Hutto v. Fernandina Beach Police Department et al

Filing 47

ORDER granting 27 Defendant Hurley's motion to dismiss, and dismissing Defendant Hurley from this action; denying 40 Plaintiff's Motion to Compel response to non-party subpoena; granting 42 Defendants' Motion for Protective O rder to the extent Plaintiff propounded his Second Requests for Admissions based on a misunderstanding of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Striking Plaintiff's Notices to the Court 38 , 39 , 41 , and 46 ; and directing the Clerk to terminate Defendant Hurley from this action. Signed by Judge Brian J. Davis on 2/2/2018. (KLC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
DENNIS T. HUTTO,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:17-cv-461-J-39MCR

FERNANDINA BEACH POLICE
DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff, an inmate of the Florida penal system, is proceeding in this action on a
pro se Amended Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 19; Amended Complaint). Plaintiff names
as defendants the City of Fernandina Beach, Chief James Hurley, Sgt. Hepler, Detective
William B. Evatt, Officer M. Douglass, and Officer Richie Benton. Before the Court are
three motions: (1) Defendant James T. Hurley’s Second1 Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27;
Hurley Motion); (2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (Doc. 40; Motion to Compel); and (3)
Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 42; Motion for Protective Order).
II. Motion to Dismiss Standard
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations set
forth in the complaint as true. Ashcroft v.Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman's World Med.
Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences

1

Defendant Hurley previously filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s original complaint (Doc. 12).

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Omar ex. rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d
1246, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some
minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 126263 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a
claim that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Though detailed factual allegations are not required to satisfy this standard, Rule
8(a)

demands “more

than

an

unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Id. Indeed, allegations showing “[t]he mere possibility the defendant acted
unlawfully [are] insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca–Cola Co.,
578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint
pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). Rather, the well-pled allegations must nudge the claim “across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
A "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do[.]" Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d
at 1262 (explaining that "conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal
conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal") (internal citation and
quotations omitted). Indeed, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]" which simply
"are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680.
2

Pleadings submitted by a pro se plaintiff “are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum
v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Courts are under no
duty, however, to “re-write” a plaintiff’s complaint to find a claim. Peterson v. Atlanta Hous.
Auth., 998 F.2d 904, 912 (11th Cir. 1993).
III. Complaint Allegations
Plaintiff alleges the Defendants violated his constitutional rights when he was
arrested and his vehicle was seized in connection with a hit-and-run accident that
occurred inside the city limits of Fernandina Beach. Amended Complaint at 3-4. He claims
he was arrested at his home on December 23, 2014, without probable cause and outside
the jurisdictional limits of the Fernandina Beach Police Department (FBPD). Id. According
to Plaintiff, on the day of the arrest, Defendants Hepler, Douglass, and Benton “were
conducting an investigation, outside their jurisdiction, to develop probable cause for the
Plaintiff’s arrest.” Id. at 4.
Plaintiff asserts Defendants’ actions resulted in the loss of “his truck, two homes, with
all their contents, and his quality of life.” Id. at 8. Plaintiff states Defendants Hepler,
Douglass, and Benton unlawfully, and without probable cause, arrested him and seized
his truck, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. Further, he claims those same
Defendants violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by excluding in the arrest and
booking report the exculpatory statement provided by his neighbor. Id. According to
Plaintiff, he was incarcerated between December 23, 2014 (the date of his arrest) and
October 27, 2016, when the charges against him were dropped. Id. at 7. As relief, Plaintiff
seeks the cost of litigation, declaratory relief, and damages. Id. at 10-11.
Defendant Hurley was not present during, nor directly involved in, Plaintiff’s arrest or
3

