Hoffman v. Jones

Filing 90

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 57 Defendants McCray, Davis, Mosely, and North's motion for summary judgment; granting in part and denying in part 70 Defendant Harris's motion for summary judgment; dismissing Plaintiff� 39;s claims for monetary damages from Defendants McCray, Davis, Mosely, North, and Harris in their official capacities; dismissing Plaintiff's due process claim against Defendant North; dismissing Plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief; directing Defendants Gaylord, North, McCray, Davis, Mosely, and Harris to review the hand-held video footage and provide the names and addresses of the officers Plaintiff identifies in his Amended Complaint as John Does "C" and "E" by August 23, 2019; dismissing John Doe "B" without prejudice; directions to the Clerk. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 7/29/2019. (KLC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
CHESTER R. HOFFMANN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 3:17-cv-361-J-39JRK

ANTHONY MCCRAY, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Chester R. Hoffmann is proceeding on a pro se
Amended Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 9; Complaint) against Chad
Gaylord, Thomas North, Anthony McCray, Robert Davis, Michalah
Mosely, Joseph Harris, and three John Does, identified as John Doe
“B,” John Doe “C,” and John Doe “E.”1 In his Complaint, Plaintiff
asserts violations of the 4th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments.
Complaint at 4.2 He alleges Defendants North, McCray, Harris, and
John Does “C” and “E” used excessive force against him on October

In his Complaint, Plaintiff identifies Defendant Gaylord as John
Doe “A” and Defendant Harris as John Doe “D.” He provided the names
of these Defendants by motion on September 14, 2018. See Motion
(Doc. 53). As such, the Court directed the Clerk to update the
docket to reflect the proper identification of these Defendants.
See Order (Doc. 55). Plaintiff has not successful identifying the
other John Doe Defendants.
1

Page numbers reflect the pagination assigned by the Court’s
electronic docketing system, which are found at the top of each
page.
2

17, 2016 (at two separate times), when he was housed at Hamilton
Correctional Institution (HCI). Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff asserts
Defendants Davis and Mosely failed to intervene, and Defendant
Gaylord, a nurse,

failed to report the force incidents.

Id.

Finally, he asserts Defendant North violated his rights under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in connection with a disciplinary
hearing resulting in an adjudication of guilt. Id. As relief,
Plaintiff

seeks

constitutional

a

declaration

rights,

that

compensatory

Defendants
and

violated

punitive

his

damages,

litigation costs, to have the alleged false disciplinary report
removed from his file, to be placed back in the general population,
and to be transferred to a different correctional facility. Id. at
16.
Before the Court are two motions for summary judgment: one
filed by Defendants McCray, Davis, Mosely, and North (Doc. 57;
McCray Motion), and one filed by Defendant Harris (Doc. 70; Harris
Motion).3 Plaintiff has responded to both Motions (Docs. 67, 80;
collectively, “Pl. Responses”).4 Accordingly, the motions are ripe
for this Court’s review.

Also pending before the Court is Defendant Gaylord’s motion to
dismiss (Doc. 89). However, Plaintiff has not yet responded to
Defendant Gaylord’s motion.
3

The second response is a duplicate of the first, with only the
date changed. The Court will cite the responses together.
4

2

II. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine when the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in
favor of the nonmovant. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93
F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville
Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere
scintilla

of

evidence

in

support

of

the

non-moving

party’s

position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”
Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243,
1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden
of demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that
there are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined at
trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th
Cir. 1991). The record to be considered on a motion for summary
judgment
stored

may

include

information,

(including

those

“depositions,

affidavits

made

for

or

documents,

electronically

declarations,

purposes

of

the

stipulations

motion

only),

admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Rule
56(c)(1)(A).
3

“When a moving party has discharged its burden, the nonmoving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own
affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox,
Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and
“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining
whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court “must view all
evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party
opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918,
921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca
Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).
III. Complaint Allegations
In his Complaint, which is verified under penalty of perjury,5
Plaintiff describes two instances of excessive force at HCI on
October 17, 2016. The first instance of force occurred inside

The factual assertions a plaintiff makes in a verified complaint
satisfy “Rule 56’s requirements for affidavits and sworn
declarations,” and are therefore given the same weight as factual
statements made in an affidavit. Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 F. App’x
948, 950 (11th Cir. 2014).
5

4

housing unit A, where Plaintiff’s cell was located. Complaint at
7. According to Plaintiff, Defendants Davis, McCray, and Mosely
were counseling inmates about cleanliness. Id. at 11. Defendant
Davis

informed

the

inmates

they

were

being

denied

certain

privileges because of cleanliness violations, and Plaintiff spoke
up, stating the punishment was unfair. Id. Plaintiff and Defendant
McCray “began going back and forth concerning the issue.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant McCray was yelling at him. Plaintiff
told Defendant McCray he was a mental health (“psych”) inmate and
did not like to be yelled at, which made Defendant McCray yell
louder. Id. Plaintiff alleges he “acted like he was going to lunge
at McCray,” but did not carry through with the action. Defendant
McCray then instructed Plaintiff to get down from his bunk, which
Plaintiff declined to do. Id.
After Plaintiff declined to get off his bunk at Defendant
McCray’s request, Defendant Davis ordered Plaintiff to get down.
Plaintiff

then

complied.

