an Amended Complaint (Doc. 41)
(Amended Complaint) in which he names the following Defendants: (1) Julie Jones,
Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC); (2) Diane Andrews,
Warden of Union Correctional Institution (UCI); (3) S.B. Rossiter, Assistant Warden
of UCI; (4) Gary Grainger, Mail Room Supervisor at UCI; (5) K. Barnett, Mail Room
Official; and (6) Sheila Thornton, Mail Room Official. Plaintiff names all Defendants
in their individual capacities for a denial of access to the courts based on ten alleged
incidents of mail tampering. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint:
Defendants Grainger, Barnett, and Thornton filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 46)
(Grainger Motion) on October 2, 2017; and Defendants Jones, Andrews, and Rossiter
filed an Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 50) (Jones Motion) on October 25, 2017
(collectively, Motions).1 Plaintiff filed Responses in Opposition2 (Docs. 48, 51)
(Responses). The Motions are ripe for review.
II. Amended Complaint3
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Grainger, Barnett, and Thornton (mailroom
Defendants) each, on different occasions between July 21, 2014 and August 17, 2015,
interfered with his legal mail. He identifies ten dates on which he submitted to one of
the mailroom Defendants legal mail addressed to one of five different attorneys in his
attempts to seek representation. According to Plaintiff, the five attorneys did not
receive his legal mail. Thus, he concludes, the mailroom Defendants “intercepted,
read, withheld, and destroyed” his mail. See Amended Complaint at 5, 9, 12.
Plaintiff states that he names Defendants Jones, Andrews, and Rossiter
(supervisory Defendants) “because of their . . . positions” as supervisors of the
mailroom Defendants. Id. at 19. Plaintiff alleges that, because he filed grievances
The Motions will be cited as “Grainger Motion” (Doc. 46) and “Jones Motion” (Doc.
50). Plaintiff’s Responses will be cited as “Pl. Grainger Resp.” (Doc. 51) and “Pl. Jones
Resp.” (Doc. 48).
1
Plaintiff responded to Jones, Rossiter, and Andrews’ original Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
45). The Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 50) is the same as the original except for
correction of a “scrivener’s error.” In the original Motion, Defendant Rossiter was
incorrectly identified as Defendant Grainger. See Jones Motion at 1 n.1. In the
Response, Plaintiff correctly addresses his claims against Defendant Rossiter. See Pl.
Jones Resp. at 8, 19, 21.
2
In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in
the Amended Complaint as true, consider the allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, and accept all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such
allegations. Miljkovic v. Shafritz & Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015).
3
2
complaining of the mail-tampering incidents, the supervisory Defendants had “notice
of the pattern of violations [by the mailroom Defendants] . . . but . . . failed to correct
or intervene,” which resulted in a custom or policy to permit such violations to occur.
Id. at 22.
Due to the interference with his legal mail, Plaintiff claims that he was not able
to “get his criminal case filed to the court.” Id. at 20. He alleges he suffers “monetary
loss, physical pain and suffering, depress[ion], stress, headaches physical injuries
impairment [sic], personal humiliation and mental anguish.” Id. at 24. In his
“Statement of Claim,” Plaintiff alleges violations of the First, Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments for a denial of access to the courts and to attorneys. See id.
at 26. He also asserts that Defendants acted with “gross negligence [sic] conduct when
they denied Plaintiff serious needs of access to the attorneys and court from their
unprofessional conduct and deficient performance.” Id.
III. Motion to Dismiss Standard
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of
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a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Pleadings submitted by pro se plaintiffs “are held to a less stringent standard
than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
Nevertheless, courts are under no duty to “re-write” a plaintiff’s complaint to find a
claim. Peterson v. Atlanta Hous. Auth., 998 F.2d 904, 912 (11th Cir. 1993).
IV. Analysis
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The mailroom Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administration remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
with respect to eight of the ten instances of alleged mail tampering: December 22,
2014, January 15, 2015, March 19, 2015, April 5, 2015, April 9, 2015, April 20, 2015,
June 8, 2015, and August 17, 2015. See Grainger Motion at 4. The PLRA provides that
“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . .
until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a). Exhaustion of available administrative remedies is “a precondition to an
adjudication on the merits” and is mandatory under the PLRA. Bryant v. Rich, 530
F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir. 2008); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007); Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (“Exhaustion is no longer left to the discretion of the
district court, but is mandatory.”) (citation omitted)).
Because exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, a
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defendant bears the burden to show a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust. See Whatley v.
Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015). “[D]eciding a motion
to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a two-step process.” Turner
v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
First, the court looks to the factual allegations in the
defendant’s motion to dismiss and those in the plaintiff’s
response, and if they conflict, takes the plaintiff’s version of
the facts as true. If, in that light, the defendant is entitled
to have the complaint dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, it must be dismissed.