the seizure of his truck.2 See id. Rather, Plaintiff sues Defendant Hurley in his role as
Chief of the FBPD. Id. at 2. Indeed, aside from Plaintiff’s identification of Hurley as a
Defendant, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains no allegations as to Defendant
Hurley’s actions or inactions with respect to alleged violations. See id. The only other
references to Defendant Hurley appear in two exhibits Plaintiff attached to his Amended
Complaint. See Pl. Ex. P (Doc. 19-17), Ex. Q (Doc. 19-18). Specifically, Plaintiff connects
Defendant Hurley to the alleged constitutional violations because Defendant Hurley, in
his capacity as Chief of Police, signed a Mutual Aid Agreement (MAA) Plaintiff claims is
illegal and resulted in his false arrest.
Exhibit P is a letter from Plaintiff to Defendant Hurley, dated April 25, 2016, in which
Plaintiff notified (Chief) Hurley of his intention to seek damages as a result of his illegal
arrest and incarceration. (Doc. 19-17; Hutto Letter). In that letter, Plaintiff asserted his
arrest by FBPD officers was in violation of the MAA between FBPD and Nassau County
Sheriff’s Office (NCSO). Hutto Letter at 2.3 Specifically, Plaintiff wrote that a particular
provision in the MAA (set forth below) “is contrary to the legislative intent of F.S. 23.125
and the agreement itself is fatally defective and illegal.” Id. He further states “FBPD and
NCSO do not have the legislative power to enter into such an agreement.” Id.
Exhibit Q is a copy of the MAA under which Plaintiff alleges he was arrested and
which Defendant Hurley signed, in his capacity as FBPD Chief of Police (Doc. 19-18;
MAA). The MAA provides that NCSO and FBPD are permitted, by Florida Statutes and

2

Defendant Evatt, similarly, was not involved in Plaintiff’s arrest. Plaintiff sues Defendant Evatt in
connection with forfeiture proceedings against his truck, which Plaintiff alleges Evatt initiated on January 6,
2015. Amended Complaint at 4. Plaintiff asserts Defendant Evatt violated the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments with respect to the disposal and suppression of his truck. Id. at 9. Plaintiff alleges Defendant
Evatt informed him by letter that his truck was released to a towing company about one month after his
arrest. Amended Complaint at 6.
3 Page numbers reflect the pagination assigned by the Court’s CM/ECF docketing system, which are found
at the top of each page.

4

the agreement, to render aid to one another “in the form of law enforcement services and
resources to adequately respond to . . . multi-jurisdictional routine law enforcement.” MAA
at 6. The agreement addresses “routine law enforcement” across jurisdictional lines in
paragraph 5(c), which is the subsection Plaintiff directly contests in his letter to Defendant
Hurley:
In the event an officer of FBPD who is investigating a felony
or a misdemeanor which occurred within FBPD jurisdiction
should develop probable cause to arrest a suspect for that
[crime] when the suspect is located outside the FBPD officer’s
jurisdiction but within Nassau County, the FBPD officer shall
be empowered with the same authority to arrest said suspect
as the FBPD officer would have within the political subdivision
in which he or she is employed. An FBPD officer intending to
effect a probable cause arrest pursuant to this paragraph
should, whenever possible, request the assistance of the
NCSO or other Law Enforcement Agency having jurisdiction
within the area in which the arrest is to take place. Failure to
request such assistance shall not, however, affect the validity
or legality of any arrest made pursuant to this paragraph.
Id. at 9.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the arresting officers violated the MAA.
In support, he asserts Defendant Hepler testified at a hearing in connection with Plaintiff’s
criminal action (following his arrest) that Hepler, as one of the arresting officers, “did not
contact the Nassau County Sheriff’s Office prior to conducting his out-of-jurisdiction
investigation and arrest of the Plaintiff,” in contravention of the MAA. Id. In his Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following:
[T]he City of Fernandina Beach and the Nassau County
Sheriff’s Office do not have the legislative authority to enter
into an agreement that confers upon FBPD officers,
jurisdictional police powers, coextensive with those of the
county deputies with NCSO. . . . [Plaintiff’s] arrest, made
pursuant to the mutual aid agreement between NCSO and
FBPD, without FBPD requesting assistance from NCSO, is
contrary to Florida law and is in violation of the Plaintiff’s
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to protection against
5

unreasonable search and seizure and his right to due
process.
Amended Complaint at 9. Plaintiff further alleges that Hepler testified the FBPD had a
policy of seizing “personal property under the guise of ‘the Act,’4 and sell[ing] the seized
property back to it’s [sic] owner.” Id. at 7.
IV. Hurley’s Motion to Dismiss
In his Motion to Dismiss, filed on June 8, 2017, Defendant Hurley argues that, to
the extent Plaintiff asserts claims against him in his official capacity, those are redundant
as claims against his employer (the City of Fernandina Beach), who also has been named
a defendant in this action. Defense Motion at 5. Further, Defendant Hurley argues that to
the extent Plaintiff asserts claims against him in his individual capacity, he is entitled to
qualified immunity, and Plaintiff fails to “plead facts regarding Chief Hurley that amount to
a violation or deprivation of the rights he asserts under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.” Id. Specifically, Defendant Hurley states that “none of the allegations . . .
pertain to Chief Hurley. . . . [and] Plaintiff has failed to allege acts or omissions on the part
of Chief Hurley.” Id. at 6, 8. Defendant Hurley also argues that, to the extent Plaintiff
asserts a state law claim, no allegations of any state law violation pertain to him. Id. at
10-11.
In his Response, Plaintiff concedes Defendant Hurley “has immunity in his official
capacity,” but contends “that immunity does not extend to [Hurley’s] personal actions
while performing his duties as chief of police”5 (Doc. 29; Response). In support of his