At

Defendant

McCray’s

instruction,

Plaintiff began walking toward the bathroom. Plaintiff alleges he
had his hands in the air. Id. Plaintiff asserts Defendant McCray
said, “when we get to the bathroom I’m going to show you who is
really is [sic] [psych].” Id. Plaintiff stopped walking, turned
around to say something to Defendant McCray, but then changed his
mind, and “turned back around with both hands in the air.” Id.
Plaintiff

asserts

Defendant

McCray
5

grabbed

him

from

behind,

slammed him face-first to the floor, handcuffed him, and sprayed
him in the face with chemical agents. Id. at 11-12.
Defendants Davis and McCray then escorted Plaintiff to the
center gate, where the second alleged incident occurred. Id. at
12. At the center gate, Defendant McCray informed Defendant North
that Plaintiff tried to hit Defendant McCray. Plaintiff asserts
Defendant North, Defendant Harris, and John Does “C” and “E” placed
a spit shield over his head and “began striking [him] in his head
and face area.” Id. Plaintiff also asserts Defendant North rammed
“his knee into [Plaintiff’s] face and the officers ram[m]ed his
head into a post and twisted his arms up and tried to break his
fingers.” Id. Officers then escorted Plaintiff to dorm H, where
Plaintiff took a decontamination shower “to wash off the ‘blood’
and ‘chemical agents.’” Id.
After the decontamination shower, officers placed a spit
shield over Plaintiff’s head again, allegedly to “hide and coverup

[Plaintiff’s]

arriving

at

the

injuries.”
medical

Id.

Plaintiff

evaluation

asserts

room,

that,

Defendant

upon
North

threatened him, stating “how you are treated here depends on what
you say and do.” Id. Plaintiff claims the nurse, Defendant Gaylord,
did not document all his injuries and did not remove the spit
shield from his head to check his face for injuries. Id. After the
medical examination, Plaintiff was placed in a cell with only
boxers for seven days. Id. at 13. In the days after his placement
6

in

the

cell,

Plaintiff’s

requests

for

medical

treatment

and

grievance forms were ignored. Plaintiff saw his mental health
counselor, John Doe “B,” about four days after the incidents.
Plaintiff asserts he suffered a concussion resulting from
Defendant McCray’s attack, and the chemical spray caused pain,
temporary blindness, and respiratory problems. Id. at 15. He
alleges the assault that occurred at the center gate resulted in
a pulled muscle, sore fingers, lumps to his head, a “busted nose,”
and black eyes. Id. Plaintiff also claims to have suffered mental
anguish, fear, depression, and other emotional injuries. Id.
In addition to his Eighth Amendment claims, Plaintiff asserts
Defendant North violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
in

connection

with

a

disciplinary

action

that

resulted

in

Plaintiff’s loss of “good adjustment transfer” and placement on
close management. Id. at 9, 13.
IV. Legal Analysis & Conclusions of Law
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants North, McCray, Davis, Mosely, and Harris assert
they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as to any claims
against them for damages in their official capacities. See McCray
Motion at 1; Harris Motion at 1. Plaintiff appears to misunderstand
Defendants’

Eleventh

Amendment

immunity

defense

because,

in

response, he simply reiterates that Defendants used excessive
force against him. Pl. Responses at 14.
7

When a plaintiff sues a state actor in his official capacity,
“the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the
state.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1986).
As such, “the state is the real, substantial party in interest and
is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though
individual officials are nominal defendants.” Id. (finding the
FDOC Secretary was immune from suit in his official capacity). To
the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendants North,
McCray, Davis, Mosely, and Harris in their official capacities,
they

are

entitled

to

Eleventh

Amendment

immunity.

Therefore,

Defendants’ motions are due to be granted as to Plaintiff’s claims
for monetary damages from them in their official capacities.
B. Qualified Immunity
Defendants McCray, Davis, Mosely, and Harris invoke qualified
immunity. See McCray Motion at 6; Harris Motion at 6.6 Plaintiff
states Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because
they used excessive force against him. See Pl. Responses at 11. As
to the first incident, Plaintiff claims he did not make any
aggressive movement toward Defendant McCray when Defendants were
escorting him, and Defendant McCray sprayed him with pepper spray
“until the can was empty.” Id. at 4. As to the second incident,

Defendant North does not assert a qualified immunity defense.
See McCray Motion at 6.
6

8

Plaintiff asserts Defendant Harris punched him in the face while
he had a spit shield covering his head and was fully restrained.
Id. at 5.
An officer sued in his individual capacity “is entitled to
qualified

immunity

for

his

discretionary

actions

unless

he

violated ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of

which

a

reasonable

person

would

have

known.’”

Black

v.

Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Case v.
Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2009)). Qualified immunity
allows officers to exercise their official duties without fear of
facing personal liability. Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951
(11th Cir. 2018). The doctrine protects all but the plainly
incompetent

or

those

who

knowingly

violate

an

inmate’s

constitutional rights. Id.
Upon asserting a qualified immunity defense, a defendant
bears the initial burden to demonstrate he was acting in his
discretionary authority at the relevant times. Dukes v. Deaton,
852 F.3d 1035, 1041-42 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 72
(2017). Here, the uncontradicted evidence demonstrates Defendants
McCray, Davis, Mosely, and Harris were acting within the scope of
their discretionary duties at the time of the alleged incidents,
which Plaintiff does not dispute. As such, Defendants carry their
burden on qualified immunity. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff.