Id. (citing Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1373-74). Second, “the court makes specific findings to
resolve disputes of fact, and should dismiss if, based on those findings, defendants
have shown a failure to exhaust.” Whatley, 802 F.3d at 1209.
Not only is there a recognized exhaustion requirement, “the PLRA . . . requires
proper exhaustion” as set forth in applicable administrative rules and policies.
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. As such, “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an
agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules[.]” Id. at 90. The DOC provides
an internal grievance procedure for its inmates. See Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.001
through 33-103.018. Generally, to properly exhaust administrative remedies, a
prisoner must correctly complete a three-step process. First, an inmate must submit
an informal grievance to a designated staff member at the institutional level. See Fla.
Admin. Code r. 33-103.005. If the issue is not resolved, the inmate must submit a
formal grievance at the institutional level. See Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.006. If the
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matter is not resolved at the institutional level, the inmate must file an appeal to the
Office of the Secretary of the DOC. See Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.007.
Florida Administrative Code rule 33-103.011 provides time frames for
submission of grievances under each step. Informal grievances must be “received
within 20 days of when the incident or action being grieved occurred”; and formal
grievances and appeals to the Office of the Secretary must be “received no later than
15 days from the date on which” the prior grievance was responded to. Grievances
“may be returned to [an] inmate without further processing” for various reasons,
including a failure to timely submit the grievance. See Fla. Admin. Code r. 33103.014(1). If a grievance is returned without action, the inmate has failed to
“properly” complete the grievance process. See Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1379 (holding that
the prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not timely
submit an appeal and, therefore, did not “properly take each step” of the relevant
administrative procedures).
Under the first step of the Turner analysis, the Court is unable to conclude that
Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because Plaintiff states
that he has. See Pl. Grainger Resp. at 8, 9. Thus, the Court proceeds to the second step
of the Turner analysis. To resolve a factual dispute about exhaustion, a district court
may “consider facts outside of the pleadings . . . so long as the factual disputes do not
decide the merits and the parties have sufficient opportunity to develop a record.”
Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1376 (footnotes omitted).
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The mailroom Defendants provide the declaration of Lawanda Williams
Sanders (Sanders Dec.), an Administrative Assistant with the DOC, working in the
Bureau of Policy Management and Inmate Appeals (Bureau); a DOC grievance log of
the grievance appeals filed by Plaintiff between May 1, 2014, and October 31, 2015;
and grievance documents for the relevant time periods (Def. Grievance Docs.) (Doc.
46-1). According to Ms. Sanders,
FDOC’s records show that Mr. Wallace’s grievance appeals,
with the Bureau . . . related to his legal mail on December
22, 2014 (#15-6-27989); March 19, 2015 (#15-6-27987); April
9, 2015 (#15-6-27986); and June 8, 2015 (#15-6-26033) were
all returned without action. FDOC’s records show that Mr.
Wallace did not file a grievance appeal, with the Bureau . .
. from his Grievance to the Warden, #1508-213-249,
concerning his legal mail on April 20, 2015. FDOC’s records
show that Mr. Wallace did not file a grievance appeal, with
the Bureau . . . for any issues related to mailing legal
documents on January 15, 2015, April 5, 2015, or August 7,4
2015.
See Sanders Dec. ¶¶ 3-5 (internal paragraph numbering omitted). The Court also
reviewed grievance records Plaintiff filed with his original complaint (Docs. 1-1
through 1-12) (Pl. Grievance Ex.).
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the grievance records, and it appears
Plaintiff has indisputably failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect
to the June 8, 2015 mail-tampering incident. Plaintiff filed grievances at each of the
three steps in the process to complain of the June 8th incident; however, he did not
This appears to be a scrivener’s error. The August 2015 date alleged by Plaintiff is
the 17th. See Complaint at 6.
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timely file his appeal to the Office of the Secretary (grievance log #15-6-26033),
resulting in the Office returning his appeal without action. See Pl. Grievance Ex. H
(Doc. 1-8). Because Plaintiff did not “properly” follow the administrative grievance
procedures, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to this one
alleged incident. See Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1379
With respect to the other seven disputed incidents, however, the mailroom
Defendants have not carried their burden to show Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Plaintiff’s formal grievances to the Warden for the December
22, 2014, March 19, 2015, and April 9, 2015 incidents were returned without action as
untimely under Chapter 33-103.014(1)(e). See Def. Grievance Docs. at 7, 13, 19. By the
Court’s calculation, Plaintiff did timely submit these formal grievances. The relevant
administrative rule provides that a grievance may be returned without action if the
inmate fails to submit the formal grievance within fifteen calendar days “of the date
on which the incident or action being complained about occurred, if an informal
grievance was not filed . . . .” See Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.014(1)(e) (emphasis
added). It appears that Plaintiff did, in fact, file informal grievances for the three
incidents, each of which an official responded to on the merits. See Def. Grievance
Docs. at 13-15; 19-21; see also Pl. Grievance Ex. B (Doc. 1-2). According to the dates
on the grievance documents, Plaintiff filed each formal grievance within fifteen
calendar days of receipt of the informal grievance response, in compliance with
Chapter 33-103.011(b)1. See id. Plaintiff completed the third step of the grievance
process by filing an appeal to the Office of the Secretary concerning the December 22,
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2014, March 19, 2015, and April 9, 2015 incidents, all of which were returned without
action because of Plaintiff’s non-compliance at the institutional level. See Def.