“The Act” refers to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, Florida Statutes 932.701-707. See Amended
Complaint, Ex. B (15-4).
5 Plaintiff’s recognition that Defendant Hurley is officially-immune from suit appears to reflect some
confusion between suits against municipal officers in their individual versus official capacities. For reasons
set forth in this Order, any confusion is not relevant to the Court’s ruling.
4

6

position that he has sufficiently stated a claim against Defendant Hurley, Plaintiff directs
the Court to Exhibits P and Q. Response at 1-2. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Hurley
ignored his letter in which he complained that the MAA and its application to him was
illegal, resulting in his false arrest. Id. Plaintiff states, “no reasonable person, in a
supervisory position, would ignore a notice, sent in ‘good faith,’ that would require, not
only his attention, but a response as well.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
A. Official Capacity Claims
As to Plaintiff’s claim(s) against Defendant Hurley in his official capacity, Defendant
Hurley argues such claims are duplicative of those against the City of Fernandina Beach,
and this Court agrees. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
691 n.55 (1978) (recognizing that “official-capacity suits generally represent only another
way of pleading an action against” a municipality of which the individual defendant is an
agent). The City of Fernandina Beach has appeared in this case and filed an Answer on
May 26, 2017 (Doc. 21). Thus, any claims against Defendant Hurley in his official capacity
are due to be dismissed as duplicative.
B. Individual Capacity Claims
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the
defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal
law and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Bingham v. Thomas, 654
F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Moreover, the Eleventh
Circuit "'requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or
omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation' in § 1983 cases." Rodriguez v. Sec'y,
Dep't of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 625 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d

7

397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986)). “A causal connection may be established by proving that the
official was personally involved in the acts that resulted in the constitutional deprivation.”
Zatler, 802 F.2d at 401. Defendant Hurley asserts there are no factual allegations
describing how he personally participated in the acts giving rise to any alleged
constitutional violations, and this Court agrees. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint includes
no allegations that Defendant Hurley personally participated in his arrest or the seizure of
his truck. Indeed, the only instance in which Defendant Hurley is even named or
mentioned in the Amended Complaint is when Plaintiff identifies him as a Defendant.
Amended Complaint at 2.
Thus, any claims against Defendant Hurley rest on Hurley’s official participation in
the MAA or for Hurley’s failure to respond to Plaintiff’s letter complaining that his arrest
was unlawful. Such allegations fail to state a claim because they rest on a theory of
supervisory liability (respondeat superior). The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that §
1983 claims against state agents may not be based a theory of respondeat superior.
Braddy v. Fla. Dep't of Labor & Emp't Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding
supervisory liability requires something more than stating a claim of liability under a theory
of respondeat superior). See also Reid v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 486 F. App'x 848, 852
(11th Cir. 2012) (affirming summary judgment in favor of a defendant sued “only in his
supervisory capacity” because the plaintiff made no allegations that the defendant
participated in the action or that he was causally responsible for any violations).
“Supervisory liability can be found when the supervisor personally participates in the
alleged constitutional violation, or when there is a causal connection between the
supervisory actions and the alleged deprivation.” Id. “The standard by which a supervisor
8