9

To overcome a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff bears
the burden to demonstrate two elements: the defendant’s conduct
caused plaintiff to suffer a constitutional violation, and the
constitutional violation was “clearly established” at the time of
the alleged violation. Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 951. “Because § 1983
‘requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the
official’s

acts

deprivation,’

or

each

omissions
defendant

and
is

the

alleged

entitled

to

constitutional
an

independent

qualified-immunity analysis as it relates to his or her actions
and omissions.” Id. (quoting Zatler, 802 F.2d at 401). As such,
the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against
Defendants separately. Before doing so, the Court will set forth
the relevant Eighth Amendment principles.7
The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment “prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain,

or

the

infliction

of

pain

totally

without

penological

justification.” Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 321 (11th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff asserts Defendants’ use of force violated the Fourth
and Eighth Amendments. See Complaint at 4, 8. Because Plaintiff
was in the custody of the FDOC at the time of the alleged use of
force, his claims arise solely under the Eighth Amendment, not the
Fourth Amendment. See Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1303 (11th
Cir. 2010) (explaining a prisoner’s claim of excessive force
implicates the Eighth Amendment). Cf. Williams v. Bauer, 503 F.
App’x 858, 859 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting the district court
properly construed the plaintiff’s claim as arising under the
Fourth Amendment when he alleged officers used excessive force
during his arrest).
7

10

As

such,

the

Eighth

Amendment

prohibits

“punishment

grossly

disproportionate to the severity of the offense.” Id. In analyzing
use of force incidents, courts must be mindful that they generally
should not interfere in matters of prison administration or inmate
discipline. Id. at 322. Thus, courts must balance concerns of an
inmate’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment with
a

prison

official’s

obligation

to

ensure

a

safe

and

secure

institution. Id. 321-22. “The Court’s decisions in this area
counsel that prison officials should be accorded wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices
that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and
discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Id. at 322
(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)).
Because of the deference afforded prison officials, an inmate
against whom force is used to restore order or quell a disturbance
demonstrates
official’s

an

action

Eighth

Amendment

“inflicted

violation

unnecessary

and

only
wanton

when
pain

the
and

suffering.” Id. (internal citations omitted). See also Williams v.
Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Whitley, 475
U.S. at (1986)) (“The Supreme Court has held that . . . any security
measure undertaken to resolve [a] disturbance gives rise to an
Eighth

Amendment

claim

only

if

the

measure

taken

‘inflicted

unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering’ caused by force used
‘maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
11

harm.’”) (emphasis is original). When an officer uses force to
quell a disturbance, the force should cease once the inmate has
been controlled. A continued use of harmful force may constitute
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment if the behavior
giving rise to the need for force has ceased. Ort, 813 F.2d at
324.
The Eleventh Circuit has articulated five factors courts may
consider in determining whether an officer’s use of force was in
good faith or carried out maliciously and sadistically for the
purpose of causing harm:
(1) the extent of injury; (2) the need for
application of force; (3) the relationship
between that need and the amount of force
used; (4) any efforts made to temper the
severity of a forceful response; and (5) the
extent of the threat to the safety of staff
and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the
responsible officials on the basis of facts
known to them.
Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7
(1992)). See also Ort, 813 F.2d at 323; Williams, 943 F.2d at 1575.
When an officer uses excessive force against an inmate,
officers who are present and in a position to intervene can be
liable if they do not. Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, 484 F.3d 1340,
1341 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The law of this circuit is that an officer
who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps
to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force,
12

can be held liable for his nonfeasance.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Applying the relevant factors and viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity as to either instance of alleged force. First,
Plaintiff asserts Defendant McCray used excessive force against
him when Defendant McCray was escorting him from his cell to the
bathroom.8 Complaint at 11-12. Plaintiff alleges the other officers
present, Defendants Davis and Mosely, failed to intervene. Id. at
9, 12. Defendants McCray, Davis, and Mosely do not dispute force
was used against Plaintiff. However, they assert “the actions taken
by Defendants were objectively reasonable given the circumstances
[they] faced.” McCray Motion at 8. Defendants maintain Plaintiff
“swung his right elbow and struck Sgt. McCray in the torso.” Id.
at 6.
Plaintiff disputes Defendant McCray’s version of events. In
his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he had his hands in the air at
the relevant times. Complaint at 11. Plaintiff does concede that,
during the escort, he turned around to say something to Defendants.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant McCray told him to walk to the
bathroom, and Defendant McCray states he was taking Plaintiff to
the dayroom. See Complaint at 11, 23. Where Defendants were
escorting Plaintiff is not material; what is material is what
happened when Defendants McCray, Davis, and Mosely were escorting
Plaintiff.
8