Grievance Docs. at 5-6, 11-12, 17-18. Because Plaintiff completed the three-step
grievance process to grieve these three incidents, he exhausted his administrative
remedies.
Whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies as to the remaining
four disputed incidents, January 15, 2015, April 5, 2015, April 20, 2015, and August
17, 2015, is less clear. The grievance records provided by the DOC and Plaintiff do not
include or reference any grievance filings for January 15, 2015, April 5, 2015, or
August 17, 2015. However, in response to the mailroom Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, Plaintiff claims that he did file grievances for these incidents, saying that he
placed them “in the inmate grievance box at the institution,” but that “he did not
receive them back from the Bureau.” Pl. Grainger Resp. at 8. Plaintiff makes a similar
claim with respect to the April 20, 2015 incident. As to that incident, Plaintiff filed
grievances at the first two steps, but he failed to submit a final appeal to the Bureau.
See Def. Grievance Docs. at 29-31; Pl. Grievance Ex. J (Doc. 1-10). Thus, the mailroom
Defendants conclude, he did not complete the three-step process. See Sanders Dec. ¶
4. According to Plaintiff, however, he did submit an appeal for the April 20, 2015
incident, but “he did not receive some of his grievance[s] back after he appeal[ed]
them.” Id. at 8-9.
Given how unclear the record is on the exhaustion issue, the Court declines to
find that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the
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January 15, 2015, April 5, 2015, April 20, 2015, and August 17, 2015 incidents. Thus,
the Grainger Motion is due to be granted with respect to one mail-tampering
incident—that occurring on June 8, 2015—but is due to be denied as to the other seven
disputed incidents.
B. Claim for Denial of Access to Courts Against the Mailroom
Defendants
Regardless of whether Plaintiff properly grieved all ten mail-tampering
incidents, he has failed to plausibly allege an access-to-courts claim. It is wellestablished that inmates have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); see also Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th
Cir. 2003) (“Access to the courts is clearly a constitutional right, grounded in the First
Amendment, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fifth Amendment,
and/or the Fourteenth Amendment.”). To state a claim for denial of access to the
courts, a plaintiff must allege an actual injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-50
(1996); Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). “Actual injury may be
established by demonstrating that an inmate’s efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim
were frustrated or impeded by . . . an official’s action.” Barbour, 471 F.3d at 1225
(citations omitted). Therefore, “the plaintiff must identify within his complaint, a
‘nonfrivolous, arguable underlying claim.’” Id. at 1226 (quoting Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). Additionally, the plaintiff must show that the
underlying nonfrivolous claim was raised, or would have been raised, in connection
with a direct appeal, a collateral attack on his conviction, or a civil rights action. Lewis,
10
518 U.S. at 354-57; Cranford v. Nev. Dep’t of Corr., 398 F. App’x 540, 546-47 (11th Cir.
2010).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was not able to get “his criminal case file[d] to
the court.” Amended Complaint at 20. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not
provide factual detail as to the nature of the “criminal case” to which he refers. In a
Memorandum Plaintiff filed in support of his claims (Doc. 42) (Pl. Mem.), he adds that
he “had a legitimate case that he could prove his innocence before the court, but his
legal mail never made it to the court or attorney because of the Defendants[’] . . .
wrong[]doing.” Pl. Mem. at 21. He further says that “his criminal [case] will be delayed
in the court because all his legal documents to this case have been intercepted and
destroyed by the mail room officials.”5 Id. Because he did not have his legal documents,
he explains, he was unable to “file motions to the trial court concerning his criminal
case.” Id. at 25.
Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege a legally-sufficient injury to state an
access-to-courts claim under the First, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments. The few
allegations he makes do not show that Defendants’ alleged conduct prevented him
from pursuing a non-frivolous legal claim related to a direct appeal of a criminal
conviction, a collateral attack on his conviction, or a civil rights action. The Court takes
The legal documents Plaintiff identifies as being destroyed are the following: “trial
transcript, post-conviction motions, motion to correct an illegal sentence, arrest report,
indictment charging document, [] discovery report, [and] habeas corpus documents.”
Pl. Mem. at 25.