is held liable in [his] individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely
rigorous.” Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008) (overruled on other
grounds).
In the absence of a known “history of widespread abuse,” the causal connection
required to establish supervisory liability can be demonstrated by alleging a supervisor
adopted a policy or custom that results in the supervisor’s “deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). “The
deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official
must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated
occurrences.” Keith v. DeKalb Cty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1048 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999)).
The closest Plaintiff comes to alleging Defendant Hurley instituted a policy or
custom resulting in deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights is to the extent
Defendant Hurley, in his official capacity as Chief, entered into a MAA. See Resolution
2014-135 (Doc. 19-18) at 3-4; Amended Complaint at 9. Neither Plaintiff’s allegations nor
the attached Exhibits demonstrate widespread abuse or existence of a policy or custom,
sufficient to allege the causal connection required for supervisory liability. First, even if
Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation, only one instance of a violation fails
to demonstrate a policy or custom. See Keith, 749 F.3d at 1048. Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint contains no allegations that others have been similarly unlawfully arrested
pursuant to the MAA.
Furthermore, assuming the MAA, as written or as applied to Plaintiff, is invalid, a
violation of state law does not support an action under § 1983. See Knight v. Jacobson,
9

300 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002) (“There is no federal right not to be arrested in
violation of state law.”). In his letter to Defendant Hurley, Plaintiff cites a Florida District
Court opinion6 to suggest that the MAA is illegal and resulted in his false arrest. Hutto
Letter at 3. In that case, a criminal defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence,
attacking the propriety of his arrest and seizure of evidence when the officers’
investigation originated outside their jurisdiction, in clear violation of a voluntary
cooperation (mutual aid) agreement. See State v. Allen, 790 So. 2d 1122, 1123-24 (Fla.
2d DCA 2001). The state court opinion, reviewing a ruling on a criminal defendant’s
motion to suppress, does not support a finding of a constitutional deprivation that would
support Plaintiff’s § 1983 action against Defendant Hurley. See Knight, 300 F.3d at 1276;
see also McDaniel v. Bradshaw, No. 10-81082-CIV-COHN-Seltzer, 2011 WL 13150496,
at 5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that an arrest made in violation
of a mutual aid agreement equated to a claim under § 1983), aff’d 491 F. App’x 981, 984
(11th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff’s allegation that FBPD had a policy of seizing “personal property under the
guise of ‘the Act,’ and sell[ing] the seized property back to it’s [sic] owner,” see Amended
Complaint at 7, is also insufficient to attribute to Defendant Hurley a policy or custom of
violating rights.

Importantly, Plaintiff does not allege Defendant Hurley instituted or

ratified such a policy, nor does he attribute the forfeiture of his truck, or any forfeiture
proceedings, to actions or inactions by Defendant Hurley. Plaintiff’s allegations as to

6

State v. Allen, 790 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

10

Defendant Hurley’s involvement, if any, relate to his alleged false arrest, not to the seizure
of his truck.7 See Amended Complaint; Exs. P, Q.
For the reasons stated above, any supervisory claim(s) against Defendant Hurley
fails because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that Defendant Hurley was
personally involved in, or otherwise causally connected to, the alleged violations of
Plaintiff’s federal statutory or constitutional rights.8 Therefore, Defendant Hurley’s Motion
is due to be granted, and the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against him.
V. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Response to Non-Party Subpoena (Doc. 40) is
DENIED. In the Motion to Compel, Plaintiff seeks the production of documents (transcripts
of hearings and depositions) from the Nassau County Clerk of Court regarding the
underlying criminal action. Plaintiff independently completed and served on the Nassau
County Clerk of Court six subpoenas (Doc. 40-1; Ex. A). Plaintiff also filed with this Court
Notices of Civil Contempt as to the Nassau County Clerk of Court, John Crawford, for his
failure to provide the “subpoenaed” documents (Docs. 38, 39).
Plaintiff’s document requests to the Nassau County Clerk of Court were not proper
subpoenas served in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 45. Thus, the
Clerk of Court was not legally required to respond. Rule 45 specifically states that “[a]
subpoena must issue from the court where the action is pending. . . . [and] “[t]he clerk
must issue a subpoena.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(2)-(3). The Rule provides that an attorney

7

Notably, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hepler made this statement at a hearing on April 21, 2016. In the
letter to Chief Hurley, dated April 25, 2016, Plaintiff does not reference the alleged improper seizure of his
truck, nor does he reference Defendant Hepler’s alleged April 21, 2016 testimony. See Hutto Letter.
8 Because the Court finds no constitutional violation, it is unnecessary to address whether Defendant Hurley
is shielded from liability under a qualified immunity. See Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1327 (11th Cir.
2009).