13

However, Plaintiff asserts he “changed his mind and turned back
around with both hands in the air.” Id. Plaintiff disputes striking
Defendant McCray. In his Responses, Plaintiff explains: “I was
walking . . . with my hands in the air when [Defendant McCray]
attacked me from behind and throw [sic] me to the ground handcuffs
[sic] me and then begins to spray me with peper [sic] spray until
[sic] the can was empty (at no time was I resisting or talking
back).” Pl. Responses at 4.
Under applicable Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the factual
discrepancy between the parties is material and must be resolved
by a jury, not by the Court on summary judgment. See Velazquez,
484 F.3d at 1342 (holding the inmate’s and the prison guards’
contradictory stories presented an issue of fact for the jury).
Cf. Sanks v. Williams, 402 F. App’x 409, 413 (11th Cir. 2010)
(holding the district court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendant because the evidence showed the defendant
“acted with the appropriate amount of force to [e]nsure his safety
and maintain order, and ceased using force when it was no longer
necessary”).
At

this

juncture,

the

Court

must

accept

Plaintiff’s

allegations as true and construe the evidence in a light most
favorable to him. Plaintiff describes conduct that, if true, rises
to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff alleges
Defendant McCray “attacked” him from behind, suggesting Plaintiff
14

was not the aggressor but the victim,9 and claims that after
Defendant McCray handcuffed him, Defendant McCray used an entire
can of chemical spray on him. Even if Plaintiff struck Defendant
McCray in the torso, a jury could find Defendant McCray used more
force

than

necessary

or

continued

using

harmful

force

after

Plaintiff had been subdued. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges he heard
Defendant Davis warn Defendant McCray during the assault to temper
his actions because of the cameras. See Complaint at 12. Plaintiff
alleges Defendant Davis said, “don’t forget the cameras,” and
Defendant McCray responded, “f*@k the cameras.” Id.
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, a reasonable jury
could

conclude

Defendant

McCray

used

force

against

Plaintiff

unnecessarily and for the purpose of causing harm or used more
force than necessary under the circumstances. See Ort, 813 F.2d at
325 (“Prison officials step over the line of constitutionally
permissible conduct if they use more force than is reasonably
necessary in an existing situation.”); see also Nasseri v. City of
Athens, 373 F. App’x 15, 19 (11th Cir. 2010) (“It is excessive
force for a jailer to continue using force against a prisoner who
already has been subdued.”). As such, Defendant McCray is not

Plaintiff concedes that, while on his bunk, he made a threatening
movement toward Defendant McCray by acting as if he were going to
lunge at the officer. Complaint at 11. However, Plaintiff claims
he did not actually lunge at Defendant McCray, and Defendant McCray
does not argue the “mock lunge” was the threatening action that
precipitated the use of force. See McCray Motion at 6.
9

15

entitled to qualified immunity. See Danley, 540 F. 3d at 1309.
Because Defendants Davis and Mosely were present during the alleged
use of force and failed to prevent or stop it, they are not entitled
to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene claim.
Next, as to the second instance of force, Plaintiff similarly
demonstrates

a

genuine

issue

of

material

fact,

overcoming

Defendants Harris’s qualified immunity defense. Plaintiff asserts
Defendant

Harris

gratuitously

beat

him

while

Plaintiff

was

handcuffed and had a spit shield over his head. Complaint at 12.
In his Response, Plaintiff asserts that after the spit shield was
placed over his head, Defendant North kneed him in the face,
breaking his nose. Pl. Responses at 5. Plaintiff began staggering
and stepped on John Doe “C’s” foot. Defendant North then ordered
that Plaintiff be placed in ankle cuffs. After Plaintiff’s ankles
were cuffed, “John Doe C and Harris started to punch Plaintiff in
the face.” Id. Plaintiff also states officers rammed him into a
post, though it is unclear whether Defendant Harris participated
in that conduct. Id.; see also Complaint at 12.
Defendant

Harris

does

not

directly

dispute

using

force

against Plaintiff, though he implies some force was used and
justified under the circumstances. See Harris Motion at 6-7. For
instance, Defendant Harris cites legal authority that describes
instances in which officers are afforded discretion to use force
reasonably necessary under the circumstances. Id. (quoting Florida
16

Statutes § 944.35 (describing circumstances under which an officer
may use force against an inmate); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct.
305, 312 (2015) (analyzing an officer’s use of deadly force in
response to a perceived threat of harm)).
In support of his motion, Defendant Harris merely relies on
footage from the hand-held camera (Harris Ex. A).10 The video
footage Defendant Harris provides, however, does not contradict
Plaintiff’s

allegations.

The

footage

starts

with

Plaintiff

standing outside (at the center gate), bent over at the waist,
with Defendant North directly in front of him, Defendant Harris on
one side, and John Doe “D” on the other. See Harris Ex. A. Defendant
North instructs Plaintiff to stop spitting and to stand upright.
Plaintiff

complies.