5
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judicial notice of the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s Mandate, issued on November
7, 2008, of the court’s per curiam opinion affirming Plaintiff’s state court criminal
conviction. See Grainger Motion Ex. 2 (Doc. 46-2) at 1; see also Wallace v. State, 993
So. 2d 536 (Table) (Fla. 2008) (unpublished disposition). In Plaintiff’s Response to the
Grainger Motion, he admits that his “direct appeal was resolved,” but states that he
was attempting to obtain an attorney “to file motions in the court [o]n his behalf
because there were errors made in his jury trial concerning his criminal case.” Pl.
Grainger Resp. at 10.
While Plaintiff’s direct appeal was finally adjudicated in 2008, Plaintiff
continued to file motions, appeals, and writs, all of which were dismissed. Of note, on
November 20, 2013, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court order
barring Plaintiff from additional pro se filings because he “had filed several improperly
successive motions which were meritless.” See Wallace v. State, 127 So. 3d 707 (Mem)
(Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (per curiam). The appellate court docket shows that the last court
activity related to Plaintiff’s appeals occurred on February 11, 2014, before the first
alleged mail-tampering incident occurred—July 21, 2014. See Wallace v. State, 135
So. 3d 291 (Table) (Fla. 2014) (unpublished disposition) (dismissing the case for lack
of jurisdiction). Thus, whatever the content of the letters Plaintiff was attempting to
send to the lawyers was, it does not meet the requirements of an access-to-courts
claim.
Because Plaintiff has failed to allege an “actual injury” resulting from the ten
mail-tampering incidents, the mailroom Defendants’ Motion is due to be granted as to
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the access-to-courts claim.6
C. Supervisor Liability
Since the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the mailroom Defendants,
there is no basis for supervisor liability against the supervisory Defendants. See
Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999) (granting summary judgment
for two supervisory defendants because plaintiff failed to demonstrate “an underlying
constitutional violation” committed by the subordinate employees). See also Gish v.
Thomas, 516 F.3d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Without an underlying violation of
[plaintiff’s] constitutional rights, [the supervisor] cannot be liable . . . .”). Thus, the
supervisory Defendants’ Motion is due to be granted and they are due to be dismissed.
D. Negligence Claim
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to assert a negligence claim, the law is well
settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of corrections
officers. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474
U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause,
While Defendants do not separately address Plaintiff’s assertion of a Sixth
Amendment violation, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations do not implicate
Sixth Amendment protections. The “right to effective counsel under the Sixth
Amendment extends only to criminal matters.” Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 472
(5th Cir. 1976) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974)) (“Any
infringement of the right to effective counsel by the reading of an inmate’s
correspondence with an attorney is included within a concurrent abridgment of the
right of access to the courts.”). As noted, and as Plaintiff acknowledges, Plaintiff’s
“direct appeal was resolved.” Thus, even accepting as true that the mailroom
Defendants read mail intended for attorneys Plaintiff hoped would undertake his
representation, any such attorney-client relationship would not have been in
connection with his underlying criminal case.
6
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whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison
officials.”). Consequently, any allegedly negligent conduct of which Plaintiff complains
does not rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation and provides no basis for
relief in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. See Cannon v. Macon Cty., 1 F.3d 1558, 1563
(11th Cir. 1993), opinion modified on reh’g, 15 F.3d 1022 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[N]egligent
conduct does not give rise to § 1983 liability for resulting unintended loss of or injury
to life, liberty, or property.” (citations omitted)).7
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1.
Defendants Grainger, Barnett, and Thornton’s Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint (Doc. 46) and Defendants Jones, Andrews, and Rossiter’s
Amended Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (Doc. 50) are GRANTED to the
extent that this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.8 Generally, a pro se Plaintiff
should be provided an opportunity to amend his complaint “[w]here it appears a more
carefully drafted complaint might state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to allege a separate state law negligence claim,
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it.
7
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief against all
Defendants, the Court does not address the Defendants’ additional arguments raised
in their respective Motions. All Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state tort claim is
barred by Florida and Federal statutes, and Plaintiff failed to allege a physical injury
as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). See Grainger Motion at 8, 11; Jones Motion at
8, 10. The mailroom Defendants also assert that they are entitled to qualified
immunity. See Grainger Motion at 10.
8
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Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by Wagner v.
Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
However, if an amendment would be futile, such as where a plaintiff can “prove no set
of facts” that would entitle him to relief, id., the Court may dismiss the case with
prejudice, Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Leave to amend
a complaint is futile when the complaint as amended would still be properly dismissed
or be immediately subject to summary judgment for the defendant.”). Any effort by
Plaintiff to further amend his complaint premised on these facts would be futile.
Accordingly, this case is dismissed with prejudice.
2.
The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with prejudice,
terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 30th day of August,
2018.
TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN
United States District Judge
Jax-6
c:
Timothy Wallace
Counsel of Record
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