11

may sign a subpoena, but only if that attorney “is authorized to practice in the issuing
court.” 45(a)(3). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se; he is not an attorney who may sign a
subpoena. Despite proceeding pro se, Plaintiff is entitled to adhere to the applicable
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including those related to discovery and issuance of
subpoenas. See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837-38 (11th Cir. 1989); see also
Order (Doc. 5) (advising Plaintiff of his obligation to follow relevant procedural rules of
court). Because Plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 45, he is not entitled to relief.
VI. Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order
In their Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 42), Defendants argue Plaintiff has
served a Second Request for Admissions solely for the purpose of “annoyance or
oppression, or to create an undue burden on the Defendants,” and seek relief pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A)-(C). Motion for Protective Order at 2. Specifically,
Defendants maintain they timely responded to Plaintiff’s First Request for Admissions as
to each Defendant, and further maintain Plaintiff’s Second Requests are largely
duplicative of the first. Id. at 1.
In his Second Request for Admissions (SRFA), Plaintiff acknowledges receipt of
each Defendants’ response to his first set. See Motion for Protective Order, Ex. C (Doc.
42-3). In his SRFA, Plaintiff included the following notice: “Because the . . . response to
the Plaintiff’s First Request for Admissions . . . was not signed by the defendant[s] and
notarized to insure its integrity, as required by Rule 33, the Plaintiff is serving his second
request for admissions . . . in ‘good faith,’ to correct the insufficiencies in his first
response.” To the extent Plaintiff submits his SRFA solely to cure a perceived deficiency,
the Defendants’ Motion is due to be granted. Plaintiff’s second requests, it appears, were
12

propounded based upon his misunderstanding of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 36, not Rule 33, applies to requests for admissions, and that rule specifically
indicates that either the party or its attorney9 must sign. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment (“The requirement that
the answer to a request for admission be sworn is deleted, in favor of a provision that the
answer be signed by the party or by his attorney.”). Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiff’s
First Requests for Admissions all bore their attorney’s signature. See Doc. 42-2 at 6, 9,
16, 21, 29, 33.
In his Response to the Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 43), Plaintiff
again acknowledges Defendants’ responses to the first set but asserts some of
Defendants’ objections were merely “boilerplate.” See Response to Motion for Protective
Order at 1. The Court notes that the Defendants provided some qualified objections in
response to Plaintiff’s First Requests for Admissions. See Motion for Protective Order,
Ex. B (Doc. 42-2). In instances where an objection was asserted, the answering
Defendant provided a substantive response subject to the objection. To the extent Plaintiff
complains the Defendants’ substantive responses to the Requests for Admissions were
not proper, he may file an appropriate motion and memorandum of law. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 36 (“The requesting party may move to determine the sufficiency of an answer or

The Plaintiff appears to indicate that, because he signed his response to the Defendants’ Requests for
Admission served on him, the Defendants, should, in turn, do the same in a spirit of fairness. See Response
to Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 43) at 1-2. In addition to clarifying the applicable Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court also draws Plaintiff’s attention to the distinctions between pro se and attorney filings.
Attorneys are governed by ethical rules imposed by the bar association and the courts to which they have
been admitted to practice.
9

13

objection.”). Any such motion must comply with applicable Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules.10
Based on the foregoing, it is now
ORDERED:
1.

Defendant Hurley’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27) is GRANTED.

2.

All claims against Defendant Hurley are DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is

directed to terminate Defendant Hurley from this action.
3.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (Doc. 40) is DENIED.

4.

Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 42) is GRANTED to the

extent Plaintiff propounded them to cure an ill-perceived deficiency resulting from his
misunderstanding of the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5.

Plaintiff’s Notices to the Court (Docs. 38, 39, 41, 46)11 are stricken from the

docket. Plaintiff is cautioned that he may file with the Court only proper motions that
comply with the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, this 2nd day of February, 2018.

10

The Court also cautions the Plaintiff that the purpose of requests for admissions is to narrow the disputed
issues between the parties. See In re Camero Enterprises, Inc., 240 B.R. 446, 449 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997)
(“The purpose of . . . Rule [36] is to enable the parties and the court to narrow or eliminate issues in a
case.”). See also Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 436 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (“The purpose of
requests for admissions is not necessarily to obtain information, but to narrow the issues for trial.”).
11 Plaintiff filed two Notices of Civil Contempt (Docs. 38, 39), a Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. 41),
and a Notice that the pending discovery Motions (Docs. 40, 42) are “delaying and disrupting the discovery
process (Doc. 46).

14

Jax-6 2/1
c:
Dennis Hutto, #883390
Counsel of record

15