When

Plaintiff

stands,

his

head

becomes

visible. He has a spit shield over his head at that time. Id. The
officers then escort him to the decontamination shower, with the
hand-held camera operator following. As Plaintiff walks away from
the camera, it becomes evident that he has cuffs arounds his
ankles. Id.
There is no video footage capturing events that preceded the
placement of the spit shield and the ankle cuffs, which is the

With the Court’s permission, Defendant Harris filed footage of
the hand-held camera under seal. See Order (Doc. 73). This footage
does not show what occurred inside dorm A, where the initial use
of force occurred, and Defendants have not provided footage from
the fixed-wing cameras.
10

17

relevant time period as described by Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims
Defendant Harris beat him after the spit shield was placed over
his head and after his ankles were cuffed. See Complaint at 12;
Pl. Responses at 5. As such, the Court may not rely upon the video
evidence to rule as a matter of law that Defendant Harris did not
beat Plaintiff as Plaintiff describes. See Logan v. Smith, 439 F.
App’x 798, 801 (11th Cir. 2011)

(holding the district court

improperly granted defendants summary judgment when it relied, in
part, on video evidence that did not capture events during the
time of the alleged incidents). If Plaintiff’s allegations are
true, a jury reasonably could conclude Defendant Harris used force
against Plaintiff for no reason or as punishment for Plaintiff’s
actions toward Defendant McCray. Such conduct amounts to an Eighth
Amendment violation. Accordingly, Defendant Harris is not entitled
to qualified immunity.
In sum, Plaintiff carries his burden on the first prong of
the qualified immunity analysis as to Defendants McCray, Davis,
Mosely, and Harris. He asserts facts that, if true, demonstrate
conduct proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. As such, Defendants
are not shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity, which has
no

application

when

officers

“knowingly

violate

an

inmate’s

constitutional rights.” See Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 951.
When a plaintiff carries his burden on the first prong of the
qualified immunity analysis in an excessive force case, the court
18

need not proceed to the second prong. The Eleventh Circuit has
held, “‘there is no room for qualified immunity’ in . . . excessive
force cases because they require a subjective element that is ‘so
extreme’ that no reasonable [officer] could believe that his
actions were lawful.” Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th
Cir. 2008), overruled in part on other grounds, Randall v. Scott,
610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Johnson v. Breeden,
280 F.3d 1308, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2002)). Accordingly, Defendants’
motions are due to be denied to the extent they assert qualified
immunity shields them from liability.
C. Damages Available Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)
Defendants North, McCray, Davis, Mosely, and Harris argue
compensatory and punitive damages are unavailable to Plaintiff
because he did not sustain physical injuries from the force
incidents. McCray Motion at 12; Harris Motion at 9. Defendants
McCray, Davis, Mosely, and North, in support of their motion, offer
Plaintiff’s medical records (Doc. 57-1; McCray Ex. A) and the
affidavit of Dr. Timothy Warren (Doc. 57-2; McCray Ex. B).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that a
plaintiff

seeking

damages

demonstrate

the

conduct

he

alleges

violated his constitutional rights caused a physical injury. 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner

confined

in

a

jail,

prison,

19

or

other

correctional

facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury.”).
The PLRA does not define “physical injury,” but the Eleventh
Circuit has explained a physical injury is one that is not simply
de minimis, though it “need not be significant.” Dixon v. Toole,
225 F. App’x 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citing Harris
v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999)). Bruising and
scrapes fall into the category of de minimis injuries. Id. Accord
Mann v. McNeil, 360 F. App’x 31, 32 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding vague
back injuries and scrapes amounted to de minimis injuries). On the
other

hand,

courts

have

recognized

that

broken

bones

and

a

concussion may constitute more than de minimis injuries. See, e.g.,
Tate

v.

Rockford,

497

F.

App’x

921,

925

(11th

Cir.

2012)

(suggesting as dicta, broken bones would constitute more than a de
minimis injury); Flanning v. Baker, No. 5:12CV337-MW-CJK, 2016 WL
4703868, at *6 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2016), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 5:12CV337-MW/CJK, 2016 WL 4703862 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 7,
2016) (citing cases that recognize a concussion is more than de
minimis).
According to the medical records, Defendant Gaylord conducted
a post-use-of-force exam. See McCray Ex. A at 1. Defendant Gaylord
noted Plaintiff had no complaints of pain and showed no signs or
symptoms of acute distress. Plaintiff had an abrasion to his upper
left back, which was not bleeding. Id. Dr. Warren avers he reviewed
20

Plaintiff’s medical records (provided as Ex. A) related to the
use-of-force

incident.

See

McCray

Ex.

B

at

1-2.

Dr.

Warren

concludes the “medical record contradicts Plaintiff’s claims that
he suffered any injury apart from a small abrasion on his back.”
Id. at 2. The only positive diagnosis was bi-polar disorder, which
Plaintiff suffered prior to the alleged incident. Id.
The

medical

records

and

affidavit

Defendants

offer

demonstrate Plaintiff suffered no more than de minimis injuries.
However,

Plaintiff

asserts

Defendant

North

threatened

him

by

telling him how he would be treated in the medical evaluation room
“depends on what you say and do.” Complaint at 12. Plaintiff
further contends Defendants took affirmative steps to conceal the
worst of his injuries by placing a spit shield over his head prior
to the medical exam. Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges Defendant
Gaylord did not document all of his injuries, nor did Gaylord
remove the spit shield to assess facial injuries.11 Id.
While some of Plaintiff’s physical injuries can be described
as de minimis, the Court declines to find as a matter of law that
a concussion and a broken nose fall into that category. Plaintiff

