Socha v. Heartland Express, Inc. of Iowa

Filing 3

ORDERED: Defendant Heartland Express, Inc. of Iowa shall have up to and including April 14, 2017, to file an amended notice of removal demonstrating that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case. See Order for details. Signed by Judge Marcia Morales Howard on 3/31/2017. (MHM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

DARRYL SOCHA,
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 3:17-cv-357-J-34PDB

HEARTLAND EXPRESS, INC. of IOWA,
Defendant.

_____________________________________/

ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court sua sponte. Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction and therefore have an obligation to inquire into their subject matter jurisdiction.
See Kirkland v. Midland Mortg. Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1279 - 1280 (11th Cir. 2001). This
obligation exists regardless of whether the parties have challenged the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction. See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir.
1999) (“[I]t is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter
jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”). “In a given case, a federal district
court must have at least one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction
under a specific statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331; or (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” Baltin v. Alaron Trading
Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997).

On March 30, 2017, Defendant Heartland Express, Inc. of Iowa (Heartland) filed
Heartland Express’ Notice of Removal (Doc. 1; Notice) removing this case from the Circuit
Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County, Florida. See Notice at 1. In the
Notice, Heartland asserts that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over the instant action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See Notice ¶ 7. Heartland alleges that Plaintiff is a citizen
of Georgia, and Heartland is “an Iowa corporation with its principal place of business in North
Liberty, IA.” Id. ¶¶ 4-5. In addition, Heartland asserts that the amount in controversy
requirement for diversity jurisdiction is satisfied. Id. ¶ 6. However, upon review of the Notice
and Complaint (Doc. 2), the Court finds that Heartland fails to allege sufficient facts to
plausibly demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.1 See Dart Cherokee
Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014).
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Heartland discriminated against him on the
basis of disability in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, sections 760.01-760.10 of the
Florida Statutes. See generally Complaint. Plaintiff asserts that his damages exceed
$15,000.00, exclusive of attorney’s fees, interest and costs. See Complaint ¶ 1. He
maintains that as a result of Heartland’s “wrongful and intentional termination, Plaintiff has
been damaged financially and has sustained damages that include loss of past and future
wages, the loss of health insurance benefits, and other compensation benefits he was
receiving prior to his termination.” Id. ¶ 15. In support of removal, counsel for Heartland
summarily asserts, without any factual support, that “[t]he amount in controversy in this

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The Court is satisfied that Heartland has sufficiently alleged diversity of citizenship.
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matter exceeds the $75,000.00 jurisdictional minimum under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” See
Notice ¶ 6.
Where a defendant removes an action from state court to federal court, the defendant
“bears the burden of proving that federal jurisdiction exists.” See Williams v. Best Buy Co.,
Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). In Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., the
Supreme Court explained that a defendant’s notice of removal must include “a plausible
allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” See Dart
Cherokee Basin Operating Co., 135 S. Ct. at 554. If the plaintiff contests the allegation, or
the court questions it, a defendant must then present evidence establishing that the amount
in controversy requirement is met. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B)); see also Dudley
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 778 F.3d 909, 912 (11th Cir. 2014). Notably, “[a] conclusory allegation in
the notice of removal that the jurisdictional amount is satisfied, without setting forth the
underlying facts supporting such an assertion, is insufficient to meet the defendant’s burden.”
See Williams, 269 F.3d at 1320. Indeed, the Court may not speculate or guess as to the
amount in controversy. See Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 752 (11th Cir.
2010). Rather, a removing defendant should make “specific factual allegations establishing
jurisdiction” and be prepared to “support them (if challenged by the plaintiff or the court) with
evidence combined with reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or other reasonable
extrapolations.” Id. at 754 (emphasis added). In those circumstances, a court is able to

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determine the amount in controversy without relying on impermissible “conjecture,
speculation, or star gazing.” Id. at 754 (emphasis added).2
Here, Heartland fails to present a “plausible allegation” of the amount in controversy.
Indeed, the Notice is devoid of any specific, factual information by which to determine
whether Plaintiff’s damages plausibly exceed the jurisdictional threshold. Upon review of the
allegations in the Notice and Complaint, the Court can do no more than speculate regarding
the extent of Plaintiff’s damages. Thus, “without facts or specific allegations, the amount in
controversy [can] be ‘divined [only] by looking at the stars’–only through speculation–and that
is impermissible.” Id. at 753-54 (third alteration in original) (quoting Lowery v. Ala. Power
Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1209, 1215 (11th Cir. 2007)). In light of Plaintiff’s vague allegations of
damages, and in the absence of any information in the Notice by which to estimate those
damages, the Court is unable to determine whether the amount in controversy requirement
is satisfied here.

As such, Heartland has failed to provide the Court with sufficient

information for the Court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over this action. In light of
the foregoing, it is
ORDERED:

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The Court notes that Dart, Dudley and Pretka, all involved cases removed to federal court under the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). Because remand orders are not ordinarily reviewable on appeal,
except in class action cases, see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), § 1453(c), appellate decisions on removal usually involve
cases removed under CAFA. See, e.g., Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752. Nonetheless, with limited exception, “CAFA’s
removal provision expressly adopts the procedures of the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446.” Pretka,
608 F.3d at 756-57 & n.11 (citations omitted). Thus, although the cases cited above involved removal under
CAFA, they interpret and apply the general removal procedures, and thus, the Court finds the analysis of those
cases applicable here. See Bender v. Mazda Motor Corp., 657 F.3d 1200, 1204 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011)
(addressing an appeal involving a non-CAFA removal and citing to Pretka as authority regarding removal
procedures).
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Defendant Heartland Express, Inc. of Iowa shall have up to and including April 14,
2017, to file an amended notice of removal demonstrating that this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida on this 31st day of March, 2017.

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Copies:
Counsel of Record

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