Video footage submitted by Defendant Harris in support of his
motion shows the post-use-of-force exam. Defendant Gaylord did not
remove Plaintiff’s spit shield during the exam, though it appears
Defendant Gaylord briefly looked through the mesh to inspect
Plaintiff’s face. There is no audio of the medical examination; it
occurred behind a closed door with a window.
11

21

alleges he requested medical treatment in the days following the
incidents, but his requests were ignored. Id. at 13. Construing
the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he demonstrates
a genuine issue of material fact as to the extent of his injuries.12
As such, Defendants’ motions are due to be denied to the extent
they argue Plaintiff’s requests for compensatory and punitive
damages are barred under the PLRA.
D. Heck-Bar13
Defendants
Plaintiff’s

due

McCray,
process

Davis,
claim

Mosely,
is

and

North

Heck-barred

maintain

because

an

adjudication in Plaintiff’s favor would “by necessity invalidate
the disciplinary conviction.” McCray Motion at 12.14 In response,
The video evidence Defendant Harris provides shows Plaintiff’s
face, covered by the mesh spit shield, as he is walking out of the
medical exam room. See Harris Ex. A. There are no obvious facial
injuries or blood. However, Plaintiff had previously taken a
decontamination shower; if there had been blood on his face, it
could have been washed away. Moreover, when Plaintiff was escorted
from the center gate to the decontamination shower, the back of
his spit shield was stained with a red/brown substance, which could
have been blood. To the extent there remain factual discrepancies
and credibility issues, this Court may not resolve those in favor
of Defendants on summary judgment. It is not the province of this
Court when ruling on a motion for summary judgment to make
credibility determinations. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (“[T]he
judge’s function is not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter.”).
12

13

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff appears to assert a due process
claim against Defendant North only. See Complaint at 9. In
Defendants McCray, Davis, Mosely, and North’s motion for summary
judgment, they jointly assert an argument that Plaintiff’s due
process claim is Heck-barred. See McCray Motion at 8. In other
14

22

Plaintiff asserts he was denied due process because he was not
afforded

advance

notice

of

the

disciplinary

hearing

and

was

deprived of the opportunity to present witnesses and evidence. See
Pl. Responses at 6, 7. He also states Defendant North should not
have been a member of the disciplinary review team, and the
investigator

failed

to

review

camera

footage

and

interview

witnesses. Id. at 7-9. Plaintiff further asserts he was denied due
process related to his status as a “psych” inmate, stating the
Florida Administrative Code requires “that no disciplinary action
shall be initiated until[] [the inmate’s] mental health care
provider has been contacted.” Id. at 9-10.15
The Supreme Court in Heck held a state prisoner’s claim for
damages “is not cognizable under § 1983 . . . . [if] a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S. at 487. The Heck-bar has its
origins in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), which held
the sole remedy for a prisoner’s federal claim seeking restoration
of good-time credits is through a writ of habeas corpus. The

words, Defendants do not address the claim as directed solely to
Defendant North. Id. To the extent Plaintiff asserts his due
process claim against Defendants McCray, Davis, and Mosely, in
addition to Defendant North, the Court’s analysis is equally
applicable.
Plaintiff references protections under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). See Pl. Responses at 9. He does not assert
a claim under the ADA in his Complaint, however.
15

23

Supreme Court later expanded the Heck-bar to a prisoner’s challenge
to disciplinary proceedings. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641,
643 (1997). In Balisok, the Court held a prisoner’s claim “for
declaratory relief and money damages, based on allegations of
deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker that necessarily
imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable
under § 1983.” Id. at 648.
The Heck-bar does not automatically apply in all cases in
which prisoners challenge prison disciplinary adjudications. See
Roberts

v.

Wilson,

259

F.

App’x

226,

228

(11th

Cir.

2007)

(discussing Heck, Balisok, and their progeny in the context of a
Florida

prisoner’s

resulting

in

a

claim

finding

challenging
of

guilt).

disciplinary
As

such,

the

proceedings
same

facts

underlying a disciplinary decision may give rise to a claim under
§ 1983 without running afoul of Heck. Davis v. Hodges, 481 F. App’x
553, 554 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Dyer v. Lee, 488 F.3d 876, 87980 (11th Cir. 2007)).
The

application

of

Heck

hinges

on

the

nature

of

the

disciplinary action, the sentence imposed, and the plaintiff’s
allegations. A district court should dismiss a claim brought under
§ 1983 if that claim “would necessarily affect the fact or duration
of [the prisoner’s] confinement.” Davis, 481 F. App’x at 554
(citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005); Muhammad v.
Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754 (2004)). For instance, if a § 1983 claim
24

“calls into question the validity of the deprivation of” good-time
credits, the Heck-bar applies. Richards v. Dickens, 411 F. App’x
276, 278 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f good-time credits have been
eliminated, a prisoner’s § 1983 suit challenging a disciplinary
action may be construed as seeking a judgment at odds with his
conviction or with the state’s calculation of time that he must
serve for the underlying sentence.”).
Here, Plaintiff received a disciplinary report for battery on
a corrections officer based on Defendant McCray’s contention that
Plaintiff struck him in the torso. Complaint at 13. Plaintiff
attaches the disciplinary report to his Complaint. The report,
completed

by

Defendant

McCray,

identifies

Plaintiff

as

the

aggressor. Id. at 23. Defendant McCray explains he, Defendant
Davis, and Defendant Mosely were counseling inmates in Plaintiff’s
housing

unit

about

cleanliness.

Defendant

McCray

writes

the

following:
While counseling with [Plaintiff] he became
argumentative and lunged toward me while on
his assigned top bunk . . . . I ordered
[Plaintiff] to get down from his bunk and walk
to the dayroom to counsel with him away from
his
bunk
and
other
inmates
present.
[Plaintiff] began walking toward the dayroom
with his hands up. [Plaintiff] then swing
[sic] his right elbow and struck me in the
midsection torso area. Chemical and physical
force was utilized in self-defense.
Id. Based upon Defendant McCray’s report and witness statements,
the disciplinary team found Plaintiff guilty and sentenced him to
25

sixty days in disciplinary confinement. Id. Plaintiff lost thirty
days of gain time, and “a good adjustment transfer [was] denied.”
Id.
Upon review, the Court finds Plaintiff’s due process claim is
Heck-barred because a ruling in his favor would necessarily call
into question the validity of the disciplinary conviction, which
included a loss of gain time. Notably, the disciplinary conviction
has not been invalidated. See McCray Motion at 12. If Plaintiff
prevails on his claim, a jury would have to accept his allegations,
which are directly contradictory to Defendant McCray’s version of
events as accepted by the disciplinary hearing team. See Complaint
at 13. Plaintiff alleges he did not strike Defendant McCray in the
torso area, but rather had his hands in the air. Id. at 11. See
also Pl. Responses at 4. Plaintiff alleges Defendant McCray engaged
him in an unprovoked attack and falsified the disciplinary report,
while the disciplinary hearing team accepted Defendant McCray’s
account that “chemical agents and physical force [were] utilized
in

self-defense”

after

Plaintiff

struck

Defendant

McCray.

Complaint at 11, 25.
If a jury accepts Plaintiff’s allegations that he did not in
fact hit Defendant McCray or otherwise engage in conduct to justify
a use of force against him, a finding in Plaintiff’s favor calls
into

doubt

the

validity

of

the

disciplinary

conviction

and

resulting loss of gain time. As such, Plaintiff’s claim is barred
26

under Heck/Balisok. See Richards, 411 F. App’x at 278 (holding
Heck applied because the plaintiff’s theory of self-defense was
contradictory to the facts upon which the disciplinary action was
based—that the plaintiff instigated the physical encounter with
officers); Roberts, 259 F. App’x at 228 (holding the plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claim was Heck-barred because the disciplinary adjudication
was not invalidated, and the claim was “at odds with the revocation
of [the plaintiff’s] good time credits”). See also McDuf v. Barlow,
No. 3:17cv909-LC-HTC, 2019 WL 2016557, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 12,
2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17CV909-LC/HTC,
2019 WL 2010709 (N.D. Fla. May 7, 2019) (finding the Heck-bar
applied because the plaintiff claimed he was wrongfully assaulted,
while the disciplinary hearing team found the plaintiff engaged in
conduct that precipitated a reactionary use of force); LaFlower v.
Kinard, No. 2:10-cv-82-FtM-29SPC, 2011 WL 2183555, at * 3 (M.D.
Fla. June 6, 2011) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim as Heckbarred because the plaintiff’s “basis for [the] action [was] wholly
inconsistent with the facts upon which the disciplinary conviction
[was] based”).
While not dispositive of but relevant to the Heck-bar issue,
Plaintiff seeks to have the “falsified D.R. removed from his [FDOC]
file[, and] to be . . . placed back in general population.”
Complaint at 16. And he requests the Court grant his “good time
adjustment transfer . . . so he will be closer to family.” Id.
27

Even if Plaintiff did not seek this relief, but sought exclusively
damages, his claim would still be Heck-barred. See Richards, 411
F. App’x at 278 (noting the plaintiff’s argument that he did not
seek expungement of his disciplinary actions “misses the mark”).
Accordingly, Defendants McCray, Davis, Mosely, and North’s
motion is due to be granted to the extent Plaintiff’s due process
claim is barred by Heck. The claim will be dismissed without
prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to refile his claims in a new civil
rights action if and when he can demonstrate the disciplinary
charge has been overturned.
E. Requests for Injunctive Relief
Defendant

Harris

objects

to

Plaintiff’s

requests

for

injunctive relief, asserting Plaintiff may not obtain the relief
he seeks from Defendant Harris or the other named Defendants. See
Harris Motion at 7. In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to have the
disciplinary

report

removed,

to

be

placed

back

in

general

population, and to be transferred. Complaint at 16.
The Court finds Plaintiff is not entitled to the injunctive
relief he seeks. Significantly, the FDOC is not a party to this
action and Plaintiff fails to demonstrate supervisory liability.
Moreover, expungement of a prison disciplinary action is relief
obtainable in a habeas action, not in a civil rights case. Preiser,
411 U.S. at 500 (“[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very
fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he
28

seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release
or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal
remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”).
Additionally, courts generally will not interfere in matters
of prison administration, including an inmate’s confinement status
or location of confinement. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
547-48 (1979) (“[T]he operation of our correctional facilities is
peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches
. . . not the Judicial.”). See also McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24,
39 (2002) (“It is well settled that the decision where to house
inmates is at the core of prison administrators’ expertise.”);
Barfield

v.

Brierton,

883

F.2d

923,

936

(11th

Cir.

1989)

(“[I]nmates usually possess no constitutional right to be housed
at one prison over another.”). As such, Defendant Harris’s motion
is due to be granted insofar as he seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s
requests for injunctive relief.
V.

John Doe Defendants

In his Amended Complaint, filed on May 4, 2017, Plaintiff
names three John Doe Defendants whom he has not yet identified.
Plaintiff was given an opportunity, through discovery, to identify
these

individuals.

Discovery

closed

on

July

17,

2018,

and

Plaintiff’s deadline to name the John Doe Defendants expired on
January 15, 2019. See Orders (Docs. 44, 69).

29

Therefore, on January 30, 2019, the Court directed Plaintiff
to show cause by March 5, 2019, why “John Doe B,” “John Doe C,”
and “John Doe E” should not be dismissed from the action. See Order
to Show Cause (Doc. 78). The Court notified Plaintiff that his
failure show satisfactory cause by the designated deadline may
result in the dismissal of the claims against Defendants “John Doe
B,” “John Doe C,” and “John Doe E” without further notice. On
February 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 82) stating he
requested

the

named

Defendants

to

provide

the

John

Does’

identities, but they have “refused to do so.”
The Eleventh Circuit has consistently held that “fictitiousparty pleading is not permitted in federal court,” unless a
plaintiff describes a John Doe defendant with such particularity
that he or she can be identified and served. See Richardson v.
Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal
of a John Doe defendant where the plaintiff’s complaint failed to
identify or describe the individual “guard” allegedly involved);
Williams v. DeKalb Cty. Jail, 638 F. App’x 976, 976-77 (11th Cir.
2016) (“[W]hen the real defendant cannot be readily identified for
service, [a fictitious name] is insufficient to sustain a cause of
action.”). Cf. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215 n.6, 1216 (11th
Cir. 1992) (holding the district court erred in denying a motion
to join a John Doe defendant because the plaintiff described the

30

individual with sufficient clarity and precision such that the
inclusion of his name would have been “surplusage”).
Plaintiff reiterates in his response to the order to show
cause (Doc. 82) what he asserts in his Complaint—that John Does
“C” and “E” can be identified through the video evidence. Defendant
Harris filed under seal the video footage Plaintiff references. As
such, it appears John Does “C” and “E” are capable of being readily
identified such that the Court can direct service of process.
Accordingly, dismissal of John Does “C” and “E” is not appropriate
at this time. The Court will direct the named Defendants to review
Plaintiff’s

allegations

and

the

hand-held

video

footage

and

provide the names of the officers Plaintiff identifies in his
Complaint at John Does “C” and “E.” See Richardson v. Johnson, 598
F.3d 734, 739-40 (11th Cir. 2010) (“It is unreasonable to expect
incarcerated and unrepresented prisoner-litigants to provide the
current addresses of . . . defendants who no longer work at the
prison . . . .”).
With respect to John Doe “B,” Plaintiff fails to provide any
identifying information upon which the Court may direct service of
process on this defendant. John Doe “B” is, therefore, subject to
dismissal for Plaintiff’s failure to identify him. See Order (Doc.
78).16

Plaintiff alleges John Doe “B” failed to report the alleged useof-force incidents. See Complaint at 9, 13.
16

31

Therefore, it is now
ORDERED:
1.

Defendants McCray, Davis, Mosely, and North’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 57) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The motion (Doc. 57) is GRANTED to the extent Plaintiff’s claims
for monetary damages from them in their official capacities are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and Plaintiff’s due process claim
is dismissed without prejudice. The motion (Doc. 57) is DENIED to
the extent Defendants McCray, Davis, Mosely, and North are not
entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
claim,

and

Plaintiff’s

request

for

compensatory

and

punitive

damages is not barred under the PLRA.
2.

Defendant Harris’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 70)

is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion (Doc. 70) is
GRANTED to the extent Plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages from
Defendant Harris in his official capacity is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, and Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief are
dismissed. The motion (Doc. 70) is DENIED to the extent Defendant
Harris is not entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claim, and Plaintiff’s request for compensatory
and punitive damages is not barred under the PLRA.
3.

By August 23, 2019, Defendants Gaylord, North, McCray,

Davis, Mosely, and Harris must review Plaintiff’s allegations and
the hand-held video footage and provide to the Court the names and
32

addresses of the officers Plaintiff identifies in his Amended
Complaint (Doc. 9) at John Does “C” and “E.” If the forwarding
addresses are confidential, the addresses shall be provided to the
Court in camera.
4.

Defendant John Doe “B” is DISMISSED without prejudice

from this action.
5.

The Clerk shall terminate Defendant John Doe “B” as a

party to this case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 26th day of
July, 2019.

Jax-6
c:
Chester R. Hoffmann
Counsel of Record

33